Moral Argument for God: Philosophy Forums

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Moral Argument for God

Tisthammerw
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Posted 02/09/08 - 08:05 AM:	#501
TMB wrote: This returns to something more fundamental, and even relies upon some of the contextual implications given earlier in one of your posts. Legitimacy of evidence, whether assumptive or even prescriptive will certainly conflate the way defintions of terms are used implicitly or explicitly. In your case your perceptive aspect has been undermined, probably as a result of certain stasis (not sure if one could ever resolve this one). What stasis? What perceptive aspect? In any case, none of what you said seems to address my rebuttal. The conclusion logically following from the definitions is still legitimate evidence. If your only support for "the conclusion is implicit in the assumptions" claim is the fact that my conclusion must follow given the definitions of the terms, then this is not sufficient reason to reject the argument as false, illogical, question-begging, or anything of the sort. Because if it were, then we would have to throw out all mathematical proofs because they all depend upon this very principle. Not necessarily. In the event that you are rejecting the contsructive paradigm of expression, it will be interpolated as reinforcing the status quo. What "constructive paradigm of expression" are you referring to that I am supposedly rejecting? In any case, none of what you said seems to address what the point I put forth. The fact that you would be changing the definitions so that "OM [objective morality] disproves the existence of God" is not a diversion; it's extremely relevant because it alters the meaning of the conclusion. Suppose for instance I was a creationist in a creation-evolution debate. My opponent describes the definition of evolution and uses lots of evidence to support the theory. Now suppose I redefine "evolution" to mean "the theory that there is a prime number greater than all prime numbers." I then use a mathematical proof to disprove this theory, thereby my conclusion is "evolution is false." Even though I have "proved" my conclusion I cannot legitimately use it in a creation-evolution debate because I have redefined the terms so that the meaning of my conclusion "evolution is false" is not the real opposite of my opponent's "evolution is true" claim. The fact that you can reach a different conclusion by redefining my terms doesn't mean much, and to claim that you really had proved the opposite of my conclusion would be using the fallacy of equivocation because you had used terms with different meanings. If you're conclusion is to really be the opposite of mine, you're going to have to use the same definitions. How? How would using the same definitions be a "fallacy"? Wouldn't "the misleading use of a word with more than one meaning (by glossing over which meaning is intended at a particular time)" be a fallacy? It beats me how you still manage to commit these fallacies You didn't answer my question. How would using the same definitions as my argument be committing a fallacy? Wouldn't "the misleading use of a word with more than one meaning (by glossing over which meaning is intended at a particular time)" be a fallacy? Edited by Tisthammerw on 02/09/08 - 10:07 AM. Reason: Typo correction
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TMB
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Posted 02/10/08 - 04:22 AM:	#502
Tist, you said What stasis? What perceptive aspect? In any case, none of what you said seems to address my rebuttal. Then get smarter. If you expect me to dumb down my answers to address your limitations you need to get another hairstyle. The conclusion logically following from the definitions is still legitimate evidence. Evidence is what happens in the real world, something your argument has managed to avoid completely. If your only support for "the conclusion is implicit in the assumptions" claim is the fact that my conclusion must follow given the definitions of the terms, then this is not sufficient reason to reject the argument as false, illogical, question-begging, or anything of the sort. At last some light at the end of the tunnel. There is some hope of reforming you. Keep striving Tist, we will get some sense from you yet. Because if it were, then we would have to throw out all mathematical proofs because they all depend upon this very principle. Lose the maths. It is not helping your argument. Think 'real world'. We are talking about objective reality, no mathematical proofs. These do not help each other in this argument. What "constructive paradigm of expression" are you referring to that I am supposedly rejecting? Have you paid attention to nothing I said? Research the earlier posts and if you are still confused, then I cant help you. The fact that you would be changing the definitions so that "OM [objective morality] disproves the existence of God" is not a diversion; it's extremely relevant because it alters the meaning of the conclusion. Good boy, this is very encouraging. Im listening. Suppose for instance I was a creationist in a creation-evolution debate. Careful. My opponent describes the definition of evolution and uses lots of evidence to support the theory. Go on. Now suppose I redefine "evolution" to mean "the theory that there is a prime number greater than all prime numbers." I then use a mathematical proof to disprove this theory, thereby my conclusion is "evolution is false." Even by your standards this is stupid. Please return to go and do not collect 200 mathmatical proofs. Even though I have "proved" my conclusion I cannot legitimately use it in a creation-evolution debate because I have redefined the terms so that the meaning of my conclusion "evolution is false" is not the real opposite of my opponent's "evolution is true" claim. OK, I see a flicker on your brain scan. The fact that you can reach a different conclusion by redefining my terms doesn't mean much, and to claim that you really had proved the opposite of my conclusion would be using the fallacy of equivocation because you had used terms with different meanings. Thats right, and this is why your argument does not mean much, and you have used the fallacy of having conclusions implicit in the asumptions. If you're conclusion is to really be the opposite of mine, you're going to have to use the same definitions. You need to have an earlier bedtime. I am no suggesting we change the meaning of relative and objective morality. I am saying that the means you have used to position and justify OM could be used equally for relative morality. Just as you have set up the conclusion implicit in the assumptions, I could also do it with RM. Didnt you learn anything from watching cartoons? You didn't answer my question. How would using the same definitions as my argument be committing a fallacy? Then ask a better question. Since you are commiting a fallacy in your argument, if I set up an argument along the same lines, then I too would be committing a fallacy. You might need an afternoon nap as well.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 02/10/08 - 07:14 AM:	#503
TMB wrote: What stasis? What perceptive aspect? In any case, none of what you said seems to address my rebuttal. Then get smarter. You used vague, bizarre terminology that you did not define (e.g. "perspective aspect"--what perspective aspect are you referring to?). I understand the individual worlds but when you put them all together it seemed like grandiloquent nonsense, as if you realized you didn't have anything capable of refuting my rebuttals and decided to become what you had you accused me of (e.g. in post #438) a "hoax poster." You continue to avoid addressing my actual points. For instance, you make claims like "Evidence is what happens in the real world, something your argument has managed to avoid completely" without bothering to even address the evidence I put forth. The fact that you can reach a different conclusion by redefining my terms doesn't mean much, and to claim that you really had proved the opposite of my conclusion would be using the fallacy of equivocation because you had used terms with different meanings. Thats right, and this is why your argument does not mean much, and you have used the fallacy of having conclusions implicit in the asumptions. You haven't addressed my rebuttal to this objection. If your only support for "the conclusion is implicit in the assumptions" claim is the fact that my conclusion must follow given the definitions of the terms, then this is not sufficient reason to reject the argument as false, illogical, question-begging, or anything of the sort. Because if it were, then we would have to throw out all mathematical proofs because they all depend upon this very principle. Lose the maths. It is not helping your argument. Of course it is. Mathematics provides a potent counterexample to the claim that a conclusion logically following from the definitions is somehow sufficient grounds for objection. If you're conclusion is to really be the opposite of mine, you're going to have to use the same definitions. You need to have an earlier bedtime. I am no[t] suggesting we change the meaning of relative and objective morality. Really? As I recall the issue was with me proving that objective morality required supreme authority. You then said (in post #446), "I could built the same model as you have done, but reverse the 'morals' and prove the exact opposite to you." I requested I would very much like to see such an argument that could do this, but to really work it would have to use the same definitions I was using. You did not provide any argument that proved the opposite of my conclusion, but you did say (in post #448), "You are dictating what definitions I am allowed to use, but you are free to use ones that you choose. Then of course you will still retain outcomes that you will claim proves your point." Later on however, you said (in post #463): You were the one who said you could prove the "exact opposite" to me. I did, that includes the definitions I would use. Ones that are contrary to yours. (1) You did no such thing, and (2) this would be using the fallacy of equivocation (changing the meaning of words in a delusive manner, e.g. reaching an "opposite" conclusion when the actual meaning of the conclusion is not the opposite). And if you are not now suggesting you change the meaning of the term "objective morality" please provide an example of an argument that would prove the exact opposite of my conclusion "objective morality has supreme authority." I don't think you can do it (unless perhaps you change the meaning of authority, in which case you would still be using the fallacy of equivocation because the meaning of your conclusion would not be the opposite of mine).
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Erasmus
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2 of 2 people found this post helpful Posted 02/10/08 - 10:31 PM:	#504
Benedict wrote: The Argument is best summed up in the following: 1.There is a universal moral law 2.Such a moral law would imply a Law Giver 3.Thus, God exists as the Law Giver The most easily seen flaw in your argument: Even if (1) is assumed to be true, (2) does not follow.
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 02/12/08 - 07:11 PM:	#505
Erasmus wrote: Benedict wrote: The Argument is best summed up in the following: 1.There is a universal moral law 2.Such a moral law would imply a Law Giver 3.Thus, God exists as the Law Giver The most easily seen flaw in your argument: Even if (1) is assumed to be true, (2) does not follow. I used to think so too, actually. But without some type of lawgiver, who or what says how we ought to behave? This is where I think an atheistic basis of objective morality runs into problems. I have been arguing somewhat differently from Benedict. My general claim is that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. My key point: basically, I have been arguing that there are only two plausible explanations for the existence of objective moral values: the brute fact position and theism. I argue that brute fact position eventually points us in the general direction of theism anyway. Morality and the brute fact position Logic says what is, but who or what says what ought to be? One response is that objective morality is a “brute fact.” But then, how does the “brute fact” position answer this questions like “What is the basis of morality” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” One possible answer to both questions is “nothing.” Yet if there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. If there is literally no basis for two plus two equaling four, then not even logic and mathematics say that the sum of two and two yield four. The problem with “nothing says how we ought to behave” is that it is tantamount to saying there are no rules of behavior. Similarly, if the truth of a given claim has literally no basis (in anything), then this would include the claim having no basis in reality. So this interpretation of a “brute fact” does not quite work. Another possible interpretation of the brute fact position is that the answers to the questions “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is reality. All facts are based in reality, since being based “in reality” is what it means for something to be real. Similarly, by definition anything that exists is based in existence, and anything based in existence exists. On this view then, a brute fact has its foundation in reality and existence, but nothing else. If we apply the latter interpretation of the brute fact, then morality being a brute fact would say that morality’s foundation is the universe and existence in some general sense as opposed to placing its basis within a person or culture. It is reality that says Hitler should have behaved differently. Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself. Implications of objective morality being a brute fact Yet in the case of morality we have a rather unusual situation if this view is correct. Unlike most objective facts, morality is prescriptive rather than descriptive. Morality says how people ought to behave and makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. saying that people should not steal. An unusual upshot for the veracity of ought-statements is that it introduces the notion of authority (the power to put forth obligatory statements of what to do). It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality are more authoritative than any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. According to the brute fact position in question then, the universe/reality/existence (the basis of objective morality) not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority). The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism. A more general definition of God is “the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality.” Pantheism is simply equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence. It should be noted that some of the traditional aspects of God—like omnipotence and consciousness—are not necessarily associated with pantheism. Thus a pantheistic God may seem like a relatively harmless implication, but even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics. This pantheistic God might not contain consciousness but would have to possess supremely transcendent moral authority (transcending all peoples and cultures) while also possessing perfect moral correctness (it cannot be mistaken about what is right). Since a pantheistic God is equated with the universe/reality/existence, this supreme metaphysical reality is omnipresent and eternal. This is perhaps to be expected however, given that objective morality commands our behavior regardless of where we are and when we are. Interestingly, the essence of this pantheistic God must also be incorporeal if objective morality is not dependent upon anything in the physical world. Suppose for instance some strange device gets rid of all matter in the universe, stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits. Would moral prohibitions against cruelty and violence cease to exist simply because there wasn’t a corporeal world? No, moral values are incorporeal and their underlying basis (the supreme metaphysical reality that says how we ought to behave) must also be incorporeal. Yet a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral is treading awfully close to theism. Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person—a moral God that says what everyone ought to do, a God that is the basis of morality and a God that everyone ought to obey. So even if it’s not an outright proof, to the very least the existence of objective morality still provides strong evidence for theism (by suggesting the existence of a God that is transcendent, omnipresent, perfectly moral etc.). Edited by Tisthammerw on 02/12/08 - 07:51 PM. Reason: Perfectionism
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TMB
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Posted 02/14/08 - 04:50 AM:	#506
Tist, you say, You used vague, bizarre terminology that you did not define (e.g. "perspective aspect"--what perspective aspect are you referring to?). I understand the individual worlds but when you put them all together it seemed like grandiloquent nonsense, Ignorance has never been an excuse, so try something better. You continue to avoid addressing my actual points. For instance, you make claims like "Evidence is what happens in the real world, something your argument has managed to avoid completely" without bothering to even address the evidence I put forth. What evidence? If your only support for "the conclusion is implicit in the assumptions" claim is the fact that my conclusion must follow given the definitions of the terms, then this is not sufficient reason to reject the argument as false, illogical, question-begging, or anything of the sort. Because if it were, then we would have to throw out all mathematical proofs because they all depend upon this very principle. It is sufficient. This principle needs to be stand on its own merits. The maths analogy does not compute. Mathematics provides a potent counterexample to the claim that a conclusion logically following from the definitions is somehow sufficient grounds for objection. Wrong again. And if you are not now suggesting you change the meaning of the term "objective morality" please provide an example of an argument that would prove the exact opposite of my conclusion "objective morality has supreme authority This would be liking teaching a pig to sing. It does not work and annoys the pig. I suggest you find a quiet place and do some rational thinking. When you have something better than all you have offered, come back and I will see if I can help you some more. You cant expect me to do all the rational thinking.

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Posted 02/16/08 - 07:00 AM:

#507

TMB wrote:

You continue to avoid addressing my actual points. For instance, you make claims like "Evidence is what happens in the real world, something your argument has managed to avoid completely" without bothering to even address the evidence I put forth.

What evidence?

Something possessing authority means that people really ought to obey it (definition of authority being used here).
Suppose morality exists (conditional proof assumption)
Morality's commands are what we ought to do (by definition)
Suppose morality's commands did not have supreme (i.e. the highest) authority (indirect proof assumption)
Then there is some non-null set of X's commands (we'll call it set X) that has higher authority than morality's commands (we'll call set M).
If the X has higher authority than M, then one ought to follow X instead of M (follows from the definition of authority, line 1).
But by definition, one ought to follow M (the commands of morality) as line 3 states, and so we get a contradiction (line 3 versus lines 4-6).
Therefore, if morality exists morality's commands possess supreme authority (lines 1-7), Q.E.D.

If your only support for "the conclusion is implicit in the assumptions" claim is the fact that my conclusion must follow given the definitions of the terms, then this is not sufficient reason to reject the argument as false, illogical, question-begging, or anything of the sort. Because if it were, then we would have to throw out all mathematical proofs because they all depend upon this very principle.

It is sufficient.
....

Mathematics provides a potent counterexample to the claim that a conclusion logically following from the definitions is somehow sufficient grounds for objection.

Wrong again.

Sound mathematical proofs should not be rejected (premise)
If a conclusion logically follows from the definitions, this is sufficient grounds for rejection (indirect proof assumption)
All conclusions of sound mathematical proofs logically follow from the definitions (e.g. of numbers).
Therefore sound mathematical proofs should be rejected (from lines 2 and 3)
But sound mathematical conclusions should not be rejected (from line 1) and so we get a contradiction (line 1 versus lines 2-4).
Therefore, it is not the case that a conclusion logically following from the definitions is sufficient grounds for rejection (lines 1 through 5), Q.E.D.

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

TMB
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Posted 02/17/08 - 11:40 PM:	#508
Tist, you say, Something possessing authority means that people really ought to obey it (definition of authority being used here). Assumptive definition. ie. there is no new information, or description of reality from this. Suppose morality exists No evidence for this supposition, but lets give ourselves a challenge. Morality's commands are what we ought to do (by definition) Once again, this is nothing more that a definition, ie. adds nothing new and not necessarily observed in reality. Suppose morality's commands did not have supreme (i.e. the highest) authority Supposition, and based upon observation it would appear that we have no context (based upon your process) to make this assessment. ie. because there are variances of relative morality we cannot observe objective morality (because it does not exist) in practice and make this observation. Then there is some non-null set of X's commands (we'll call it set X) that has higher authority than morality's commands (we'll call set M). We not able to make this observation for reasons above. If the X has higher authority than M, then one ought to follow X instead of M (follows from the definition of authority, line 1). Conclusion is implicit in the assumption, but given we are observing relative morality, the point is invalid. But by definition, one ought to follow M (the commands of morality) as line 3 states, and so we get a contradiction (line 3 versus lines 4-6). Not a real contradiction as this has been caused by a self imploding argument (for various invalid arguments used). Therefore, if morality exists morality's commands possess supreme authority (lines 1-7), Q.E.D. Blah, blah, blah Sound mathematical proofs should not be rejected (premise) These work be used for mathematical proving, but do not work for judgment of morality. If you are going to try this tack you need to show how mathematical proofs apply. The rest of your argument collapses at this point. These are not impressive arguments. Why dont you just come clean and admit you are trying to find ways to support a faith based position and want to convey the appearance of rationality in doing so?

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Posted 02/20/08 - 09:04 AM:	#509
Tisthammerw wrote: Erasmus wrote: Benedict wrote: The Argument is best summed up in the following: 1.There is a universal moral law 2.Such a moral law would imply a Law Giver 3.Thus, God exists as the Law Giver The most easily seen flaw in your argument: Even if (1) is assumed to be true, (2) does not follow. I used to think so too, actually. But without some type of lawgiver, who or what says how we ought to behave? This is where I think an atheistic basis of objective morality runs into problems. The first thing we need to do is recognize that "universal moral law" is not what is really meant here. The issue is whether or not there is an objective moral law. (Remember, objective/subjective is a different debate from absolute/relative, even though the terms sometimes cross over for secondary or tertiary meanings/purposes.) That said: Let O = "There exists an objective moral law." Let L = "There exists a law giver." Let G = "God exists." The argument we are given, then, is this: 1. O (assumption for conditional proof) 2. O -> L (premise) 3. G (from 1 and 2) Obviously, there is a lot left unsaid in this argument. For one thing, the given conclusion is G, when it is quite clear that the moral argument could not achieve anything more than O -> G. (And indeed, since O is false, the argument is really quite useless even if it is successful. After all, it has not even been argued that G -> O or that O <-> G.) There is also the problem that G is entered into the argument as a conclusion without having a prior appearance in the argument. We are left to assume that the only possible law giver for an objective morality is God. Still, I trust we can all agree that if there is a law giver, either he decides what the moral law will be by fiat or it is not the case that he decides what the moral law will be by fiat (F v ~F). If he decides by fiat, then the law is subjective (it could have been different, after all, and is only as it is because of the law giver's whim). If it is not decided by fiat, however, then the law giver is not a law giver at all. At best he would be a law indicator. The law, therefore, must either come from an actual law giver (who faces the same dilemma) or be independent of law givers altogether. Any law that comes from a law giver is subjective, and any other law exists without the law giver. That is: 1. -F v ~F . . . [Law of the Excluded Middle] 2. F -> ~O . . . [By Definition] 3. ~F -> ~L . . . [From Above] 4. ~O v ~L . . . [1, 3, Constructive Dilemma] And the English translation of (4) is: either morality is not objective or there is no law giver.
"If there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life." - Albert Camus

Tisthammerw
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Posted 02/20/08 - 05:02 PM:

#510

To recap what I argued:

Something possessing authority means that people really ought to obey it (definition of authority being used here).
Suppose morality exists (conditional proof assumption)
Morality's commands are what we ought to do (by definition)
Suppose morality's commands did not have supreme (i.e. the highest) authority (indirect proof assumption)
Then there is some non-null set of X's commands (we'll call it set X) that has higher authority than morality's commands (we'll call set M).
If the X has higher authority than M, then one ought to follow X instead of M (follows from the definition of authority, line 1).
But by definition, one ought to follow M (the commands of morality) as line 3 states, and so we get a contradiction (line 3 versus lines 4-6).
Therefore, if morality exists morality's commands possess supreme authority (lines 1-7), Q.E.D.

Sound mathematical proofs should not be rejected (premise)
If a conclusion logically follows from the definitions, this is sufficient grounds for rejection (indirect proof assumption)
All conclusions of sound mathematical proofs logically follow from the definitions (e.g. of numbers).
Therefore sound mathematical proofs should be rejected (from lines 2 and 3)
But sound mathematical conclusions should not be rejected (from line 1) and so we get a contradiction (line 1 versus lines 2-4).
Therefore, it is not the case that a conclusion logically following from the definitions is sufficient grounds for rejection (lines 1 through 5), Q.E.D.

To take an example,

Suppose morality's commands did not have supreme (i.e. the highest) authority

Supposition, and based upon observation it would appear that we have no context (based upon your process) to make this assessment

You took my quote out of context. This "supposition" is an indirect proof assumption and not intended to be taken as true (you cut off the part explaining it was an indirect proof assumption). TMB, the indirect and conditional proof assumptions are not something to be attacked such that their falsehood could refute the conclusion of the argument (i.e. those assumptions could be false and the argument remain perfectly valid). Please read the links associated with those terms. You've done nothing to show that the logic is invalid. You could not give me even one example of a premise that does not logically follow.

If the X has higher authority than M, then one ought to follow X instead of M (follows from the definition of authority, line 1).

Conclusion is implicit in the assumption

Only because it logically follows from the definitions involved, and this is not sufficient grounds to reject the argument (as proof, note the second argument in this post regarding mathematics).

Sound mathematical proofs should not be rejected (premise)

These work be used for mathematical proving, but do not work for judgment of morality. If you are going to try this tack you need to show how mathematical proofs apply.

I did (notice the conclusion of the argument).

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Posted 02/20/08 - 05:21 PM:	#511
Benedict's argument is not my own, so I shall skip that part of it. (My argument can be found at post #505.) Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Still, I trust we can all agree that if there is a law giver, either he decides what the moral law will be by fiat or it is not the case that he decides what the moral law will be by fiat (F v ~F). I agree with that statement, though it's not entirely clear what you mean by "fiat." It seems your definition of fiat means "by whim, such that it could have been different." If he decides by fiat, then the law is subjective (it could have been different, after all, and is only as it is because of the law giver's whim). If it is not decided by fiat, however, then the law giver is not a law giver at all. At best he would be a law indicator. Yes and no. God being the basis of objective moral values doesn’t necessarily imply divine command theory (note: I do not believe in divine command theory). Rather, the theist could argue that connection between God and moral goodness is more elemental. It is true that God’s commands of what we ought to do are morally good, but the reason why they are good is because moral goodness is an inextricable part of God’s nature and essence of who and what he is, to the extent that God cannot exist without objective morality. (Hence one could say that objective morality is grounded in the heart of God; the heart of God says how we ought to behave, because the connection between God and moral goodness is that elemental.) On this view, the absence of God might not provide objective morality, but God being the basis of objective morality does not imply that those morals arise by "fiat." The law, therefore, must either come from an actual law giver (who faces the same dilemma) or be independent of law givers altogether. You didn't answer my question earlier. Without some type of lawgiver, who or what says how we ought to behave? This (I think) is where the atheistic basis of objective morality runs into a problem it cannot adequately resolve. It is partly because of this that I believe God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values.
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Posted 02/22/08 - 04:42 AM:	#512
Great discussion. The big problem with objective morality is in how it may be known. Even if the source of an objective morality is of universally unquestioned absolute authority, I'm afraid it’s still subject to human interpretation. There’s no universal agreement about the Bible’s moral teachings, for example. Thus, even if there is objective morality, we cannot know it.

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Posted 02/22/08 - 08:59 AM:	#513
Tisthammerw wrote: Benedict's argument is not my own, so I shall skip that part of it. That's fine, I was responding to Benedict in my last post. Tisthammerw wrote: I agree with that statement, though it's not entirely clear what you mean by "fiat." It seems your definition of fiat means "by whim, such that it could have been different." Yes, so long as we understand that "whim" is not necessarily a derogatory term in this context. Tisthammerw wrote: God being the basis of objective moral values doesn’t necessarily imply divine command theory (note: I do not believe in divine command theory). Well, DCT is not an objectivist theory of morality, so the two really couldn't go together. However, it remains to be seen whether or not God can be the basis of a morality that is not subjective. That is, of course, what we are debating here. Tisthammerw wrote: Rather, the theist could argue that connection between God and moral goodness is more elemental. It is true that God’s commands of what we ought to do are morally good, but the reason why they are good is because moral goodness is an inextricable part of God’s nature and essence of who and what he is, to the extent that God cannot exist without objective morality. (Hence one could say that objective morality is grounded in the heart of God; the heart of God says how we ought to behave, because the connection between God and moral goodness is that elemental.) This is some fine quoting of William Lane Craig, but what neither he nor you have ever bothered to explain is how this makes any sense whatsoever. That is, it's a lot of words but very little substance. Indeed, when you say that God cannot exist without objective morality, you could be interpreted as saying that objective morality is a precondition for God's existence. This might give us G -> O, but you are looking for O -> G. Of course, you could also say that objective morality is part of the very concept of God, but this is false. Perhaps omnibenevolence or just plain "goodness" is part of the (traditional) concept of God, but that would imply a standard to hold Him against -- an independent standard. And really, this is just a part of the general muddle that is theism. Because all that's left is to say that God just is objective morality (and this is yet another way we could reasonably interpret what you've said above) -- but that no more proves the traditional concept of God than me saying that unicorns exist because gerbils just are what I call unicorns. That is, you can insist on calling the source of objective morality "God" no matter what it is, but this is no real argument against the naturalist moral objectivist because what he rejects is not a name, but an idea. Tisthammerw wrote: On this view, the absence of God might not provide objective morality, but God being the basis of objective morality does not imply that those morals arise by "fiat." But again, this view does not really explain how God is the basis of objective morality. It's a series of flowery conclusions without premises or arguments. Tisthammerw wrote: You didn't answer my question earlier. Without some type of lawgiver, who or what says how we ought to behave? This (I think) is where the atheistic basis of objective morality runs into a problem it cannot adequately resolve. It is partly because of this that I believe God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. First off, we need to remember that I am a moral nihilist. I believe that objective morality is conceptually impossible (with or without God). In that way, this argument is moot for me as far as a proof of God's existence goes. That said, moral objectivists are typically concerned with making objective morality akin to the "laws" of physics. The scare quotes there are to remind us -- as Nietzshce does in The Gay Science -- that physics does not have laws, as such. Rather, calling them laws is a trick of language due to our tendency to anthropomorphize nature. Gravity, then, is not a law, but a "law" -- and "laws" do not require law givers. And if morality could be a matter of "law," rather than law, then atheists have access to a conception of morality analogous to your own. That is, God is no more a giver of law than physics, on your view. The entire law/law giver argument is no more than a trick of language. Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/14/08 - 11:32 AM
"If there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life." - Albert Camus

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Posted 02/22/08 - 09:03 AM:	#514
Mr Fide wrote: The big problem with objective morality is in how it may be known. Even if the source of an objective morality is of universally unquestioned absolute authority, I'm afraid it’s still subject to human interpretation. There’s no universal agreement about the Bible’s moral teachings, for example. Thus, even if there is objective morality, we cannot know it. Moral epistemology is certainly a thorny issue, as you say. But a moral objectivist who wishes to play close to the vest on this one will just say that all that proves is the existence of moral ignorance. Moreover, they might argue that it is not yet clear that a proper understanding of morality (e.g. what the correct system is and what sorts of things it demands) would not uncloud our epistemic issues, allowing us to know morality "from the top down," as it were. Not that I agree with them, but that's what they might say.
"If there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life." - Albert Camus

TMB
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Posted 02/22/08 - 03:15 PM:	#515
Tist, you are arguing in a timewarp. The difficulty with doing this is trying to take a step back and see the whole structure for what it is. Most of the posters here (including me) are seduced into arguing within the context of what you have set up - ie. on your terms. This ensures that the argument stays spinning in orbit around a totally fallacious and spurious system. Lets play in the shallows, but you should seriously try and get rid of your teddy and blankey and get some sleep by yourself. You have to grow up sometime. Something possessing authority means that people really ought to obey it (definition of authority being used here). Agreed, and becomes an assumption because of how it is defined Suppose morality exists (conditional proof assumption) This is your 'if'. Evidence does not support you so you cover this hole by making it another assumption. This has the hallmarks of using words to fill in the lack of every day observation of reality. Morality's commands are what we ought to do (by definition) As a definition it becomes yet another assumption. ie. it still might show nothing that is true in the real world. Suppose morality's commands did not have supreme (i.e. the highest) authority (indirect proof assumption) Why introduce a supposition like this, apart from it use as words to hide behind? Look into the real world and see if observation and evidence make this a valid proposition. They dont, so why use it? Then there is some non-null set of X's commands (we'll call it set X) that has higher authority than morality's commands (we'll call set M). Smoke and mirrors. Useful to continue the spread of untruth to gain advantage over people you want to win arguments against, but it adds nothing to our knowledge of the real world. If the X has higher authority than M, then one ought to follow X instead of M (follows from the definition of authority, line 1). As above. But by definition, one ought to follow M (the commands of morality) as line 3 states, and so we get a contradiction (line 3 versus lines 4-6). Its easy to produce contradictions given the convolutions caused by the above tap dancing. Therefore, if morality exists morality's commands possess supreme authority (lines 1-7), Q.E.D. Congratulations, you have just used words in their least useful function. To obscure reality instead of illuminate it. Shame on you. Your next attempt to verbally conjure up a world that does not reflect reality. Sound mathematical proofs should not be rejected (premise) The conclusion is implicit in the assumption. The only reason we say things should not be rejected is when they are based upon something sound, because (at least in theory) we argue that the truth of things should be paramount. Ironically you are using this to support your argument. Dont you have a conscience? If a conclusion logically follows from the definitions, this is sufficient grounds for rejection (indirect proof assumption) It is not a 'logical following'. It is because they are implicit in the assumptions. It has nothing to do with logic. All conclusions of sound mathematical proofs logically follow from the definitions (e.g. of numbers). This one valid statement now has no context within the argument. Therefore sound mathematical proofs should be rejected (from lines 2 and 3) As above, once you lost the validity in the first line, everything else collapses. But sound mathematical conclusions should not be rejected (from line 1) and so we get a contradiction (line 1 versus lines 2-4). Dream on. Therefore, it is not the case that a conclusion logically following from the definitions is sufficient grounds for rejection (lines 1 through 5), Q.E.D. This whole futile argument can be seen here. The issue is not a conclusion logically following on from the definitions. It is the conclusion being implicit in the assumptions where it fails. When this is done it will get offered as a real proof, but it has achieved nothing and bears not relation to the real world. I accept that fairy tales do have a big market, but this is a philosophy forum, you would be better served by having this discussion with the Easter Bunny or Santa Claus. You took my quote out of context. This "supposition" is an indirect proof assumption and not intended to be taken as true (you cut off the part explaining it was an indirect proof assumption). TMB, the indirect and conditional proof assumptions are not something to be attacked such that their falsehood could refute the conclusion of the argument (i.e. those assumptions could be false and the argument remain perfectly valid). Please read the links associated with those terms. You've done nothing to show that the logic is invalid. You could not give me even one example of a premise that does not logically follow. You are taking logic out of context. The idea of logic in conjunction with evidence is to establish a better understanding of our reality. You are using semantics to play silly games that bear no relation to reality. You are working from the premise that God exists and that is based upon your faith, is counter intuitive and counter factual. Every aspect of your argument arises from this position. You want objective morality to exist, because if it did you could use this to help prove God exists, but the evidence is lacking for this. So you make it an assumption, and you dress it up in fancy terminology to give it some credibility. You then embark upon a convoluted fantasy of semantic gibberish. At the end of it, it bears no relation to reality, but you insist that it must still be valid because you can get words with no meaning to line up and appear to make sense. You might as well start off your argument with 'Once upon a time...', and finish it with 'They all lived happily ever after...', and we could accept that you are offering us a fairy tale that is not meant to bear any relation to reality. You will not get any useful validation with your comments. Only because it logically follows from the definitions involved, and this is not sufficient grounds to reject the argument (as proof, note the second argument in this post regarding mathematics). Humpty Dumpty cannot be put back together again. Remember, he is not real. Then Cinderella discovered that the seven dwarves had been living inside the pumpkin all this time, just to hide from the wolf. The wolf decided that three little pigs would taste better than little red riding hood. In reality, Cinderellas ugly sisters and wicked step mother represent all the spurious arguments in the horrid real world where morality is based upon selfishness and power, where justice is not really blind, we are only told this to keep down the rebellion. Where deceit and corruption and selfishness rules the ways. Our fairy tales exist because if we truly knew the reality around us, society would fracture. So stay with the rose tinted testacles Tist; fly on gossamer wings with the fairies; take my share of the gold at the end of the rainbow; tell Cinderella that true love exists; get the little piggies to build a big fire in the brick house. But most of all stay in the semantic bog. We have evolved a complex language so that we can disappear inside it and imagine it is a real world. Don't you think that the big bad wolf will huff and puff, and HUFF and PUFF, and blow the house down?

Tisthammerw
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Posted 02/23/08 - 06:25 AM:	#516
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Rather, the theist could argue that connection between God and moral goodness is more elemental. It is true that God’s commands of what we ought to do are morally good, but the reason why they are good is because moral goodness is an inextricable part of God’s nature and essence of who and what he is, to the extent that God cannot exist without objective morality. (Hence one could say that objective morality is grounded in the heart of God; the heart of God says how we ought to behave, because the connection between God and moral goodness is that elemental.) This is some fine quoting of William Lane Craig, but what neither he nor you have ever bothered to explain is how this makes any sense whatsoever. I wasn't aware I was quoting William Lane Craig (though I am aware he shares this particular position of mine), but in any case why does this not make sense? Is the idea that moral goodness being an inextricable part of who and what God incoherent? If so why? Indeed, when you say that God cannot exist without objective morality, you could be interpreted as saying that objective morality is a precondition for God's existence. In a way it is, because as I said it is an inextricable part of what God (the supreme metaphysical reality and the metaphysical basis of objective morality) is. Of course, you could also say that objective morality is part of the very concept of God, but this is false. Perhaps omnibenevolence or just plain "goodness" is part of the (traditional) concept of God, but that would imply a standard to hold Him against -- an independent standard. That would depend on which theology you accept. It is true that some theists (and I was once among them) believe that morality is independent of God. Now I'm convinced that the metaphysics of reality operate differently from what I previously thought. To see why I believe this, please see post #505. First off, we need to remember that I am a moral nihilist. I believe that objective morality is conceptually impossible (with or without God). In that way, this argument is moot for me as far as a proof of God's existence goes. True, but hopefully we can still reason about whether if objective moral values exist they provide evidence for the existence of God (which is my central claim here). That said, moral objectivists are typically concerned with making objective morality akin to the "laws" of physics. Laws of physics are descriptive, but unlike most objective facts the moral laws are prescriptive. Morality says how people ought to behave and makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. saying that people should not steal. An unusual upshot for the veracity of ought-statements is that it introduces the notion of authority (the power to put forth obligatory statements of what to do). It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Who or what possesses this authority? At the end of the day you still have not quite answered my question. Who or what says how we ought to behave? I think the concept of objective moral goodness requires some type of God, some type of supreme metaphysical reality (whether it be pantheism, deism, or whatever). The problem comes when we try to answer questions like, "Without God, who or what says how we ought to behave?" Suppose for instance the answer to this question was “nothing.” Yet if there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. The problem with “nothing says how we ought to behave” is that it is tantamount to saying “there are no rules of behavior.” So it seems that some type of supreme metaphysical reality is needed, even if it's only pantheism (e.g. “It is the universe/reality/existence that says how we ought to behave”). But pantheism, as I argued in post #505, seems to point in the general direction of traditional theism anyway (because this pantheism has a number of interesting implications). Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/14/08 - 11:35 AM
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Posted 02/23/08 - 08:01 AM:

#517

To recap what I argued:

I argued that morality's commands (if they exist) require supreme authority. My evidence:

Something possessing authority means that people really ought to obey it (definition of authority being used here).
Suppose morality exists (conditional proof assumption)
Morality's commands are what we ought to do (by definition)
Suppose morality's commands did not have supreme (i.e. the highest) authority (indirect proof assumption)
Then there is some non-null set of X's commands (we'll call it set X) that has higher authority than morality's commands (we'll call set M).
If the X has higher authority than M, then one ought to follow X instead of M (follows from the definition of authority, line 1).
But by definition, one ought to follow M (the commands of morality) as line 3 states, and so we get a contradiction (line 3 versus lines 4-6).
Therefore, if morality exists morality's commands possess supreme authority (lines 1-7), Q.E.D.

If your only support for "the conclusion is implicit in the assumptions" claim is the fact that my conclusion must follow given the definitions of the terms, then this is not sufficient reason to reject the argument as false, illogical, question-begging, or anything of the sort. Mathematics provides a potent counterexample to the claim that a conclusion logically following from the definitions is somehow sufficient grounds for objection. My evidence:

Sound mathematical proofs should not be rejected (premise)
If a conclusion logically follows from the definitions, this is sufficient grounds for rejection (indirect proof assumption)
All conclusions of sound mathematical proofs logically follow from the definitions (e.g. of numbers).
Therefore sound mathematical proofs should be rejected (from lines 2 and 3)
But sound mathematical conclusions should not be rejected (from line 1) and so we get a contradiction (line 1 versus lines 2-4).
Therefore, it is not the case that a conclusion logically following from the definitions is sufficient grounds for rejection (lines 1 through 5), Q.E.D.

TMB wrote:

Suppose morality exists (conditional proof assumption)

This is your 'if'. Evidence does not support you so you cover this hole by making it another assumption.

.....

All conclusions of sound mathematical proofs logically follow from the definitions (e.g. of numbers).

This one valid statement now has no context within the argument.

Therefore sound mathematical proofs should be rejected (from lines 2 and 3)

As above, once you lost the validity in the first line, everything else collapses.

But sound mathematical conclusions should not be rejected (from line 1) and so we get a contradiction (line 1 versus lines 2-4).

Dream on.

Okay, at best what we have here is failure to communicate. Even if the conditional proof assumption is itself false, unjustified, irrational etc. none of that matters because of what a conditional proof assumption is. And if you don't see how "All conclusions of sound mathematical proofs logically follow from the definitions (e.g. of numbers)" applies to the context of the argument even after I very specifically explained why, I don't see much reason to continue.

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

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Posted 02/25/08 - 08:43 AM:	#518
Before we go any further, I want to identify the two types of moral argument that have been employed historically. The first is from Kant, and it argues (in brief) that objective morality exists regardless, but is only meaningful if God exists to distribute happiness in proportion to virtue. (In this way, Kant believes he avoids consequentialism.) As such, regardless of whether or not God actually exists, we must believe he exists if we are to believe in/act in accordance with objective morality. On this argument, the existence of objective morality is not actually proof of God's existence, but rather an impetus for belief. It is clear, then, that this can't really get us what most theists are looking for out of the moral argument (particularly in light of Rawls' naturalization of Kanitan ethics). Therefore, there has arisen a second sort of moral argument -- though its proponents often fail to notice its distinctness from the first kind. This argument makes God a literal component of moral objectivism, and suggests that objective morality simply cannot exist without God. Moreover, those who argue this tend to make God the source of morality, not just the guarantee of its relevance. As such, God would have to precede objective morality, though the existence of objective morality would be taken as evidence of the existence of God (since they believe it could not exist without him). Tisthammerw wrote: I wasn't aware I was quoting William Lane Craig (though I am aware he shares this particular position of mine)... It's virtually a word-for-word reconstruction of his position -- quite a case of convergent evolution, if I do say so myself! Tisthammerw wrote: ...but in any case why does this not make sense? Is the idea that moral goodness being an inextricable part of who and what God incoherent? That is not incoherent, but it is quite a leap from "moral goodness is an inextricable part of God" to "God is an inextricable part of moral goodness." That is, the statement that you and Craig make sounds good to people who already want to believe the argument, but it does not really add anything in favor of the argument. Tisthammerw wrote: Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Indeed, when you say that God cannot exist without objective morality, you could be interpreted as saying that objective morality is a precondition for God's existence. In a way it is, because as I said it is an inextricable part of what God (the supreme metaphysical reality and the metaphysical basis of objective morality) is. But anything that can exist prior to (i.e., is a precondition of) x can exist independently of x. And unless there is a necessary causal relationship between the two, the existence of one does not entail the existence of the other. If objective morality is a precondition for God, then you are now committing yourself to the view that somehow the existence of objective morality brings God into existence. Not only is that an odd view to defend, it seems rather unnecessary. Tisthammerw wrote: That would depend on which theology you accept. It is true that some theists (and I was once among them) believe that morality is independent of God. Now I'm convinced that the metaphysics of reality operate differently from what I previously thought. To see why I believe this, please see post #505. Just so you know, your links don't work. Luckily, all I have to do is scroll up. The main mistake you make in that post is this statement: Tisthammerw[/quote wrote: The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism. For one thing, if you are referring to a sort of Spinozist pantheism then you are not helping your own position here. But secondly, you are begging the question by importing your assumption that the only kind of moral authority there could be is some sort of God. Third, you have presented several false dilemmas: the "brute fact" position is not committed to either "nothing" or "the universe" as options, and the moral realist is not committed to either "brute fact" or "God" as options. At both junctures, one might invoke reason (following Kant) or necessary truth (following Mill). In the absence of actual arguments against these options, you are left in the midst of a fallacy. Tisthammerw wrote: True, but hopefully we can still reason about whether if objective moral values exist they provide evidence for the existence of God (which is my central claim here). You asked for an answer to your question regarding who or what says how we ought to behave, and I mentioned that I am a moral nihilist (and thus believe that the answer is "nothing"). The point was to remind you that I am here solely to argue against the logic of the argument you are presenting -- and this is the response I get? Tisthammerw wrote: Laws of physics are descriptive, but unlike most objective facts the moral laws are prescriptive. Yes and no. Atomic moral statements (for example, "x is morally good" or "y is morally wrong") are descriptive. They describe properties ("goodness" or "wrongness") that certain actions ("x" or "y") are said to hold. Now, the general meaning of a word such as "wrong" is that one ought not do it, but it is the further step of recognizing this that we get prescriptivity ("x is wrong -- therefore, you ought not x"). Regardless, you are being too literal. By saying that non-theistic moral realists are concerned with finding moral laws akin to the laws of physics, I obviously do not mean purely descriptive laws. What I mean is that they are concerned with finding moral laws that follow from reason, the relation of ideas, and/or the way the universe is -- all naturalistic elements. Again, I agree with you that all such attempts will fail. What I disagree with you on is whether or not theistic attempts can fare any better. Tisthammerw wrote: At the end of the day you still have not quite answered my question. Who or what says how we ought to behave? No, I answered your question quite clearly, and I shall do so again: nothing. There is nothing to say how we ought to behave in the sense you are seeking, including God. Tisthammerw wrote: I think the concept of objective moral goodness requires some type of God, some type of supreme metaphysical reality (whether it be pantheism, deism, or whatever). But now you are equivocating: "some type of God" is not identical with "some type of supreme metaphysical reality." Remember, you are not defending the thesis of supernaturalism, but rather a species of it -- the moral argument for the existence of God. So here is my challenge to you: name one non-subjective, morally relevant thing that God can do that cannot be handled by a sufficiently constructed concept of karma. Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/14/08 - 11:38 AM
"If there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life." - Albert Camus

TMB
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Posted 02/25/08 - 09:54 PM:	#519
Tist, you said, Okay, at best what we have here is failure to communicate. We have the failure of you to be reasonable. You have a a priori view that God exists and you are prepared to butcher a rational discussion on this basis. On the other hand, if communication is not about the transfer of information, rather it’s the manipulation of others (as Dawkins offers), then you have done quite well. Even if the conditional proof assumption is itself false, unjustified, irrational etc. none of that matters because of what a conditional proof assumption is. Just like false arguments. Shall we look the other way when someone presents us with a falsehood, because they are meant to be false? The problem is that untruth presents itself as truth, when discovered it disappears so I suggest you try using things are not false, are justified, and are rational. If this is beyond you, look again and see what forum you are on. Its a truth seeking one. And if you don't see how "All conclusions of sound mathematical proofs logically follow from the definitions (e.g. of numbers)" applies to the context of the argument even after I very specifically explained why Heal thyself physician. You are trying a convoluted word exercise to avoid the reality of moral states in human life. You offer (as you admit) false, unjustified and irrational portions to your argument. Tell me how this adds up to a valid argument. I don't see much reason to continue. You are being too hard on yourself. There is hope yet. Stay with me and we can work together on your logical shortcomings. Let’s start with when you said. Ethics is an example of something that says what ought to be. Specifically, it makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave. Agreed In doing so, objective morality somehow possesses authority behind its statements. This is not correct, morality attempts to exert authority over what we ought to do. In some cases it succeeds, in others it does not. The same process applies to both objective and relative morality. Authority is "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." As morality can be seen to not always have the authority to enforce ought behaviour, this definition no longer supports the argument. Objective ethical statements such as "We should not torture people for fun" do indeed command our behavior. They do not have this power, unless you are OK with a seemingly random, variable record through recorded history. As you are fond of quoting Hitler, and history tells us that children were tortured under his regime, and the enforcers appeared to be ethically OK with the justification, how do you support your statement. What is the point of having something that ‘commands our behavior’, if it is ineffective in doing so? Additionally, the authority of morality (however it exists) seems supreme; it transcends what anyone (e.g. Hitler) thinks about how people ought to behave. Only from your relative perspective. You have been misled by the increasingly global public ethical standards. This is a phenomenon of social dynamics. Certain behaviours and ethical standards are widely regarded as being necessary for modern, civilised humans. Those who disagree with, or violate these are unlikely to admit to this. This does not mean that an objective standard exists that transcends other views on this. It just means it is currently predominant and public, not necessarily objective. Given that there are certain commands (ethical ones) that have an authority transcending what humanity says, thinks, and feels; how is this possible? So far, its not possible. You are using a false given. What is morality's transcendent source of authority? There isn’t one. Just look around for evidence at the standards that have existed, and still do. All subject to human opinion, or by transference into a religious deity. The only option to regard the Christian God to be beyond human construction and fallibility, indeed this is how humans define God. The credibility of this suffers because of competing religions, all claiming the same principle, resulting in scepticism from rational observers. If morality is not dependent on what people think, then what fundamental reality says how we ought to behave? At this point the argument is well and truly unfounded. Theism provides an explanation for all this. Morality’s transcendent source of authority is the heart of God. It’s a convenient answer, but the conclusion is inherent in the assumptions. You offer that you have defined God to be ultimate and supreme, and point out that only something like this could provide a full explanation, and then make a conclusion that it is a proven thing. Its not. Without evidence to show that a God exists that has these traits, it carries not more weight than an easter bunny. Arguments for deity need to be more robust than this one. By definition, God is the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality transcending all else. But offers no evidence for the assertion. In contrast, atheism provides no source for morality and no explanation for its existence. I am not an atheist so wont presume to speak on their behalf, but I suspect that they use the same one we all do. Subjective, power based morality and various institiutions to shore up this power and impose the morality.. Whereas the existence of God explains why moral values transcend humanity. There is no question that the explanation works in terms of addressing all the requirements, but it fails when evidence or logic is required. Once again an easter bunny can easily explain how kids around the world get chocolate eggs, when evidence shows us that parents are the source. From a childs viewpoint a magical figure is certainly the easiest explanation. It also explains why some should-statements are matters of personal taste and why others are not. You might get somewhere with this line of reasoning, try checking this against any moral standard you care to name, and someone, somewhere is sure to have been OK with it. It may be then that God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. Best in what sense? Accurate is what we are looking for here. It might be best in that we get an opiate for the masses, but its not a result of rational thinking. Otherwise, who or what says how we ought to behave? People do. Just look around you. Look at Hitler. Whatever you might think about their actions, they managed to ethically justify what they did. What else would be the metaphysical basis for objective moral values? Got no answer for you. Maybe there are no objective moral values. An alternative to theism (I think) is the brute fact position. A brute fact is a fact that is based in reality (as all facts are), but nothing else. I get it so far. This objection says that morality's foundation is the universe and existence in some general sense, as opposed to placing its basis within a person or culture. Supposition and not based upon anything useful. That is, a brute fact just exists as reality, and thus there is no metaphysical basis for moral values existing other than existence and reality itself. There is no connection between existence and a subjective construction of moral standards by humans, except that humans are part of existence themselves. This is like saying that all things are brute facts, but it does not answer the question of it being objective or not. Where was objective reality prior to human life? Where was it prior to any life? On this view, the answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is "reality." This is not an answer. Humans are part of reality, and they have constructed subjective moral standards, therefore we might say that it is indeed all part of reality, but its not very illuminating. It is reality that says Hitler should have behaved differently. No, it is humans saying that Hitler should have behaved differently. What evidence exists to suggest this ethereal reality says this? Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. The flaw in this argument is finding an agreed validation point that is not subjective. By delivering it through humans, this hypothetical reality loses any objective reality by getting humans to deliver the message. Either the reality agent does not exist, or else people distort it. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself. Easy to propose, but impossible (so far) to prove. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. The proof is in the pudding. Even if we say they ought to, do they? One reason is this: what if people have conflicting views on what they ought to do? Suppose a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality are more authoritative than any human. But we cannot measure it. The subordinate ends up obeying the Nazi. Do we assume that the Nazi offered a right moral dictate, or that he has a view that is mostly unpopular today, but within his context was acceptable? Either way, your position does not allow us to prove anything of use. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. Agreed. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. And does it? Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. But we find people do obey dictators, any moral views they hold, even if different from that held by the dictator are still relative.. According to the brute fact position in question then, the universe/reality/existence (the basis of objective morality) not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority). This argument has even less basis and clarity than a divine explanation.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 02/27/08 - 05:02 PM:	#520
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: I wasn't aware I was quoting William Lane Craig (though I am aware he shares this particular position of mine)... It's virtually a word-for-word reconstruction of his position Source please? Perhaps a verifiable quote from Craig himself? Bear in mind I never doubted that he shared this position of mine, I was questioning whether what I said was a "quote." The main mistake you make in that post is this statement: Tisthammerw wrote: The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism. For one thing, if you are referring to a sort of Spinozist pantheism then you are not helping your own position here. But secondly, you are begging the question by importing your assumption that the only kind of moral authority there could be is some sort of God. Third, you have presented several false dilemmas: the "brute fact" position is not committed to either "nothing" or "the universe" as options, and the moral realist is not committed to either "brute fact" or "God" as options. Then please give me even one plausible alternative. (Note: I did not actually claim that the brute fact position is committed to "nothing," I just said this option would not work.) You mention (later on) “necessary truth” by Mill but this strikes me as a bit vague. What exactly does he mean by this? How does this answer the following question of who or what says how we ought to behave? (Call me ignorant, but when I think of Mill and ethics I think of utilitarianism.) On your first point, I was referring to “pantheism” strictly as I defined it in post #505, which can include but is not limited to Spinoza’s pantheism. I think this pantheism does help my position because of the interesting implications this pantheism would entail (as I mentioned in post #505). On your second point, I was not begging the question you mentioned (at least not in the section you quoted me). I do however believe that objective moral values require some type of God, some type of supreme metaphysical reality, even if it’s only pantheism (i.e. “The universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave.”) Which brings me to this brief digression: I think the concept of objective moral goodness requires some type of God, some type of supreme metaphysical reality (whether it be pantheism, deism, or whatever). But now you are equivocating: "some type of God" is not identical with "some type of supreme metaphysical reality." Actually, yes it is. I very specifically said that a more general definition of God is “the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality.” It's what allowed me to define pantheism as I did in post #505, remember? Now, regarding alternatives to the alleged false dilemma: At both junctures, one might invoke reason (following Kant) or necessary truth (following Mill). Please elucidate if these are viable alternatives. How does reason say how we ought to behave? Is there some logical or mathematical proof from which we can derive moral principles like "thou shalt not kill"? Reason can be used to build upon pre-existing moral statements but reason cannot by itself serve as the foundation of morality. For instance, reason could work with Mill in setting up some sort of utilitarian calculus with the goal of "benefiting society" but there's still the question of who or what says we ought to benefit society. Reason can take us from the basic moral axioms to conclusions, but it cannot provide the foundation for those axioms. Remember, my claim that the brute fact position is the only plausible alternative for the atheist who embraces moral objectivism. If any proposed alternatives are not viable they are not counterexamples to my claim. Remember, you are not defending the thesis of supernaturalism, but rather a species of it -- the moral argument for the existence of God. So here is my challenge to you: name one non-subjective, morally relevant thing that God can do that cannot be handled by a sufficiently constructed concept of karma. God can provide the metaphysical basis of objective moral values; God (by nature of what he is) answers the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" Karma does not do this, or at least not in the normal sense of the term. And what about my question earlier? If objective moral values exist and God is not the metaphysical basis for them, who or what says how we ought to behave? (This is my challenge to you) Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/14/08 - 11:43 AM
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Posted 02/29/08 - 07:45 AM:

#521

Tisthammerw wrote:
Source please? Perhaps a verifiable quote from Craig himself? Bear in mind I never doubted that he shared this position of mine, I was questioning whether what I said was a "quote."

I'll look for one. I've heard it straight from his mouth a few times, and he's used it in debates. Regardless, I was never accusing you of plagiarism or anything. In my last post I noted that it may just be a case of convergent evolution. Stranger things have happened.

That said, here's a quote from a debate between Craig and Charles Taylor that is similar, though not the same:

God’s own holy and perfectly good nature provides the absolute standard against which all actions and decisions are measured. His commands flow necessarily from His own moral nature and constitute for us our moral duties.

Though Craig did not -- in this instance -- say anything about the heart of God, I'm sure you can see the similarity in your views.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Then please give me even one plausible alternative.

Assuming that you are not equivocating on the word "plausible," then the options I already gave (reason, necessary truth) are certainly plausible -- so much so that they form the basis of the two major extant moral theories. And the fact remains that you have not yet properly disposed of them, you have merely asserted that they are insufficient (contrary to the historical Zeitgeist of all Western philosophy).

Tisthammerw wrote:
(Note: I did not actually claim that the brute fact position is committed to "nothing," I just said this option would not work.)

I didn't say you did. I said that "the 'brute fact' position is not committed to either 'nothing' or 'the universe' as options." That is, I called the dilemma (N v U) false: there are other options that are, at least initially, in the realm of logically possibility.

Tisthammerw wrote:
You mention (later on) "necessary truth" by Mill but this strikes me as a bit vague. What exactly does he mean by this? How does this answer the following question of who or what says how we ought to behave? (Call me ignorant, but when I think of Mill and ethics I think of utilitarianism.)

You should think of utilitarianism. But while Bentham could perhaps be interpreted as a moral anti-realist, Mill believed happiness to be an objective good and the principle of utility to be a necessary truth (see his comments on Kant, for example, and how he takes his theory to be an advancement of Kantian principles).

Tisthammerw wrote:
On your first point, I was referring to "pantheism" strictly as I defined it in post #505, which can include but is not limited to Spinoza's pantheism. I think this pantheism does help my position because of the interesting implications this pantheism would entail (as I mentioned in post #505).

But you didn't define, you asserted. And I have questioned that assertion. You also made another claim that I left alone at the time:

Tisthammerw wrote:
...even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics.

I do not think this is true. Spinoza's pantheism, for instance, simply asserts that the totality of nature/the universe -- whatever it is -- just is God. That may be fine as far as it goes, except that it is open to a very simple counter: If you are willing to radically redefine God, then you can have your God. But as the saying goes, "calling a tail a leg don't make it a leg." As such, some forms of pantheism fail to make philosophically interesting claims.

Tisthammerw wrote:
On your second point, I was not begging the question you mentioned (at least not in the section you quoted me).

Well, let's look at the relevant statements again:

Postmodern Beatnik wrote:

Tishammerw wrote:
The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism.

[...] you are begging the question by importing your assumption that the only kind of moral authority there could be is some sort of God.

As presented, you seem to be jumping from "there is some source of moral authority in the universe" to "that source is God (even if just a pantheistic God)." But this is what you are trying to prove; therefore, using it in the middle of the argument is begging the question. It is a subtle fallacy, to be sure: it seems to be achieved by way of a mistaken anthropomorphism of "authority" (itself a misleading word in this context). What the naturalist is arguing for is not moral authority in any anthropomorphic sense, but rather that there are real truths which have prescriptive entailments. Even Kant himself, who originated the moral argument, saw these as independent of God (though requiring Him to be practically relevant).

Tisthammerw wrote:
I do however believe that objective moral values require some type of God, some type of supreme metaphysical reality, even if it's only pantheism (i.e. "The universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave.")

I understand that you believe this -- you probably wouldn't be taking the position you are on this thread otherwise. But believing it and proving it are two separate things with different sufficient causes.

Tisthammerw wrote:

Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
But now you are equivocating: "some type of God" is not identical with "some type of supreme metaphysical reality."

Actually, yes it is. I very specifically said that a more general definition of God is "the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality."

But that stipulation (not definition) has been questioned by me. You can't just keep asserting it in the face of doubts and expect me to go along with it. It may be that, if God exists, he may be fairly described as "the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality." But if he doesn't exist, that does not necessarily mean that something else cannot be thus defined. As such, using one as a substitute for the other in this context is equivocation.

Tisthammerw wrote:
It's what allowed me to define pantheism as I did in post #505, remember?

I remember you asserting that "The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism." Do you remember me responding with, "For one thing, if you are referring to a sort of Spinozist pantheism then you are not helping your own position here. But secondly, you are begging the question by importing your assumption that the only kind of moral authority there could be is some sort of God"? But this has all been dealt with above, so let's move on.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Now, regarding alternatives to the alleged false dilemma:

Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
At both junctures, one might invoke reason (following Kant) or necessary truth (following Mill).

Please elucidate if these are viable alternatives. How does reason say how we ought to behave? Is there some logical or mathematical proof from which we can derive moral principles like "thou shalt not kill"?

See: Kant, the categorical imperative. He argued that there was indeed a logical proof of "thou shalt not kill." As for Mill, you can see my Advocatus Diaboli thread from last year for a simplified version of a Millian argument. His Utilitarianism is still the best source, of course; or you can look at modern utilitarians for more (metaethics was not quite so developed of an enterprise in the days of Kant and Mill).

Of course, you have now slipped from "pla