Tisthammerw wrote:


If the terms were defined that way then yes. If not then no.

Tist wrote:
"The basis of morality's metaphysical authority is the heart of God.

"What makes that legitimate is that God, by definition, is the supreme metaphysical reality.

"If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that God is the supreme metaphysical reality by definition.

"It seems at that point you'd get to brute facts.

Wosret wrote:




ROFL. I am honestly stunned. You think tautologies are objective truths?

Yes, if the terms were defined that way then anyone disagreeing with the definitions would be wrong because the person defining the terms things otherwise not being the universe things anything.

Buddahchuck wrote:

I'll humor you in this, one last time.



....





... all the way through to post 480:

I have never said nor implied that everything in existence details what morality is. I do not believe you can find any place where I have said that. But if I have never specifically stated this, have I ever implied it? No. The idea that "reality says what ought to be" does not at all imply that every individual unit will behave morally, and it does not even imply that every individual unit will have the correct idea of what ought to be.

Consider for instance the fallacy of division. A plane is capable of flying. However, that does not imply that each individual unit of the plane (e.g. a chair) is capable of flight. Similarly, if reality says X is true, that does not imply that a every individual component of reality will say X is true.

I have never claimed that every component of reality says what ought to be, just reality itself (if the brute fact position is true). Similarly, just because I say a plane is capable of flight does not mean I am saying that every individual component of the plane is capable of flight.

The problem is that there is no imaginable way in which reality dictates morality.

If reality tells us what is right and wrong (i.e. morality), and we can't hear it, see it, or anything, as you yourself admit, then your statement that reality dictates morality ("with supreme authority") is no more credible than the analogy I presented where we "objectively" determine the answers to moral questions by flipping a coin.

It is problematic because it defies the laws of non-contradiction. If something happens it is part of reality, existence. Now if something happens in existence that ought not happen, then existence itself is a contradiction.

Existence is wrong, but not in regards to what ought to be. So existence wants to be something other than it is. Is that what you're saying?

I also want to point out, that you have consistently said that existence commands morality with "supreme authority", and if we don't actually have to do anything that existence tells us to do, then its authority isn't actually supreme.

Wosret wrote:



Then everyone does not agree, or else who is defining the terms? Terms don't define themselves.

Buddahchuck wrote:
First, I will point-out all the arguments you just didn't even answer:

No Answer.

But this really doesn not give any bearing on the issue and only shows your complete unwillingness to understand the arguments presented against your conception of pantheistic moral objectivism. We do not need a physically see morals, but we do not some way to determine what these morals might be. With no conceivable way to devise what existence is telling me about how I ought to behave, then your argument merely boils down to a blind assertion, as people have been telling you, to no avail, for the past 6 months.

Why would I take your unclear pantheistic vision of objective morals over the very clear idea that we can flip a coin to obtain objective morals?

Then you try to present the fallacy of division as if this were a place in which you could use it:



But this is not such a place. Why?

1) There is no evidence that morality is a part of existence.

2) Pantheism, itself, plays the fallacy of division. This again, is an argument to which you gave no answer.

Pantheism is a means of reconciling the is/ought problem by saying that everything that is, ought to be.

3) There is a major difference between considering an airplane and considering the entirety of existence; so the fallacy of division does not even apply in this circumstance. In otherwords, because existence is the measure of truth to begin with, so the soundness of ANY argument has its bearing on existence itself. However, if there are things that exist, and somehow they ought not exist, then the use of an ought in a medium that is designated only for is statements only confounds the issue, producing contradictions that literally MAKE NO SENSE. So not only is your argument unsound because of this, it is also UN-INTELLIGIBLE!

4) Even if I have a plane with a broken wing, I am not wrong in saying that the plane is broken. If the plane's wing is red, I am not wrong in saying that the plane has red on it. The fallacy of division does not negate the entire existence of a certain arguments.

5) The fallacy of division is not an uncontended fallacy. Philosophers have been arguing about the difference between "the one and the many" for Millenia, and it is not something you can just throw into an argument and gain credibility. You need to show some reason why morality, being a part of existence, is separate from existence itself, especially if you are saying that existence itself is the basis of morality.

1) Morality is based in existence.
2) Killing and murder and rape occur in existence.
3) Killing and murder and rape are subject to moral judgement.
4) Killing and murder and rape are moral.

There is no reason why these things would be any more moral than immoral when we base them on existence.

So existence has no will? Really?

So what determines what is right/wrong in existence if it has no will? It just is that way?

As if reality were some high school kid taking a math test. And I really don't care to enter into the reality of math debate, but you really must understand that Mathematics is quite clearly a human concept, an elaborate adjective invented and intelligible by only the human mind. You have no support to oppose this claim, and everyone that has posted here has had to argue with you about it.

Tisthammerw wrote:

The people in this scenario have defined the terms 2, 4, and 5 with the same meanings we ascribe to them. However, they are incorrect about the implications of those definitions. In this scenario everyone thinks 2 + 2 = 5, and everyone thinks "2 + 2 = 4" is a false statement. Again, isn't it true that even if everyone thinks 2 + 2 did not equal 4, they would still be wrong? (Note: the definitions of 2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them, and it is the implications of those definitions that the people in this scenario disagree with us.) And if these people are wrong, would not this imply that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is independent of what people think, feel, or believe?

And yet another example of how you completely missed the point and reverted to one of your handbook of 3 answers you give to any objection. Why ought I obey it? What's the universe going to do to me if I don't "obey" it? Is the universe going to give me any different treatment if I didn't obey it?

One more question? How do you NOT do what existence says?

Tist wrote:

if objective morality is a brute fact, then pantheism.

Because it wasn't particularly relevant to what I was arguing. Remember, I'm not espousing pantheism. I was just arguing that objective morality being a brute fact implies pantheism. The questions you asked here are actually a bit off topic. I argued that the universe/reality/existence having supreme authority over moral right and wrong implies pantheism. This pantheistic God by necessity is the basis of morality. Whether any pantheistic God needs to "set" morality is beside the point, and so is even "the course of the universe" determining the actions of people. I was arguing if objective morality is a brute fact, then pantheism.

But if you check the quote above, I did provide some way to determine what these morals might be: namely, intuitive recognition (at least for those possessing accurate intuitions on this matter). In any case, even if everyone had no way to determine what these moral truths are, that would have no bearing on the validity in the argument. Why? The statement "objective morality being a brute fact implies pantheism" does not actually imply that people will be aware of these objective moral truths.

Because one is rationally justified from the brute fact position and the other is not. I did not address this coin flipping scenario previously because it seemed more like a parody than an actual argument (it really didn't explain what was wrong with my argument). I should point out that I'm not actually arguing in support of pantheism per se, I was arguing that a brute fact position implied pantheism.

Tist wrote:



The key argument I was putting forth is that if objective moral values exist then they are evidence for the existence of God (objective morality being a brute fact implying pantheism is a sub-claim I use to support this "overall" claim). We are starting with "objective moral values exist" as a sort of conditional proof assumption. So this objection does not apply.

Tist wrote:



This is not at all the definition of pantheism I presented, nor does it logically follow at all from any definition of pantheism I presented. I think you have confused my position. What you said is not in the least how pantheism (in my argument) attempts to reconcile the is-ought problem. Thus, this particular fallacy of division objection appears to be misdirected (attacking a position I was not presenting). Indeed, it isn't even clear that this particular objection is charging "fallacy of division" here.

Tist wrote:



If anything, it is this objection that is unintelligible, but I will try to make sense of it (please correct me if I have misunderstood you). The fallacy of division does not apply in this circumstance because...why exactly? The plane was just an illustration of how the fallacy of division could be applied. The fallacy of division is by no means unique to this. So why exactly does the fallacy of division not apply here? It is true that existence is the measure of truth to begin with; any mathematical truths that exist are (by definition) based in existence. But that does not imply, for instance, that units of existence (e.g. math students) will not occasionally get answers to math questions wrong. So the fallacy of division still seems to apply even when applied to existence.

Hume in Treatise on Human Nature wrote:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

It is also vastly unclear why units of existence not doing what they ought to do provides a contradiction. This seems like a kind of ought-is fallacy (going from what ought to be to what is). If the moral truth "People should not steal" is based in existence, this does not at all imply that people will necessarily not steal, and there is no violation of the law of noncontradiction when people steal in spite of the existence of the "People should not steal" truth.

Tist wrote:



Sure, but we have to be careful about how far we push that (to avoid making the fallacy of division). Suppose for instance that a unit of existence (e.g. a math student) gets an answer wrong. This does not imply that reality/existence as a whole is not infallible when it comes to the correctness of mathematical truths. By definition, any mathematical statement based in reality is real. This sort of thing is similarly true with mathematical truths being based in existence.

Tist wrote:



How can the fallacy of division be rationally contended? There are scores of examples to show that a property being true for the whole does not necessarily imply being true for the unit. There are of course cases where the unit has the property of the whole, but there are also cases were the affirming the consequent is used where the conclusion is correct. The point is that the type of reasoning isn't necessarily sound; that's why it's called a fallacy.

If anything, you need to show some reason why the "universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" implies that individual units (as people) will necessarily behave morally and have correct judgments on how they ought to behave.

Otherwise it's just the fallacy of division (along with the ought-is fallacy, if you're attempting to conclude that because people ought to behave morally then they necessarily will).

Objective moral values being based in existence simply means they have real existence.

If objective moral values exist, and if "People should not rape and kill" was a moral value, then it would by definition be immoral to rape and kill. Isn't that reason enough?

Suppose the answer is "nothing."

Doing the deed without being punished for it does not imply that the deed was unethical.

Perhaps existence will punish you in the afterlife, for instance. But even if it doesn't, the claim that "I got away with it, so reality doesn't say I was wrong" just doesn't logically follow.

Well, if the universe/reality/existence says stealing a candy bar is wrong, I can defy existence by getting in my car, going to the store, and take the candy bar when no one is looking. I then proceed to my car and drive home. That is one way to defy existence (if basis of objective morality was a pantheistic God).

Wosret wrote:



This is true by the conventions that we and apparently they use as well. Not independently of that.

This scenerio doesn't make any sense it's convoluted and hell, and still is a non sequitur. Sure it's true in your scenerio but it does not follow to your conclusion, since you state "Note: the definitions of 2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them, and it is the implications of those definitions that the people in this scenario disagree with us." These are people. You state "2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them". So they are obviously (quite obviously) not indepentent of what people think.