Philosophy Forums
Forums Links Articles Gallery Chat
Style:


Moral Argument for God

printPrint


Page: First 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Last

Moral Argument for God
Wosret
Yuri ga daisuki desu!
Avatar

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Mar 29, 2007
Location: New Brunswich Canada
Total Topics: 11
Total Posts: 1753
Posted 01/15/08 - 06:53 PM:
quote post
#476
Tisthammerw wrote:




The fact that the conclusion logically follows from the definitions of the terms is evidence. If such a thing were not evidence, we'd have to throw out all mathematical proofs because they depend upon this principle.




God exists and is a supernatural agent
All supernatural agents have purple hair
therefore god has purple hair.

So you agree that god has purple hair then? Good to know. sticking out tongue

"I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.
lovelikepi


Usergroup: Members
Joined: Aug 02, 2007
Total Topics: 1
Total Posts: 19
Posted 01/15/08 - 06:53 PM:
quote post
#477
2+2=5 and 2+2=4 are mathematical statements that depend solely on your definitions for 2, 4, 5, + and =. How are you defining them?
Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 733
Posted 01/15/08 - 06:55 PM:
quote post
#478
Wosret wrote:


There are people in this scenario. Again, would 2 + 2 = 5 merely because people believe it to be so?


If the terms were defined that way then yes. If not then no.


But then if 2 + 2 does not equal 5 even when people believe it to be so, it seems that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 does not depend on what people think, feel, or believe. In that case, wouldn't 2 + 2 = 4 be a mathematically objective truth?

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Wosret
Yuri ga daisuki desu!
Avatar

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Mar 29, 2007
Location: New Brunswich Canada
Total Topics: 11
Total Posts: 1753
Posted 01/15/08 - 06:58 PM:
quote post
#479
Tisthammerw wrote:


If the terms were defined that way then yes. If not then no.


But then if 2 + 2 does not equal 5 even when people believe it to be so, it seems that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 does not depend on what people think, feel, or believe. In that case, wouldn't 2 + 2 = 4 be a mathematically objective truth?
[/quote]

ROFL. I am honestly stunned. You think tautologies are objective truths?

Yes, if the terms were defined that way then anyone disagreeing with the definitions would be wrong because the person defining the terms things otherwise not being the universe things anything. The whole this is a disagreement about semantics and rules of a system, and is a disagreement among people. The person defining the terms wins.

"I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.
Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 733
Posted 01/15/08 - 07:11 PM:
quote post
#480
Buddahchuck wrote:
What we don't understand, and where I think Tist's lack of consistency is astounding, is what it means for "existence" to "command" morality.



If my lack of consistency on this is "astounding" I don't suppose you are capable of providing even one specific example in which I was not consistent on this issue?

The key questions are "What is the basis of objective morality?" and "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" The brute fact position, as I argued earlier, seems inevitably to say "reality says how we ought to behave." The basis of moral values existing is existence itself. I will grant you that the universe/reality/existence saying how we ought to behave seems a bit strange. Where, after all, does it say that? Under a rock? Embedded in the fabric of space somehow? Nonetheless, the implication that reality (in some general sense) says how we ought to behave does seem to logically follow. Or if it doesn't, please feel free to explain where exactly my argument went wrong on this matter.


Even further, Tist's whole concept of pantheism is skewed because while he recognizes that all these things that happen are part of some god, he does not adhere to the idea that everything that happens ought to happen.


Why exactly is this problematic though? Why would a pantheistic God saying how we should behave imply that everyone will behave that way? Without some sort of explanation, it just doesn't appear to logically follow.



This was one of Spinoza's major points in presenting the concept of pantheism, because if there was something wrong with the universe, something wrong with god, then god would be fallible and his authority to "command" morality would be lost.


You have to remember though that a pantheistic God does not necessarily share the same attributes as the Judeo-Christian God (e.g. omnipotence and omniscience). So yes there is something wrong with "existence" and "reality" but not in regards to being incorrect about what ought to be; it still is not the case that "reality says how we ought to behave" implies that people in reality will behave that way.



So lets take a being that has no concept of morality at all. We have it standing on a field that has two squares, red and green, Yes and no. We have a set list of moral circumstances (man in front of a train, uncle drowning a baby, abortion etc.). For each event, we mark which box the animal moves to, assuming such movement will be random. Thus, we determine a list of what is moral and what is not.


How on Earth does this logically follow? Are we operating on the assumption that the decision the animal takes makes it moral? If so what is the basis of this assumption?

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
hipskipdip
||||||||||||||||||
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Sep 09, 2006
Location: Michigan
Total Topics: 8
Total Posts: 533
Posted 01/15/08 - 07:38 PM:
quote post
#481
Tist wrote:
"The basis of morality's metaphysical authority is the heart of God.


Assertion.

"What makes that legitimate is that God, by definition, is the supreme metaphysical reality.


Assertion.

"If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that God is the supreme metaphysical reality by definition.


Assertion.

"It seems at that point you'd get to brute facts.


There are no facts, evidence, proofs, or intelligible material backing up your assertions, just simply one assertion after another. Assertions can be put forward as hypothesis, but there needs to be something supporting them. When you say:

Assertion 1: God is the supreme metaphysical basis for objective moral
Assertion 2: Objective morals exist.

Conclusion: Therefore God exists.

Simply begs the question because your assertions are in just as much need of proof as your conclusion. Not to mention your first assertion is also the conclusion, and so there really isn't any conclusion, simply assertions. Here you've failed to even make an argument but already assumed what you wanted to prove.

I suggest that you look very closely at your assumptions and find some proofs for them, otherwise you'll never ever have a means of communicating or persuading anyone to your pov and (as of right now) assumptions about the world.


-----------------------------

Thanks Buddahchuck for your post!


Edited by hipskipdip on 01/16/08 - 10:09 AM

"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust.

"I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class

"You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert
Buddahchuck
Bodhisatva
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 16, 2006
Total Topics: 24
Total Posts: 550
Posted 01/16/08 - 04:22 PM:
quote post
#482
I'll humor you in this, one last time.

Tist wrote:

If my lack of consistency on this is "astounding" I don't suppose you are capable of providing even one specific example in which I was not consistent on this issue?


Tist from post 376 wrote:

-just because a person ought not to do X does not necessarily mean that the person will not do X.

-Different societies may have different ideas of what constitutes murder versus justified homicide (e.g. killing the enemy) but in all or nearly all cultures it is not the case where you can just kill anyone you want for any reason.


Tist from post 387 wrote:

I have never said nor implied that everything in existence details what morality is.


... all the way through to post 480:

Tist wrote:

I will grant you that the universe/reality/existence saying how we ought to behave seems a bit strange. Where, after all, does it say that? Under a rock? Embedded in the fabric of space somehow? Nonetheless, the implication that reality (in some general sense) says how we ought to behave does seem to logically follow.


And you want to know....
Tist wrote:

Or if it doesn't, please feel free to explain where exactly my argument went wrong on this matter.


The problem is that there is no imaginable way in which reality dictates morality. If anything, the fact that such an unimaginable problem occurs is more evidence that there is no pantheistic god than the stretch that there is. If reality tells us what is right and wrong (i.e. morality), and we can't hear it, see it, or anything, as you yourself admit, then your statement that reality dictates morality ("with supreme authority") is no more credible than the analogy I presented where we "objectively" determine the answers to moral questions by flipping a coin. And indeed, since you seem not to know what morality in reality actually means, this could easily be what it does mean. And if objective morals do actually entail the flipping of a coin to let reality determine the right and wrong of society, I doubt you will find many people subscribing to objective morality.


Why exactly is this problematic though?


It is problematic because it defies the laws of non-contradiction. If something happens it is part of reality, existence. Now if something happens in existence that ought not happen, then existence itself is a contradiction. Pantheism, in some sense, is a means of discarding the is/ought problem by saying that everything that is, ought to be. But if the totality of existence entails contradictions, things existing when they ought not exist, then pantheism couldn't possibly be correct because that would mean that existence itself is flawed.


Why would a pantheistic God saying how we should behave


Not that you've demonstrated even how this could be the case, other than moving around definitions...


imply that everyone will behave that way? Without some sort of explanation, it just doesn't appear to logically follow.


Why would a pantheistic god need to set morality anyway? Why wouldn't the course of the universe determine actions of people free from moral judgement? Having a pantheistic god just does not imply morality. And no amount of logical adjustments or arranging of definitions can make this the case. I know, you are trying to prove that objective morality is evidence of god, but you are doing so through very specious reasoning. Would you accept it if someone argued that if light actually exists, then it is evidence of God? Would you accept that if Mathematics exist, then it is evidence of God? Would you likewise accept that if a hinge exists, there must be a door? Or that for every sock there is its mate. Or that for every left speaker there is a right speaker. Just because I see a speaker does NOT imply that there is another, just as if I see a hinge, I am not guaranteed to see a door. Just because there is a balance to the world, does not mean that some intelligent designer created it, and just because I can conceive of objective morals does not mean there is a god. And if you disagree with these things, then it is only evidence that you are not following logic.


So yes there is something wrong with "existence" and "reality" but not in regards to being incorrect about what ought to be


So I find this hilarious. Existence is wrong, but not in regards to what ought to be. So existence wants to be something other than it is. Is that what you're saying? Are you saying that existence can somehow stretch beyond its own bounds and be more than it is? Existence, itself, is wrong. One might almost imagine existence being a bearded old man. I really don't know the words to explain how contradictory the concept of existence being wrong, but not about what it ought to be, truly is. It's almost like saying that apples aren't the color they ought to be, or that duck-billed platypuses shouldn't lay eggs, or that whales should have legs.

I also want to point out, that you have consistently said that existence commands morality with "supreme authority", and if we don't actually have to do anything that existence tells us to do, then its authority isn't actually supreme. Especially when murderers, rapists, thieves, adulterers etc. are certainly in no short supply. I would say that the authority of existence is particularly suspect in this case.


How on Earth does this logically follow?


Well, morality is more or less a list of what is right and wrong. As long as we have a list of what is right and wrong, then we have morality, and if not subjective entity is determining that entity, then we have objective morality. Not nearly as illogical as assuming there is a God merely because we have objective morality.


Are we operating on the assumption that the decision the animal takes makes it moral? If so what is the basis of this assumption?


Well, the analogy is only ludicrous because your argument is ludicrous. I mean, at least the animal is giving a list of what is moral and what is not. We are asking moral questions; the animal is merely answering them, objectively. We could also even say that the animal is most like the entirety of existence, so we only need to do what the animal, existence, tells us. Its not so different from the groundhog, or cows, or anything else. We could even name the animal existence, seeing as how it commands morality, objectively. And if everyone believes it, then it will be doing so with supreme authority.
Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 733
Posted 01/19/08 - 07:58 AM:
quote post
#483
Wosret wrote:



But then if 2 + 2 does not equal 5 even when people believe it to be so, it seems that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 does not depend on what people think, feel, or believe. In that case, wouldn't 2 + 2 = 4 be a mathematically objective truth?


ROFL. I am honestly stunned. You think tautologies are objective truths?


Well, yeah. Even if everyone on this planet disagreed with the statement "If an animal is hairless, then it has no hair" it would still be true regardless of what people thought, felt, or believed. Isn't this true? Isn't it also true that even if everyone thought 2 + 2 did not equal 4, they would still be wrong?


Yes, if the terms were defined that way then anyone disagreeing with the definitions would be wrong because the person defining the terms things otherwise not being the universe things anything.


Actually, in this scenario the person defining the terms does not think otherwise. Suppose in this scenario everyone thinks 2 + 2 = 5, and everyone thinks "2 + 2 = 4" is a false statement. (Please also remember that the definition of the word "two" has not changed; people are just making incorrect conclusions about the implications of the definitions.) Isn't it true that even if everyone thought 2 + 2 did not equal 4, they would still be wrong? And if they are wrong, would not this imply that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is independent of what people think, feel, or believe?

Edited by Tisthammerw on 01/19/08 - 08:56 AM. Reason: Corrected a typo

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 733
Posted 01/19/08 - 08:14 AM:
quote post
#484
hipskipdip wrote:


"The basis of morality's metaphysical authority is the heart of God.


Assertion.


"What makes that legitimate is that God, by definition, is the supreme metaphysical reality.


Assertion.


"If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that God is the supreme metaphysical reality by definition.


Assertion.


"It seems at that point you'd get to brute facts.


There are no facts, evidence, proofs, or intelligible material backing up your assertions, just simply one assertion after another.


You asked, "What is the basis of authority? What makes this authority legitimate?" and I responded what my worldview had to say on this. If you're looking for evidential justification for God being the metaphysical basis of objective morality, please see post #452 and attack the argument given there.



Assertions can be put forward as hypothesis, but there needs to be something supporting them. When you say:

Assertion 1: God is the supreme metaphysical basis for objective moral
Assertion 2: Objective morals exist.

Conclusion: Therefore God exists.

Simply begs the question because your assertions are in just as much need of proof as your conclusion. Not to mention your first assertion is also the conclusion, and so there really isn't any conclusion, simply assertions. Here you've failed to even make an argument but already assumed what you wanted to prove.


You might want to take a look at post #452 again, because what you described was not at all how my argument worked. Instead (in a nutshell) I argued this way: the only plausible alternative to God being the metaphysical basis of objective moral values is the brute fact position. The brute fact position however (I argued), eventually implies some sort of pantheism, and this ends up constituting evidence for the existence of God anyway. This is the sort of argument I used to support my claim that if objective moral values exist, they are evidence for the existence of God. There is of course more to my argument than this; e.g. an explanation of why the brute fact position leads to pantheism (in post #452). If you think any part of my argument (such as that one) is flawed, feel free to attack the justification behind it.

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 733
Posted 01/19/08 - 08:51 AM:
quote post
#485
Buddahchuck, first I would like to thank you for at least attempting to provide specific, verifiable quotes behind your accusations. A lot times people make attacks about what a person said or did in a thread but do not back it up with verifiable quotes. So again, I thank you providing verifiable quotes.


Buddahchuck wrote:

I'll humor you in this, one last time.

Tist wrote:
:

If my lack of consistency on this is "astounding" I don't suppose you are capable of providing even one specific example in which I was not consistent on this issue?


....


Tist from post 387 wrote:

I have never said nor implied that everything in existence details what morality is.



... all the way through to post 480:

Tist wrote:


I will grant you that the universe/reality/existence saying how we ought to behave seems a bit strange. Where, after all, does it say that? Under a rock? Embedded in the fabric of space somehow? Nonetheless, the implication that reality (in some general sense) says how we ought to behave does seem to logically follow.



Again, thank you for providing a verifiable quote, but it seems you have taken what I said in post 387 out of context. You made it appear that what I said in post 387 conflicts with what I said in post 480. If we look at what I said in post 387 in context:


I have never said nor implied that everything in existence details what morality is. I do not believe you can find any place where I have said that. But if I have never specifically stated this, have I ever implied it? No. The idea that "reality says what ought to be" does not at all imply that every individual unit will behave morally, and it does not even imply that every individual unit will have the correct idea of what ought to be.

Consider for instance the fallacy of division. A plane is capable of flying. However, that does not imply that each individual unit of the plane (e.g. a chair) is capable of flight. Similarly, if reality says X is true, that does not imply that a every individual component of reality will say X is true.

I have never claimed that every component of reality says what ought to be, just reality itself (if the brute fact position is true). Similarly, just because I say a plane is capable of flight does not mean I am saying that every individual component of the plane is capable of flight.


So even if reality/existence in some general sense says how we ought to behave, that does not imply that every individual unit in existence says how we ought to behave; much as a plane being able to fly does not imply that every individual component (e.g. a chair) is capable of flight. There was no inconsistency here, much less an "astounding" one.




Or if it doesn't, please feel free to explain where exactly my argument went wrong on this matter.


The problem is that there is no imaginable way in which reality dictates morality.


I'm not sure an argument from lack of imagination will work here. For one thing, it doesn't even address the reasoning I used to get from "brute fact" to "reality says what ought to be," much less explain why it is wrong.



If reality tells us what is right and wrong (i.e. morality), and we can't hear it, see it, or anything, as you yourself admit, then your statement that reality dictates morality ("with supreme authority") is no more credible than the analogy I presented where we "objectively" determine the answers to moral questions by flipping a coin.


But why must we physically see it or hear it to rationally acknowledge it? Reality (and more specifically that domain of reality known as mathematics) says the sum of two and two are four. We know this intellectually without requiring eyes or ears. Similarly, the brute fact ethical objectivist would say that the existence of objective moral truths is just something that's intuitively recognized (at least for those possessing accurate intuitions on this matter).




Why exactly is this problematic though?


It is problematic because it defies the laws of non-contradiction. If something happens it is part of reality, existence. Now if something happens in existence that ought not happen, then existence itself is a contradiction.


But as I earlier said, this seems to be making the fallacy of division; there is a difference between the whole and its parts. There is no violation of the law of non-contradiction to say that a plane can fly but a part of the plane (as a chair) cannot. Simply because X as a whole says what ought to be does not imply that some component of X says what ought to be. Furthermore, just because something ought not to happen does not imply that it will not happen.


Existence is wrong, but not in regards to what ought to be. So existence wants to be something other than it is. Is that what you're saying?


No. Reality/existence says what ought to be, but that does not imply that reality/existence has a will (at least, that's what some naturalistic pantheists would argue). Reality is infallible in the context of objective morality; i.e. it cannot be mistaken about what is right any more than reality can be mistaken about mathematical truths (reality is what is real, after all).



I also want to point out, that you have consistently said that existence commands morality with "supreme authority", and if we don't actually have to do anything that existence tells us to do, then its authority isn't actually supreme.


This does not logically follow, at least not from the definition of authority I am using. The universe/reality/existence is authoritative in the sense that one really ought to obey it. It does not logically follow that because we ought to do something (e.g. love our neighbor) that we necessarily will do that something.

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Wosret
Yuri ga daisuki desu!
Avatar

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Mar 29, 2007
Location: New Brunswich Canada
Total Topics: 11
Total Posts: 1753
Posted 01/19/08 - 10:58 AM:
quote post
#486
Tisthammerw wrote:




Well, yeah. Even if everyone on this planet disagreed with the statement "If an animal is hairless, then it has no hair" it would still be true regardless of what people thought, felt, or believed. Isn't this true? Isn't it also true that even if everyone thought 2 + 2 did not equal 4, they would still be wrong?


No, if the terms did not exist the question makes abolutely no sense. If they did and everyone (I'm assuming you and I are people, and thus part of this) thought that the terms meant something else, then that is exactly what they would mean. Things are true by definition solely because we agree on what the terms mean, and imply. Saying that if everyone agreed that those statements are false, then on what grounds do you assert that they wouldn't be? Since you and I would also agree that they are false.

The question makes no sense at all.

Tisthammerw wrote:

Actually, in this scenario the person defining the terms does not think otherwise. Suppose in this scenario everyone thinks 2 + 2 = 5, and everyone thinks "2 + 2 = 4" is a false statement. (Please also remember that the definition of the word "two" has not changed; people are just making incorrect conclusions about the implications of the definitions.)


Then everyone does not agree, or else who is defining the terms? Terms don't define themselves.

Tisthammerw wrote:

Isn't it true that even if everyone thought 2 + 2 did not equal 4, they would still be wrong? And if they are wrong, would not this imply that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is independent of what people think, feel, or believe?


Of course not, this is so obvious that it is amazing that you can think otherwise. If everyone thought that statement was false then it would be, no one would ave defined it that way if everyone agreed that it wasn't that way.

The words in and off themselves don't matter. The fact that there are other languages or words that mean the same thing should demonstrate this to you. If everyone agree that black was white and white was black then they would be. All that would change is the conventions.

If everyone agrees that a word doesn't mean something, then it doesn't.

"I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.
Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 733
Posted 01/19/08 - 11:54 AM:
quote post
#487
Wosret wrote:


Actually, in this scenario the person defining the terms does not think otherwise. Suppose in this scenario everyone thinks 2 + 2 = 5, and everyone thinks "2 + 2 = 4" is a false statement. (Please also remember that the definition of the word "two" has not changed; people are just making incorrect conclusions about the implications of the definitions.)


Then everyone does not agree, or else who is defining the terms? Terms don't define themselves.


The people in this scenario have defined the terms 2, 4, and 5 with the same meanings we ascribe to them. However, they are incorrect about the implications of those definitions. In this scenario everyone thinks 2 + 2 = 5, and everyone thinks "2 + 2 = 4" is a false statement. Again, isn't it true that even if everyone thinks 2 + 2 did not equal 4, they would still be wrong? (Note: the definitions of 2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them, and it is the implications of those definitions that the people in this scenario disagree with us.) And if these people are wrong, would not this imply that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is independent of what people think, feel, or believe?

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Buddahchuck
Bodhisatva
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 16, 2006
Total Topics: 24
Total Posts: 550
Posted 01/20/08 - 08:00 AM:
quote post
#488
And now I would like to demonstrate why everyone is so frustrated with you, Tist. First, I will point-out all the arguments you just didn't even answer:

I wrote:

then your statement that reality dictates morality ("with supreme authority") is no more credible than the analogy I presented where we "objectively" determine the answers to moral questions by flipping a coin.


Why would I take your unclear pantheistic vision of objective morals over the very clear idea that we can flip a coin to obtain objective morals? Your only attempt to answer this is to say:

"But why must we physically see it or hear it to rationally acknowledge it? Reality (and more specifically that domain of reality known as mathematics) says the sum of two and two are four. We know this intellectually without requiring eyes or ears. Similarly, the brute fact ethical objectivist would say that the existence of objective moral truths is just something that's intuitively recognized (at least for those possessing accurate intuitions on this matter).
"
[/quote]

But this really doesn not give any bearing on the issue and only shows your complete unwillingness to understand the arguments presented against your conception of pantheistic moral objectivism. We do not need a physically see morals, but we do not some way to determine what these morals might be. With no conceivable way to devise what existence is telling me about how I ought to behave, then your argument merely boils down to a blind assertion, as people have been telling you, to no avail, for the past 6 months. At least I have a concept of what "2" means, but even you have no concept of what "existence details morality" means. If you're only answer to this problem is that brute fact morality is "intuitive", which it clearly is NOT, then there is no reason to lend any credence to what you have to say. You're about as credible right now as that smelly bumb on the street with the burnt lips telling us the world ended 20 years ago.

I wrote:

Why would a pantheistic god need to set morality anyway? Why wouldn't the course of the universe determine actions of people free from moral judgement?


No Answer.

I wrote:

Would you accept it if someone argued that if light actually exists, then it is evidence of God? Would you accept that if Mathematics exist, then it is evidence of God? Would you likewise accept that if a hinge exists, there must be a door? Or that for every sock there is its mate. Or that for every left speaker there is a right speaker. Just because I see a speaker does NOT imply that there is another, just as if I see a hinge, I am not guaranteed to see a door. Just because there is a balance to the world, does not mean that some intelligent designer created it, and just because I can conceive of objective morals does not mean there is a god.


No answer.

Then you try to present the fallacy of division as if this were a place in which you could use it:

Tist wrote:

But as I earlier said, this seems to be making the fallacy of division; there is a difference between the whole and its parts.


But this is not such a place. Why?

1) There is no evidence that morality is a part of existence. You have given none, only assertions, and in merely re-iterating these assertions through every contentions, you have only destroyed your own, personal credibility.

2) Pantheism, itself, plays the fallacy of division. This again, is an argument to which you gave no answer. Pantheism is a means of reconciling the is/ought problem by saying that everything that is, ought to be. In a sense, things only need to partially exist in order to be true because after all, they are all part of God, and God is the utlimate truth. This is not my argument, but rather the paraphrasing of the innovator of pantheism, Spinoza. (N.B. There is another argument presenting itself, here that was never answered that is seperate from the fallacy of division, but I will refer to that later).

3) There is a major difference between considering an airplane and considering the entirety of existence; so the fallacy of division does not even apply in this circumstance. In otherwords, because existence is the measure of truth to begin with, so the soundness of ANY argument has its bearing on existence itself. However, if there are things that exist, and somehow they ought not exist, then the use of an ought in a medium that is designated only for is statements only confounds the issue, producing contradictions that literally MAKE NO SENSE. So not only is your argument unsound because of this, it is also UN-INTELLIGIBLE!

4) Even if I have a plane with a broken wing, I am not wrong in saying that the plane is broken. If the plane's wing is red, I am not wrong in saying that the plane has red on it. The fallacy of division does not negate the entire existence of a certain arguments.

5) The fallacy of division is not an uncontended fallacy. Philosophers have been arguing about the difference between "the one and the many" for Millenia, and it is not something you can just throw into an argument and gain credibility. You need to show some reason why morality, being a part of existence, is separate from existence itself, especially if you are saying that existence itself is the basis of morality. This is the argument I was referring to earlier:

1) Morality is based in existence.
2) Killing and murder and rape occur in existence.
3) Killing and murder and rape are subject to moral judgement.
4) Killing and murder and rape are moral.

There is no reason why these things would be any more moral than immoral when we base them on existence. What is it about existence that tells us that "killing and murder and rape" would be immoral? Nothing! You have never answered this question, but merely assume that fallacy of division answers this problem; it does not. With existence showing no preference one way or another, there is no way that we could ever jump to saying that morality is based on existence.

To tidy up:


There is no violation of the law of non-contradiction to say that a plane can fly but a part of the plane (as a chair) cannot.


a) There is a fundemental difference between the relationship of a plane and a chair and existence of morality. For one, we know without question that this chair is part of the plane. Second, the plane is claiming to tell the chair what it ought to do. How would this make any sense at all? The chair is capable of doing what it can do whether there is a plane or no.

b) (The Analogy) Where the plane is existence/God and the Chair is morality. Your argument: If Chairs recline, it is evidence of the existence of a plane.

Tist wrote:

No. Reality/existence says what ought to be, but that does not imply that reality/existence has a will


So existence has no will? Really? So what determines what is right/wrong in existence if it has no will? It just is that way? Is this the brilliant argument you are devising, or just part of it? I hope my sarcasm is not lost. This actually sounds a lot like some hokey dogmatic decree that some poor fantasy novelist would devise. Reality/existence is wrong, remember, it just not wrong when it comes to saying what is right/wrong. You seem to like to personify reality in this twisted way, and I se that you missed my play on such a thing, as you continue in your characterization of such:

i.e. it cannot be mistaken about what is right any more than reality can be mistaken about mathematical truths (reality is what is real, after all).


As if reality were some high school kid taking a math test. And I really don't care to enter into the reality of math debate, but you really must understand that Mathematics is quite clearly a human concept, an elaborate adjective invented and intelligible by only the human mind. You have no support to oppose this claim, and everyone that has posted here has had to argue with you about it. I am really not getting into this with you because you clearly have little understanding of such things, but I don't want you thinking that mathematics is "real" in the same way that anything else we might consider is "real".


Reality is infallible in the context of objective morality


No, this is your assumption. You are assuming that existence has anything to do with morality to begin with, and you never answered my direct attack on this argument, that existence is simply amoral altogether (a slight paraphrasing of the questions: Why does existence need to pass moral judgement?). Reality is only infallible in that it can't be false and be reality at the same time. But because we are never "told" anything about morality by reality to begin with, then "infallible" is not the kind of thing we can really say about reality to begin with.


The universe/reality/existence is authoritative in the sense that one really ought to obey it. It does not logically follow that because we ought to do something (e.g. love our neighbor) that we necessarily will do that something.


And yet another example of how you completely missed the point and reverted to one of your handbook of 3 answers you give to any objection. Why ought I obey it? What's the universe going to do to me if I don't "obey" it? Is the universe going to give me any different treatment if I didn't obey it? Napoleon certainly didn't Obey it, and what happened to him, oh yeah, he nearly conquered Europe. Queen Elizabeth didn't obey the universe, she just became one of the wealthiest and most prestigious people on the face of the Earth. Ramses of Egypt, didn't obey it, casting people into slavery. He just had the biggest monuments every constructed in a man's name.

Or, maybe all these people, by killing, enslaving, raping and pillaging other people did obey the universe, and that was why they were so successful. Maybe the universe told them to do these things that one might consider evil, but the universe might consider necessary, and for committing such acts, they were rewarded with power, fame and luxuries.

One more question? How do you NOT do what existence says? If I had it in my head to go about defying the dictates of existence, where would I start? Would I flip a coin?






Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 733
Posted 01/20/08 - 01:23 PM:
quote post
#489
Buddahchuck wrote:
First, I will point-out all the arguments you just didn't even answer:


For space constraints I try to pick things that go to the heart of the matter. Some do this more than others. For instance:




I wrote:

Why would a pantheistic god need to set morality anyway? Why wouldn't the course of the universe determine actions of people free from moral judgement?


No Answer.


Because it wasn't particularly relevant to what I was arguing. Remember, I'm not espousing pantheism. I was just arguing that objective morality being a brute fact implies pantheism. The questions you asked here are actually a bit off topic. I argued that the universe/reality/existence having supreme authority over moral right and wrong implies pantheism. This pantheistic God by necessity is the basis of morality. Whether any pantheistic God needs to "set" morality is beside the point, and so is even "the course of the universe" determining the actions of people. I was arguing if objective morality is a brute fact, then pantheism.




"But why must we physically see it or hear it to rationally acknowledge it? Reality (and more specifically that domain of reality known as mathematics) says the sum of two and two are four. We know this intellectually without requiring eyes or ears. Similarly, the brute fact ethical objectivist would say that the existence of objective moral truths is just something that's intuitively recognized (at least for those possessing accurate intuitions on this matter).
"


But this really doesn not give any bearing on the issue and only shows your complete unwillingness to understand the arguments presented against your conception of pantheistic moral objectivism. We do not need a physically see morals, but we do not some way to determine what these morals might be. With no conceivable way to devise what existence is telling me about how I ought to behave, then your argument merely boils down to a blind assertion, as people have been telling you, to no avail, for the past 6 months.


But if you check the quote above, I did provide some way to determine what these morals might be: namely, intuitive recognition (at least for those possessing accurate intuitions on this matter). In any case, even if everyone had no way to determine what these moral truths are, that would have no bearing on the validity in the argument. Why? The statement "objective morality being a brute fact implies pantheism" does not actually imply that people will be aware of these objective moral truths.



Why would I take your unclear pantheistic vision of objective morals over the very clear idea that we can flip a coin to obtain objective morals?


Because one is rationally justified from the brute fact position and the other is not. I did not address this coin flipping scenario previously because it seemed more like a parody than an actual argument (it really didn't explain what was wrong with my argument). I should point out that I'm not actually arguing in support of pantheism per se, I was arguing that a brute fact position implied pantheism.



Then you try to present the fallacy of division as if this were a place in which you could use it:

Tist wrote:


But as I earlier said, this seems to be making the fallacy of division; there is a difference between the whole and its parts.


But this is not such a place. Why?

1) There is no evidence that morality is a part of existence.


The key argument I was putting forth is that if objective moral values exist then they are evidence for the existence of God (objective morality being a brute fact implying pantheism is a sub-claim I use to support this "overall" claim). We are starting with "objective moral values exist" as a sort of conditional proof assumption. So this objection does not apply.



2) Pantheism, itself, plays the fallacy of division. This again, is an argument to which you gave no answer.


My apologies, but I wasn't aware you gave this argument. I'll try to answer it here.



Pantheism is a means of reconciling the is/ought problem by saying that everything that is, ought to be.


This is not at all the definition of pantheism I presented, nor does it logically follow at all from any definition of pantheism I presented. I think you have confused my position. What you said is not in the least how pantheism (in my argument) attempts to reconcile the is-ought problem. Thus, this particular fallacy of division objection appears to be misdirected (attacking a position I was not presenting). Indeed, it isn't even clear that this particular objection is charging "fallacy of division" here.



3) There is a major difference between considering an airplane and considering the entirety of existence; so the fallacy of division does not even apply in this circumstance. In otherwords, because existence is the measure of truth to begin with, so the soundness of ANY argument has its bearing on existence itself. However, if there are things that exist, and somehow they ought not exist, then the use of an ought in a medium that is designated only for is statements only confounds the issue, producing contradictions that literally MAKE NO SENSE. So not only is your argument unsound because of this, it is also UN-INTELLIGIBLE!


If anything, it is this objection that is unintelligible, but I will try to make sense of it (please correct me if I have misunderstood you). The fallacy of division does not apply in this circumstance because...why exactly? The plane was just an illustration of how the fallacy of division could be applied. The fallacy of division is by no means unique to this. So why exactly does the fallacy of division not apply here? It is true that existence is the measure of truth to begin with; any mathematical truths that exist are (by definition) based in existence. But that does not imply, for instance, that units of existence (e.g. math students) will not occasionally get answers to math questions wrong. So the fallacy of division still seems to apply even when applied to existence.

It is also vastly unclear why units of existence not doing what they ought to do provides a contradiction. This seems like a kind of ought-is fallacy (going from what ought to be to what is). If the moral truth "People should not steal" is based in existence, this does not at all imply that people will necessarily not steal, and there is no violation of the law of noncontradiction when people steal in spite of the existence of the "People should not steal" truth.



4) Even if I have a plane with a broken wing, I am not wrong in saying that the plane is broken. If the plane's wing is red, I am not wrong in saying that the plane has red on it. The fallacy of division does not negate the entire existence of a certain arguments.


Sure, but we have to be careful about how far we push that (to avoid making the fallacy of division). Suppose for instance that a unit of existence (e.g. a math student) gets an answer wrong. This does not imply that reality/existence as a whole is not infallible when it comes to the correctness of mathematical truths. By definition, any mathematical statement based in reality is real. This sort of thing is similarly true with mathematical truths being based in existence.


5) The fallacy of division is not an uncontended fallacy. Philosophers have been arguing about the difference between "the one and the many" for Millenia, and it is not something you can just throw into an argument and gain credibility. You need to show some reason why morality, being a part of existence, is separate from existence itself, especially if you are saying that existence itself is the basis of morality.


How can the fallacy of division be rationally contended? There are scores of examples to show that a property being true for the whole does not necessarily imply being true for the unit. There are of course cases where the unit has the property of the whole, but there are also cases were the affirming the consequent is used where the conclusion is correct. The point is that the type of reasoning isn't necessarily sound; that's why it's called a fallacy. If anything, you need to show some reason why the "universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" implies that individual units (as people) will necessarily behave morally and have correct judgments on how they ought to behave. Otherwise it's just the fallacy of division (along with the ought-is fallacy, if you're attempting to conclude that because people ought to behave morally then they necessarily will). There is just no violation of the law of noncontradiction to say that objective moral values are based in existence (i.e. they have real existence) but people sometimes violate these moral principles. If you think there is, then you need to demonstrate it if your objection is to have any compelling weight.



1) Morality is based in existence.
2) Killing and murder and rape occur in existence.
3) Killing and murder and rape are subject to moral judgement.
4) Killing and murder and rape are moral.

There is no reason why these things would be any more moral than immoral when we base them on existence.


Objective moral values being based in existence simply means they have real existence. If objective moral values exist, and if "People should not rape and kill" was a moral value, then it would by definition be immoral to rape and kill. Isn't that reason enough?




No. Reality/existence says what ought to be, but that does not imply that reality/existence has a will


So existence has no will? Really?


I think you may have quoted me out of context here. The full context of the quote is, "Reality/existence says what ought to be, but that does not imply that reality/existence has a will (at least, that's what some naturalistic pantheists would argue)." The point is that my argument doesn't assume nor is it strictly dependent upon the universe/reality/existence having a mind and will.


So what determines what is right/wrong in existence if it has no will? It just is that way?


That is what the brute fact ethical objectivist/naturalistic pantheist would argue. But again, either way it doesn't really affect my argument.




i.e. it cannot be mistaken about what is right any more than reality can be mistaken about mathematical truths (reality is what is real, after all).


As if reality were some high school kid taking a math test. And I really don't care to enter into the reality of math debate, but you really must understand that Mathematics is quite clearly a human concept, an elaborate adjective invented and intelligible by only the human mind. You have no support to oppose this claim, and everyone that has posted here has had to argue with you about it.


I can only think of one other person who might have disagreed with me on mathematical truths being objective truths. Can you name another? I do incidentally have support for the claim that mathematical truths are independent of what people think, feel, and believe. As I had previously said,

Tisthammerw wrote:

The people in this scenario have defined the terms 2, 4, and 5 with the same meanings we ascribe to them. However, they are incorrect about the implications of those definitions. In this scenario everyone thinks 2 + 2 = 5, and everyone thinks "2 + 2 = 4" is a false statement. Again, isn't it true that even if everyone thinks 2 + 2 did not equal 4, they would still be wrong? (Note: the definitions of 2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them, and it is the implications of those definitions that the people in this scenario disagree with us.) And if these people are wrong, would not this imply that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is independent of what people think, feel, or believe?





The universe/reality/existence is authoritative in the sense that one really ought to obey it. It does not logically follow that because we ought to do something (e.g. love our neighbor) that we necessarily will do that something.


And yet another example of how you completely missed the point and reverted to one of your handbook of 3 answers you give to any objection. Why ought I obey it? What's the universe going to do to me if I don't "obey" it? Is the universe going to give me any different treatment if I didn't obey it?


Suppose the answer is "nothing." Doing the deed without being punished for it does not imply that the deed was unethical. Similarly, simply because the deed was unethical does not imply that you will necessarily be punished with it. Even under pantheism however, the answer is not necessarily "nothing." Perhaps existence will punish you in the afterlife, for instance. But even if it doesn't, the claim that "I got away with it, so reality doesn't say I was wrong" just doesn't logically follow.



One more question? How do you NOT do what existence says?


Well, if the universe/reality/existence says stealing a candy bar is wrong, I can defy existence by getting in my car, going to the store, and take the candy bar when no one is looking. I then proceed to my car and drive home. That is one way to defy existence (if basis of objective morality was a pantheistic God).

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Wosret
Yuri ga daisuki desu!
Avatar

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Mar 29, 2007
Location: New Brunswich Canada
Total Topics: 11
Total Posts: 1753
Posted 01/20/08 - 09:35 PM:
quote post
#490
Tisthammerw wrote:




The people in this scenario have defined the terms 2, 4, and 5 with the same meanings we ascribe to them. However, they are incorrect about the implications of those definitions.


This is true by the conventions that we and apparently they use as well. Not independently of that.

Tisthammerw wrote:

In this scenario everyone thinks 2 + 2 = 5, and everyone thinks "2 + 2 = 4" is a false statement. Again, isn't it true that even if everyone thinks 2 + 2 did not equal 4, they would still be wrong? (Note: the definitions of 2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them, and it is the implications of those definitions that the people in this scenario disagree with us.) And if these people are wrong, would not this imply that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is independent of what people think, feel, or believe?


This scenerio doesn't make any sense it's convoluted and hell, and still is a non sequitur. Sure it's true in your scenerio but it does not follow to your conclusion, since you state "Note: the definitions of 2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them, and it is the implications of those definitions that the people in this scenario disagree with us." These are people. You state "2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them". So they are obviously (quite obviously) not indepentent of what people think. You clearly say that it isn't yourself.

You are attempting to divorce conventions from the people that invent them, it cannot be done.

"I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.
Buddahchuck
Bodhisatva
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 16, 2006
Total Topics: 24
Total Posts: 550
Posted 01/22/08 - 06:55 PM:
quote post
#491
Tist wrote:

if objective morality is a brute fact, then pantheism.


So you used this in an attempt to answer objections. I will show how your use of this argument not only doesn't apply, but is ultimately meaningless.


Because it wasn't particularly relevant to what I was arguing. Remember, I'm not espousing pantheism. I was just arguing that objective morality being a brute fact implies pantheism. The questions you asked here are actually a bit off topic. I argued that the universe/reality/existence having supreme authority over moral right and wrong implies pantheism. This pantheistic God by necessity is the basis of morality. Whether any pantheistic God needs to "set" morality is beside the point, and so is even "the course of the universe" determining the actions of people. I was arguing if objective morality is a brute fact, then pantheism.


And the idea that objective morality is a brute fact is put under direct scrutiny when I say that objective morality is not a brute fact because existence is free from moral judgement altogether. I am denying objective morality altogether, and while this does not attack the conditional conclusion, it does rob it of its meaning, causing your argument to be inconsequential. In other words, if morality is not a brute fact (because existence is free from moral judgement) then not pantheism.


But if you check the quote above, I did provide some way to determine what these morals might be: namely, intuitive recognition (at least for those possessing accurate intuitions on this matter). In any case, even if everyone had no way to determine what these moral truths are, that would have no bearing on the validity in the argument. Why? The statement "objective morality being a brute fact implies pantheism" does not actually imply that people will be aware of these objective moral truths.


And this feeds back into what I have been consistently arguing. "Intuitive recognition" is a very poor standard for morals. Why? People who commit murder do not feel they were wrong. People who theive do not feel they are wrong. People who rape do not feel they are wrong. This "intuitive recognition" of which you speak is not the same for every person, ergo, it CANNOT be the same for all of existence. Just the mere hint of you trying to say that some people's "intuitive recognition" is more superior than others invalidates your point. How do we distinguish the people whose intuition is accurate and those whose isn't? We can't. My "intuitive recognition" says that capitalism is immoral. Is this some moral decree from existence? Is it a brute fact that capitalism is immoral because I intuitively recognize it? Because this standard is so poor, and it is the only one you even hint at in describing how we can possibly know the moral demands of existence, we must consider your argument either meaningless or useless.


Because one is rationally justified from the brute fact position and the other is not. I did not address this coin flipping scenario previously because it seemed more like a parody than an actual argument (it really didn't explain what was wrong with my argument). I should point out that I'm not actually arguing in support of pantheism per se, I was arguing that a brute fact position implied pantheism.


You don't even rationally justify the brute fact position. You have left it unclear what it even means, aside from listening to "intuitive recognition", which I have already explained is a particularly ridiculous means of determining morality. And you are right, the coin-flip scenario is a parody demonstrating that the justification that you give for accepting the brute fact position is about as good as the coin-flipping position. People do not have universal morals, which is why morality is such a highly contested philosophical discussion.

One of the first premises of your argument is that the only way that objective morality exists is if you accept the brute fact position. The coin flipping scenario directly defies this, demonstrating that objective morality can exist without accepting the brute fact position. By presenting an form of objective morality aside from the brute fact position, no matter how ludicrous, I am explicity demonstrating how "if objective morality, then god" is a false statement.

Then on to Fallacy of Division

Tist wrote:

I wrote:
1) There is no evidence that morality is a part of existence.


The key argument I was putting forth is that if objective moral values exist then they are evidence for the existence of God (objective morality being a brute fact implying pantheism is a sub-claim I use to support this "overall" claim). We are starting with "objective moral values exist" as a sort of conditional proof assumption. So this objection does not apply.


But because we are discussing the fallacy of division, it does apply. If morality isn't even a part of existence, then we can't really have a fallacy of division, now can we? Additionally, "objective moral values exist" a) is not a conditional and b) is not proven. I agree that it is your assumption, but because you never justify such an assumption, then there is no reason for anyone here to accept it. This is part of presenting a compelling argument. Lots of arguments could be presented if we assume certain things, but the fact that we assume those things, does not make those arguments logical.

Tist wrote:

I wrote:

2) Pantheism, itself, plays the fallacy of division. This again, is an argument to which you gave no answer. Pantheism is a means of reconciling the is/ought problem by saying that everything that is, ought to be. In a sense, things only need to partially exist in order to be true because after all, they are all part of God, and God is the utlimate truth. This is not my argument, but rather the paraphrasing of the innovator of pantheism, Spinoza.


This is not at all the definition of pantheism I presented, nor does it logically follow at all from any definition of pantheism I presented. I think you have confused my position. What you said is not in the least how pantheism (in my argument) attempts to reconcile the is-ought problem. Thus, this particular fallacy of division objection appears to be misdirected (attacking a position I was not presenting). Indeed, it isn't even clear that this particular objection is charging "fallacy of division" here.


Actually, it is not a definition of pantheism at all, it is the legitimation of pantheism given by the person who first thought-it-up. What I am [trying] to present is how, by straying from Spinoza's original conception, and instead morphing it into some wierd existential godly intuition that exists in some parts but not all, you are actually confounding the issue. If you'll notice, I was not attacking Spinoza's position at all. I was describing how pantheism itself resolves a fallacy of division. But when you present an argument saying this is not how you presented pantheism, it seems like you are being dodgy in your argumentation, allowing a pantheism that permits the fallacy of division for the sole purpose of defending your argument.

Therefore, according to the actual definition for pantheism, there is not fallacy of division. Because you change this, you incur the other objections I presented concerning the fallacy of division.

Tist wrote:

I wrote:

3) There is a major difference between considering an airplane and considering the entirety of existence; so the fallacy of division does not even apply in this circumstance. In otherwords, because existence is the measure of truth to begin with, so the soundness of ANY argument has its bearing on existence itself. However, if there are things that exist, and somehow they ought not exist, then the use of an ought in a medium that is designated only for is statements only confounds the issue, producing contradictions that literally MAKE NO SENSE. So not only is your argument unsound because of this, it is also UN-INTELLIGIBLE!


If anything, it is this objection that is unintelligible, but I will try to make sense of it (please correct me if I have misunderstood you). The fallacy of division does not apply in this circumstance because...why exactly? The plane was just an illustration of how the fallacy of division could be applied. The fallacy of division is by no means unique to this. So why exactly does the fallacy of division not apply here? It is true that existence is the measure of truth to begin with; any mathematical truths that exist are (by definition) based in existence. But that does not imply, for instance, that units of existence (e.g. math students) will not occasionally get answers to math questions wrong. So the fallacy of division still seems to apply even when applied to existence.


So I'll break it down for you. This particular fallacy of division that you are claiming is closely related to the is/ought problem because you are claiming that I have a fallacy of division. I am saying that morality (an ought) cannot come from existence (an is). In fact, it is your exact reasoning to which Hume objected:

Hume in Treatise on Human Nature wrote:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.



It is also vastly unclear why units of existence not doing what they ought to do provides a contradiction. This seems like a kind of ought-is fallacy (going from what ought to be to what is). If the moral truth "People should not steal" is based in existence, this does not at all imply that people will necessarily not steal, and there is no violation of the law of noncontradiction when people steal in spite of the existence of the "People should not steal" truth.


"Vastly unclear". What is vastly unclear is how something like "people should not steal" can be based in existence. There is no rationale behind such a thing. The contradiction argument I presented (separate from my responses to fallacy of division, though linked) is that existence is the bottom line, the actual truth of reality. Because it is the truth of reality, it has a few properties. 1) Ought statements are irrelevant 2) Nothing can exist that does not exist. You are well within your rights to say that something that exists isn't right, but it is a contradiction to use existence itself as a justification to say that the something that exists isn't right. If it exists, then that's it. There is no judgement that come from existence itself; the judgement comes from YOU.

As you, yourself say, you are told by your own personal existence, through "intuitive recognition", through your human cognitive skills, that some things aren't right. Now if you want to redefine "existence" to encompass only the things that you, personally think of, then I think we have come to a critical point as to why we disagree. Unfortunately, if existence is only in your mind, and you consider "if objective morality, then pantheistic God", then you are saying "If objective morality, then I am God." Which sounds like you have some sort of a complex. This is the logical end of the viable end of the argument you are presenting.

I do not believe that YOU believe you are God, however. So you must embrace an existence that is overarching and carries beyond your own existence and into that of others. When you view existence in such a way, you see the major contradiction in saying that existence tells us that existence is wrong.

Tist wrote:

I wrote:

4) Even if I have a plane with a broken wing, I am not wrong in saying that the plane is broken. If the plane's wing is red, I am not wrong in saying that the plane has red on it. The fallacy of division does not negate the entire existence of a certain arguments.


Sure, but we have to be careful about how far we push that (to avoid making the fallacy of division). Suppose for instance that a unit of existence (e.g. a math student) gets an answer wrong. This does not imply that reality/existence as a whole is not infallible when it comes to the correctness of mathematical truths. By definition, any mathematical statement based in reality is real. This sort of thing is similarly true with mathematical truths being based in existence.


You're playing the redundancy game. "Any mathematical truth based in reality is real. ...this is similarly true with mathematical truths being based in existence." How about moral ideas? Since we are, after all, discussing morality, it seems like you would want to explain something that bears a closer relationship to morals. And please, don't use mathematical analogies with me, I don't want to get into that debate.

You need to prove that morality is the type of thing that cannot be negated by existence in order to make your fallacy of division argument stick (i.e.Show that morality is unlike saying that the plane has red on it, and more like saying that the math student made a wrong answer). But you need to do that after you prove that morality is part of existence.

Tist wrote:

I wrote:

5) The fallacy of division is not an uncontended fallacy. Philosophers have been arguing about the difference between "the one and the many" for Millenia, and it is not something you can just throw into an argument and gain credibility. You need to show some reason why morality, being a part of existence, is separate from existence itself, especially if you are saying that existence itself is the basis of morality.


How can the fallacy of division be rationally contended? There are scores of examples to show that a property being true for the whole does not necessarily imply being true for the unit. There are of course cases where the unit has the property of the whole, but there are also cases were the affirming the consequent is used where the conclusion is correct. The point is that the type of reasoning isn't necessarily sound; that's why it's called a fallacy.


Where you are claiming that I am presenting a "Fallacy of Divison", I am claiming that you are presenting a "[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suppressed_correlative]Suppressed Correlative[/url]". You are saying "Morality exists, therefore existence is the basis of morality." This is only one argument that denies the fallacy of division of which you are claiming. We can even go back as far as Plotinus and see the struggle to explain the One and its relation to the many. You have hardly shown that my argument that existence (the One) entails immoral things (the many) is a fallacy of division. After all, it is equally possible that most of existence actually disagrees with your concept of morals.


If anything, you need to show some reason why the "universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" implies that individual units (as people) will necessarily behave morally and have correct judgments on how they ought to behave.


Actually, no. That is your proposition. I don't believe that "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" is true, much less that people will necessarily behave morally according to this principle. In fact, I have presented a great many examples of how immoral actors are actually rewarded by acting immorally, more than those who do not. To just about anyone not dogmatically adhering to dodgy theories, this would constitute evidence to show that, at the very least, existence has no correlation with human concepts of morality, and at the very worst, that existence actually promotes immoral behavior.


Otherwise it's just the fallacy of division (along with the ought-is fallacy, if you're attempting to conclude that because people ought to behave morally then they necessarily will).


No again. You are the one incurring the is-ought problem, as presented by Hume. I am not trying to conclude that because people ought to behave morally the they necessarily will, but just demonstrate that existence lends itself toward immorality, rewarding the more immoral, at least with respect to this objection.



Objective moral values being based in existence simply means they have real existence.


Again the supressed correlative.


If objective moral values exist, and if "People should not rape and kill" was a moral value, then it would by definition be immoral to rape and kill. Isn't that reason enough?


Actually, there is no reason given in this at all. You merely assert "people should not rape and kill." You need to give a justification, a reason. You'd need to show 1) "People should not rape and kill" is objective (assuming that we only accept objective moral values) 2) Why "People should not rape and kill" is a valuable moral 3) That objective moral values exist. This is the perfect example of how pertinent the coin-flipping scenario is pertinent. I could rephrase your sentence and merely pretend it made sense, as you are doing:

"If objective moral values exist, and "People should Rape and kill" is an objective moral value, then it would by definition be moral to rape and kill. Isn't that reason enough?"


Authority

Suppose the answer is "nothing."


Then God has absolutely no moral authority.


Doing the deed without being punished for it does not imply that the deed was unethical.


Doing the deed without being punished implies that the moral authority has no power. Additionally, doing the deed that is immoral and being rewarded implies that the authority favors such people. If somebody kill another person and happens to gain $500, and that money is desired for the killer, and there are no consequences, then it would seem that the moral authority favors those who commit immoral acts.


Perhaps existence will punish you in the afterlife, for instance. But even if it doesn't, the claim that "I got away with it, so reality doesn't say I was wrong" just doesn't logically follow.


Nor does it suppor the claim that the universe upholds morality with "supreme authority". This whole paragraph to which you were responding was meant to indict this little catch-phrase you keep using. Clearly the universe does not uphold morality with "supreme authority" if there is no consequence.


Well, if the universe/reality/existence says stealing a candy bar is wrong, I can defy existence by getting in my car, going to the store, and take the candy bar when no one is looking. I then proceed to my car and drive home. That is one way to defy existence (if basis of objective morality was a pantheistic God).


And if via "intuitive recognition" the universe tells me that stealing a candy bar is wrong, and I do it anyway, then there must be some other "intuitive recognition" that tells me that stealing a candy bar is worth the reward, and the universe is telling me that stealing a candy bar is right; otherwise, I wouldn't do it. With no discernible way to distinguish which intuitive recognition to listen to, then there is no real way to defy the universe. For every action that somebody commits, they must have some sort of inner "intuitive recognition" that tells them to do it.


Edited by Buddahchuck on 01/22/08 - 07:22 PM
Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 733
Posted 01/30/08 - 08:27 PM:
quote post
#492
Buddahchuck, please be aware what my positions are. Here are two positions (among several) I am arguing in this thread:

  1. If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God.
  2. If objective morality is a brute fact, then this implies pantheism.


I have justified these statements in post #452 (feel free to intellectually assault the argument).

I should point out that I don't actually believe morality is a brute fact and thus don't actually believe in the pantheistic explanation. Nonetheless, I have criticized the claim that "Reality/existence saying how we ought to behave implies that people [units of existence] will necessarily behave morally" because it is a claim that I do not think logically follows (in this post, I'll simply refer to this as B-claim). One reason is that it would be employing the fallacy of division to even say that "Reality/ existence says how we ought to behave means every unit of existence says how we ought to behave," and it seems even more illogical to claim that reality/existence saying how we ought to behave implies that every unit of existence necessarily will actually behave that way.


Buddahchuck wrote:

If morality isn't even a part of existence, then we can't really have a fallacy of division, now can we?


Yes you can. You can still make illogical statements based on a false conditional. The claim "If it rains tomorrow, then this event will blow up the Earth" does not logically follow even if the antecedent is false. Similarly, the claim "Reality/existence says how we ought to behave means every unit of existence says how we ought to behave."

The fact (if it were so) that "There is no evidence that morality is a part of existence" has no bearing on whether B-claim logically follows. It also has no bearing on the validity of my claims #1 and #2.


Buddahchuck wrote:

I am denying objective morality altogether, and while this does not attack the conditional conclusion, it does rob it of its meaning, causing your argument to be inconsequential.


But if my argument is inconsequential, why are you responding to my posts? Do you wish to demonstrate that the reasoning behind my reasoning is flawed? If not, why respond to my posts?



One of the first premises of your argument is that the only way that objective morality exists is if you accept the brute fact position.


That is not actually my argument. I did claim however that the only plausible alternative to God being the metaphysical basis of objective morality is the brute fact position.



The coin flipping scenario directly defies this, demonstrating that objective morality can exist without accepting the brute fact position.


The coin flipping scenario, however, is not plausible. Presenting an alternative form of objective morality apart from the brute fact position is inconsequential if that alternative is ludicrous.



Tist wrote:


2) Pantheism, itself, plays the fallacy of division. This again, is an argument to which you gave no answer. Pantheism is a means of reconciling the is/ought problem by saying that everything that is, ought to be. In a sense, things only need to partially exist in order to be true because after all, they are all part of God, and God is the utlimate truth. This is not my argument, but rather the paraphrasing of the innovator of pantheism, Spinoza.


This is not at all the definition of pantheism I presented, nor does it logically follow at all from any definition of pantheism I presented. I think you have confused my position. What you said is not in the least how pantheism (in my argument) attempts to reconcile the is-ought problem. Thus, this particular fallacy of division objection appears to be misdirected (attacking a position I was not presenting). Indeed, it isn't even clear that this particular objection is charging "fallacy of division" here.


Actually, it is not a definition of pantheism at all, it is the legitimation of pantheism given by the person who first thought-it-up.


Spinoza is not the person who thought up pantheism, however. Pantheism is millennia old and takes many different forms. I used a very generic (and not unorthodox) version: the universe/reality/existence being the supreme metaphysical reality; indeed this is pretty much the standard all-purpose definition of pantheism (it fits all or nearly all forms of pantheism). This version of pantheism does not at all imply that "everything that is, ought to be." Your objection here was misplaced, attacking a form of pantheism my claim did not possess.



Tist wrote:


3) There is a major difference between considering an airplane and considering the entirety of existence; so the fallacy of division does not even apply in this circumstance. In otherwords, because existence is the measure of truth to begin with, so the soundness of ANY argument has its bearing on existence itself. However, if there are things that exist, and somehow they ought not exist, then the use of an ought in a medium that is designated only for is statements only confounds the issue, producing contradictions that literally MAKE NO SENSE. So not only is your argument unsound because of this, it is also UN-INTELLIGIBLE!


If anything, it is this objection that is unintelligible, but I will try to make sense of it (please correct me if I have misunderstood you). The fallacy of division does not apply in this circumstance because...why exactly? The plane was just an illustration of how the fallacy of division could be applied. The fallacy of division is by no means unique to this. So why exactly does the fallacy of division not apply here? It is true that existence is the measure of truth to begin with; any mathematical truths that exist are (by definition) based in existence. But that does not imply, for instance, that units of existence (e.g. math students) will not occasionally get answers to math questions wrong. So the fallacy of division still seems to apply even when applied to existence.


So I'll break it down for you. This particular fallacy of division that you are claiming is closely related to the is/ought problem because you are claiming that I have a fallacy of division. I am saying that morality (an ought) cannot come from existence (an is).


Fine, but that doesn't mean that the B-claim logically follows or that the brute fact position doesn't imply pantheism.




It is also vastly unclear why units of existence not doing what they ought to do provides a contradiction. This seems like a kind of ought-is fallacy (going from what ought to be to what is). If the moral truth "People should not steal" is based in existence, this does not at all imply that people will necessarily not steal, and there is no violation of the law of noncontradiction when people steal in spite of the existence of the "People should not steal" truth.


"Vastly unclear". What is vastly unclear is how something like "people should not steal" can be based in existence. There is no rationale behind such a thing. The contradiction argument I presented (separate from my responses to fallacy of division, though linked) is that existence is the bottom line, the actual truth of reality. Because it is the truth of reality, it has a few properties. 1) Ought statements are irrelevant 2) Nothing can exist that does not exist.


None of this matters when it comes to the claim "Reality/existence saying how we ought to behave violates the law of noncontradiction when units of existence do not behave that way." The claim still doesn't logically follow.


You are well within your rights to say that something that exists isn't right, but it is a contradiction to use existence itself as a justification to say that the something that exists isn't right. If it exists, then that's it.


It's still vastly unclear why it's a contradiction. Consider this case. Reality (and more specifically a domain of reality called mathematics) says 1847 + 2385 = 4232. Now suppose a unit of reality (an elementary math student) mistakenly says on his exam that 1847 + 2385 = 2375. This event does not make "Reality says 1847 + 2385 = 4232 and a component of reality says otherwise" a logical contradiction. To think otherwise would make the fallacy of division. I think you need to explain clearly why "Reality/existence says how we ought to behave" provides a logical contradiction when a unit of reality gets it wrong; because it just doesn't seem to logically follow.



Where you are claiming that I am presenting a "Fallacy of Divison", I am claiming that you are presenting a "[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suppressed_correlative]Suppressed Correlative[/url]". You are saying "Morality exists, therefore existence is the basis of morality."


But I have never made any such claim. (If you look through my posts, I believe you'll have trouble finding this claim.)




If anything, you need to show some reason why the "universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" implies that individual units (as people) will necessarily behave morally and have correct judgments on how they ought to behave.


Actually, no. That is your proposition. I don't believe that "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" is true, much less that people will necessarily behave morally according to this principle.


(1) No, that is not my position, because I believe the claim is a non sequitur (2)I don't believe that "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" is true (3) I am simply claiming that "universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave implies that individual units (as people) will necessarily behave morally and have correct judgments on how they ought to behave" does not logically follow and you seem to think otherwise. That is the claim I have been arguing against.


I am not trying to conclude that because people ought to behave morally the they necessarily will


Then I am rather puzzled why you seem to be arguing in support of that conclusion.




Objective moral values being based in existence simply means they have real existence.


Again the supressed correlative.


What suppressed correlative? I wasn't saying that objective moral values actually exist, I said the statement "objective moral values being based in existence" means "they have real existence." I was simply describing what phrases mean.




If objective moral values exist, and if "People should not rape and kill" was a moral value, then it would by definition be immoral to rape and kill. Isn't that reason enough?


Actually, there is no reason given in this at all. You merely assert "people should not rape and kill."


I didn't actually assert that. You are conflating the antecedent with the actual claim. You said "There is no reason why these things [as raping and killing, when morality is based in existence] would be any more moral than immoral when we base them on existence." The reason, of course is that (1) if objective moral values were based in existence then they would (by definition) exist; and (2) if "People should not rape and kill" was a moral value, then it would by definition be immoral to rape and kill.



"If objective moral values exist, and "People should Rape and kill" is an objective moral value, then it would by definition be moral to rape and kill.


Yes, this would logically follow.




Perhaps existence will punish you in the afterlife, for instance. But even if it doesn't, the claim that "I got away with it, so reality doesn't say I was wrong" just doesn't logically follow.


Nor does it suppor the claim that the universe upholds morality with "supreme authority". This whole paragraph to which you were responding was meant to indict this little catch-phrase you keep using. Clearly the universe does not uphold morality with "supreme authority" if there is no consequence.


(1) I never said nor implied that it supported the claim that the universe upholds morality with "supreme authority." (2) The claim "Clearly the universe does not uphold morality with 'supreme authority' if there is no consequence" does not logically follow from the definition of "authority" I have been using. When I said the basis of morality had to be authoritative I very specifically said "authoritative" meant that people really ought to obey it. The fact that people ought not to commit murder does not imply that a person cannot commit murder in spite of what the basis of morality (whether it be reality in some general sense or the heart of God) says. In the context I was using it, authority is "the power to put forth statements of what to do (commands) that ought to be obeyed." Simply because reality/existence (the basis of morality under the brute fact position) says how we ought to behave (to e.g. not murder), and simply because one ought to e.g. refrain from murder, this does not imply someone will not murder. X possessing authority merely means that people ought to obey X, not that they necessarily will.

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 733
Posted 01/30/08 - 08:49 PM:
quote post
#493
Wosret wrote:


The people in this scenario have defined the terms 2, 4, and 5 with the same meanings we ascribe to them. However, they are incorrect about the implications of those definitions.


This is true by the conventions that we and apparently they use as well. Not independently of that.


Except the implications of those definitions are that "2 + 2 = 4" is true and that "2 + 2 = 5" is false even if everyone thinks otherwise, correct? That's the kind of objective truth I am referring to. The implications of those definitions is that "2 + 2 = 4" regardless of what people think, feel, and believe; isn't that true? (Note: by "independent" I am not referring to people changing the definitions to mean something else, for that would be the fallacy of equivocation given what I am actually arguing.)



In this scenario everyone thinks 2 + 2 = 5, and everyone thinks "2 + 2 = 4" is a false statement. Again, isn't it true that even if everyone thinks 2 + 2 did not equal 4, they would still be wrong? (Note: the definitions of 2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them, and it is the implications of those definitions that the people in this scenario disagree with us.) And if these people are wrong, would not this imply that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is independent of what people think, feel, or believe?


This scenerio doesn't make any sense it's convoluted and hell, and still is a non sequitur. Sure it's true in your scenerio but it does not follow to your conclusion, since you state "Note: the definitions of 2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them, and it is the implications of those definitions that the people in this scenario disagree with us." These are people. You state "2, 4, and 5 are the same as we define them". So they are obviously (quite obviously) not indepentent of what people think.


You're missing the point, just as you missed the point earlier when you said if everyone "thought that the terms meant something else, then that is exactly what they would mean" (when I was clearly referring to people who were using the same definitions). Suppose for instance the scenario was a Chinaman who does not know English and believes two plus two do not equal four. I do not literally mean he has the English words "two" and "four" in his vocabulary, I am only talking about the meaning of the concepts themselves. The Chinaman is still wrong when he thinks two plus two do not equal four, correct? Similarly, these people in my scenario are wrong when they think two plus two do not equal four, because the truth does not depend on what people think (note: I am talking about the meanings, not the definitions; remember the case of the Chinaman).

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Buddahchuck
Bodhisatva
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 16, 2006
Total Topics: 24
Total Posts: 550
Posted 01/31/08 - 02:35 PM:
quote post
#494
Tist wrote:

The fact (if it were so) that "There is no evidence that morality is a part of existence" has no bearing on whether B-claim logically follows. It also has no bearing on the validity of my claims #1 and #2.


So you really aren't saying anything. Only asserting a conditional, and conditionals alone have no necessary logic. What you are saying is not any more true than my saying:

If the sky were purple, the see would be orange.
If trees were marshmallows, we could eat smores everyday.
If rain had vitamin c, we wouldn't need to eat oranges.

All of these, while they may be true, are ultimately meaningless statements, and it would be useless for me to argue them with anybody for 200+ posts.


But if my argument is inconsequential, why are you responding to my posts?


Why are you posting? If you don't even believe in the brute fact position, and you don't believe in pantheism, you don't really have anything you are trying to justify, now do you?


The coin flipping scenario, however, is not plausible. Presenting an alternative form of objective morality apart from the brute fact position is inconsequential if that alternative is ludicrous.


Exactly. And the brute fact position is ludicrous, equally as ludicrous as the coin flipping scenario. Now you understand why your argument is moronic.


Spinoza is not the person who thought up pantheism


Uh, in philosophy, yes he is.


Your objection here was misplaced, attacking a form of pantheism my claim did not possess.


And if you even understood my objection, y