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Moral Argument for God
Wolfman
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Posted 05/14/07 - 02:10 PM:
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#26
Mariner wrote:
Actually, there is no possible or imaginable category of acts better founded than this one. Every act of knowledge (X knows Y) is an act without witness, for instance.


No, what I mean't was this specific case of acts without witness. It is an appeal to the supernatural, and remains dubious and unfounded in my view. Moral evolution coincides with the processes of evolution, for which there is ample evidence. If moral consciousness is indeed imparted to man by divine Providence, my question is, when did this occur?

"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing." - Socrates
"The only tyrant I accept in this world is the still voice within." - Gandhi
"Metaphysics is a dark ocean without shores or lighthouse, strewn with many a philosophic wreck." - Kant
"It is better to do one's own duty, however defective it may be, than to follow the duty of another, however well one may perform it. He who does his duty as his own nature reveals it, never sins." - Lao Tzu
Calcutechnician
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Posted 05/14/07 - 03:12 PM:
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#27
Mariner wrote:


Actually, there is no possible or imaginable category of acts better founded than this one. Every act of knowledge (X knows Y) is an act without witness, for instance.



Does the witness need to be external to the act?

Or, to avoid semantics, can't the concious individual fill in the roll of the witness, since he can recognise the existence of other 'immanent' conciousnesses?

Do acts without witness really suppose 'God', or might there be other explanations? For example a number of gods, or benevolant space-aliens.

(I think Hume's criticism of the argument from intelligent design, that he wrote three hundred godamn years ago, might also be applied here.)



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Mariner
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Posted 05/14/07 - 07:33 PM:
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#28
Wolfman wrote:


No, what I mean't was this specific case of acts without witness. It is an appeal to the supernatural, and remains dubious and unfounded in my view.


What is "this specific case"? I don't know what you mean, since I referred to a whole category of acts.

Moral evolution coincides with the processes of evolution, for which there is ample evidence. If moral consciousness is indeed imparted to man by divine Providence, my question is, when did this occur?


My answer is, I have no idea (nor do I care too much about it). Now, will you answer my question? How can naturalistic processes allow intellectual and moral traits to "take root"? Get your hands dirty, friend smiling face. Show me how moral evolution "coincides with the processes of evolution" (taking particular care to avoid solutions which involve "group selection", which is the ban of evolutionary psychology. These guys really should re-read their Darwin, or their Hamilton for that matter, before talking about this).

***

Calcutechnician wrote:
Does the witness need to be external to the act?

Or, to avoid semantics, can't the concious individual fill in the roll of the witness, since he can recognise the existence of other 'immanent' conciousnesses?


The answer is clear in the first post of mine here. No, the witness need not (and actually cannot) be external to the act. And the conscious individual certainly can (I would phrase it as "must", but I'm answering your question) fill in the role of the witness.

(I think Hume's criticism of the argument from intelligent design, that he wrote three hundred godamn years ago, might also be applied here.)


Unfortunately, this has absolutely nothing to do with what we're discussing. (If I had a dollar for every poster who replies to some bogey argument rather than to what was posted, I'd be very, very rich grin). Intelligent design and the moral argument are not the same thing. (Hard to miss the differences -- try to catch a glimpse of intelligent design in my argument and you'll get an imaginary dollar yourself wink. I used to teach evolution -- just so you know).

"In faith there is enough light for those who want to believe and enough shadows to blind those who don't." -- Blaise Pascal

"The more I am by myself and alone, the more I have come to love myths" -- Aristotle in his later years
Wosret
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Posted 05/14/07 - 08:11 PM:
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#29
Mariner wrote:


No, it isn't.

And there isn't much more to be said about yout outburst. I hope you'll try to read what was written, the next time you try to address it.


Um...that is what I got out of it. Otherwise what exactly did he mean by other a few people have the ability to know what real morality is, however anyone can be taught. That certainly sounds to me like he was saying that only his view of morality is right, and anyone who has a different one needs education.

My outburst? Ohwell, whatever.

What little you wrote and story means nothing anyway, it is simply someone's opinion on the subject, it added nothing really. So instead of even trying to argue, since it isn't even your opinion, and you obviously cannot answer for the writter, it was a waste of time to even bother reading really.


Mariner wrote:

Re-read the article and you may grasp it. Pay special attention to the distinction between morality and "group survival", and particularly the opposition between these two concepts.

Morality is not group instinct. It is very far from being group instinct. 9-year old boys running loose are governed by "group instinct", but no one would confuse their behavior with "morality", especially if one has actually seen a bunch of boys of that age.

And, honestly, if anyone does not understand this, he shouldn't be discussing morality.


Sorry, I guess I used a single term out of place, giving you fodder to attack and ignore the point. When I said group survival, I only meant how well a group interacts with each other is important toward the groups long term survival. Being moral to one and other within a society greater improves it's chances of survival. Therefore morality is advantageous to a societies continued suvival. Anyway, my point was that even though humans are the only animals that we know of capable of conceptualizing morality does not mean that we have a monopoly on morality. We wittness what we would preceive as morality in the wild in almost all mamilian societies. Also the fact that another mamals suffer from anti-social personality disorder, making them unempathetic, violent, and detached, shows that morality is effected by the brain, and not only human brains.

Are you actually going to reply this time? Or act like I'm an idiot and then just dismiss what I've said? Like you seem to have done to everyone else as well.




Edited by Wosret on 05/14/07 - 08:17 PM

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Posted 05/14/07 - 08:48 PM:
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#30
Mariner, in the interests of brevity I will avoid quoting you. However based upon your views and articles, do I understand that although you do not belive that morality is an absolute standard but can (and sometimes does) arise immutably within individuals. And that is is not explainable by a natural system like evolution? You then imply (without offering a logical view - perhaps I have skipped over it), that this propensity must therefore support the existence of a God?

You also mention that morality imbues a tendency to universalise ones judgments. ie. that in doing so, we somehow arrive at a sense of a universal standard although it has arisen at an individual level. If I have understood you correctly, I do no understand how this tendency becomes the essence, rather than just one its properties. Much of the argument in this thread shows how polarised the opposing ideas of universal and relative morality are, regardless of how this actually arises. If we were able to distinguish between this, perhaps that should shed light upon the existence of a divinity, or are the discussions inseperable?
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Posted 05/14/07 - 10:26 PM:
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#31
Mariner wrote:
What is "this specific case"? I don't know what you mean, since I referred to a whole category of acts.


OK; and I was refering to moral consciousness derived from divine Providence.

Mariner wrote:
My answer is, I have no idea (nor do I care too much about it). Now, will you answer my question? How can naturalistic processes allow intellectual and moral traits to "take root"? Get your hands dirty, friend smiling face. Show me how moral evolution "coincides with the processes of evolution" (taking particular care to avoid solutions which involve "group selection", which is the ban of evolutionary psychology. These guys really should re-read their Darwin, or their Hamilton for that matter, before talking about this).


I missed your last question. All of our best research indicates that hominoids possessed less intellectual capacity than modern man, and naturally, hominids, the branch of hominoids that the human line is found in, possessed greater intellectual capacity than hominoids. As the intellectual capacity gradually became greater in the hominid line over the course of several million years, we would be less driven by instinct. This is indicative in man's self-awareness, an element of the human condition that complements man's strive for perfection, i.e., that which is more desirable, advantageous, ideal, etc., through which morality is formulated. I feel that this is the best explanation for the development of morality.

Edited by Wolfman on 05/14/07 - 10:38 PM

"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing." - Socrates
"The only tyrant I accept in this world is the still voice within." - Gandhi
"Metaphysics is a dark ocean without shores or lighthouse, strewn with many a philosophic wreck." - Kant
"It is better to do one's own duty, however defective it may be, than to follow the duty of another, however well one may perform it. He who does his duty as his own nature reveals it, never sins." - Lao Tzu
Calcutechnician
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Posted 05/14/07 - 11:03 PM:
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#32
Actually, I wasn't saying they where the same thing, only that hume's criticism can be similarly applied, that is to say:

The criticism that we cannot any anything about the first mover or an intelligent designer could also be applied to this case, since we know nothing about the being that supposedly created us moral.

I still don't understand why mankind's inability, if he is indeed unable, to explain how we are moral necessitates God, unless it involves some kind of false dilemma... i.e. not evolution, therefore God. There might be other options.

If evolution cannot explain morailty then our theory of evolution is flawed, however, this doesn't pave a magical yellow brick road for God.

I also have a faint tickling of 'the selifsh gene' ringing in the back of my head. I'm going to read it at the library today and see what it says.


Edited by Calcutechnician on 05/14/07 - 11:10 PM

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Posted 05/15/07 - 08:34 AM:
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#33
Wosret wrote:

Are you actually going to reply this time? Or act like I'm an idiot and then just dismiss what I've said? Like you seem to have done to everyone else as well.


When a reply is idiotic, I have no qualms in calling it idiotic. For instance, this is idiotic:

wosret wrote:
What little you wrote and story means nothing anyway, it is simply someone's opinion on the subject, it added nothing really. So instead of even trying to argue, since it isn't even your opinion, and you obviously cannot answer for the writter, it was a waste of time to even bother reading really.


Why should I bother to reply to someone who thinks it is a waste of time to read what I write?

I can only hope that when you try to address what I wrote, you won't be idiotic. So far, you haven't tried. I don't know whether you are an idiot or not, but I sure know that your replies have been... idiotic. (Not least when you imply that I've addressed everybody identically -- there have been idiotic answers and non-idiotic answers, but perhaps you thought that reading other posts was a waste of time as well).

***

TMB wrote:
...do I understand that although you do not belive that morality is an absolute standard but can (and sometimes does) arise immutably within individuals. And that is is not explainable by a natural system like evolution? You then imply (without offering a logical view - perhaps I have skipped over it), that this propensity must therefore support the existence of a God?


I'm not sure of what you mean when you talk about morality "arising immutably within individuals". Does it mean that people cannot change their moral views? If so, I disagree. But perhaps it means something else, please clarify.

I certainly believe that the phenomenon of morality (as distinguished from the content of morality -- and this is an important distinction) is not explainable by evolution. For the very good reason that evolution cannot select for moral instincts, which are, by definition, free -- metaphysically free. (If they are not free, they are not moral instincts). Moral instincts are, therefore, beyond the range of evolution's "radar" (as are intellectual properties, by the way, but this is a more subtle argument). Evolution can only deal with increases in fitness which result from gene frequencies; this cannot account for morality. (Although it can account for "group instincts").

Finally, you are right that I imply that this phenomenon is evidence for God. I'd accept the clarification that it is evidence for non-natural properties; it is natural for me grin to associate "non-natural properties" with God, but I'd have to agree to an hypothetical objection that the non-natural field is a given, and that God has nothing to do with it.

What is untenable on the face of it is the belief that the non-natural field does not exist, or that it can arise through natural means. Which is pretty much how everybody was replying to Benedict's original post, and why I came into this thread in the first place. These untenable beliefs belie a fundamental misunderstanding of what morality is.

You also mention that morality imbues a tendency to universalise ones judgments. ie. that in doing so, we somehow arrive at a sense of a universal standard although it has arisen at an individual level. If I have understood you correctly, I do no understand how this tendency becomes the essence, rather than just one its properties.


Let me see if I understand your question here. You are saying that the essence of morality is not the universalization; that this is merely one of its properties. Perhaps you're right; but then what is the essence?

I claim that the universalization is the essence because that's what distinguishes a moral claim from a non-moral claim. "You should not murder" and "You should not eat chocolate ice-cream" are easily indentifiable (by any sane human being) as belonging to different categories, and the main difference is that the latter can be replied with "that's your opinion, I couldn't care less", and no one will mind, but if you try this reply to the former, you are immoral.

(Subject to the umpteen qualifications of "murder" which we see in every discussion about morality, of course. As regards myself, I am much more stubborn about this than the majority of people, and would include lots of "self-defense" scenarios under this prohibition, but everybody would agree that whatever is classified as "murder" should not be done, unlike "eating chocolate ice-cream").

The essence of morality, then, is that it is binding on others. (In other words, it is universalizable, even though it must be born as an individual judgment).

What is your candidate for "the essence"?

Much of the argument in this thread shows how polarised the opposing ideas of universal and relative morality are, regardless of how this actually arises. If we were able to distinguish between this, perhaps that should shed light upon the existence of a divinity, or are the discussions inseperable?


The ordinary distinction between universal and relative morality is one of content, not of form. (I know, this appears to be inverted grin). All morality is universal. In other words, a dialogue between the Pope and an abortionist (to pick extreme examples) that concludes that none can convince the other about the righteousness of his position does not mean that "morality is relative". The Pope will still believe that the abortionist is wrong, and vice-versa. The moment in which one of them drops the claim of being right about this matter is the moment in which this ceases to be a moral dialogue.

"Relative morality" is, therefore, a relative confusion grin. It is usually meant as a defense of free will and of the human liberty to choose its own views, and as such, it is commendable. But when it tries to say that there are different moralities which can co-exist even while being diametrically opposed to each other, it is in effect denying the existence of any morality. (And it is not "relative morality" any more).

Re your last question: since time immemorial (at least since Homer), the existence of morality has been taken as evidence for the existence of god(s). I suppose we can posit the existence of morality without positing the existence of god(s), but this will amount to a major cop-out in my opinion. It is equivalent to saying that there are 5 fundamental forces in the world, gravity, electromagnetic, weak nuclear, strong nuclear... and morality, and that while the other 4 are somehow linked to each other (hopefully through a coming unified theory), the fifth is unique and unrelated to anything else.

It is much, much easier to accept the accumulated wisdom of mankind and to agree that morality is evidence for god(s), at least in my view.

***

Wolfman wrote:
OK; and I was refering to moral consciousness derived from divine Providence.


But this was not witnessed by anyone. It is a speculation. It is "theory". The data of the theory is the moral experience (as exemplified by Schweitzer's tale). It happens to be a parsimonious theory, and to fit the data better than any naturalistic explanation, but it is still theory (and as I said above in reply to TMB, we can refuse to accept it while still taking the data into account).

I missed your last question. All of our best research indicates that hominoids possessed less intellectual capacity than modern man, and naturally, hominids, the branch of hominoids that the human line is found in, possessed greater intellectual capacity than hominoids. As the intellectual capacity gradually became greater in the hominid line over the course of several million years, we would be less driven by instinct. This is indicative in man's self-awareness, an element of the human condition that complements man's strive for perfection, i.e., that which is more desirable, advantageous, ideal, etc., through which morality is formulated. I feel that this is the best explanation for the development of morality.


Intellectual capacity, as its name bears out, is a ... capacity. How this capacity was actualized (through the development of intellectual essences) is the question, because a purely naturalistic world has no essences. Here, evolution is at a very delicate position. If everything is the result of movements which are either random or determined by mechanistic laws, there cannot be any essence. But our thinking is fueled by essences. Hence, there are two roads open to the evolutionist here:

1) Essences really do not exist; we project them as part of our mechanism for survival.
2) Essences exist, and there is something else apart from naturalistic processes going on.

(1) may look superficially attractive, but it would really mean that the theory of evolution itself is projected upon the world, i.e., that it has no claim to be true or not. (Neither would the proposition "the sun has risen today" have this claim, by the way, since it depends on essences).

We have drifted a bit from morality into the problem of essences, but these two are not unrelated. Moral essences are more obviously problematic than merely intellectual essences (e.g. "murder" vs. "chair"), but both are difficult to reconcile with a purely naturalistic worldview.

***

Calcutechnician wrote:
The criticism that we cannot any anything about the first mover or an intelligent designer could also be applied to this case, since we know nothing about the being that supposedly created us moral.

I still don't understand why mankind's inability, if he is indeed unable, to explain how we are moral necessitates God, unless it involves some kind of false dilemma... i.e. not evolution, therefore God. There might be other options.


I agree. This is the criticism of "the theory", though; the data (moral experiences) remain there to be explained.

If evolution cannot explain morailty then our theory of evolution is flawed, however, this doesn't pave a magical yellow brick road for God.


It depends on what you understand as "God". Most people (especially in this kind of discussion) have a "grand old man in the sky" picture of God, but this is not how philosophers, poets, and prophets think of Him, since for ever. The Divine as the source of intelligibility and morality in the world is basically a tautology if you look at the problem through their eyes; which is why atheism is so rare among these classes (if you look at it historically).

Nowadays, of course, there are many philosophers, poets, and prophets who never thought about these matters, and who think that God is a sadomasochistic father figure. We live in atypical times, though.

Whatever is your chosen theory, though, the problem remains -- explaining intelligibility and morality. To say "they are givens" is tenable, but awfully... lazy smiling face.

I also have a faint tickling of 'the selfish gene' ringing in the back of my head. I'm going to read it at the library today and see what it says.


By far Dawkins' best book. He completely sidesteps our problem (he doesn't know much about philosophy or metaphysics), but it is still a very good book for those interested in biology.
Wosret
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Posted 05/15/07 - 08:44 AM:
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#34
Mariner wrote:


When a reply is idiotic, I have no qualms in calling it idiotic. For instance, this is idiotic:



ROFL. Guess not.

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Posted 05/15/07 - 09:04 AM:
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#35
Mariner wrote
evolution cannot select for moral instincts, which are, by definition, free -- metaphysically free. (If they are not free, they are not moral instincts).

Can you explain this further? How are you using instinct? Are you implying a distinction between the physical and the metaphysical wrt instinct?


AH HAH! . . . said with a rising inflection.
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Posted 05/15/07 - 11:14 AM:
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#36
Mariner,

My assertion was that the process of assigning moral values is a subjective one that exists within the brain. As the brain further developed, the processes by which we formulate morality would develop as well. In other words, our sense of morality developed alongside our intellectual growth.

Clearly, moral judgments held by hominids have evolved as they became more intelligent. Compare some of the modern approaches to ethics to how early hominids lived. Many of us would look at the world of the australopithecines africanus and robustus in a negative light. There was constant group conflict, killing, and cannibalization. None of these behaviors were considered aberrant in the early hominid line; in fact, they occured quite regularly. These early hominids were essentially Hobbesian, being short (no pun intended, they stood three feet tall), brutish, and nasty; at least by modern standards. In today's society, these things still occur, but they are largely considered counteractive and/or deviant practices in much of the modern [Western] world.

I do not subscribe to the notion that there exists moral essences, rather that the formation of morality correlates to the intellectual growth of the brain. This view is also congruent with my idea that morality is formulated via subjective processes, i.e., developed in the brain.

Similarly, I would assert that the terms turtle or tortuga are not intrinsic values of a turtle, rather that they are terms assigned to turtles by man.

I respect your position, but I can not agree with it.

Edited by Wolfman on 05/15/07 - 01:02 PM. Reason: spelling

"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing." - Socrates
"The only tyrant I accept in this world is the still voice within." - Gandhi
"Metaphysics is a dark ocean without shores or lighthouse, strewn with many a philosophic wreck." - Kant
"It is better to do one's own duty, however defective it may be, than to follow the duty of another, however well one may perform it. He who does his duty as his own nature reveals it, never sins." - Lao Tzu
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Posted 05/15/07 - 12:42 PM:
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#37
Mariner wrote:


I certainly believe that the phenomenon of morality (as distinguished from the content of morality -- and this is an important distinction) is not explainable by evolution. For the very good reason that evolution cannot select for moral instincts, which are, by definition, free -- metaphysically free. (If they are not free, they are not moral instincts). Moral instincts are, therefore, beyond the range of evolution's "radar" (as are intellectual properties, by the way, but this is a more subtle argument). Evolution can only deal with increases in fitness which result from gene frequencies; this cannot account for morality. (Although it can account for "group instincts").

You will have to explain these claims - they don't seem to be right in any way. Perhaps a start would be to explain what you mean by 'metaphysically free'?
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Posted 05/15/07 - 01:40 PM:
Subject: Law vs Intuition
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#38
The moral argument stated above depends on the language you use. Here it is, as above:

The Argument is best summed up in the following:
1.There is a universal moral law
2.Such a moral law would imply a Law Giver
3.Thus, God exists as the Law Giver

Let's change the words slightly:

1.There is a universal moral intuition
2.Such a moral intuition would imply a subject
3.Thus, subjects exists as intuitive moralisers

What is "moral intuition"? It is the same as the moral law above - the sense that something is not fair or evil. Children have this sense before they even know who/what God/s or laws are. This is because the sense of "rightness" is an evolved sense that is a result of our social and inter-personal nature. In essence, all people are born with certain moral intuitions that elicite responses of disgust, outrage, sadness, etc. Obviously though, socialisation can alter, suppress, or enhance these basic, primate, feelings.

Thus, the moral argument for God is just another theological error. There is no law-making, only the development of socially-based feelings.
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Posted 05/15/07 - 01:49 PM:
Subject: do dogs feel guilty?
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#39
Wolfman wrote:

Clearly, moral judgments held by hominids have evolved as they became more intelligent.


It is also clear that moral judgments about what is right or wrong are made by our distant cousins, like Chimps and Bonobos. If a chimp is attacked, it will run away screaming if it does not attack back. It has a sense of wrongess, which is why is screams in anger and fear and either fights or runs - because the attack is wrong. It may nurse a grudge and exact revenge. It may form a coalition with friends and relatives (both are acts of justice - righting the wrong). The attacker may not see it that way, and may have attacked out of its own sense of wrongness.

Of course, these judgments became more refined as humans developed culture and intellect, but the basic feelings are the same.
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Posted 05/18/07 - 01:29 AM:
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#40
HI Mariner, you say,


I'm not sure of what you mean when you talk about morality "arising immutably within individuals". Does it mean that people cannot change their moral views? If so, I disagree. But perhaps it means something else, please clarify.



Perhaps I incorrectly paraphrased your earlier comment when you said this.


It is rather that we, humans, are beings with a propensity for morality which is not explainable by natural means. And I explicity include evolution in the list of "natural means".



I am not stating that I think morality exists as something inexplicable (by natural means). I was attempting to encapsulate your view and ask questions around it. However, since you ask me, let me give you my view on this. I imagine that we are quite capable of changing our moral views, and this does arise from something within ourselves. However I imagine this to be something quite natural and subject to processes like evolution. Just as we have an evolved faculty for language allowing us to learn to speak a variety of dialects, does not mean we are born with specific dialects already formed. We are born with the ability to produce, learn and communicate in a dialect. I believe that same applies to our ability to form moral judgments.

I certainly believe that the phenomenon of morality (as distinguished from the content of morality -- and this is an important distinction) is not explainable by evolution.


I am not sure if you are saying with certainty that evolution CANNOT explain this, and it is a proven and logical fact that it cannot. Or if you are saying that because we incompletely understand the mechanisms of material evolution as they affect ethereal aspects like intellect?

Although morality as a phenomenon is different to the content, (I presume by this you mean actual moral positions on specific scenarios). I can understand that a moral view of NOT killing others can be adaptive, just as a moral view of killing others could also be adaptive (ie. It is likely we could describe scenarios where both could be adaptive, and if the mechanism that produces these is heritable, then evolution can produce them.)

If moral content is a product of the concept of morality, and morality is a product of the human mind, in turn a product of the human brain, blah, blah blah then evolution is the underlying process making this possible. I accept that there are emergent properties, however this does not remove the underlying mechanisms, it just means one needs to be careful of making predictions based upon the pieces as to what whole it produces. That a specific moral position is looked at and found NOT to be adaptive is also possible, but it can still arise as a result of evolution, even if it does not bestow fitness. So I do not see how this disqualifies morality from evolving.

For the very good reason that evolution cannot select for moral instincts, which are, by definition, free -- metaphysically free. (If they are not free, they are not moral instincts).


I do not understand this statement. Why are moral instincts free? Why have you defined them in such a way to disqualify them as being a product of natural selection, regardless of them being free or not free? Even if we defined them to be free and then applied them to explain the process by which we designate right and wrong and control behaviour accordingly, how does this exclude evolution? Are you not building a framework that will automatically produce the required answer?

You have also said that it is metaphysically free. To avoid any misunderstanding of the use of this term are you able to just describe the properties you are trying to apply to the term metaphysical without using the word?

Moral instincts are, therefore, beyond the range of evolution's "radar" (as are intellectual properties, by the way, but this is a more subtle argument). Evolution can only deal with increases in fitness which result from gene frequencies; this cannot account for morality.


I am not comfortable with the assumptions used to arrive here, so I do not, as yet, accept your conclusion.

If I understand you correctly you are positing that because evolution produces only increases in fitness, via the process of genetic selection, things like intellectual properties as well as this moral instinct, are not subject to evolution. However, these properties do arise from faculties that are directly subject to evolution, and without the existence of these faculties there would not be a moral instinct, or an intellect.

In order for this scenario to work surely you require something supernatural to exist that is independent of the material system and its evolution. It also means that non material aspects of material evolution are somehow freed from certain implications of their material source, although if that source were removed, things like moral instinct and intellect would also disappear. How do you support this?

In addition, fitness is not a requirement of evolution. The concept of spandrels allows the existence of features that do not improve fitness, but still arise as a direct result of evolution. Why can moral instinct (MI) not be one of these? Or alternatively, if moral instinct does bestow fitness and we can trace all inclusive steps to our genes for the existence of MI, then it still qualifies.

(Although it can account for "group instincts").


You are saying that although evolution cannot account for moral instincts or intellectual properties, it can account for group instincts (GI). What is a group instinct and how does evolution account for them?

Finally, you are right that I imply that this phenomenon is evidence for God. I'd accept the clarification that it is evidence for non-natural properties; it is natural for me to associate "non-natural properties" with God, but I'd have to agree to an hypothetical objection that the non-natural field is a given, and that God has nothing to do with it.


What do you mean by the term ‘non-natural’? I cannot see how the above accounts for the existence of something that could be termed as not being natural or of some derivative, unless you specifically set apart something that is unnatural. And since this is according to your definition and not based upon external criteria, you are certain to return to this self proven position. Setting aside a divinity, something that is counter factual and counter intuitive, what sets moral instinct and intellectual properties apart from ‘natural’ things? I understand it is possible to use the terms natural and non-natural as a way to set things apart, however these are just labels used to describe certain properties. Perhaps we should restrict ourselves to descriptions to avoid the semantic bog?

What is untenable on the face of it is the belief that the non-natural field does not exist, or that it can arise through natural means.


Surely this just depends upon what you regard as narural and non-natural. If you choose to regard the intellect and morality as being non natural, and the brain and evolution as natural, once again you are sure to fulfil the requirements you set up for these. I have no issue with setting apart the brain and the mind and something like morality. I am less able to justify putting a divinity in the same basket as an intellectual concept or morality, unless we define it in such a way as to make this possible. In which case, as with some of the points above, this is using a definition of the term ‘non natural’ within the definition itself and it will always result in a false positive outcome.

Which is pretty much how everybody was replying to Benedict's original post, and why I came into this thread in the first place. These untenable beliefs belie a fundamental misunderstanding of what morality is.


Or how we have chosen to define it. If we decide that morality has supernatural origins, then we have constructed a defence that prevents us from straying for this definition, however that takes us back to the need to establish the certainty of a supernatural being. If, however, morality is a social construct then any misunderstanding of morality is due to ignorance of how we ourselves have defined it.

We are in a position to define what it is we want morality to be, and it carries a weight of social opinion and a life of its own. Lets remove the name ‘morality’ completely and just call it ‘factor-x’. Lets start with a clean slate and apply all properties this factor-x should have and see how it works with natural and non-natural forces.

Let me see if I understand your question here. You are saying that the essence of morality is not the universalization; that this is merely one of its properties. Perhaps you're right; but then what is the essence?


I meant moral essence as I understand you to position moral content. In the sense that morality is able to create a perception of universal judgment, however this does not describe the content of morality, merely that it acts upon whatever the content of the morality. For example, we might consider that murder is morally wrong, or we might consider it morally right. In both cases we can still see these as universally applicable, although the content is at direct odds with each other. Being universal does not affect certain aspects of what we judge, but it will instil a sense of universality to them.

I claim that the universalization is the essence because that's what distinguishes a moral claim from a non-moral claim. "You should not murder" and "You should not eat chocolate ice-cream" are easily indentifiable (by any sane human being) as belonging to different categories, and the main difference is that the latter can be replied with "that's your opinion, I couldn't care less", and no one will mind, but if you try this reply to the former, you are immoral.


For one culture it might be immoral NOT to eat the remains of your dead father, as this would show disrespect for the ancestral dead. Or we eat the flesh of our enemies, or we cut off and shrink their heads and sell them to rich tourists. None of the actions carries innate morality within the action. It requires someone to take a moral position on the action, the morality is within the person (as they define it), not the object (or it could be imposed by a supernatural agent). I agree that eating not eating icecream might seem innocuous but that’s just the way we have defined it. That there are some obvious characteristics to most of the choices we have made on morality is due to evolutionary outcomes favouring things that are adaptive. This means we are unlikely to need a moral view on many things, while others we do need to judge. This still does not mean the morality resides in the object or behaviour. It still lies within our minds and social structures.

I am only immoral by killing someone because we as a society agree that it should be judged this way. Just as others have decided it might not be. We have examples of both, and in each case we can see how some aspect of survival of a person or group is affected by this. This proving requires an understanding of fundamental forces of nature that drive the way we operate. We have not done this in this discussion, and many of these not not well understood or agreed.

(Subject to the umpteen qualifications of "murder" which we see in every discussion about morality, of course. As regards myself, I am much more stubborn about this than the majority of people, and would include lots of "self-defense" scenarios under this prohibition, but everybody would agree that whatever is classified as "murder" should not be done, unlike "eating chocolate ice-cream").




There is a difference between what a group thinks should not be done, how extreme this prohibition is, and what consequences are applied. Aside from capital, corporal punishment, deprivation of liberty etc, another way is to mould behaviour through properties like shame, disgust, etc into a moral fabric.

The essence of morality, then, is that it is binding on others. (In other words, it is universalizable, even though it must be born as an individual judgment).




I agree that binding upon others is a property of this, but I do not agree with the universal aspect, because this is still qualified into ‘other people’, ie. Relative. Universal cannot be qualified, otherwise, by definition, it is relative.

What do you mean ‘born as an individual judgment’? If we have common moral standards. Ie. All people living in the village of head hunters, agree that head hunting is morally acceptable, is it possible that all these people have an innate disposition to become this way, or do they acquire if from their community, and express it through their innate capacity to form a moral position?

The ordinary distinction between universal and relative morality is one of content, not of form. (I know, this appears to be inverted ).





I do not see this as inverted, I see it as having no context, except as how you are creating this. This might arise from taking the a priori view of where absolute and relative will end up, as opposed to taking observations of reality and grouping properties based upon similarities and differences and then applying a label. If we observe things that have properties of impermanence, culturally formed, changing etc, then we might decide that a label of ‘relative’ will be applied. Or equally we could call it X. Those that display properties of immutability, eternal etc we might decide universal applies here, or equally we could call it Y. Our disconnect occurs because we have formed a ‘character’ in the word, independent of the properties it describes, and we are led by this some a high degree and we bend meanings to fit into this.



All morality is universal.







We can define it any way we like, however it is the presence of properties like eternal, immutable that we are actually seeking. Does morality display these? It does not appear to. In that case we can call it universal if you chose, but it will not bestow eternal and immutable properties to it.




In other words, a dialogue between the Pope and an abortionist (to pick extreme examples) that concludes that none can convince the other about the righteousness of his position does not mean that "morality is relative".





Again this will depend upon our use of semantics. Nothing actually means that morality is relative. There are properties of behaviour in the world and ways in which we judge them. What are the properties of these? If they show themselves to be immutable and eternal, then we can give them any label we wish, but the properties are key, not the label.


The Pope will still believe that the abortionist is wrong, and vice-versa. The moment in which one of them drops the claim of being right about this matter is the moment in which this ceases to be a moral dialogue.





If that is how you have defined the use of the term ‘moral’. You appear to have decided that these properties fit this definition of moral. However, to get real outcomes it is the actual properties of the reality around us that we claim to be interested in. Yet this debate is just around labels and how we want to use them to justify a position, and properties are mostly overlooked.

"Relative morality" is, therefore, a relative confusion





Not necessarily, you can define it such that you avoid this, in fact the way you have defined it has pretty much avoided this. If you are working with labels and not meanings/properties then it becomes an endless circular debate, always returning to the same point of meaninglessness.




It is usually meant as a defense of free will and of the human liberty to choose its own views, and as such, it is commendable.





How is relative morality meant defend free will? Do you mean that individuals or groups are able to choose their own views, independent of external forces? Would this include independence of a cause and effect process?




But when it tries to say that there are different moralities which can co-exist even while being diametrically opposed to each other, it is in effect denying the existence of any morality. (And it is not "relative morality" any more).





It can be if that is how we define the label. Once again I am seeing you ascribe properties to a label that has its own baggage and ability to influence our thinking and opinions.

Re your last question: since time immemorial (at least since Homer), the existence of morality has been taken as evidence for the existence of god(s).



Are you presenting gods as causing morality? That morality exists, therefore gods must also exist because gods caused morality?




I suppose we can posit the existence of morality without positing the existence of god(s), but this will amount to a major cop-out in my opinion.





That depends. We could view morality based upon observable properties and make a judgment without an a priori god and see if the evidence and logic support it.




It is equivalent to saying that there are 5 fundamental forces in the world, gravity, electromagnetic, weak nuclear, strong nuclear... and morality, and that while the other 4 are somehow linked to each other (hopefully through a coming unified theory), the fifth is unique and unrelated to anything else.





We could do this, what does the evidence and logic support this view? Do we have evidence to support that morality is unique, and unrelated to anything else. I am aware of logic and evidence to show that it does arise from human social systems, appears to be linked with conformant behaviour, designed to produce socially acceptable behaviour. This behaviour is furthermore aimed at producing harmony within the group (even if at the expense of individuals). There is logic so show that group harmony allows social scaling well beyond other primates.

It is much, much easier to accept the accumulated wisdom of mankind and to agree that morality is evidence for god(s), at least in my view.





It is very easy to take what passes as wisdom, and this is probably why it is so prevalent. The same mechanism of conformance that produces morality produces many examples where we accept various ideas from those around us. We follow cosmetic fashion, even at the expense of our health. We insist (up to a point) that the earth must be flat, not because it is, but because this is the prevailing belief. Going against social thinking is difficult, so much so that it might not be adaptive and gets selected out of the species. Most radical thinking has caused its owner to suffer major trauma. Galileo, Socrates etc did not have it easy.


Edited by dreamweaver on 06/20/07 - 04:38 PM. Reason: taking out smilies
Tisthammerw
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Posted 05/19/07 - 06:28 AM:
Subject: Objective moral values as evidence for the existence of God
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#41
I originally had another thread devoted to this topic, but I thought it might be more appropriate to place this argument here.

Are objective moral values evidence for the existence of God? Here’s how I see it. The general idea is that ethics says what ought to be, but what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be? Theism has an answer: ethics are grounded in the heart of God. By definition, God is the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality transcending all else. Thus, if objective moral values were grounded in the heart of God they would possess a supremely transcendent source of authority. In contrast, atheism provides no source for morality.

What about objective morality being a brute fact? On this argument, moral statements of what ought to be do not need any basis or source for existence. Objective morality is just a “brute fact,” not requiring further explanation. There is no point in asking why or how objective morality exists, it just is.

But this has potential problems. Consider this argument. If objective morality has literally no source and no basis, then there is literally nothing that says Hitler was wrong when he believed he should slaughter millions of Jews. Here some atheists might object, saying that is not what they mean by objective morality being a brute fact. It is reality that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says what ought to be. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe (as a person or culture) that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself.

By attributing the universe with supreme metaphysical authority over right and wrong above us mortals, this would by definition be accepting some form of pantheism. A more general definition of God is “the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality.” Pantheism is equating God with the universe/reality/existence (it should be noted that some of the traditional aspects of God—like omnipotence and consciousness—are not necessarily associated with pantheism). But even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics.

This pantheistic God might not contain consciousness but would have to possess supremely transcendent moral authority (transcending all peoples and cultures) while also possessing perfect moral correctness (it cannot be mistaken about what is right).

This pantheistic God must also be omnipresent—assuming morals are valid and binding regardless of who you are and where you are. Interestingly, this pantheistic God must also be incorporeal if objective morality is not dependent on collections of atoms. Suppose for instance we took everything away from the physical universe except Mount Rushmore. Would Mount Rushmore be the source of objective moral values? No, moral values are incorporeal and their underlying basis (the supreme metaphysical reality that says what ought to be) must also be incorporeal. This pantheistic God must also be eternal—assuming morals are valid and binding regardless of when you are.

Yet the necessity of a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral is treading awfully close to theism. Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person.

So even if it’s not an outright proof, to the very least the existence of objective morality still seems to provide strong evidence for theism (by implying the existence of a God that is transcendent, omnipresent, perfectly moral etc.).

Any thoughts on this?





[discussion moved from another thread]:

greenmagi wrote:
Perhaps morality is evidence for a god's existence, regardless of there being no proof of it. However, it would not be a moral code set forth from religious texts.


Maybe not, but that would evidence against a particular religion (or set thereof), not against the existence of God. One can easily accept God's existence without being a conservative Christian. Deists do so all the time.



However, it is unlikely that morality is recieved from gods. It is most likely that 'goodness' is a condition that promotes group survival.


It sure does, but that's not a complete answer. Suppose for instance I rob a bank because it benefits me. You might say what I did was wrong because it did not benefit the group. Why should I care about benefiting the group? Because it's what one ought to do...and then we get to the same problem. What transcendent source of authority says what people ought to do? Theism provides an answer, atheism does not.

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Posted 05/19/07 - 08:01 AM:
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#42
Tisthammerw wrote:
But this has potential problems. Consider this argument. If objective morality has literally no source and no basis, then there is literally nothing that says Hitler was wrong when he believed he should slaughter millions of Jews. Here some atheists might object, saying that is not what they mean by objective morality being a brute fact. It is reality that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says what ought to be. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe (as a person or culture) that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself.


You are arguing from the standpoint that -- morality is objective, (part of the universe or whatever), and that objective morality implies an authority, so that authority must be what theists call "God", (transcendent creator of the universe). However:

- Is morality really objective? If so, it has to be the same for all time. Something that is moral at one point in time, (slavery is a big example), must be true for all time -- including the slaughter of disbelieving men, women and children, (such as the Jews in Germany), as well as adulterers, blasphemers and sabbath-breakers. The fact that theists are willing to accept that morals have changed over time means that morality is possibly relative to time, place and what a person believes.
- Does something objective really require an authority? The speed of light and the weight of all electrons are objective factors of the universe, but these values seem related to other physical relationships, not to an anthropomorphic author.
- If morality is an objective part of the universe, is it physically quantifiable, like distance and mass? There are plenty of systems of morality, (ethics), that can be derived through a pattern of rules and exceptions that don't require an external author and in fact can be only relevant to humans. You could be a consequentialist or utilitarian and religious beliefs are irrelevant.

A software developer is someone who, when you tell them to "go to hell", they are more worried about the "goto".
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Posted 05/19/07 - 11:31 AM:
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#43
Morals vary greatly between social groups so much so that if we were to allow every culture to pick from a pile of morals dear to all cultures everything they found to be detestable we’d be left with nothing. That’s to say, nothing is universally moral in every culture.

Correlation between societies and morals seems evident and we can take that as a sign or indication. What kind of correlation are we talking about?

There’s the argument here that morals are objective and therefore evidence for a moral agent (i.e. God). The evidence for objective morals is at question; while on the flip side, justifying the correlation between social organizations and their morality needs to be established.

Without convincing evidence that morals are objective we’re left to work on just how morals relate to social communities (not limited to humans).



Edited by hipskipdip on 05/19/07 - 11:36 AM

"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust.

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Posted 05/19/07 - 12:01 PM:
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#44
mariner wrote:
"I certainly believe that the phenomenon of morality (as distinguished from the content of morality -- and this is an important distinction) is not explainable by evolution. For the very good reason that evolution cannot select for moral instincts, which are, by definition, free -- metaphysically free."


Carl Jung wrote:
“Despite the fact that we neither know nor pretend to know what the “psyche” is, we can deal with the phenomenon of “mind.” We do not assume that the mind is a metaphysical entity or that there is any connection between an individual mind and a hypothetical Universal Mind. Our psychology is, therefore, a science of mere phenomena without any metaphysical implications.
The development of Western philosophy during the last two centuries has succeeded in isolating the mind in its own sphere and in severing it from its primordial oneness with the universe."



Evolution plays a part in the physical, phenomenal, changes in the evolution of the social organism. What you call metaphysically free does little to enrich our understanding (the point of quoting Jung above). We entice our couriousities searching for content rich in phenomenon than searching for content within metaphysics. You've already cut yourself short.


"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust.

"I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class

"You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert
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Posted 05/19/07 - 03:15 PM:
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#45
Tisthammerw wrote:
But this has potential problems. Consider this argument. If objective morality has literally no source and no basis, then there is literally nothing that says Hitler was wrong when he believed he should slaughter millions of Jews.


Sure there is, i.e., other people's opinions.

"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing." - Socrates
"The only tyrant I accept in this world is the still voice within." - Gandhi
"Metaphysics is a dark ocean without shores or lighthouse, strewn with many a philosophic wreck." - Kant
"It is better to do one's own duty, however defective it may be, than to follow the duty of another, however well one may perform it. He who does his duty as his own nature reveals it, never sins." - Lao Tzu
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Posted 05/19/07 - 03:37 PM:
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#46
Wolfman wrote:
"Sure there is, i.e., other people's opinions."


You mean humans have to take ethical/moral responsibility for themselves?!

"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust.

"I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class

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Posted 05/19/07 - 04:14 PM:
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#47
swstephe wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

But this has potential problems. Consider this argument. If objective morality has literally no source and no basis, then there is literally nothing that says Hitler was wrong when he believed he should slaughter millions of Jews. Here some atheists might object, saying that is not what they mean by objective morality being a brute fact. It is reality that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says what ought to be. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe (as a person or culture) that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself.


You are arguing from the standpoint that -- morality is objective, (part of the universe or whatever), and that objective morality implies an authority, so that authority must be what theists call "God", (transcendent creator of the universe).


Eh, you got it sort of right. I was arguing that if objective moral values exist they provide evidence for the existence of God. Must it be a creator God? Maybe, though I don't know of a way to prove it.



However:
- Is morality really objective? If so, it has to be the same for all time. Something that is moral at one point in time, (slavery is a big example), must be true for all time -- including the slaughter of disbelieving men, women and children, (such as the Jews in Germany), as well as adulterers, blasphemers and sabbath-breakers. The fact that theists are willing to accept that morals have changed over time means that morality is possibly relative to time, place and what a person believes.


I don't think it means that at all--any more than beliefs of the physical world (e.g. the shape of the Earth) changing over time implies truths of the physical world are relative.



- Does something objective really require an authority? The speed of light and the weight of all electrons are objective factors of the universe, but these values seem related to other physical relationships, not to an anthropomorphic author.


Problem is, morality is not something physical, it is an idea of what ought to be. Who decides what ought to be? This is something very different from saying what is (e.g. the speed of light). Sergeants tell their privates what they ought to do (“march on maggots!”) and parents tell their children what they ought to do (“eat your vegetables”) what about morality? Who decides what ought to be in that sense? There are a number of differing opinions of what the world ought to be like, and we can hardly appeal to empirical observation to tell who (if anyone) is right. It's not as if we can empirically test the wrongfulness of stealing, for instance.

Notice also that some ought-statements (e.g. my stapler ought to be blue) are relative whereas others (the Holocaust ought not to have happened) are not. Why is the case? Theism at least provides an answer here.

For the non-theist, the best answer of who/what decides what ought to be is reality (in some general sense). Reality says Hitler was wrong etc. But that leads us into the problems I discussed in post #41.



- If morality is an objective part of the universe, is it physically quantifiable, like distance and mass? There are plenty of systems of morality, (ethics), that can be derived through a pattern of rules and exceptions that don't require an external author and in fact can be only relevant to humans. You could be a consequentialist or utilitarian and religious beliefs are irrelevant.


Yes, you could be a utilitarian, but that still doesn't really solve the problem I illustrated before.

Suppose for instance I rob a bank because it benefits me. You might say what I did was wrong because it supplies a negative effect to the group (on a utilitarian view). Why should I care about benefiting the group? Because it's what one ought to do...and then we get to the same problem. What transcendent source of authority says what people ought to do?

I should also provide this caveat on what the argument from morality is not. The claim is not that an atheist cannot recognize the existence of moral values (an atheist could believe, however mistakenly, that God is not necessary for objective moral values), nor is the claim that belief in theism is necessary to live a moral life (an atheist could follow the rules of morality and still disagree, however mistakenly, on the metaphysical basis of those rules).

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Posted 05/19/07 - 04:19 PM:
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#48
Wolfman wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

But this has potential problems. Consider this argument. If objective morality has literally no source and no basis, then there is literally nothing that says Hitler was wrong when he believed he should slaughter millions of Jews.


Sure there is, i.e., other people's opinions.


Except none of those people matter under ethical objectivism. The best solution for non-theists who want to believe in objective morality seems to be "Reality says Hitler was wrong," but that leads us into the problems I discussed in post #41.

Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
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Posted 05/19/07 - 06:32 PM:
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#49
Hi hip, you say,

You mean humans have to take ethical/moral responsibility for themselves?!


Not necessarily. They can ascribe this to a divinity, regardless of whether one exists. Taking responsibility is not something we are good at doing, its usually imposed by others. For this reason we emply deceptive practices to avoid as much responsibilty as possible. For Hitler some people did stand against his behavior, but not until he had created significant damage. To add weight of something greater than ourselves, as well as to take the onus from us, enter a divinity, and the idea of this does the rest.

This is not an attempt to disprove divinity, just that we are capable of fabricating one to exert greater control over large groups of people.

The argument incorrectly attributed to Dostoyevsky in 'The Brother Karazamov' that 'if there is no God then everything is permitted', is simplistic. By various means we decide what behavior is permitted. In practical terms it is not 'permitted' to walk down a street in Iraq at night with a US flag. Or to swim in shark infested waters. In both cases common sense dictates the behavior. We set up msocial mechanisms in the same way. If someone kills another, we decide if it was justified, and allocate punishment if it is not. ie. we set up parameters around permitted behavior. If we do not have mechanisms and wholescale and indiscriminate killing occurs we revert to anarchy. Somalia is close to this presently, and its not too say this does not happen, just that human behavior tends to produce expanding and controlling social systems, from vigilantes to supreme courts, to religious morals.

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Posted 05/19/07 - 08:28 PM:
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#50
TMB- wink

************************************

Addressing the Thread:


A lack of hard evidence does not detract from the inference or correlation we draw between society’s influence (software) on the human brain (Hardware) and the moral phenomena that is expressed (moral-semantic interpretations). The point to be made is in the methods in which we explore this correlation. Differentiating between natural generalizations (all copper conducts electricity) and accidental generalizations (every time I go to the game my team loses, therefore I cause the team to lose) can be tested through scientific methods. Applied scientific methods give telling results. Applied metaphysics (used loosely to mean “things beyond the physical”) miss the mark entirely when it comes to morals.

If one was to take this gained insight and apply it to evolutionary history, one could visibly see how the physical conditions readily influence the “psychic.” Hardware can be utilized in various ways, but successful “software” or popular synaptic channels will be more readily formed in organisms in which it is advantageous. What might be a vestigial organ in humans could be a very functional and prevalent organ in another species. If this were to be true in the anatomy of the human brain as compared to close biological relatives, one might conclude that evolution bears on the biologic-make-up of our brains. That’s the hardware part. The software is something different, more flexible and free. The hardware sets up the parameters for operating software. If certain popular synaptic channels were fundamental software, they may become, evolutionarily, infused in the organism’s hardware. During early developmental stages of the organism’s mental faculties certain basic operating software would become biologically installed (such as an instinctual aversion to cat urine in mice –prior to any experience with cats and cat urine).

Morality is probably even more greatly removed from our biological-“software” than we might think. Given that cultures throughout time and place have had vastly different preferences and ethos it would be hard to pick out some universal moral.

It’s here that I would question if human morality is really missing the heart of the discussion? Instead of looking for moral laws or guidelines that exist out there… how about looking at what’s in here, within our psyche? I doubt there’s any “software” of moral laws within… but there’s a whole body of emotional content which guide humans in their everyday decisions. Perhaps the question of morality is the wrong perspective when dealing with the emotional content of the human organism.

"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust.

"I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class

"You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert
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