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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God

Wosret
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Posted 01/12/08 - 12:20 PM:	#451
Because you ought to?
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/12/08 - 01:06 PM:	#452
hipskipdip wrote: A supreme authority does not create moral obligation, but merely tells us what the obligation means. Hmm, we may be using different definitions of "authority" here. I was using it in the context of the power to put forth obligatory statements of what to do. E.g. a captain orders the subordinates to wash the deck, and the subordinates are now obligated to do just that. hipskipdip wrote: "Objective morality implies supreme authority." A supreme authority needn't be God or a god at all. Well, "objective morality implies supreme authority" was really only one part of my argument. It is true that "objective morality implies supreme authority" does not imply (at least not in any obvious way) the existence of God. I'll restate my argument here. My general claim is that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. My key point: basically, I have been arguing that there are only two plausible explanations for the existence of objective moral values: the brute fact position and theism. The brute fact position, however, eventually points us in the general direction of theism anyway. Morality and the brute fact position Logic says what is, but who or what says what ought to be? One response is that objective morality is a “brute fact.” But then, how does the “brute fact” position answer this questions like “What is the basis of morality” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” One possible answer to both questions is “nothing.” Yet if there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. If there is literally no basis for two plus two equaling four, then not even logic and mathematics say that the sum of two and two yield four. The problem with “nothing says how we ought to behave” is that it is tantamount to saying there are no rules of behavior. Similarly, if the truth of a given claim has literally no basis (in anything), then this would include the claim having no basis in reality. So this interpretation of a “brute fact” does not quite work. Another possible interpretation of the brute fact position is that the answers to the questions “What is the basis of morality” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is reality. All facts are based in reality, since being based “in reality” is what it means for something to be real. Similarly, by definition anything that exists is based in existence, and anything based in existence exists. On this view, the basis of a brute fact is reality and existence, but nothing else. If we apply the latter interpretation of the brute fact, then morality being a brute fact would say that morality’s foundation is the universe and existence in some general sense as opposed to placing its basis within a person or culture. It is reality that says Hitler should have behaved differently. Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself. Implications of morality being a brute fact Yet in the case of morality we have a rather unusual situation if this view is correct. Morality is prescriptive, rather than descriptive. Morality says how people ought to behave and makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. saying that people should not steal. An unusual upshot for the veracity of ought-statements is that it introduces the notion of authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative; the definition of authoritative being that people really ought to obey it. One reason is this: what if people have conflicting views on what they ought to do? If a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews, should the subordinate obey the Nazi? Clearly, the subordinate should obey the dictates of morality instead. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands (e.g. dictators who would order torture and genocide) if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. According to the brute fact position in question then, the universe/reality/existence not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority). The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism. A more general definition of God is “the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality.” Pantheism is simply equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence. It should be noted that some of the traditional aspects of God—like omnipotence and consciousness—are not necessarily associated with pantheism. Thus a pantheistic God may seem like a relatively harmless implication, but even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics. This pantheistic God might not contain consciousness but would have to possess supremely transcendent moral authority (transcending all peoples and cultures) while also possessing perfect moral correctness (it cannot be mistaken about what is right). Since a pantheistic God is equated with the universe/reality/existence, this supreme metaphysical reality is omnipresent and eternal. This is perhaps to be expected however, given that objective morality commands our behavior regardless of where we are and when we are. Interestingly, the essence of this pantheistic God must also be incorporeal if objective morality is not dependent on collections of atoms. Suppose for instance we took everything away from the physical universe except Mount Rushmore. Would Mount Rushmore be the source of objective moral values? No, moral values are incorporeal and their underlying basis (the supreme metaphysical reality that says how we ought to behave) must also be incorporeal. Yet a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral is treading awfully close to theism. Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person—a moral God that says what everyone ought to do, a God that is the basis of morality and a God that everyone ought to obey. So even if it’s not an outright proof, to the very least the existence of objective morality still provides strong evidence for theism (by suggesting the existence of a God that is transcendent, omnipresent, perfectly moral etc.).
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rbnrbn
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Posted 01/12/08 - 07:05 PM:	#453
Its simple OP - The basic morality of the bible is derived from humanity, not the other way around. I just wish the Atheists of latter years were to have written their own "bible"! So tell me; what about the kids who did'nt have a religious childhood, how did gods morals reach them!? Confucius 551 - 479 BEFORECHRIST - Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire. If we were to follow some of the Old Testamant moral judgements we'd be stoning our wives, wiping out gay communities and sending our daughters to the slaughter to appease "god"!!! Watch this OP, quick and basic explanation - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elEYKpo7kFk and this named the "shifting moral zeitgeist" - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZ9JMUFIVqE Edited by rbnrbn on 01/12/08 - 07:30 PM

hipskipdip
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Posted 01/12/08 - 07:12 PM:	#454
TW wrote: "If a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews, should the subordinate obey the Nazi? Clearly, the subordinate should obey the dictates of morality instead. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands (e.g. dictators who would order torture and genocide) if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful." Must it? What justification do you offer? It seems too simplistic to take the Nazi's as the paradigm of amoral behavior. Perhaps their moral sensibilities were augmented or scewed by transcendent authorities. Furthermore, a supernatural explanation is nonexplanatory, but rather inexplicable. "even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics. " By accepting the most atheistic form of morality, we needn't appeal to god, gods, or God, and furthermore any transcendent metaphysical reality. I don't feel like I need to defend atheistic objective views of morality, but merely mention that they exist. A leading theory is Reflective Equilibrium. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equi... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflective_equilibri... "Suppose for instance we took everything away from the physical universe except Mount Rushmore. Would Mount Rushmore be the source of objective moral values? No, moral values are incorporeal and their underlying basis (the supreme metaphysical reality that says how we ought to behave) must also be incorporeal." This seems to be a meaningless argument as it doesn't really add anything to our understanding of incorporeal moral truths. Morality by definition applies to moral agents or living things. Now is morality something like color? A red rose is only red under certain circumstances and a relational property of physical objects? Or are they nonrelational (aparently red) which is simple and unanalyzable?
_____________________ "What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/13/08 - 07:48 AM:	#455
hipskipdip wrote: TW wrote: "If a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews, should the subordinate obey the Nazi? Clearly, the subordinate should obey the dictates of morality instead. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands (e.g. dictators who would order torture and genocide) if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful." Must it? What justification do you offer? Well, recall the definition of "authoritative" I defined in the paragraph you quoted me (though you did not include that definition in the quote). Morality must be authoritative in the sense that people really ought to obey it. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, which means morality's authority transcends that of the Nazi commander. I was hoping to have made that clear in the paragraph. One of the reasons I am participating in this thread is to find better ways to explain my position more clearly. How would you have worded it? I've considered changing the paragraph's wording to this: Yet in the case of morality we have a rather unusual situation if this view is correct. Morality is prescriptive, rather than descriptive. Morality says how people ought to behave and makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. saying that people should not steal. An unusual upshot for the veracity of ought-statements is that it introduces the notion of authority (the power to put forth obligatory statements of what to do). It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. One reason is this: what if people have conflicting views on what they ought to do? Suppose a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality are more authoritative than any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. According to the brute fact position in question then, the universe/reality/existence (the basis of objective morality) not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority). By accepting the most atheistic form of morality, we needn't appeal to god, gods, or God, and furthermore any transcendent metaphysical reality. If that is the case, please explain what is intellectually wrong with my argument that said otherwise. I don't feel like I need to defend atheistic objective views of morality, but merely mention that they exist. I'm sure they do, but I'm not sure if any of them ultimately work. For instance, an atheist might appeal to utilitarianism, saying we should follow the greatest happiness principle. One problem, who or what says we ought to do what's best for society? What if I think I should do the most harm to society? Who or what says I ought to do otherwise? The best explanation to these questions seems to be the “brute fact” explanation, but that seems to lead us to pantheism as I argued earlier. (If you think the argument is wrong, please feel free to intellectually assault it.) Regarding reflective equilibrium (which I confess I don't think I've heard of until now), the Wikipedia entry defines it thusly: Reflective equilibrium is a state of balance or coherence among a set of beliefs arrived at by a process of deliberative mutual adjustment among general principles and particular judgments. To quote C.S. Lewis, "The account may (or may not) explain why men do in fact make moral judgments. It does not explain how they could be right in making them." But for the moment, let's ignore that and say that this explains not only how people make moral judgments but is also the metaphysical source of moral truth. One problem: whose beliefs are we to follow? If it is the culture's beliefs that are the source of moral truth, then it seems we just have cultural relativism--not objective morality. If it is the individual's beliefs that are the source of moral truth, then we have ethical subjectivism--not objective morality. Moral objectivism by definition says that moral truths are independent of what us humans think and believe. "Suppose for instance we took everything away from the physical universe except Mount Rushmore. Would Mount Rushmore be the source of objective moral values? No, moral values are incorporeal and their underlying basis (the supreme metaphysical reality that says how we ought to behave) must also be incorporeal." This seems to be a meaningless argument as it doesn't really add anything to our understanding of incorporeal moral truths. Morality by definition applies to moral agents or living things. Perhaps so, but would it be the case that moral statements would have truth-value even if there were nothing to apply them to, much the same way that the statements of mathematics and logic are true even if there were nothing to apply them to? Recall that in the context of my argument I am referring to ethical objectivism--the doctrine that moral truths are independent of what humans think, feel, and believe. This is especially true if the basis of objective morality is not humans but "reality" or the "universe" in some general sense (which is what the above paragraph is referring to). In the above paragraph, I argued that the "essence" of the basis of objective morality must be incorporeal, similar (albeit only slightly) to the idea that the basis of mathematical truths do not depend on physical objects.
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/13/08 - 07:57 AM:	#456
rbnrbn wrote: Its simple OP - The basic morality of the bible is derived from humanity, not the other way around. I just wish the Atheists of latter years were to have written their own "bible"! So tell me; what about the kids who did'nt have a religious childhood, how did gods morals reach them!? I think you may be misunderstanding my position here. I am not claiming that religion is the basis of objective morality. Please note also that the claim is not that an atheist cannot recognize the existence of moral values (an atheist could believe, however mistakenly, that God is not necessary for objective moral values), nor is the claim that belief in theism is necessary to live a moral life (an atheist could follow the rules of morality and still disagree, however mistakenly, on the metaphysical basis of those rules). Nonetheless, the argument does claim that God is the metaphysical basis for objective ethics.
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Wosret
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Posted 01/13/08 - 08:05 AM:	#457
I am not aware of any atheists that accept that there are a basic for objective morality. In my opinion it is a self-contradictory statement. You can use words like "values" and morality without it refering to subjects. When you can point to the object that is morality, or the objects that are values I'll take this seriously. Values require valuers, and morality requires agents to be moral to. Objective anything do not require agents to exist. I am also under the impression that theists believe god to be an agent, a subject. If morality derives from god, then it derives from a subject, and would not exist without that subject. You main mean objective as in not determined by opinions and biases, in which case I may agree given a foundation that isn't an agent to derive moral considerations from. However, any value, or moral decision cannot be divorced from agents and subjects. By definition they cannot be. This thread is huge, so I am not willing to read it all, but perhaps you could explain how you get past these obvious roadblocks?
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hipskipdip
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Posted 01/13/08 - 09:11 AM:	#458
TW wrote: "Morality says how people ought to behave and makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. saying that people should not steal. An unusual upshot for the veracity of ought-statements is that it introduces the notion of authority (the power to put forth obligatory statements of what to do)." Justice is God's command. But this is just a stop-gap because it's difficult to understand how something is true simply because it is commanded, no matter how powerful or frightning the diety may be. A just command would be commanded by a just diety, but the question now is why we suppose that our dieties are just, and whether that judgement is more than an expression of our own subjectivity. The Judo-Christian Gods seem to be just that. In which case this whole approach seems more to embody our longings for absolutes than an approach to truth itself.
_____________________ "What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/13/08 - 02:52 PM:	#459
For the record, my purpose here is not really to argue that objective morality exists, only that if it does it is evidence for the existence of God. Still, I'll veer off topic in this case. Wosret wrote: I am not aware of any atheists that accept that there are a basic for objective morality. I'm assuming you meant "basis of objective morality." Atheists would have to accept a basis of objective morality if they accept the existence of objective morality. Else, how do we answer questions like “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” Suppose the answer to these questions is "nothing." Yet if there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. If there is literally no basis for two plus two equaling four, then not even logic and mathematics say that the sum of two and two yield four. The problem with “nothing says how we ought to behave” is that it is tantamount to saying there are no rules of behavior. Similarly, if the truth of a given claim has literally no basis (in anything), then this would include the claim having no basis in reality. In my opinion it is a self-contradictory statement. You can use words like "values" and morality without it refering to subjects....Values require valuers, and morality requires agents to be moral to. Objective anything do not require agents to exist....However, any value, or moral decision cannot be divorced from agents and subjects. By definition they cannot be. It is true that "people should not steal" has little practical use when there are no people. However, just because a statement has no physical application does not imply that it has no truth value. For instance, 2 + 2 = 4 would still be a true statement even if there were no physical objects to apply it to. Similarly, the statement "people should not steal (if people existed)" could still theoretically be true. All that aside, what do you think of my actual argument (post #452)?
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/13/08 - 03:03 PM:	#460
hipskipdip wrote: Justice is God's command. But this is just a stop-gap because it's difficult to understand how something is true simply because it is commanded, no matter how powerful or frightning the diety may be. I had mentioned this earlier (albeit a long time ago) but I am not an adherent of divine command theory. I do not believe a statement is true by virtue of God's commands. Rather, I think the connection between God and moral goodness is more elemental than that. It is true that God’s commands of what we ought to do would be morally good, but the reason why they are good is because moral goodness is an inextricable part of God’s nature, an inseparable part of who and what he is. It is this sense in which I believe God is the metaphysical basis of objective moral values. All that aside, what do you think of the actual argument (post #452)?
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Wosret
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Posted 01/13/08 - 05:34 PM:	#461
Tisthammerw wrote: For the record, my purpose here is not really to argue that objective morality exists, only that if it does it is evidence for the existence of God. Still, I'll veer off topic in this case. Then aren't you getting ahead of yourself? A can't possible implied B if A doesn't exist. It implies nothing. Tisthammerw wrote: I'm assuming you meant "basis of objective morality." Atheists would have to accept a basis of objective morality if they accept the existence of objective morality. Else, how do we answer questions like “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” Suppose the answer to these questions is "nothing." Yet if there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. If there is literally no basis for two plus two equaling four, then not even logic and mathematics say that the sum of two and two yield four. The problem with “nothing says how we ought to behave” is that it is tantamount to saying there are no rules of behavior. Similarly, if the truth of a given claim has literally no basis (in anything), then this would include the claim having no basis in reality. How does this follow? People say what one ought and ought not do. Point me to a single other thing than agents that have been observed to do this. Also, if you aren't aware. 2+2=4 because of the way the rules are defined in base ten math. In other words, also because people say. It also doesn't follow from morality being a produce of agents or thinking animals to say that it is arbitrary anymore than it follows to say that logic or mathematics are arbitrary because they are the product of agents. Given their foundations and well defined goals they are not arbitrary. Morality when based on personal values is arbitrary, however morality based on universal such as surviving and surviving well, then it is not arbitrary, nor is it relative. Everyone (at least the overwhelming healthy majority) want to survive and survive well. Given this, I can not only claim that hitler was wrong doing what he was doing, but demonstrate that he was wrong in is action given standards of such moral considerations. Much like one can demonstrate that someone was illogical given the standards of a system of logic. If not objective then nothing is a false dichotomy. Tisthammerw wrote: It is true that "people should not steal" has little practical use when there are no people. However, just because a statement has no physical application does not imply that it has no truth value. No but statements and propositions do not exist independently of agents, so that is irrelevent. The statement "people should not steal" not only holds no meaning without people, but doesn't even exist without them. Tisthammerw wrote: For instance, 2 + 2 = 4 would still be a true statement even if there were no physical objects to apply it to. Similarly, the statement "people should not steal (if people existed)" could still theoretically be true. 2+2=4 would hold no meaning, and not exist if not for the invention of base ten math. Base ten math was not a discovery it was an invention. It can be applied to reality, but it is designed to work abstractly, in conceptual space. The abstract and conceptual do not exist without minds. So no, without people to determine it, decide it, and follow the rules of base ten math 2+2 does not only not equal 4 the concept doesn't exist. Those terms do not exist, their tautological conclusions do not exist. You cannot divorce human inventions, abstractions ideas thoughts, notions or anything else that is the result of agents and minds from those agents and minds. Evem the concept of truth holds no meaning outside of agents, it is a condition of a statement or proposition that is perported to correspond accurately to reality. If agents, little on statements and propositions do not exist, then even if the concept of truth someone did exist, it would have nothing to judge as true or false. Came up with as many hypotheticals as you please, it will not change this fact. You cannot even begin to form hypotheticals without using things that would not exist if not for agents, and if they did. No one could be around to judge whether they would be true or not. So in what sense could you claim them to be? Tisthammerw wrote: All that aside, what do you think of my actual argument (post #452)? I'm not going to bother looking. Even if it follows from unjustified premises then it isn't very impressive. Anyone can make logic from absurd presmises. God exists and is a supernatural agent All supernatural agents have purple hair therefore god has purple hair. I've proved deductively, that god has purple hair.
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/13/08 - 07:03 PM:	#462
Wosret wrote: For the record, my purpose here is not really to argue that objective morality exists, only that if it does it is evidence for the existence of God. Still, I'll veer off topic in this case. Then aren't you getting ahead of yourself? A can't possible implied B if A doesn't exist. It implies nothing. That's not true at all. Mathematics and logic are fraught with indirect proofs that depend on implications from premises that aren't true. Conditional proofs, similarly, do not depend on the antecedent being true. Yet they still depend on the conditional proof assumption being able to imply things. All that aside, what do you think of my actual argument (post #452)? I'm not going to bother looking. Then why are you here? The argument from morality is after all what the thread is about. For instance, 2 + 2 = 4 would still be a true statement even if there were no physical objects to apply it to. Similarly, the statement "people should not steal (if people existed)" could still theoretically be true. 2+2=4 would hold no meaning, and not exist if not for the invention of base ten math. Base ten math was not a discovery it was an invention. If mathematical truths were not discoveries but merely inventions, why can't we make them say whatever we want them to say? Why can't we, for instance, make 2 + 2 = 5? It seems clear that both mathematical and logical truths are independent of human minds. Even if every human mind was deluded into thinking 2 + 2 = 5, that would not alter the fact that 2 + 2 = 4.
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Posted 01/14/08 - 05:05 AM:	#463
Tist, you said this, But I have offered evidence that objective morality implies supreme authority. You could argue that objective morality is merely a conditional proof assumption and that objective morality does not exist in the real world. Even if true however, it does not change the evidence that objective morality implies supreme authority. If you are going to justify the claim that I have no such evidence, you're going to need to refute the evidential argument I presented. And I don't think you can do that. Just watch me refute it. You have presented no evidence for this. You have made this defintion. Even if it is generally acepted it is still theoretically contrived. No evidence offered. Next case please. Definitions aren't really assumptions though. Yours are. All arguments depend on definitions if any language is used to communicate them. Agreed. My definitions aren't assumptions at all; they're just descriptions of the terms I use so I can make myself clear. There are both. Your defintion is that OM implies supreme authority. This is an assumption. Its possible that OM does not exist, or if it does it does not imply supreme authority. Howver you are assuming that it does, and when called upon to support a psotion, you return to this point and use it to recover a flaw in the process or evidence. Yet because it is an assumption, and unprovable because of the way you have structured it, it provies you with a rabbithole to vanish down. How does OM imply supreme authority? Who says it does? What evidence supports this? None - its an assumption in the definition. Saying that my argument depends on definitions is not at all any reason to reject it as unsound, not true in the real world, or anything of the sort. Otherwise we'd have to throw out mathematics and logic. Dont look to mathematics and logic for help, see if your position can stand on its own merits. Your definitions have assumptions inbuilt which allow you to prove your desired point. Without assumptions that are provable, and evidence to take you forward, there is no validity. You are looking for assistance to a paralel to maths and logic, this appeal does not work If you're talking about whether the antecedent "objective morality exists," the fact (if it were so) that objective morality does not exist is irrelevant to the soundness of the argument "if objective morality, then supreme authority." Still no banana. Lets suppose OM does exist. Why define it as having supreme authority? Is already built into the assumption of being OM, so no process is required. You however, use this as if you are offering some logic and evidence. You are not. As an analogy, all mathematical proofs would be perfectly valid and sound even if there was nothing to apply them to beyond the conceptual realm. For a while there were no real world applications to complex numbers (those based on the square root of negative one) but that didn't make their proofs any less valid or sound. Forget the math. We are talking about morality, does it stand on its own merit? Similarly, arguing that I haven't shown objective morality exists in the real world doesn't change the soundness of my argument. Agreed. It is still true in the real world that objective morality implies authority It has been defined that way. Relative morality also implies authority. It is defined this way as being what ought to be. This has no effect on it being objective or relative. , just as certain mathematical truths are true in the real world even if there was no evidence that they had any physical application. This is not math. It is not a valid parallel. You were the one who said you could prove the "exact opposite" to me. I did, that includes the definitions I would use. Ones that are contrary to yours. To prove an exact opposite, does not mean every aspect of the argument needs to be negatively exact, just the outcome. Because your argument has no basis, and the proof is already built into the assumptions, its posible to arrive at the opposite conclusion, it just requires the defintions to be designed to achieve it. For such a proof to be sound, you would have to be using the same definitions as I was. To not do so would be committing the fallacy of equivocation Wrong. Go back to wikipedia and read it again. You also might try and see if you are able to carry this argument by youself without recourse to wiki and maths. You might also try and avoid the assumptions, but try and prove them. I am reminded by the current debate over the use of 'waterboarding' by the CIA to get information from suspects. They also maintain they do not use torture on their suspects. The solution? Do not define waterboarding as torture. In doing so they are avoiding the reality that waterboarding does indeed embody the key characteristics that other methods use. This is the approach you are using. Love your work.

Wosret
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Posted 01/14/08 - 05:07 AM:	#464
Tisthammerw wrote: If mathematical truths were not discoveries but merely inventions, why can't we make them say whatever we want them to say? Why can't we, for instance, make 2 + 2 = 5? It seems clear that both mathematical and logical truths are independent of human minds. Even if every human mind was deluded into thinking 2 + 2 = 5, that would not alter the fact that 2 + 2 = 4. Yes, I'm afraid that it would. Since that conclusion to that problem is tautological, if the terms and definitions were changed, then the conclusion would change as well. This of course ignores that without people, the terms and definitions would not exist to change. Nor could anything be followed to their conclusions. So even if it did exist, who is left to say that 2+2=4 and not 5 if there are no agents? Who judges claims for their truth value? Edited by Wosret on 01/14/08 - 05:19 AM
_____________________ "cute girls really should stick with other cute girls, hm?" - Morinaga Milk

hipskipdip
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Posted 01/14/08 - 09:13 AM:	#465
Tist wrote: "I think the connection between God and moral goodness is more elemental than that. It is true that God’s commands of what we ought to do would be morally good, but the reason why they are good is because moral goodness is an inextricable part of God’s nature, an inseparable part of who and what he is. It is this sense in which I believe God is the metaphysical basis of objective moral values." In this case goodness is an attribute (or a limitation) of the diety's nature. How do we know what we call good is good? "The reason why they are good is because moral goodness is an inextricable part of God’s nature" which is circular. "It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. One reason is this: what if people have conflicting views on what they ought to do?" Which is another way of asking who's authority is legitimate? This question doesn't really stop at dieties, because we can't very well define goodness by appealing to a diety and a diety to refer to goodness, due to its circularity. Even if we transform the term goodness into approval we're still left asking who is it that approves? And I'd ask why should I care if the diety approves? What is the basis of authority? What makes this authority legitimate? What makes a god's authority legitimate? I don't find an argument that authority is intrinsic very appealing, rather it's invested or earned; thus relational. Authority is a kind of contract between the governing power and the governed. Why should I suppose that I've been contracted into a situation in which I'm governed by a god? A contract (with or without a diety) between two or more parties creates an obligation. A contract requires agreement otherwise the contract is either negated, broken, or illegitiment. Before we can even get to what makes a legitiment authority, what set of morals is it that god finds agreeable? Why should we suppose that we'd otherwise be incapable of identifying these morals without a diety? How do we communicated or become informed as to a god's agreeable nature of any set of morals? Without which how could a diety even become a candidate for authority? This is hardly an is/ought problem, but one of value. How do we find value in morals or certain morals agreeable or "good"? Is "good" really what we're looking for? What about "right" morals or values? Are morals an intrinsic value or a relational value? Every human makes thousands of evaluations, most of which are value assestments. Perhaps our search for value is just an expression of our own subjectivity, emboding our natural longings for absolutes. Edited by hipskipdip on 01/14/08 - 11:04 AM
_____________________ "What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

hipskipdip
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Posted 01/14/08 - 03:02 PM:	#466
Tist wrote: "Yet in the case of morality we have a rather unusual situation if this view is correct. Morality is prescriptive, rather than descriptive. Morality says how people ought to behave and makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. saying that people should not steal." That means that Obj. M. is operational and therefore commits the theory to being only a predictive device, and unexplanatory. "The answers to the questions “What is the basis of morality” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is reality. All facts are based in reality, since being based “in reality” is what it means for something to be real." Reality (R) instructs morality (M). All facts (F) are reality (R). Since reality instructs morality and exists within reality it is also a fact. Therefore morality (M) is a fact (F). R is M R is F Therefore M is a F. This is a hasty generalization and a fallacy due to a false or unsubstantiated premise. What reality share's in common, morality may not. There's no reason (at least from this reasoning) to believe that morality is anymore a fact than any ideas I have (I). R is I R is F Therefore I is a F. It's much more likely that morality is not "of this world" but projected onto it by moral agents.
_____________________ "What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

hipskipdip
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Posted 01/14/08 - 03:38 PM:	#467
Tist wrote: "Moral statements would have truth-value even if there were nothing to apply them to, much the same way that the statements of mathematics and logic are true even if there were nothing to apply them to." Mathematics and moral judgments are not alike systems which may or may not apply to outside objects. Morals most definately apply to outside objects, ie moral agents. X should not destroy another X is not a universal unrelational system. It's absolutely nonsensical and might otherwise not apply in all cases if there were content. For example say moral agent Xa could push moral agent Xb in front of an oncoming train which will certainly kill hundreds of moral agents. Unfortunately for Xb, he is just big enough to stop the train if he were pushed in front of the train, dieing so that hundreds of others may survive. What is moral permissable in this seemingly moral paradox? But really, the question is one of relational value. What is the moral value? What is the relational value between these moral agents? Say Xb was Xa's mother! Or say Xb was a complete stranger while the hundreds of doomed moral agents were family and friends of Xa. Irregardless of the strength of my counter-arguments, any universal moral equation you come up with can be refuted or debated, finding weak agreement between human moral agents (so long as we agree that humans are indeed moral agents!)
_____________________ "What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

Buddahchuck
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Posted 01/15/08 - 12:39 PM:	#468
I would like to use this oppurtunity to point-out the inherently flawed style of Tist's argumentation. Now, I have extensively argued with him before about his point, and I eventually gave up because most of Tist's responses are not actually responses but merely assertions that don't address anyone else's point of contention. He's very wrapped-up in this idea and does not really offer any specificity that we may require in order to actually understand the point he is making. But I have a pretty clear idea of what's he's getting at, and this is how I can talk about the style of his argumentation. So everyone here understands pantheism and the implications that it has in a theological debate. More often than not, people who are atheists generally don't agree with pantheists because they find it ridiculous to allow people to change their definitions of certain things. Linguistically, there is a trend between opposing concepts in their sharing some sort of commonality. For example, extreme communism is much like extreme fascism in its blind devotion to the state/community. Another example is the atheism-pantheism debate, for truly there is not such a great conceptual difference between everything being god and nothing being god. The reason Tist's argument is so screwy, however, is that he's trying to persuade atheists that there is a god, existence; when atheists are quite clearly of a mindset that there is no God. But as you can probably tell, I don't think this ultimately matters, because his argument is substantially unclear to begin with. Certainly we all know what Objective morality is, and if we didn't, Tist has defined it in every post for the past 400 posts. What we don't understand, and where I think Tist's lack of consistency is astounding, is what it means for "existence" to "command" morality. If I were given no context to the sentence "Existence commands morality", my interpretation would be that anything we can do, than can actually exist, is moral. But this is not what tist is saying. Instead, he is saying that somehow, existence gives an "ought" to the way human being should act. Earlier I presented an unanswered counterpoint to this saying that emprically, people who commit heinous acts wind-up on top, indicating that the more willing someone is to commit act that I consider immoral, the better off they are. In other words, existence rewards seemingly immoral acts. But of course, I was accused of not quite understanding his argument and so he repeated it again, in a more lengthy version, as if this somehow answered the criticism offered. It seems that Tist has a clear idea of what is moral and what is not, one so clear that the rest of us have no idea what it is. And when asked about what is included in this moral schema that he has divised, the only examples he can point to are things like murder or theft. But the question that truly need to be answered, that is consistently dodged is "What does it mean for existence to command morality?" In no way does existence command that I not murder the man next to me. In no way does it keep me from stealing something from someone else. In fact, things get stolen from people all the time without consequence to the person who thieves. Are we then to turn around and say that existence is merely warning us against posessions? Are we going to take the fact that murder happens and turn it around to say that it must be immoral to be attached to life? Even further, Tist's whole concept of pantheism is skewed because while he recognizes that all these things that happen are part of some god, he does not adhere to the idea that everything that happens ought to happen. This was one of Spinoza's major points in presenting the concept of pantheism, because if there was something wrong with the universe, something wrong with god, then god would be fallible and his authority to "command" morality would be lost. By dropping this point, Tist allows for the authority of something like existence to be tainted and thus the whole argument he is trying for becomes useless. So I don't expect Tist will have a response to these points further than repeating himself,as has been done so often before, but I did want to drop this in so that all the people arguing with Tist know where this is going.

Buddahchuck
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Posted 01/15/08 - 12:58 PM:	#469
Oh, I also want to offer an analogy that may help a little bit with the Objective Morality/Supreme Authority debate. So lets take a being that has no concept of morality at all. We have it standing on a field that has two squares, red and green, Yes and no. We have a set list of moral circumstances (man in front of a train, uncle drowning a baby, abortion etc.). For each event, we mark which box the animal moves to, assuming such movement will be random. Thus, we determine a list of what is moral and what is not. Because the ultimate deciding factor, the movement of the animal, is an objective being (NB this is just for example, I really don't want to get into an argument over the objectivity/subjectivity of animals) we have an objective list of moral actions. For Tist, How does the existence of this list: a) imply supreme authority? b) prove the existence of God? c) is the animal then god? NB: if there are objections to the mistreatment of animals in the determining of morality a simple two-sided coin would work just fine.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/15/08 - 06:14 PM:	#470
Wosret wrote: If mathematical truths were not discoveries but merely inventions, why can't we make them say whatever we want them to say? Why can't we, for instance, make 2 + 2 = 5? It seems clear that both mathematical and logical truths are independent of human minds. Even if every human mind was deluded into thinking 2 + 2 = 5, that would not alter the fact that 2 + 2 = 4. Yes, I'm afraid that it would. Since that conclusion to that problem is tautological, if the terms and definitions were changed, then the conclusion would change as well. But the definitions are not being changed in this scenario. The definitions are the same, but people are fallaciously believing that two plus two make five. So would 2 + 2 = 5 merely because people believe it to be so?
_____________________ Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Wosret
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Posted 01/15/08 - 06:17 PM:	#471
Tisthammerw wrote: Yes, I'm afraid that it would. Since that conclusion to that problem is tautological, if the terms and definitions were changed, then the conclusion would change as well. But the definitions are not being changed in this scenario. The definitions are the same, but people are fallaciously believing that two plus two make five. So would 2 + 2 = 5 merely because people believe it to be so?[/quote] But there are no people. You are claiming that it is an objective fact, using it as an exmaple for your objective morality. By objective if you mean exists independently of what people think, and what we've invented. Then leave people and what we think out of it and show that it is true.
_____________________ "cute girls really should stick with other cute girls, hm?" - Morinaga Milk

Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/15/08 - 06:31 PM:	#472
TMB wrote: But I have offered evidence that objective morality implies supreme authority. You could argue that objective morality is merely a conditional proof assumption and that objective morality does not exist in the real world. Even if true however, it does not change the evidence that objective morality implies supreme authority. If you are going to justify the claim that I have no such evidence, you're going to need to refute the evidential argument I presented. And I don't think you can do that. Just watch me refute it. You have presented no evidence for this. You have made this defintion. Even if it is generally acepted it is still theoretically contrived. No evidence offered. The fact that the conclusion logically follows from the definitions of the terms is evidence. If such a thing were not evidence, we'd have to throw out all mathematical proofs because they depend upon this principle. You were the one who said you could prove the "exact opposite" to me. I did, that includes the definitions I would use. Ones that are contrary to yours. Then you would not at all be proving the exact opposite to me, because your conclusion would not be the exact opposite to mine. For such a proof to be sound, you would have to be using the same definitions as I was. To not do so would be committing the fallacy of equivocation Wrong. Go back to wikipedia and read it again. No, I am right. Go back to Wikipedia and read it again. The fallacy of equivocation happens when the terms change meanings in the attempt to support a conclusion. This is exactly what your argument would do if it came to the "opposite" conclusion only because it used different definitions. If your argument used different definitions the conclusion would not be opposite to mine in any meaningful way. You can't just gloss over the changed meanings of the terms and then claim you've proved the opposite of my conclusion, especially if the meaning of the conclusion isn't the opposite of mine.
_____________________ Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/15/08 - 06:34 PM:	#473
Wosret wrote: But the definitions are not being changed in this scenario. The definitions are the same, but people are fallaciously believing that two plus two make five. So would 2 + 2 = 5 merely because people believe it to be so? But there are no people. There are people in this scenario. Again, would 2 + 2 = 5 merely because people believe it to be so?
_____________________ Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Wosret
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Posted 01/15/08 - 06:49 PM:	#474
Tisthammerw wrote: But there are no people. There are people in this scenario. Again, would 2 + 2 = 5 merely because people believe it to be so?[/quote] If the terms were defined that way then yes. If not then no. In any case, the question is completely irrelevent to anything we were talking about. Your question is eqivolent to asking "is a car a vehicle with four wheels" the asnwer would be in the current english language conventions yes. That doesn't make the statement objectively true.
_____________________ "cute girls really should stick with other cute girls, hm?" - Morinaga Milk

Tisthammerw
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Posted 01/15/08 - 06:52 PM:	#475
hipskipdip wrote: In this case goodness is an attribute (or a limitation) of the diety's nature. How do we know what we call good is good? "The reason why they are good is because moral goodness is an inextricable part of God’s nature" which is circular. I'm not sure it is circular in any unfavorable, at least in the worldview I am proffering. The heart of God is where "the good" lies. The heart of God is the metaphysical basis for objective moral values. Is it circular to say that the basis of the truth "the Earth is round" is the shape of the Earth? Perhaps, but not in any unfavorable way. What is the basis of authority? What makes this authority legitimate? The basis of morality's metaphysical authority is the heart of God. What makes that legitimate is that God, by definition, is the supreme metaphysical reality. If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that God is the supreme metaphysical reality by definition. It seems at that point you'd get to brute facts. A contract (with or without a diety) between two or more parties creates an obligation. Says who? Suppose one of the parties says "I'm not obligated." Who or what says he's wrong? It seems inescapable that you're going to need some kind of basis for morality. Reality (R) instructs morality (M). All facts (F) are reality (R). Since reality instructs morality and exists within reality it is also a fact. Therefore morality (M) is a fact (F). R is M R is F Therefore M is a F. This is a hasty generalization and a fallacy due to a false or unsubstantiated premise. What reality share's in common, morality may not. There's no reason (at least from this reasoning) to believe that morality is anymore a fact than any ideas I have (I). It is not hasty at all if we are working under the conditional proof assumption that objective morality exists. Remember, I am arguing that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. If moral truths are real facts, then they are real facts. So please keep in mind what I was claiming: I was saying that if objective morality exists and if it were a brute fact, then it would be based in reality. "Moral statements would have truth-value even if there were nothing to apply them to, much the same way that the statements of mathematics and logic are true even if there were nothing to apply them to." Mathematics and moral judgments are not alike systems which may or may not apply to outside objects. Morals most definately apply to outside objects, ie moral agents. But the absence of objects doesn't preclude conditional statements about objects from being true. Logic is fraught with examples of this.
_____________________ Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

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