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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God
Kwalish Kid
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Posted 12/08/07 - 03:06 PM:
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#426
Tisthammerw wrote:
On this view, the answer to the question “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is “reality.”

This is where you are merely assuming the conclusion of your argument. A straightforward answer from the brute fact position would be that there is nothing that says how one ought to behave, it is a fact how one ought to behave, not something that is commanded.
According to the brute fact explanation, the sole metaphysical basis for moral values existing is simply existence itself. Yet morality prescribes (rather than describes) our behavior, and thus we have a question that rarely applies to brute facts: “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” If existence really is the sole basis of morality, then the answer to this question is “existence.” On this view, existence itself says how we ought to behave, and does so with authority. The prescriptive nature of morality permits this otherwise bizarre implication. Additionally, as the sole basis of objective morality, existence says how we ought to behave with supreme (e.g. transcending Hitler’s) authority.

There is nothing in the prescriptive nature of morality that says that there must be a speaker. The brute fact position is that there is no commander of moral rules, these rules are simply fact.
If so, let me be clear: authority in the context of how I used it was commanding behavior, i.e. having the right to say how we ought to behave. "Authority" in this sense does not imply such things as "any universe with any properties is divine."

If you really want to stick with this definition, then you can't make your argument, because the universe, in a brute fact theory, has no more right to give moral rules than it does to give laws of physics.
It only attacks those sub-theories that say "we'd find the same creatures in the same environment." The mere fact (it it were so) that life was artificially created does not imply that.

Find a theory that does not.
Of course I've thought about it, but the connection is almost trivially true. Evolution is "a theory that the various types of animals and plants have their origin in other preexisting types and that the distinguishable differences are due to modifications in successive generations." Lamarckian evolution contains this claim.

Why do you retreat to some dictionary for school children? Why don't you address the definition of evolution as actual scientists use it?
Okay, that's a start. The Discovery Institute certainly is an "upper tier" creationist movement (more legitimately scientific than say Institute for Creation Research). How about something a little more verifiable from one of their leaders? A verifiable quote from a book or web page perhaps?

If a creationist theory holds that the creator creates organisms for their environment, then we should expect that the same creatures are in the same environments. If the vague notion does not have any principles for its creator, then it really isn't a theory.

Perhaps you can give some details about a creationist theory that makes claims that a creator will create organisms that don't fit their environment.
It seems you do not quite understand what I mean when I say that a theory is consistent with the data. Let's take the five-minute hypothesis as an example: the universe and everything in it was created just as it was five minutes ago by some unknown force. Empirical data by itself cannot favor this hypothesis over the old universe hypothesis; since both are consistent with the data. However, we can use some philosophical principles to say that the old universe theory fits the data better, e.g. the assumed reliability of memory.

I can do better than that, and so can any ten-year old. The way things work don't give us any reason to believe in a world created five minutes ago. Perhaps you think that fantasy is on the same footing as our experience of the world... oh, wait, you're a creationist!
Your philosophical principle says "the major epicycles are all coordinated with the relative position of the planet to the sun" is a good indication that heliocentric theory is more likely to be true. However, a naysayer could say that is just coincidence, accept the empirical data as is, and accept the geocentric view with no logical inconsistencies.

Yes, a naysayer who wants to ignore empirical information.
In short, saying one theory "better" fits the data may seem intuitive and reasonable, but it is still the case that the data by itself is insufficient to prefer one theory over an empirically identical competitor. I am not saying that "empirically identical" means "equally reasonable." I'm just saying empirically identical means that data by themselves are insufficient to prefer one theory over another.

In hindsight, bringing up evolution and creation was perhaps a mistake. The topic generates so much heated emotion that it seems most knowledgeable adherents do not think clearly about the issue. (For instance, your attempt to provide data that was allegedly inconsistent with the belief that the various types of life were artificially created.)

What's emotional about that? Every actual creationist theory I know of has a problem with that evidence. The emotion here is with your choice to, in ignorance, turn to a poor example.
First: it's better to provide primary sources rather than hearsay, especially when it comes to the creation-evolution controversy. There have been far, far too many times that one side has (usually unintentionally) distorted the other.

The distorting side is the creationist side. I suppose you think that the photos in that photo essay are fake?
It's one of the reasons why their appears to be no end anytime soon and why orthodox evolution is more disputed than other respected scientific theories (e.g. atomic theory).

The obvious reason for the dispute is that non-scientists who want Biblical literalism do not want to understnad the theory and don't want anyone else to understand it either.
If the minds of evolutionists are so clouded that they cannot even see the opposing side clearly, it doesn't look promising that those minds would reach a rational resolution. (To be fair, the minds of creationists have been equally clouded.) An example of a distortion from the web page:
[quote]It seems unlikely that item number 2 is true, for the Fall (according to the Genesis creation story) came about by eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, not the tree of life.

You're right, he made a mistake. So, if we make the correction, do you deny his presentation? Or has he faked the pictures about the position of the museum?
Why do you say this? Is evolving a new organ magical?

According to your position, there is something magical about organs that make them different from every other biological process. This magic prevent organs from evolving, even though we have so much evidence for their evolution.
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein [This is included for the irony.]
Tisthammerw
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Posted 12/19/07 - 07:15 PM:
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#427
Kwalish Kid wrote:

This is where you are merely assuming the conclusion of your argument. A straightforward answer from the brute fact position would be that there is nothing that says how one ought to behave


But if that is literally true, then there is nothing that says Hitler was wrong when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. But if that is true, then morality does not exist.

You said, "it is a fact how one ought to behave." Okay, but without something like God what makes it a fact? Who or what says we ought to do X? If there is literally nothing that says we ought to behave a certain way (not logic, not reality; literally nothing) then morality has no basis and morality does not really exist. As an analogy, logic and arithmetic say that two plus two equal four. If literally nothing says two plus two equal four (not even reality in some general sense) then it would not be factual. Bear in mind that when I say “X says Y” I am not necessarily talking about a conscious mind here. I am talking about a basis for why something is true. (On a related issue, recall that I very specifically said--on more than one occasion--that a pantheistic God does not require consciousness.)




According to the brute fact explanation, the sole metaphysical basis for moral values existing is simply existence itself. Yet morality prescribes (rather than describes) our behavior, and thus we have a question that rarely applies to brute facts: “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” If existence really is the sole basis of morality, then the answer to this question is “existence.” On this view, existence itself says how we ought to behave, and does so with authority. The prescriptive nature of morality permits this otherwise bizarre implication. Additionally, as the sole basis of objective morality, existence says how we ought to behave with supreme (e.g. transcending Hitler’s) authority.


There is nothing in the prescriptive nature of morality that says that there must be a speaker.


There must be a basis, e.g. the rules of arithmetic say two plus two equals four. If morality has literally no basis and literally nothing--not even reality in some general sense--says how we ought to behave, then morality does not exist.




If so, let me be clear: authority in the context of how I used it was commanding behavior, i.e. having the right to say how we ought to behave. "Authority" in this sense does not imply such things as "any universe with any properties is divine."


If you really want to stick with this definition, then you can't make your argument, because the universe, in a brute fact theory, has no more right to give moral rules than it does to give laws of physics.


The laws of physics are merely descriptive, not prescriptive. But if it is true that the universe/reality/existence has no right to say how we ought to behave, then what does? If you say, "nothing" then we have a problem, for that implies that morality does not exist.

Off topic: science and the philosophy of science


oh, wait, you're a creationist!


Again, did I ever say I was? You didn't answer this question when I asked it before, so let me just make it clear. When I argue for creation I am playing devil's advocate. Actually, I think I have already told you this on some earlier occasion.




It only attacks those sub-theories that say "we'd find the same creatures in the same environment." The mere fact (it it were so) that life was artificially created does not imply that.


Find a theory that does not.


Well, the theory I just described for starters. Incidentally, it's actually somewhat difficult to say that creation is inconsistent with the data you described; you provided no verifiable references and no specifics. Depending on the specifics of the data, it might not pose any problem to creation whatsoever. In post #417 you said, "the types of organisms that one find in a region are related as much (if not more) to the organisms of nearby areas than they are to animals that share distant regions of the same environment." Related to each other on what level? Phyla? Classes? Genera? Species?



Why do you retreat to some dictionary for school children?


Er, that definition is found in a collegiate dictionary. I used a link to the Internet to a reputable dictionary (that is not solely for schoolchildren) for your convenience. And evolution (as defined there) is accepted by the scientific community--regardless of whether you wish to call it a belief, paradigm, or whatever. In any case, Lamarckian evolution is still a sub-theory of evolution (in the "maxi-theory" or "paradigm" sense of the term).




Okay, that's a start. The Discovery Institute certainly is an "upper tier" creationist movement (more legitimately scientific than say Institute for Creation Research). How about something a little more verifiable from one of their leaders? A verifiable quote from a book or web page perhaps?


If a creationist theory holds that the creator creates organisms for their environment, then we should expect that the same creatures are in the same environments.


So no verifiable references of any leading creationist that would actually agree that their theory says this? This is simply your own conclusion?

A problem with your statement here is that makes assumptions on the motives of the creator--which do not necessarily exist. Sure, if the creator's goal was to only create creatures that perfectly match their environment and only one type of creature that matches the environment, then we might reasonably expect identical creatures in identical environments. But this does consequence does not necessarily follow if the only starting assumption is that life was artificially created. We cannot know what the creator's motives are solely from this background assumption.




It seems you do not quite understand what I mean when I say that a theory is consistent with the data. Let's take the five-minute hypothesis as an example: the universe and everything in it was created just as it was five minutes ago by some unknown force. Empirical data by itself cannot favor this hypothesis over the old universe hypothesis; since both are consistent with the data. However, we can use some philosophical principles to say that the old universe theory fits the data better, e.g. the assumed reliability of memory.


I can do better than that, and so can any ten-year old. The way things work don't give us any reason to believe in a world created five minutes ago.


Perhaps so, but notice that you cannot dismiss the theory merely by pointing to the data. Anything you point to--gray hairs, fossils etc.--are 100% logically consistent with the five-minute hypothesis (all of that was created five minutes ago). This belief is logically possible and empirically identical to beliefs regarding a much older universe. A person can agree on what the empirical data are, still accept the five-minute hypothesis, and be 100% logically consistent in doing so. To favor one empirically identical theory over another, you're going to have to use some non-empirical, philosophical principles (e.g. the assumed reliability of memory). That's been my point here.

Remember, there is a distinction between being consistent with the data and how "well" a given theory "fits" the data (the latter will require some philosophical principles, e.g. Occam's razor).



Perhaps you can give some details about a creationist theory that makes claims that a creator will create organisms that don't fit their environment.


Sure. According to one Biblical creationist theory, a number of design degradations (including vestigial organs) are the result of the Fall. Thus, we wouldn't necessarily expect all creatures to fit their environment perfectly.

So in any case, you cannot point to a single empirical datum that cannot be reconciled in one way or another with the general theory of creation. The same goes with evolution. Creationists implied this point decades ago e.g. in Scientific Creationism. While that book may have many flaws, on this point they are right. This is not to say that both theories are equally rational, only that they are logically consistent with the data (before you object, remember that even the five-minute hypothesis meets this).




In hindsight, bringing up evolution and creation was perhaps a mistake. The topic generates so much heated emotion that it seems most knowledgeable adherents do not think clearly about the issue. (For instance, your attempt to provide data that was allegedly inconsistent with the belief that the various types of life were artificially created.)


What's emotional about that?


The controversy stirs up emotions (anger, indignation) that cloud people's minds. The data you mentioned was clearly not logically inconsistent with the theory that life was artificially created. Suppose it is true that certain species are more similar to each other in nearby environments then they are in identical environments separated by great distances. This is not logically inconsistent with the belief that the basic types of were artificially created. A number of responses are possible here, but one of them is "they were just created that way." You may think this response is unreasonable, but one cannot reject it merely by pointing to the data because the belief that the creator created them that way matches up with such observations (again, think of the five-minute hypothesis example).



First: it's better to provide primary sources rather than hearsay, especially when it comes to the creation-evolution controversy. There have been far, far too many times that one side has (usually unintentionally) distorted the other.


The distorting side is the creationist side.


It is not the only side. Don't believe me? Read Battle of Beginnings which documents a load of examples (from both sides) of people misconstruing the opposition. You yourself have (unintentionally I think) distorted my position on more than one occasion. Emotions can cloud up the mind so much that some people do not even see the opposition as it is.




It's one of the reasons why their appears to be no end anytime soon and why orthodox evolution is more disputed than other respected scientific theories (e.g. atomic theory).


The obvious reason for the dispute is that non-scientists who want Biblical literalism do not want to understnad the theory and don't want anyone else to understand it either.


Of course to you this is the obvious answer, but in reality it doesn't quite work. A good number of leading ID adherents are legitimate scientists who do not believe in Biblical literalism. Michael Behe is one such example. He and many other scientists have no religious objections to evolution; their beef is purely scientific. And this sort of scientific objection is still far more widespread than e.g. atomic theory. Such people may be mistaken, but the point is that the "obvious" answer does not quite work here--though doubtless you've read (or assumed) otherwise. Heated emotions raise the probability of irrational thinking, like prejudices and distortions of the opposition, which is why I somewhat regret taking an emotionally charged issue (creation and evolution) as an example of empirical underdetermination. I feared something like this might happen. Though I am still hopeful I can explain this example of underdetermination to you.




Why do you say this? Is evolving a new organ magical?


According to your position, there is something magical about organs that make them different from every other biological process.


I don't seem to recall making such a position. Would you care to justify your assertion? A verifiable quote perhaps? Or is this yet another instance of unintentionally distorting the opposition?


Edited by Tisthammerw on 12/19/07 - 07:22 PM
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Kwalish Kid
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Posted 12/19/07 - 08:10 PM:
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#428
Tisthammerw wrote:
But if that is literally true, then there is nothing that says Hitler was wrong when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. But if that is true, then morality does not exist.

There is some weird disconnect in your thinking. The brute fact position is that there is no saying of moral rules, there is just a being. Just like physical laws don't need someone to say them.
You said, "it is a fact how one ought to behave." Okay, but without something like God what makes it a fact? Who or what says we ought to do X? If there is literally nothing that says we ought to behave a certain way (not logic, not reality; literally nothing) then morality has no basis and morality does not really exist.

No, because the universe is not making a claim, the universe merely has properties. Some of these properties are moral rules. This is the brute fact position.
As an analogy, logic and arithmetic say that two plus two equal four. If literally nothing says two plus two equal four (not even reality in some general sense) then it would not be factual.

OK...
Bear in mind that when I say “X says Y” I am not necessarily talking about a conscious mind here. I am talking about a basis for why something is true. (On a related issue, recall that I very specifically said--on more than one occasion--that a pantheistic God does not require consciousness.)

You are assuming that there is something with at least a will to make claims. But that assumption is the antithesis of the brute fact position. You can prove anything if you assume something and its contradiction.

Again, the brute fact position is that it does not take a will to create moral rules, it only takes will to follow these rules.
There must be a basis, e.g. the rules of arithmetic say two plus two equals four. If morality has literally no basis and literally nothing--not even reality in some general sense--says how we ought to behave, then morality does not exist.

Reality is the basis for morality, but not the will of morality. You have done nothing to support the position that reality has a will. You have done nothing to provide a reason that moral rules are themselves the products of acts of will.

NB: If you adopt this position, you are adopting a might makes right meta-ethics.
The laws of physics are merely descriptive, not prescriptive.

Really? Do you think that everything in physics happens willy-nilly? Tohu Bohu? There are many physical laws that determine possible courses of action.

Yet even if this is a serious difference, you have done nothing to show that prescriptive rules must be the product of a will.
But if it is true that the universe/reality/existence has no right to say how we ought to behave, then what does? If you say, "nothing" then we have a problem, for that implies that morality does not exist.

It's not a question of whether or not the universe has a right to or not. The laws are features of the universe, not the separate products of acts of the universe. This is what you are assuming in your argument and it is also a conclusion of your argument. This is a problem.
Again, did I ever say I was? You didn't answer this question when I asked it before, so let me just make it clear. When I argue for creation I am playing devil's advocate. Actually, I think I have already told you this on some earlier occasion.

Why ever are you not a creationist? As far as I can tell, you have no reason not to be a creationist and every reason to be a creationist. You must be really nuts to not be a creationist!
Well, the theory I just described for starters.

I have no idea what you mean by this.
Incidentally, it's actually somewhat difficult to say that creation is inconsistent with the data you described; you provided no verifiable references and no specifics. Depending on the specifics of the data, it might not pose any problem to creation whatsoever.

Seriously, pick a location.

I'll pick one first. Let's take the Galapagos Islands. The organisms there live in an environment that is very much like many other environments. Yet the organisms there, while they fit their environment fairly well, are all also closely related to organisms on the near mainland. Close in terms of their overall features and close in terms of their genetic makeup.

Now there is no reason for this to be the case with a creator. If the creator creates things for their environment, then they should do a much better job that we find. (Heck, the panda is a perfect example of this.) If the creator creates things at random, then we shouldn't find things related like we do.

If the creator creates things that look exactly like they are evolved, then fine. But we would be crazy to adopt such a theory.
Er, that definition is found in a collegiate dictionary.

"Collegiate" as in "high school"?
I used a link to the Internet to a reputable dictionary (that is not solely for schoolchildren) for your convenience.

I don't need convenience. I need some actual science. If you don't want to know anything about evolution, fine, just don't make claims about it.
And evolution (as defined there) is accepted by the scientific community--regardless of whether you wish to call it a belief, paradigm, or whatever. In any case, Lamarckian evolution is still a sub-theory of evolution (in the "maxi-theory" or "paradigm" sense of the term).

As I've said repeatedly, the only reason that some maxi-theory is accepted is because of the actual theory that supports it. So your point is moot. Scientists do not just decide to believe things, they actually get evidence.
So no verifiable references of any leading creationist that would actually agree that their theory says this? This is simply your own conclusion?

If you know so much about these theories, you should be able to go into detail about why the creator does not create things to fit their environment.
A problem with your statement here is that makes assumptions on the motives of the creator--which do not necessarily exist. Sure, if the creator's goal was to only create creatures that perfectly match their environment and only one type of creature that matches the environment, then we might reasonably expect identical creatures in identical environments. But this does consequence does not necessarily follow if the only starting assumption is that life was artificially created. We cannot know what the creator's motives are solely from this background assumption.

So, you are saying that the only content of this theory is that life might have been created? Are you saying that there is no other content?

Do you also think that the theory that angels push the planets around in their orbits is just as good as Newton's theory of gravity?
Perhaps so, but notice that you cannot dismiss the theory merely by pointing to the data. Anything you point to--gray hairs, fossils etc.--are 100% logically consistent with the five-minute hypothesis (all of that was created five minutes ago). This belief is logically possible and empirically identical to beliefs regarding a much older universe.

"Logic is the beginning of wisdom." You can't say that everything about empirical judgments is logic.
A person can agree on what the empirical data are, still accept the five-minute hypothesis, and be 100% logically consistent in doing so.

Sure, just crazy. Do you believe the 5 minute hypothesis?

And just to be clear, you are saying that ID is just as viable as the 5 minute hypothesis?
To favor one empirically identical theory over another, you're going to have to use some non-empirical, philosophical principles (e.g. the assumed reliability of memory). That's been my point here.

Just because something is not a part of logic does not mean that it is non-empirical.
Remember, there is a distinction between being consistent with the data and how "well" a given theory "fits" the data (the latter will require some philosophical principles, e.g. Occam's razor).

Occam's razor is awful. There are much better, empirical, reasons to adopt a theory. Like I pointed out with the Tychonic vs. Ptolemeic systems, there we see from the relationships in the empirical data that a Tychonic or Copernican system explains the data better, even though they are logically the same.

Since you seem to have admitted that the creator theory doesn't make any explanations, then it seems that it fails to meet the empirical evidence.
Sure. According to one Biblical creationist theory, a number of design degradations (including vestigial organs) are the result of the Fall. Thus, we wouldn't necessarily expect all creatures to fit their environment perfectly.

That's better. But would we expect them to resemble the nearby organisms? And what about all the other features that organisms have? In the end, that some things should be vaguely misshapen or sub-par explains far less than even Lamarckian evolution. Even here, the actual data stymies creationism.
So in any case, you cannot point to a single empirical datum that cannot be reconciled in one way or another with the general theory of creation. The same goes with evolution.

Actually, there are lots of potential observations that could put evolution in trouble. It doesn't take much thought to think of them. Some creationists are even doing an experiment, keeping an empty cage in the hopes that the creator will create an organism inside the cage.
Creationists implied this point decades ago e.g. in Scientific Creationism. While that book may have many flaws, on this point they are right. This is not to say that both theories are equally rational, only that they are logically consistent with the data (before you object, remember that even the five-minute hypothesis meets this).

Some creationist theories are logically compatible with the data (I suspect only the 5 minute hypothesis actually is). However, too many have significant problems. The creationist theories with "The Fall" all tend to have serious problems with the geological record. Some are just plain logically incoherent.
The controversy stirs up emotions (anger, indignation) that could people's minds. The data you mentioned was clearly not logically inconsistent with the theory that life was artificially created. Suppose it is true that certain species are more similar to each other in nearby environments then they are in identical environments separated by great distances. This is not logically inconsistent with the belief that the basic types of were artificially created.

Which theory that the basic types were artificially created? Some of these theories will simply fail to be consistent with the geological record.
A number of responses are possible here, but one of them is "they were just created that way." You may think this response is unreasonable, but one cannot reject it merely by pointing to the data because the belief that the creator created them that way matches up with such observations (again, think of the five-minute hypothesis example).

Sure, if one is willing to be crazy, then one can think anything.
It is not the only side. Don't believe me? Read Battle of Beginnings which documents a load of examples (from both sides) of people misconstruing the opposition. You yourself have (unintentionally I think) distorted my position on more than one occasion. Emotions can cloud up the mind so much that some people do not even see the opposition as it is.

I'm sorry if i misunderstood your positions. I really expected you to at least be a creationist. Otherwise I am quite concerned.
Of course to you this is the obvious answer, but in reality it doesn't quite work. A good number of leading ID adherents are legitimate scientists who do not believe in Biblical literalism. Michael Behe is one such example. He and many other scientists have no religious objections to evolution; their beef is purely scientific.

Well, that can't be true of Behe, since his science continues to fail again and again, yet he keeps going. Indeed, he even went so far as to accept all of evolution. He has been quite clear, also, that he has a religious position on this issue.
And this sort of scientific objection is still far more widespread than e.g. atomic theory. Such people may be mistaken, but the point is that the "obvious" answer does not quite work here--though doubtless you've read (or assumed) otherwise.

All one has to do is look at the quality of the work of someone like Behe or Dembski. It's frighteningly bad.
I don't seem to recall making such a position. Would you care to justify your assertion? A verifiable quote perhaps? Or is this yet another instance of unintentionally distorting the opposition?

You are presenting that there is something about organs that justifies treating their biological properties as different than other biological properties. We can see that changes in genetics change biological properties. You have been saying that organs make some sort of potential barrier to evolutionary processes. Unless you have some biological reason for this, I assume it's magic.
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein [This is included for the irony.]
Kwalish Kid
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Posted 12/20/07 - 08:55 AM:
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#429
While we're on the subject, here's a nice song about the ethics of the ID crowd, "I am the very model of a cdesign proponentsist": http://austringer.net/wp/index.php/2007/12/19/gue...
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein [This is included for the irony.]
Tisthammerw
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Posted 12/20/07 - 06:46 PM:
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#430
Kwalish Kid wrote:


Bear in mind that when I say “X says Y” I am not necessarily talking about a conscious mind here. I am talking about a basis for why something is true. (On a related issue, recall that I very specifically said--on more than one occasion--that a pantheistic God does not require consciousness.)


You are assuming that there is something with at least a will to make claims.


I have never said nor implied any such thing, not even when I put forth "X says Y is true" statements. A counterexample: logic and arithmetic say that two plus two equal four. If literally nothing says two plus two equal four (not even reality in some general sense) then it would not be factual. Nonetheless, I am not saying or implying that logic/arithmetic have a "will." Similarly, when I say morality values are based in existence, this does not necessarily imply that existence has a "will" or a mind.



Reality is the basis for morality, but not the will of morality. You have done nothing to support the position that reality has a will.


And for good reason: it is not the position I am taking (assuming I am understanding you correctly by what you mean by “will”). Nonetheless, having the universe (or reality, or existence) as the sole basis of morality does bring about some peculiarities. Unlike most brute fact statements, morality is prescriptive, rather than descriptive. It makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. thou shalt not kill. The unusual upshot is that the veracity of ought-statements introduces the notion of authority, i.e. who or what has the right to say how we ought to behave? There is a difference between issuing a behavioral command and possessing the power to be right in making it. If people have differing views on what they ought to do, the basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands (e.g. dictators who would order torture and genocide) if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. According to the brute fact position in question then, the universe/reality/existence not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority).

However, the universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would necessarily be some form of pantheism, as I argued earlier.




The laws of physics are merely descriptive, not prescriptive.

Really? Do you think that everything in physics happens willy-nilly?


No, but it doesn't alter the fact that descriptions of empirical regularities (and that is just what scientific laws are) are just that: descriptions of empirical regularities and not prescriptive statements.


Off topic: science and the philosophy of science


Why ever are you not a creationist? As far as I can tell, you have no reason not to be a creationist and every reason to be a creationist.


But if evolution really the scientifically superior theory as you seem to claim, why do you say I have no reason to be a creationist? Surely scientific evidence is a good reason for me not to be a creationist?




Er, that definition is found in a collegiate dictionary.


"Collegiate" as in "high school"?


No, I believe "collegiate" refers to "college," as in "designed for or characteristic of college students" (a definition to be found in Merriam-Webster Collegiate dictionary, 11th edition).



A problem with your statement here is that makes assumptions on the motives of the creator--which do not necessarily exist. Sure, if the creator's goal was to only create creatures that perfectly match their environment and only one type of creature that matches the environment, then we might reasonably expect identical creatures in identical environments. But this does consequence does not necessarily follow if the only starting assumption is that life was artificially created. We cannot know what the creator's motives are solely from this background assumption.

So, you are saying that the only content of this theory is that life might have been created? Are you saying that there is no other content?


No.


Do you also think that the theory that angels push the planets around in their orbits is just as good as Newton's theory of gravity?


No. However, it is true that the "angels theory" can be modified in such a way to be empirically identical to Newton's theory of gravity. (Again though, empirically identical does not necessarily mean equally rational.)



A person can agree on what the empirical data are, still accept the five-minute hypothesis, and be 100% logically consistent in doing so.


Sure, just crazy. Do you believe the 5 minute hypothesis?


No, but I recognize that if I am to reject it, I will have to do more than merely point to the data. Anything I point to--gray hairs, fossils etc.--are 100% logically consistent with the five-minute hypothesis (all of that was created five minutes ago). To reject the five-minute hypothesis, I'm going to have to appeal to something other than mere data (e.g. the assumed reliability of memory).


And just to be clear, you are saying that ID is just as viable as the 5 minute hypothesis?


I didn't say that, though I do think the five-minute hypothesis isn't more reasonable than ID. Yet they have this in common: they both can be used as examples of empirical underdetermination.


Occam's razor is awful. There are much better, empirical, reasons to adopt a theory. Like I pointed out with the Tychonic vs. Ptolemeic systems, there we see from the relationships in the empirical data that a Tychonic or Copernican system explains the data better, even though they are logically the same.


Even here though you had to appeal to some philosophical principle to favor one theory over the other; you have to if you are to have criteria as to what it means for one empirically identical theory to fit the data "better." Your philosophical principle says "the major epicycles are all coordinated with the relative position of the planet to the sun" is a good indication that heliocentric theory is more likely to be true. I think this is reasonable, because such coordination is a more straightforward expectation of heliocentric theory than geocentrism. However, a naysayer could say that this principle means nothing and it is merely a coincidence. You may think this is unreasonable and perhaps it is, but recognize that disagreements like this happen in real life. As an example: a creationist could claim that not seeing evolution of new basic types is a more straightforward expectation under the creationist theory. A creationist might even say that "the mere existence of this empirical data is sufficient grounds to say that creation better fits this particular observation, ceteris paribus." You however might disagree vehemently (and I suspect you do).




Of course to you this is the obvious answer, but in reality it doesn't quite work. A good number of leading ID adherents are legitimate scientists who do not believe in Biblical literalism. Michael Behe is one such example. He and many other scientists have no religious objections to evolution; their beef is purely scientific.


Well, that can't be true of Behe, since his science continues to fail again and again, yet he keeps going.


But why can it not be true that Behe honestly believes orthodox evolution is scientifically inferior and that he is simply mistaken? Behe is a Roman Catholic and has no religious objections to evolution. He does not believe in the literal interpretation of the Genesis creation story (nor do many other leading ID proponents). He honestly believes that naturalistic evolution just doesn't hold scientific merit in certain cases.

Creationists, incidentally, often believe the same thing about evolutionists; many of them believe evolutionary science fails again and again so miserably that "the very existence of opponents generates near bafflement" (says observer Del Ratzsch--for both sides). One of the oddities of this debate is that people from both sides can look at the same data and honestly believe that the data overwhelmingly supports their side.




I don't seem to recall making such a position. Would you care to justify your assertion? A verifiable quote perhaps? Or is this yet another instance of unintentionally distorting the opposition?


You are presenting that there is something about organs that justifies treating their biological properties as different than other biological properties.


Again, would you care to justify your assertion? A verifiable quote perhaps?


We can see that changes in genetics change biological properties. You have been saying that organs make some sort of potential barrier to evolutionary processes.


I never said that genetics can't change organs. I said (playing devil's advocate, taking up the creationist cause without necessarily adhering to it) that new organs cannot evolve. As analogy, an archaeologist does not deny that geological processes can change the shape and properties of a stone. Nonetheless, the archaeologist would say that is infeasible for natural geological processes to create something like the Rosetta Stone or Stonehenge. A creationist could argue that we have seen a number of organs that have deteriorated and become vestigial in extant organisms. We have not however seen any new organs that are now evolving in extant species. A creationist could furthermore claim that this is more straightforwardly expected from creationist theory than evolution; and therefore that it "fits" this data better.
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Kwalish Kid
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Posted 12/20/07 - 08:48 PM:
quote post
#431
Tisthammerw wrote:
I have never said nor implied any such thing, not even when I put forth "X says Y is true" statements. A counterexample: logic and arithmetic say that two plus two equal four. If literally nothing says two plus two equal four (not even reality in some general sense) then it would not be factual. Nonetheless, I am not saying or implying that logic/arithmetic have a "will." Similarly, when I say morality values are based in existence, this does not necessarily imply that existence has a "will" or a mind.

I say that you have made no argument in favour of the claim that the universe is making a command and you deny this. That is, you specifically tried to defend the claim that the universe makes a command.

If the universe makes no command then we're done, then the moral rules are simply part of the furniture of the universe, there is no need for a deity, and we can move on.

Logic and arithmetic do not make claims. If the principles of logic and mathematics are true, they are true by virtue of the nature of the universe, not by any claim and not by any authority in the sense that someone has the right to make a claim that they could make otherwise.
And for good reason: it is not the position I am taking (assuming I am understanding you correctly by what you mean by “will”). Nonetheless, having the universe (or reality, or existence) as the sole basis of morality does bring about some peculiarities. Unlike most brute fact statements, morality is prescriptive, rather than descriptive. It makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. thou shalt not kill. The unusual upshot is that the veracity of ought-statements introduces the notion of authority, i.e. who or what has the right to say how we ought to behave? There is a difference between issuing a behavioral command and possessing the power to be right in making it. If people have differing views on what they ought to do, the basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands (e.g. dictators who would order torture and genocide) if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. According to the brute fact position in question then, the universe/reality/existence not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority).

Alternatively, it could be that the universe is such that certain things are beyond authority. You have not addressed this position.
No, but it doesn't alter the fact that descriptions of empirical regularities (and that is just what scientific laws are) are just that: descriptions of empirical regularities and not prescriptive statements.

Do they not say how a thing will behave, before the fact?
But if evolution really the scientifically superior theory as you seem to claim, why do you say I have no reason to be a creationist? Surely scientific evidence is a good reason for me not to be a creationist?

But you clearly don;t care for scientific evidence. This is why your non-creationist position is so confusing and worrying.
No.

Then what is the content of the creationist theory?
I didn't say that, though I do think the five-minute hypothesis isn't more reasonable than ID. Yet they have this in common: they both can be used as examples of empirical underdetermination.

Only to a crazy person. Nobody sane would think that the 5-minute hypothesis explains the world better than other theories.
Even here though you had to appeal to some philosophical principle to favor one theory over the other; you have to if you are to have criteria as to what it means for one empirically identical theory to fit the data "better." Your philosophical principle says "the major epicycles are all coordinated with the relative position of the planet to the sun" is a good indication that heliocentric theory is more likely to be true. I think this is reasonable, because such coordination is a more straightforward expectation of heliocentric theory than geocentrism. However, a naysayer could say that this principle means nothing and it is merely a coincidence. You may think this is unreasonable and perhaps it is, but recognize that disagreements like this happen in real life. As an example: a creationist could claim that not seeing evolution of new basic types is a more straightforward expectation under the creationist theory. A creationist might even say that "the mere existence of this empirical data is sufficient grounds to say that creation better fits this particular observation, ceteris paribus." You however might disagree vehemently (and I suspect you do).

Yes, but the difference would be that I would be sane and honest and the creationist would be insane or dishonest. The empirical facts include the relationship between the sun and the apparent motions of the planets and the Ptolemaic system can only accept this while the Tychonic or Keplerian systems can explain it. Similarly, the creationist position has yet to explain a single thing in biology. It can make claims, perhaps, that certain features of organisms will be sub-par, but it cannot say which ones and it cannot make predictions about this.
But why can it not be true that Behe honestly believes orthodox evolution is scientifically inferior and that he is simply mistaken? Behe is a Roman Catholic and has no religious objections to evolution. He does not believe in the literal interpretation of the Genesis creation story (nor do many other leading ID proponents). He honestly believes that naturalistic evolution just doesn't hold scientific merit in certain cases.

So your argument is I should believe him because he believes things we can demonstrate to be wrong?
Creationists, incidentally, often believe the same thing about evolutionists; many of them believe evolutionary science fails again and again so miserably that "the very existence of opponents generates near bafflement" (says observer Del Ratzsch--for both sides). One of the oddities of this debate is that people from both sides can look at the same data and honestly believe that the data overwhelmingly supports their side.

I would agree with you except for the "honesty" part. Many creationists are so obviously not honest that it is painful. (I mean, good god: http://pandasthumb.org/archives/2007/12/expelled-... ) There is one honest creationist, though.

As Phillip Johnson said ( http://sciencereview.berkeley.edu/articles.php?is... ),
Phillip Johnson wrote:
I also don’t think that there is really a theory of intelligent design at the present time to propose as a comparable alternative to the Darwinian theory, which is, whatever errors it might contain, a fully worked out scheme. There is no intelligent design theory that’s comparable. Working out a positive theory is the job of the scientific people that we have affiliated with the movement. Some of them are quite convinced that it’s doable, but that’s for them to prove…No product is ready for competition in the educational world.

Again, would you care to justify your assertion? A verifiable quote perhaps?

I'm sorry, didn't you raise the claim that evolution needed special evidence in order to show that an organism could develop with a new or different organ? I apologize if I had you confused with someone else. I really can't take the time to weed through your posts, unfortunately.
I never said that genetics can't change organs. I said (playing devil's advocate, taking up the creationist cause without necessarily adhering to it) that new organs cannot evolve. As analogy, an archaeologist does not deny that geological processes can change the shape and properties of a stone. Nonetheless, the archaeologist would say that is infeasible for natural geological processes to create something like the Rosetta Stone or Stonehenge. A creationist could argue that we have seen a number of organs that have deteriorated and become vestigial in extant organisms. We have not however seen any new organs that are now evolving in extant species. A creationist could furthermore claim that this is more straightforwardly expected from creationist theory than evolution; and therefore that it "fits" this data better.

It would fit the data better if we hadn't seen the evolution of new organs. Fortunately, we have. Whew.

Edited by Kwalish Kid on 12/20/07 - 08:52 PM
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

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Tisthammerw
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Posted 12/22/07 - 10:43 AM:
quote post
#432
Kwalish Kid wrote:


I have never said nor implied any such thing, not even when I put forth "X says Y is true" statements. A counterexample: logic and arithmetic say that two plus two equal four. If literally nothing says two plus two equal four (not even reality in some general sense) then it would not be factual. Nonetheless, I am not saying or implying that logic/arithmetic have a "will." Similarly, when I say morality values are based in existence, this does not necessarily imply that existence has a "will" or a mind.


I say that you have made no argument in favour of the claim that the universe is making a command and you deny this.


Well, yes. I have made such an argument before (though you did not address the argument in your previous post), e.g. post #401.

Morality makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. thou shalt not kill. If the basis of morality gives such orders that we ought to obey, it is clearly making commands--unless we are using different definitions of the word "command." I am using it in the sense of saying "a statement of what to do that must be obeyed by those concerned" (a wording I found in Merriam-Webster's nice website). How are you defining "command"?



And for good reason: it is not the position I am taking (assuming I am understanding you correctly by what you mean by “will”). Nonetheless, having the universe (or reality, or existence) as the sole basis of morality does bring about some peculiarities. Unlike most brute fact statements, morality is prescriptive, rather than descriptive. It makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. thou shalt not kill. The unusual upshot is that the veracity of ought-statements introduces the notion of authority, i.e. who or what has the right to say how we ought to behave? There is a difference between issuing a behavioral command and possessing the power to be right in making it. If people have differing views on what they ought to do, the basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands (e.g. dictators who would order torture and genocide) if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. According to the brute fact position in question then, the universe/reality/existence not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority).


Alternatively, it could be that the universe is such that certain things are beyond authority.


If X has the right to make behavioral commands that people ought to obey, then X has authority by definition--unless we are using different definitions of the word. How do you define "authority"?




No, but it doesn't alter the fact that descriptions of empirical regularities (and that is just what scientific laws are) are just that: descriptions of empirical regularities and not prescriptive statements.


Do they not say how a thing will behave, before the fact?


But those are descriptive statements, not prescriptive ones. I can describe the geometric properties of a circle, but I am not issuing orders merely by making such a description.


Off topic: science and the philosophy of science



But if evolution really the scientifically superior theory as you seem to claim, why do you say I have no reason to be a creationist? Surely scientific evidence is a good reason for me not to be a creationist?


But you clearly don;t care for scientific evidence.


I have never said nor implied any such thing.




I didn't say that, though I do think the five-minute hypothesis isn't more reasonable than ID. Yet they have this in common: they both can be used as examples of empirical underdetermination.


Only to a crazy person.


Really? Then please point to one piece of empirical data that doesn't fit the five-minute hypothesis. You can't, because anything you point to (gray hairs, fossils, etc.) was created just as it was five-minutes ago according to the hypothesis. I'm not saying the five-minute hypothesis is rational of course, only that if you wish to reject it you're going to have to appeal to some nonempirical philosophical principles (e.g. the assumed reliability of memory).



Nobody sane would think that the 5-minute hypothesis explains the world better than other theories.


Again, being empirically identical does not mean equally rational. We can use various philosophical principles (again, an example being the assumed reliability of memory rather than believing those memories to be illusory) as rational criteria for favoring one empirically identical claim over another.

The point is that merely putting forth data will not work among competing theories that all predict that same data (e.g. the theory that the gray hairs were created five minutes ago predicts those gray hairs would exist).




Even here though you had to appeal to some philosophical principle to favor one theory over the other; you have to if you are to have criteria as to what it means for one empirically identical theory to fit the data "better." Your philosophical principle says "the major epicycles are all coordinated with the relative position of the planet to the sun" is a good indication that heliocentric theory is more likely to be true. I think this is reasonable, because such coordination is a more straightforward expectation of heliocentric theory than geocentrism. However, a naysayer could say that this principle means nothing and it is merely a coincidence. You may think this is unreasonable and perhaps it is, but recognize that disagreements like this happen in real life. As an example: a creationist could claim that not seeing evolution of new basic types is a more straightforward expectation under the creationist theory. A creationist might even say that "the mere existence of this empirical data is sufficient grounds to say that creation better fits this particular observation, ceteris paribus." You however might disagree vehemently (and I suspect you do).


Yes, but the difference would be that I would be sane and honest and the creationist would be insane or dishonest.


Okay, so you evidently disagree with my devil's advocate creationist claim. But then please recognize then that empirical data are not enough: both the creationist and you have the same data and disagree how that data is best interpreted. The (arguably) more straightforward expectation over evolution regarding this data is simply a bad coincidence and means nothing, right? But our hypothetical creationist doesn't think so. It's one of the reasons why the debate is still ongoing; sincere people can disagree as to which theory the scientific evidence favors. A creationist could say that you or insane or dishonest for not recognizing that the creationist theory more naturally expects and better fits the data of only seeing evolution within basic types (and not seeing evolution of new basic types) ceteris paribus.




But why can it not be true that Behe honestly believes orthodox evolution is scientifically inferior and that he is simply mistaken? Behe is a Roman Catholic and has no religious objections to evolution. He does not believe in the literal interpretation of the Genesis creation story (nor do many other leading ID proponents). He honestly believes that naturalistic evolution just doesn't hold scientific merit in certain cases.


So your argument is I should believe him because he believes things we can demonstrate to be wrong?


No, I'm saying you should believe him because he sincerely believes such "demonstrations" are rationally flawed. Remember, I believe I can demonstrate that you are mistaken regarding the underdetermination of theories (at least, you seem to be disagreeing with me; unless you are somehow missing the points I have specifically mentioned). You have, on more than one occasion, even put positions in my mouth I have never said nor implied, and so I could easily accuse you of dishonest, deliberate misrepresentation of my position (as people sometimes do in emotionally heated controversies); but I do not accuse you dishonesty. I think you are simply mistaken in part because I am aware that emotions can cloud thinking even to the extent of not correctly seeing what the opposition claims.



I would agree with you except for the "honesty" part. Many creationists are so obviously not honest that it is painful. (I mean, good god: http://pandasthumb.org/archives/2007/12/expelled-... )


Let's think about this for a moment. What exactly was dishonest there? "The people who gave it 5 stars out of 5 are ID adherents!" Okay, but people who give pro-evolutionary reviews are usually evolutionists. Is this dishonest when mentioning favorable reviews for a pro-evolutionary book/article when the pro-evolutionary stances of the reviewers are not revealed? Speaking of dishonesty, there might well be some dishonesty by an anti-ID proponent John Kwok. One comment on Amazon for a review said, "As for Kwok's review- he lied. He didn't read the book. He said he got a copy from a library when no library had been sent a copy." I did a little digging and he seemed to have written a review of the book without ever actually having read it. This apparently caused Amazon.com to remove Kwok's review. John Kwok's was one of the few one-starred rating at the time Dembski wrote his piece (and one of the top 50 Amazon.com reviewers). I daresay that this would be more dishonest than what Dembski did.

One interesting thing about controversial issues that it seems that people never make mistakes; if they get their facts wrong it's always deliberate deception. Bush wasn't simply mistaken about WMDs in Iraq, he deliberately and willfully lied about it. And it couldn't be, for instance, that Dembski was unaware that two of those who gave it a favorable review also signed the "Dissent from Darwin" list (which has hundreds of hundreds of signatures). He knew it and lied about...well, come to think of it he didn't say anything about the identity of those who gave the book a favorable review. But we'll call it a case of obvious dishonesty anyway. Because creationists and ID adherents are bastards.

Both sides make mistakes of ignorance. I'm sure you could give a lot of examples were deception could be inferred (so can I; creationists are hardly immune from emotions clouding reason). But please recognize I could also provide a lot of examples for anti-creationists (even apart from John Kwok). For instance, I could accuse you of deliberately distorting my position (as opposed to making a genuine mistake), saying that this is one of many examples where evolutionists have put forth obvious lies in an attempt to make the opposition look foolish.

But you and I both know that your mistakes were genuine, even the egregious ones. For instance, I said that a objective morality being a brute fact implied pantheism, you then claimed I was arguing for panpsychism, despite the fact I had very specifically said that a pantheistic God does not require consciousness.




A creationist could argue that we have seen a number of organs that have deteriorated and become vestigial in extant organisms. We have not however seen any new organs that are now evolving in extant species. A creationist could furthermore claim that this is more straightforwardly expected from creationist theory than evolution; and therefore that it "fits" this data better.


It would fit the data better if we hadn't seen the evolution of new organs. Fortunately, we have. Whew.


Really? Please give me one specific example of us seeing new organs that are now evolving in extant organisms. My claim (as devil's advocate): we have seen a number of organs that have deteriorated and become vestigial in extant organisms. We have not however seen any new organs that are now evolving in extant species. This is more straightforwardly expected from creationist theory than evolution; and therefore that it "fits" this data better ceteris paribus.

The fact of the matter is that we can only "see" the evolution of new organs in a metaphorical sense (if we can "see" it at all); e.g. connecting the dots of fossils. A creationist could claim that such connections are unwarranted; computer programs can be similar to each other without having a common ancestor etc. (though they might have a common designer).

As far as I know, we have not seen the evolution (however gradual) of new organs now developing any more than we have seen the evolution of new basic types. (Remember, I am talking about what we have literally seen rather than a controversial inference about a non-observed past event).




Again, would you care to justify your assertion? A verifiable quote perhaps?


I'm sorry, didn't you raise the claim that evolution needed special evidence in order to show that an organism could develop with a new or different organ?


Hmm, even playing devil's advocate I can't say for certain, because I think the answer may depend on what you mean by "special evidence." Can you provide a verifiable quote on what you believe I claimed?

I do seem to recall putting forth the claim (as devil's advocate) that a creationist could argue that we have seen a number of organs that have deteriorated and become vestigial in extant organisms. We have not however seen any new organs that are now evolving in extant species. I don't recall "presenting that there is something about organs that justifies treating their biological properties as different than other biological properties," which is why I asked for a verifiable quote.

Edited by Tisthammerw on 12/22/07 - 11:26 AM
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Kwalish Kid
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Posted 12/22/07 - 11:20 AM:
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#433
Tisthammerw wrote:
Well, yes. I have made such an argument before (though you did not address the argument in your previous post).

Morality makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. thou shalt not kill. If the basis of morality gives such orders that we ought to obey, it is clearly making commands--unless we are using different definitions of the word "command." I am using it in the sense of saying "a statement of what to do that must be obeyed by those concerned" (a wording I found in Merriam-Webster's nice website). How are you defining "command"?

I am not defining command because, as I said before, to assume that morality is a form of command is to beg the question. If that's your definition, then fine.
But those are descriptive statements, not prescriptive ones. I can describe the geometric properties of a circle, but I am not issuing orders merely by making such a description.

Sure. You can make statements about morality, too, without issuing orders.

You seem to be reluctant to distinguish between the content of statements and the act of making statements. The brute fact position is that there is moral content that does not need to be stated in much the same way that there are physical laws that do not need to be stated.

And, of course, physical laws are not about what a circle is, but about the movements of bodies in circles or similar shapes.
Really? Then please point to one piece of empirical data that doesn't fit the five-minute hypothesis. You can't, because anything you point to (gray hairs, fossils, etc.) was created just as it was five-minutes ago according to the hypothesis. I'm not saying the five-minute hypothesis is rational of course, only that if you wish to reject it you're going to have to appeal to some nonempirical philosophical principles (e.g. the assumed reliability of memory).

Well, there are all the behaviours of everything that we examine. If we want to explain them, then we use them as evidence. If we want merely to come up with a story that is logically compatible with them, then we can do almost anything.
Again, being empirically identical does not mean equally rational. We can use various philosophical principles (again, an example being the assumed reliability of memory rather than believing those memories to be illusory) as rational criteria for favoring one empirically identical claim over another.

The reliability of memory is not a philosophical principle. That we can explain and predict certain phenomena are not philosophical principles. They are part of reasonably analyzing empirical data.
Okay, so you evidently disagree with my devil's advocate creationist claim. But then please recognize then that empirical data are not enough: both the creationist and you have the same data and disagree how that data is best interpreted.

I do disagree with this. Most creationists are either ignorant about the available data or willfully deceptive about the available data or they apply their criteria inconsistently. This is an inclusive "or".
But our hypothetical creationist doesn't think so. It's one of the reasons why the debate is still ongoing; sincere people can disagree as to which theory the scientific evidence favors.

Sincere people have little to do with this debate.
A creationist could say that you or insane or dishonest for not recognizing that the creationist theory more naturally expects and better fits the data of only seeing evolution within basic types (and not seeing evolution of new basic types) ceteris paribus.

A creationist will say all kinds of things. I fortunately know, from experience and analysis, better than to use anything they say or write to judge anything (even their own opinions and science, often).
One interesting thing about controversial issues that it seems that people are never wrong; if they get their facts wrong it's always deliberate deception.

This is not always the case. I think that Behe is probably simply wrong about most of his work on the subject. Dembski is also plain wrong in many ways. The Discovery Institute? More than just wrong.
For instance, I could accuse you of deliberately distorting my position (as opposed to making a genuine mistake), saying that this is one of many examples where evolutionists have put forth obvious lies in an attempt to make the opposition look foolish.

I do try to present the most extreme consequences of your position.
But you and I both know that your mistakes were genuine, even the egregious ones. For instance, I said that a objective morality being a brute fact implied pantheism, you then claimed I was arguing for panpsychism, despite the fact I had very specifically said that a pantheistic God does not require consciousness.

You said this, but you were wrong about your conclusions. You also said that you didn't want to make morality into statements. Then in your next post you said that you did want morality to be statements.
Really? Please give me one specific example of us seeing new organs that are now evolving in extant organisms.

Did I say extant?

Of course, we have seen the creation of new organs several times in fruit flies, from very small genetic changes or duplication of genetic code.
My claim (as devil's advocate): we have seen a number of organs that have deteriorated and become vestigial in extant organisms. We have not however seen any new organs that are now evolving in extant species. This is more straightforwardly expected from creationist theory than evolution; and therefore that it "fits" this data better ceteris paribus.

Except that even if we hadn't seen any new organ creation in living memory, creation theories would still explain every single organism worse than evolutionary theories. Because every single organism has teh telltales signs of evolution in its physiology and in its genetics.
The fact of the matter is that we can only "see" the evolution of new organs in a metaphorical sense (if we can "see" it at all); e.g. connecting the dots of fossils. A creationist could claim that such connections are unwarranted; computer programs can be similar to each other without having a common ancestor etc. (though they might have a common designer).

But in order to make this into an argument, they either have to say that the creator creates exactly what evolution would have created in every case or that the creator created everything exactly as it's found and the evolution thing is a coincidence. In either case, evolution does better on the evidence. In the first case, evolution acting alone makes more sense than evolution that happens "really" because of a hidden agent. In teh second case, the theory says nothing other than "the creator creates whatever the creator creates" and has no real content. Indeed, it is that lack of content that you are relying on to claim that creationist theories face no problem with the available evidence.
As far as I know, we have not seen the evolution (however gradual) of new organs now developing any more than we have seen the evolution of new basic types. (Remember, I am talking about what we have literally seen rather than a controversial inference about a non-observed past event).

Well, over my lifetime I've seen many new basic types. Since they play no real role in biology, the taxonomical classifications have been revised many times for operational reasons.
I do seem to recall putting forth the claim (as devil's advocate) that a creationist could argue that we have seen a number of organs that have deteriorated and become vestigial in extant organisms. We have not however seen any new organs that are now evolving in extant species. I don't recall "presenting that there is something about organs that justifies treating their biological properties as different than other biological properties," which is why I asked for a verifiable quote.

They are the same thing, if one accepts that there is evolution "within basic types" or "except for the development of new organs". Because if you believe in evolution everywhere else, then you must believe that there is something special for organs that prevents them from being influenced by ordinary biological processes.
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein [This is included for the irony.]
Tisthammerw
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Posted 12/27/07 - 07:03 PM:
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#434
Kwalish Kid wrote:


Well, yes. I have made such an argument before (though you did not address the argument in your previous post).

Morality makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. thou shalt not kill. If the basis of morality gives such orders that we ought to obey, it is clearly making commands--unless we are using different definitions of the word "command." I am using it in the sense of saying "a statement of what to do that must be obeyed by those concerned" (a wording I found in Merriam-Webster's nice website). How are you defining "command"?


I am not defining command because, as I said before, to assume that morality is a form of command is to beg the question.


But notice here I didn't beg the question; I gave clear justification for the position that moral statements fit a fairly standard definition of the term.




But those are descriptive statements, not prescriptive ones. I can describe the geometric properties of a circle, but I am not issuing orders merely by making such a description.


Sure. You can make statements about morality, too, without issuing orders.


Unfortunately, those "statements" seem to command people's behavior, e.g. thou shalt not kill.




But you and I both know that your mistakes were genuine, even the egregious ones. For instance, I said that a objective morality being a brute fact implied pantheism, you then claimed I was arguing for panpsychism, despite the fact I had very specifically said that a pantheistic God does not require consciousness.


You said this, but you were wrong about your conclusions.


You are free to disagree with my conclusions, but that is no reason to distort my position before attacking it. You used phrases like "when you make you[r] argument for panpsychism" in post #304, suggesting to any casual reader that I was making an argument for panpsychism, when of course I was arguing no such thing. Indeed, I had very specifically said that a pantheistic God does not require consciousness.



You also said that you didn't want to make morality into statements. Then in your next post you said that you did want morality to be statements.


Can you provide some verifiable quotes supporting this claim? Or is this yet another unintentional distortion of my position?


Off topic: science and philosophy of science



Really? Then please point to one piece of empirical data that doesn't fit the five-minute hypothesis. You can't, because anything you point to (gray hairs, fossils, etc.) was created just as it was five-minutes ago according to the hypothesis. I'm not saying the five-minute hypothesis is rational of course, only that if you wish to reject it you're going to have to appeal to some nonempirical philosophical principles (e.g. the assumed reliability of memory).


Well, there are all the behaviours of everything that we examine. If we want to explain them, then we use them as evidence. If we want merely to come up with a story that is logically compatible with them, then we can do almost anything.


Fine, but that does nothing to answer my question. The fact of the matter is that if you're going to reject the five-minute hypothesis you'll have to do more than just point to data that the five minute hypothesis already predicts (e.g. the belief that gray hairs were created five minutes ago predicts the existence of gray hairs). Do you now concede the empirical underdetermination of theories?




Again, being empirically identical does not mean equally rational. We can use various philosophical principles (again, an example being the assumed reliability of memory rather than believing those memories to be illusory) as rational criteria for favoring one empirically identical claim over another.


The reliability of memory is not a philosophical principle.


The assumption that we can rely at all on our most basic sources of knowledge (like memory, testimony, and sense experience) is within the domain of epistemology. The more radical skeptics reject that we have any adequate grounds for believing anything at all. So the reliability of our basic perceptions (e.g. sense experience and the perception of being able to control our own actions) fits within epistemology and metaphysics. Notice that the reliability of memory and sense experience cannot be justified by pointing to the data either.




For instance, I could accuse you of deliberately distorting my position (as opposed to making a genuine mistake), saying that this is one of many examples where evolutionists have put forth obvious lies in an attempt to make the opposition look foolish.


I do try to present the most extreme consequences of your position.


I wasn’t talking about you saying something like “The consequences of your argument are X, and X is ridiculous.” I’m talking about “your argument is X, and X is wrong” when I put forth no such argument (the panpsychism issue is one example).

Additionally, a number of your consequences can only follow from a distorted version of my position. For instance, I argued that the universe having supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong above us mortals implied pantheism. You later said my position implied that any universe with any properties is divine, when of course my position implies no such thing.




Okay, so you evidently disagree with my devil's advocate creationist claim. But then please recognize then that empirical data are not enough: both the creationist and you have the same data and disagree how that data is best interpreted.


I do disagree with this.


Why? Think back to my apparent counterexample: we do not see the evolution of new basic types. A creationist could say that her theory predicts this data more straightforwardly than evolution, and that creation fits this data better than evolution ceteris paribus. Also, we have seen organs that have deteriorated and become vestigial in extant organisms but we have never seen new organs now evolving (however slowly) in extant organisms. Again, a creationist could say that her theory predicts this data more straightforwardly than evolution, and that creation fits this data better than evolution ceteris paribus. Can you really not see why a creationist would honestly believe this?




A creationist could say that you or insane or dishonest for not recognizing that the creationist theory more naturally expects and better fits the data of only seeing evolution within basic types (and not seeing evolution of new basic types) ceteris paribus.


A creationist will say all kinds of things.


Sure, but you’re missing the point. You seem so quick to vilify creationists that you don’t seem to realize a creationist might be able to vilify you using your own criteria.

You implied that a creationist would be “insane or dishonest” if he did not agree with you about which theory better fit a certain set of data ceteris paribus (which incidentally, was the expectation of not seeing new basic types evolving). Using the same criteria, “the evolutionist doesn’t agree with me about this interpretation” a creationist could accuse you of insanity/dishonesty.

You seem quick to attack honesty and integrity in general, such as the case where Dembski cited favorable book reviews with those reviewers being ID proponents (in this you seemed to suggest was “so obviously not honest that it is painful”) . The only clear case of dishonesty here was an anticreationist who evidently lied about reading the book while giving the book the lowest rating possible. Consider your behavior thus far that a creationist could use as a basis for personally attacking you.

You have repeatedly misrepresented my position before attacking it, one example again being the panpsychism case.

Also, you made a claim that allegedly represented a creationist position, and I questioned it. I asked (in post #421), “Can you perhaps give me a single, verifiable reference of a modern leading creationist adherent that predicts what you described?” You proposed the Discovery Institute. And when I asked for something verifiable from the Discovery Institute (in post #423), you refused to give me anything. A creationist could accuse you here of simply fabricating the position, deliberately slandering the Discovery Institute.

I asked for a specific verifiable source for the claim in question. You supplied an anticreationist web article (again in post #423) that, when looked up, did not contain the claim. Again, a creationist could accuse you of deliberately supplying a phony citation to support your bogus claim.

I remarked that we have not seen new organs now evolving in new basic types. You responded (in post #431) that fortunately (for evolution), we actually have “seen the evolution of new organs.” Of course, it is an outright falsehood that we have seen new organs evolving in the sense I was referring to. We have only “seen” organs evolving in a metaphorical sense (i.e. inferences from data rather than the data themselves). You probably did not intend your statement to be delusive, but I fear it was anyway.

Yes, a creationist can say anything. But let’s turn the tables a moment and say you saw a creationist doing these same things.

A creationist several times misrepresents evolutionists before attacking their position. You remark that we have never directly seen a human skull alongside dead Cambrian organisms. He says, “fortunately we have seen that.” But when you call him on it he backtracks saying it was metaphorical; that the inference of the data leads us to believe there were human skulls at the same time as extinct Cambrian organisms.

He says evolution says there would be an unbroken continuum of organisms rather than the gaps we see. You ask him for a verifiable source of a leading evolutionist who says evolution implies this. He says the National Center for Science Education. You ask for something more verifiable, and he refuses to cite anything from that organization. He later puts up a citation in response to the request for a source, but when actually looked up it is not an evolutionist but a creationist source that still does not even contain the claim in question.

Would not you and a number of other anticreationists accuse this fellow of dishonesty?

I would like to request a few things: (1) please do not misrepresent my position; (2) please do not make delusive comments (e.g. references that do not contain the claim in question); (3) consider not being as quick to vilify those who disagree with your position, especially if they can vilify you using your own standards.

Please also remember that opponents (particularly in emotionally heated and controversial issues) are quite capable of making foolish yet sincere mistakes. Remember that you yourself have made a number of mistakes as I have documented here, and yet I have not attacked your integrity.




As far as I know, we have not seen the evolution (however gradual) of new organs now developing any more than we have seen the evolution of new basic types. (Remember, I am talking about what we have literally seen rather than a controversial inference about a non-observed past event).


Well, over my lifetime I've seen many new basic types.


Obviously, but my point is you’ve never seen any new ones evolve (please keep in mind the context in which I am using “seen”).




I do seem to recall putting forth the claim (as devil's advocate) that a creationist could argue that we have seen a number of organs that have deteriorated and become vestigial in extant organisms. We have not however seen any new organs that are now evolving in extant species. I don't recall "presenting that there is something about organs that justifies treating their biological properties as different than other biological properties," which is why I asked for a verifiable quote.


They are the same thing, if one accepts that there is evolution "within basic types" or "except for the development of new organs". Because if you believe in evolution everywhere else, then you must believe that there is something special for organs that prevents them from being influenced by ordinary biological processes.


Not at all. A creationist could believe that organs are indeed influenced by ordinary biological processes, but that ordinary biological processes simply aren’t reasonably capable of evolving new organs. As analogy, an archaeologist doesn’t doubt that stone can’t be influenced by ordinary geological processes. But she still doubts that ordinary geological processes are reasonably capable of producing things like the Rosetta Stone or Stonehenge.

The claim that there must be “something special” about organs that “prevents them from being influenced by ordinary biological processes” simply does not logically follow.
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Kwalish Kid
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Posted 12/27/07 - 10:32 PM:
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#435
Tisthammerw wrote:
Unfortunately, those "statements" seem to command people's behavior, e.g. thou shalt not kill.

Unfortunately, this is merely an order, not a moral claim.

And now I'm done with this thread. Since you can't keep your own claims consistent from one post to the next, I no longer have to show your errors; your own arguments are their undoing.
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein [This is included for the irony.]
Tisthammerw
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Posted 12/29/07 - 03:53 PM:
quote post
#436
Kwalish Kid wrote:


Unfortunately, those "statements" seem to command people's behavior, e.g. thou shalt not kill.


Unfortunately, this is merely an order, not a moral claim.


In the context in which I was using it, it is a moral claim; namely, that killing is morally wrong (hence the prescriptive statement forbidding it). Moral claims are statements of what ought to be, how people ought to behave, so they are by nature commands when it comes to behavior; such has the prohibition against murder.



Since you can't keep your own claims consistent from one post to the next


Really? Care to provide a specific example?

In post #433 you said:

Kwalish Kid wrote:

You also said that you didn't want to make morality into statements. Then in your next post you said that you did want morality to be statements.


In post #434 I replied:

Tisthammerw wrote:


You also said that you didn't want to make morality into statements. Then in your next post you said that you did want morality to be statements.


Can you provide some verifiable quotes supporting this claim? Or is this yet another unintentional distortion of my position?


Considering you subsequently refused to provide any support for this claim, I'm thinking it's the latter.



And now I'm done with this thread.


Sorry to see you go; I think you were one of the more reasonable critics of my argument and you helped me refine it and explain it better. For that I thank you.

For purposes of future discussion (should anyone continue this thread) I’ll restate the key point of my argument here. My general claim is that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. My key point: basically, I have been arguing that there are only two plausible explanations for the existence of objective moral values: the brute fact position and theism. The brute fact position, however, eventually points us in the general direction of theism anyway.

Morality and the brute fact position

Logic says what is, but who or what says what ought to be? One response is that objective morality is a “brute fact.” But then, how does the “brute fact” position answer this questions like “What is the basis of morality” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?”

One possible answer to both questions is “nothing.” Yet if there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. If there is literally no basis for two plus two equaling four, then not even logic and mathematics say that the sum of two and two yield four. The problem with “nothing says how we ought to behave” is that it is tantamount to saying there are no rules of behavior. Similarly, if the truth of a given claim has literally no basis (in anything), then this would include the claim having no basis in reality. So this interpretation of a “brute fact” does not quite work.

Another possible interpretation of the brute fact position is that the answers to the questions “What is the basis of morality” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is reality. All facts are based in reality, since being based “in reality” is what it means for something to be real. Similarly, by definition anything that exists is based in existence, and anything based in existence exists. On this view, the basis of a brute fact is reality and existence, but nothing else.

If we apply the latter interpretation of the brute fact, then morality being a brute fact would say that morality’s foundation is the universe and existence in some general sense as opposed to placing its basis within a person or culture. It is reality that says Hitler should have behaved differently. Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself.

Implications of morality being a brute fact

Yet in the case of morality we have a rather unusual situation if this view is correct. Morality is prescriptive, rather than descriptive. Morality says how people ought to behave and makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. saying that people should not steal. An unusual upshot for the veracity of ought-statements is that it introduces the notion of authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative; the definition of authoritative being that people really ought to obey it. One reason is this: what if people have conflicting views on what they ought to do? If a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews, should the subordinate obey the Nazi? Clearly, the subordinate should obey the dictates of morality instead. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands (e.g. dictators who would order torture and genocide) if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. According to the brute fact position in question then, the universe/reality/existence not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority).

The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism. A more general definition of God is “the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality.” Pantheism is simply equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence. It should be noted that some of the traditional aspects of God—like omnipotence and consciousness—are not necessarily associated with pantheism. Thus a pantheistic God may seem like a relatively harmless implication, but even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics.

This pantheistic God might not contain consciousness but would have to possess supremely transcendent moral authority (transcending all peoples and cultures) while also possessing perfect moral correctness (it cannot be mistaken about what is right). Since a pantheistic God is equated with the universe/reality/existence, this supreme metaphysical reality is omnipresent and eternal. This is perhaps to be expected however, given that objective morality commands our behavior regardless of where we are and when we are. Interestingly, the essence of this pantheistic God must also be incorporeal if objective morality is not dependent on collections of atoms. Suppose for instance we took everything away from the physical universe except Mount Rushmore. Would Mount Rushmore be the source of objective moral values? No, moral values are incorporeal and their underlying basis (the supreme metaphysical reality that says how we ought to behave) must also be incorporeal.

Yet a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral is treading awfully close to theism. Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person—a moral God that says what everyone ought to do, a God that is the basis of morality and a God that everyone ought to obey. So even if it’s not an outright proof, to the very least the existence of objective morality still provides strong evidence for theism (by suggesting the existence of a God that is transcendent, omnipresent, perfectly moral etc.).

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Tisthammerw
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Posted 12/29/07 - 09:30 PM:
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#437
I guess it's time I get back to a post I never got around to replying to: post #415 (which was in response to my post #413).


TMB wrote:


Yes. It's not as if there is only one issue I can have a position on.


I am sure you are right on this, however my issue was of you holding inconsistent positions


But if you'll recall, I was pointing out that the positions in question were not inconsistent with each other. You said, "In your original post detailing symbolic logic, you offered a sentence that said OM commands behavior, the next one said it is a supreme authority to command behavior." If OM has supreme authority (as I have been suggesting) these two positions are not inconsistent.




Reductio ad absurdum, as I mentioned earlier. Of course, we may disagree whether statements like "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" is a reasonable belief (whereas I consider it an absurdity).


in which case (if there are people who do not consider it absurd), it does not qualify as Reduction ad absurdum.


It depends on whether people have valid reasons to claim it is not an absurdity. I do not think you have any reasonable basis for claiming "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" is not absurd, but as I said perhaps we'll have to agree to disagree.




Huh? What contradiction? How does this argument even remotely approach a contradiction?


Objective is not the same as supreme, as you selectively use them to suit various points in your argument. Just because a position is objective does not mean it automatically acquires supreme authority (unless you add other evidence to justify this).


But I did provide an evidential argument supporting the claim that objective moral truths imply supreme authority. You may think the argument is unsound, but please do not completely ignore it and then imply I haven't tried to justify it.



If we assume that an objective position existed behind the holocaust, we then see that by humans driving the holocaust they overrode any possible objective position behind it.


This does not logically follow (assuming you are still talking about "authority"). By objective morality being authoritative I mean that people really ought to obey it. Simply because people conducted a Holocaust does not mean they "overrode" the authority of morality. They still should not have committed the genocide. Just because people do an action does not imply they ought to have done it (confer the is-ought fallacy or the naturalistic fallacy).

Let me try to argue again that objective morality i