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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God
Tisthammerw
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Posted 10/21/07 - 12:33 PM:
quote post
#401
Tisthammerw wrote:

Kwalish Kid wrote:

[Me admitting that some symbolic logic statements rely upon English language justification]

Not good enough. If you have an "English language" justification for your points, you should be able to symbolize them.


Suppose I break down a justification for a symbolic logic statement into further symbolic logic statements. But of course those symbolic logic points would have to be justified as well. But if the only valid justification for those points is breaking them down further for more symbolic logic statements, then we're going to have to have symbolic logic statements supporting those symbolic logic statements which support the original symbolic logic statement. The chain, as you can imagine, is going to be a bit unwieldy. It seems clear that eventually we're going to have to get to English language justification considering that my core claim being false is not logically impossible (and thus not amenable to a strict proof).


Kwalish Kid wrote:
Why don't you try to go one level deeper [in the symbolic logic].


I'll do so for what I believe to be the most contentious part of the argument; that if objective morality exists then either Brute fact or theism is the most plausible explanation, the former implying objective morality is evidence for the existence of God.

First I'll define the variables (note: these variables are not themselves the premises).

M: Objective morality exists. By morals being objective it is meant that moral statements are binding and valid regardless of what people think.

G: God is the correct and most plausible explanation for why objective moral values exist, with there being no other plausible alternatives being available (except perhaps for B, defined below)

B: Objective morality as a brute fact is a plausible explanation for why objective moral values exist; and there are no other plausible alternatives (except perhaps for G, and anything else this variable would imply).

X: The universe/reality/existence as the metaphysical basis of objective morality is a plausible explanation for why objective moral values exist; and there are no other plausible alternatives (except perhaps for G, and statements derived from this variable, and any propositions that this statement was derived from).

S: The universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave, and does so with supreme authority.

P: A pantheistic God is the metaphysical basis of morality, and there are no other plausible alternatives (except perhaps for G, and any propositions that this statement was derived from)

C: A pantheistic God that is the basis of objective morality would by necessity possess certain characteristics associated with a theistic God (e.g. being transcendent, omnipresent, and perfectly moral).

E: Objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God

And now for the proof. The goal is to prove M -> E given these seven premises.


  1. M -> (B or G)
  2. B -> X
  3. X -> S
  4. S -> P
  5. P -> C
  6. C -> E
  7. G -> E.
    =====================
  8. B -> S 2,3 (hypothetical syllogism)
  9. B -> P (8,4 hypothetical syllogism)
  10. B -> C (9,5 hypothetical syllogism)
  11. B -> E (10,6 hypothetical syllogism)
  12. M (conditional proof assumption)
  13. (B or G) (12,1 modus ponens)
  14. ~B -> G (13, conditional equivalence)
  15. ~B -> E (14,15 hypothetical syllogism)
  16. (B or E) (15, conditional equivalence)
  17. (E or B) (16, commutation)
  18. ~E -> B (17, conditional equivalence)
  19. ~E -> E (18, 11, modus ponens)
  20. (E or E) (19, conditional equivalence)
  21. E (20, duplication)
  22. M -> E (12-21, conditional proof)


And now to justify some premises.

The idea that objective morality has literally no basis and no source has potential problems. If the answer to the question, “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is “nothing,” then there is nothing that says how we ought to behave. But if this is true, then there is literally nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. If morality has literally no source and no basis, then there is nothing that says Hitler was wrong.

Justification for B -> X

Of course, one could immediately argue that this is not what it means for the existence of objective morality to be a brute fact. All facts are based in reality, since being based “in reality” is what it means for something to be real. Anything existing in actual fact is by definition based in reality. Similarly, by definition anything that exists is based in existence, and anything based in existence exists. So all things considered, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the basis of a brute fact is reality and existence, but nothing else.

Justification for X -> S

This alternative brute fact interpretation would say that morality’s foundation is the universe and existence in some general sense, as opposed to placing its basis within a person or culture. That is, a brute fact just exists as reality, and thus there is no metaphysical basis for moral values existing other than existence and reality itself. On this view, the answer to the question “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is “reality.” It is reality that says Hitler should have behaved differently. Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself.

The idea that the universe or existence somehow says how we ought to behave may sound like a strange consequence for a brute fact. Existence normally says what is, not what ought to be. So why would this consequence follow from morality and its basis? Something is based in existence if and only if it exists. According to the brute fact explanation, the sole metaphysical basis for moral values existing is simply existence itself (as opposed to a person or culture). Yet morality prescribes our behavior, and consequently we have a question that rarely applies to brute facts: “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” If existence really is the sole basis of morality, then the answer to this question is “existence.” Existence itself says how we ought to behave, and does so with authority. The prescriptive nature of morality permits this otherwise bizarre implication. Additionally, as the sole basis of objective morality, existence says how we ought to behave with supreme (e.g. transcending Hitler’s) authority.

Justification for S -> P

The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over right and wrong above us mortals would by definition be some form of pantheism. A more general definition of God is “the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality.” Pantheism is simply equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence. It should be noted that some of the traditional aspects of God—like omnipotence and consciousness—are not necessarily associated with pantheism. Thus a pantheistic God may seem like a relatively harmless implication, but even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics.

Justification for P -> C

This pantheistic God might not contain consciousness but would have to possess supremely transcendent moral authority (transcending all peoples and cultures) while also possessing perfect moral correctness (it cannot be mistaken about what is right). Since a pantheistic God is equated with the universe/reality/existence, this supreme metaphysical reality is omnipresent and eternal. This is perhaps to be expected however, given that objective morality commands our behavior regardless of where we are and when we are. Interestingly, the essence of this pantheistic God must also be incorporeal if objective morality is not dependent on collections of atoms. Suppose for instance we took everything away from the physical universe except Mount Rushmore. Would Mount Rushmore be the source of objective moral values? No, moral values are incorporeal and their underlying basis (the supreme metaphysical reality that says how we ought to behave) must also be incorporeal.

Justification for C -> E

Yet a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral is treading awfully close to theism. Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person—a moral God that says what everyone ought to do, a God that is the basis of morality and a God that everyone ought to obey. So even if it’s not an outright proof, to the very least the existence of objective morality still provides strong evidence for theism (by suggesting the existence of a God that is transcendent, omnipresent, perfectly moral etc.).

Edited by Tisthammerw on 10/21/07 - 12:38 PM
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Kwalish Kid
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Posted 10/21/07 - 03:51 PM:
quote post
#402
Tisthammerw wrote:
truly bizarre examples of ad hoc reasoning

The sort of reasoning you imagine is incredibly week. So week to the point of insanity. People can say all kinds of crazy things. You've given no reason to suppose that they should or would say certain things.
I'm not to sure about that. Consider the many-number-of-universes example above. There are some evolutionists (e.g. Richard Dawkins) who are willing to embrace such a thing if it means they can reject a belief they don't like.

That's a nice attack against Dawkins that is not grounded in any fact. You might be upset that Dawkins can rely on science and you cannot, but that doesn't give you the license to wholly fabricate an imagined course of action for him.
Additionally, UFO skeptics have used the same sort of "convolutions" when it comes to dismissing eyewitness testimony (as lies, overactive imagination etc.) and video evidence (as forgeries).

Yes, and that's why we think that these people are insane.
Of course I am. For evolution, I am talking about the "theory that the various types of animals and plants have their origin in other preexisting types and that the distinguishable differences are due to modifications in successive generations."

That's certainly not enough to consider a scientific theory. There is no explanation there, heck there's not even any description there. There is no reason to believe in your pseudo-theory. There are many reasons to believe in evolution.
Yes there are specific sub-theories regarding mechanisms of how evolution could or did occur, but like it or not this theory of evolution as I defined it is what is embraced in the scientific community and this theory is not falsifiable. If what I described above is not a theory, what exactly is it?

You can say that it is, but actually, the theory that biologists embrace is very much more specific than what you have imagined.

What is evolution?

1. http://talkorigins.org/faqs/evolution-definition.html
2. http://talkorigins.org/faqs/faq-intro-to-biology.html
3. http://talkorigins.org/faqs/modern-synthesis.html
I'll define creation here also. The theory that the various forms of life were directly created by an intelligent agency.

How? Created what organisms? With what characteristics?

I could believe that the entire universe was created a minute ago and it would be equally as well supported as your two pseudo-theories. But to do so would be to be crazy.
You didn't provide one specific example of an empirical datum that doesn't fit in either this theory or evolution.

Right, I provided three examples that would, if established, lead to the end of belief in evolution, or at least modification to an extreme level.

I can't provide an example to your pseudo-theory of creation, because it could be a theory of anything and everything being created at any time. Without any specifics, I'm simply looking at a radical skeptic, Cartesian-Demon hypothesis.
You could say these theories are vague, that specific varieties are more falsifiable etc. Fine, but that doesn't change the logic of the circumstances. Both of these theories are logically possible, and each can be modified so that both are empirically indistinguishable. It is true once we create some very specific versions of those theories, those specific theories are more falsifiable. But if a specific theory of e.g. creation is falsified a creationist can just adjust his general theory so that creation still fits the facts, and the upshot is that we still have two theories that are empirically identical. The underdetermination of theories remains.

Sure, underdetermination remains for theories that say absolutely nothing about the nature of anything in the world. Hooray for you.
It was when it came to fitting the empirical data. I've read this in multiple sources. I first read about it in a book, but since I can't seem to place where exactly that was, here's one online source you can quickly verify.

Ummm... a play for kids? About the pseudo-science of Egyptian astronomy?

You might want to actually read some books on the subject. Books not by conspiracy nuts.

However, I apologize, I had thought you were discussing Ptolemy, not Copernicus. In either case, the Copernican system had to be modified quite a bit before it reached the point where the Tychonic system was made (effectively by fixing the Earth as stationary rather than the sun, but keeping all other orbital relationships.

In this case, the Tychonic system does indeed do just as well. The only reason to distinguish between them is.. well what?

You can decide whether or not Newton's demonstration of the center of gravity or the discovery of the aberration of light does it for you. In this case, it seems that evidence wins the day.
And here:
Oh, how ironic. This thesis is about how, even in the face of geometrically identical results, the evidence still weighs in favour of the heliocentric system.
[quote]This is a clear case of the underdetermination of theories, though AFAIK it usually isn't this radical.

I'll still with the Bennet thesis you linked to and agree one one level of equivalence, but that ultimately the Keplerian system remains better. Indeed, since Newton demonstrated this with more evidence later, I'm happy.
A more modern example is the various different (yet mathematically equivalent) interpretations of quantum mechanics.

These interpretations are not theories. They do not change the scientific theory at all.
Some have likened the underdetermination of theories as dots on a graph coupled with a myriad quantity of lines that could fit it. Some lines may be simple and elegant and some may look like spaghetti, but there are invariably innumerable lines that can fit it. A similar sort of situations arise between data and theories in science.

No, because the theories that scientists come up with generally aren't entirely random. They tend to be in only a vanishingly small domain of logically possible theories. Why is that?
This is the claim of someone truly ignorant of the philosophy of science--or at least what my position is. I very specifically said that the underdetermination of theories has to do with empirical data. That doesn't mean the "evidence" is equal unless you define "evidence" exclusively as empirical evidence. Let's take the five minute hypothesis as an example. This hypothesis says that everything in the universe (gray hairs, fossils, etc.) was created five minutes ago by an unknown force. This is empirically identical with the theory that the universe is 10 to 20 billion years old. Do they have the same degree of rational support? Probably not. The old universe theory more fits the data more straightforwardly. However the five-minute hypothesis is logically possible and consistent with all the data. Anything you point to, including fossils, one can say "that was created just as it was five minutes ago" and such a claim is logically possible. Is the five minute hypothesis irrational? Of course it is. But this is still an instance of the underdetermination of theories nonetheless, and one cannot choose between these two theories purely on empirical grounds.

It's perfect case of underdetermination, one that involves two theories, one of which clearly isn't a scientific theory. Now you want to make a distinction between evidence and data, but you seem to challenge the theory of evolution only on data. What use do we have for random theories that only address data without any regard for evidence?
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein
Tisthammerw
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Posted 10/27/07 - 08:19 AM:
Subject: A digression: philosophy of science 		quote post
#403
It seems we have digressed into the philosophy of science, but for the moment I am willing to engage in this off-topic discussion here.

Kwalish Kid wrote:


I'm not to sure about that. Consider the many-number-of-universes example above. There are some evolutionists (e.g. Richard Dawkins) who are willing to embrace such a thing if it means they can reject a belief they don't like.


That's a nice attack against Dawkins that is not grounded in any fact.


You sure about that? I could be wrong, but I seem to remember that Dawkins appears willing embrace what I said above as an acceptable explanation when it comes to a belief he doesn't like (confer when he talks about the fine-tuning argument regarding the physical constants of the universe).



You might be upset that Dawkins can rely on science and you cannot, but that doesn't give you the license to wholly fabricate an imagined course of action for him.


I cannot rely on science and I have wholly fabricated an imagined course of action for Dawkins? That's a nice attack against me that is not grounded in any fact. (Sorry, couldn't resist; but please be more careful about your personal attacks. Careless ad hominems arise all too easily in controversial issues.)




Additionally, UFO skeptics have used the same sort of "convolutions" when it comes to dismissing eyewitness testimony (as lies, overactive imagination etc.) and video evidence (as forgeries).


Yes, and that's why we think that these people are insane.


Maybe they are, but please notice that dismissing the ad hoc hypotheses of "they were imagining it" or "video evidence was forged" as irrational can sound a bit hypocritical when we use them ourselves.




Of course I am. For evolution, I am talking about the "theory that the various types of animals and plants have their origin in other preexisting types and that the distinguishable differences are due to modifications in successive generations."


That's certainly not enough to consider a scientific theory.


You still didn't answer my question as to what we would call this belief that is clearly embraced in science. If we can't call it a "theory" (when even the dictionary seems to do so) what do we call it?

Since you don't seem to want to call this scientific belief a "theory," let's call it a "maxi-theory" (and the same thing for the creationist theory I described earlier). The maxi-theory of evolution has been modified quite a bit throughout the years, and so not all sub-theories of evolution have stuck with us, though the maxi-theory remains accepted today. Although maxi-theory of evolution can discard some sub-theories in favor of others (just as the maxi-theory of creation has done so among creationists), this does not really resolve the problem of underdetermination regarding which maxi-theory (creation or evolution) to accept. In the end we still have two possibilities that are perfectly consistent with all the data. You have not, for instance, provided even one specific example of an empirical datum that doesn't fit in either maxi-theory.




I'll define creation here also. The theory that the various forms of life were directly created by an intelligent agency.


How? Created what organisms? With what characteristics?


This will vary depending on the specifics (just as with evolution), but one could say that the creator in question created the "basic types" of plant and animal life on Earth. To get a definition of "basic type" I recommend reading Chapter 8 of Mere Creation. The bottom line, again, is that we have two distinct possible explanations for how life came about, and both are underdetermined by the empirical data.



You might want to actually read some books on the subject. Books not by conspiracy nuts.


Er, I don't seem to recall about reading the Copernicus and Brahe thing in a book by a conspiracy nut. In any case there are a number of websites supporting my claim, and I'm sure that at least a few were not by conspiracy nuts.



However, I apologize, I had thought you were discussing Ptolemy, not Copernicus.


I very specifically said I was discussing Tyco Brahe and Copernicus. What part of my words did you think I was talking about Ptolemy in lieu of Copernicus? Especially when you very specifically claimed in response that "It sure as heck wasn't Copernicus' theory that could match Tycho's"?

Of course we now have reason to believe that heliocentrism is true. Nonetheless, at that time we had two empirically identical theories.




A more modern example is the various different (yet mathematically equivalent) interpretations of quantum mechanics.


These interpretations are not theories.

....


This is the claim of someone truly ignorant of the philosophy of science--or at least what my position is. I very specifically said that the underdetermination of theories has to do with empirical data. That doesn't mean the "evidence" is equal unless you define "evidence" exclusively as empirical evidence. Let's take the five minute hypothesis as an example. This hypothesis says that everything in the universe (gray hairs, fossils, etc.) was created five minutes ago by an unknown force. This is empirically identical with the theory that the universe is 10 to 20 billion years old. Do they have the same degree of rational support? Probably not. The old universe theory more fits the data more straightforwardly. However the five-minute hypothesis is logically possible and consistent with all the data. Anything you point to, including fossils, one can say "that was created just as it was five minutes ago" and such a claim is logically possible. Is the five minute hypothesis irrational? Of course it is. But this is still an instance of the underdetermination of theories nonetheless, and one cannot choose between these two theories purely on empirical grounds.


It's perfect case of underdetermination, one that involves two theories, one of which clearly isn't a scientific theory.


Forgive me for saying so, but it seems that nearly every time we have logically possible empirically identical beliefs about the natural world you dismiss them as "not scientific theories." There a number of problems with this. One of them is that simply labeling alternative possibilities as "not scientific theories" does not alter the fact that we have multiple possibilities for the same data. We have to rely on non-empirical philosophical principles to select among empirically identical competitors. One of them (at least for you) is defining (perhaps narrowly) what constitutes a "scientific theory" and eliminating those that don't fit the definition. But this will have no relevance to the veracity of the "scientific theories" we accept unless we have some philosophical grounds for thinking that nature's preferences are similar to ours.

Let me be clear: I am not saying that this annihilates the rationality of science, but I am saying that the underdetermination of theories is a pervasive problem in science and prevents us from wholly relying on empirical data when it comes to deciding which theories (or maxi-theories) to accept.



Now you want to make a distinction between evidence and data, but you seem to challenge the theory of evolution only on data.


Did I ever say in this thread that evolution was false, irrational, or anything of the sort? No. All I said is that creation and evolution are empirically underdetermined. And this happens to be true.
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Kwalish Kid
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Posted 10/27/07 - 12:26 PM:
quote post
#404
Tisthammerw wrote:
You sure about that? I could be wrong, but I seem to remember that Dawkins appears willing embrace what I said above as an acceptable explanation when it comes to a belief he doesn't like (confer when he talks about the fine-tuning argument regarding the physical constants of the universe).

There is no fine-tuning argument. There are some specious discussions of fine-tuning, but since there is no probability measure on the possible laws of physics in the universe, we have yet to see a decent argument come out of fine-tuning discussions.

In essence, you are saying that Dawkins comes up with a specious response to an actual argument because he doesn't like the conclusion. That is your own attack without evidence.
I cannot rely on science and I have wholly fabricated an imagined course of action for Dawkins? That's a nice attack against me that is not grounded in any fact. (Sorry, couldn't resist; but please be more careful about your personal attacks. Careless ad hominems arise all too easily in controversial issues.)

Well, you have yet to actually bring any science to the table, here. Dawkins presents many arguments based on science, yet you chose to look at a response to a piece of, so far, pure fantasy (i.e. the fine tuning argument).
Maybe they are, but please notice that dismissing the ad hoc hypotheses of "they were imagining it" or "video evidence was forged" as irrational can sound a bit hypocritical when we use them ourselves.

So there is no difference in these cases? Perhaps you believe that things like the science of evolution is on the same level as, say, 9-11 conspiracy theorists? What is hypocritical about denouncing poor evidence?
You still didn't answer my question as to what we would call this belief that is clearly embraced in science. If we can't call it a "theory" (when even the dictionary seems to do so) what do we call it?

Well, we call what you presented an incredibly vague, useless statement. As I said, I expect a scientific theory to at least describe something. I also expect an explanation for an at least somewhat accurate description of the world. Until you provide something like that, you aren;t even talking about anything relevant to science.
Since you don't seem to want to call this scientific belief a "theory," let's call it a "maxi-theory" (and the same thing for the creationist theory I described earlier). The maxi-theory of evolution has been modified quite a bit throughout the years, and so not all sub-theories of evolution have stuck with us, though the maxi-theory remains accepted today. Although maxi-theory of evolution can discard some sub-theories in favor of others (just as the maxi-theory of creation has done so among creationists), this does not really resolve the problem of underdetermination regarding which maxi-theory (creation or evolution) to accept. In the end we still have two possibilities that are perfectly consistent with all the data. You have not, for instance, provided even one specific example of an empirical datum that doesn't fit in either maxi-theory.

Who cares? Seriously, if we take a "maxi-theory" seriously, it is because it is an element of an actual theory.

Is there an actual Creationist theory?
This will vary depending on the specifics (just as with evolution), but one could say that the creator in question created the "basic types" of plant and animal life on Earth. To get a definition of "basic type" I recommend reading Chapter 8 of Mere Creation. The bottom line, again, is that we have two distinct possible explanations for how life came about, and both are underdetermined by the empirical data.

Ah, so you do believe in magic!

Seriously, though, do you believe that the creationist theory is that everything was created, just as we find it, and that's it. That is, every organism we find is just how it was supposed to be created and there is no particular reason or explanation as to why these organisms are the way they are.
Er, I don't seem to recall about reading the Copernicus and Brahe thing in a book by a conspiracy nut. In any case there are a number of websites supporting my claim, and I'm sure that at least a few were not by conspiracy nuts.

Yet, you link to such a page. An interesting go to website.
I very specifically said I was discussing Tyco Brahe and Copernicus. What part of my words did you think I was talking about Ptolemy in lieu of Copernicus? Especially when you very specifically claimed in response that "It sure as heck wasn't Copernicus' theory that could match Tycho's"?

I had them mixed up in my mind. Still, Copernicus' theory can't match Tycho's. A modified version can.
Of course we now have reason to believe that heliocentrism is true. Nonetheless, at that time we had two empirically identical theories.

In the same way that evolution and creationism are empirically identical?
Forgive me for saying so, but it seems that nearly every time we have logically possible empirically identical beliefs about the natural world you dismiss them as "not scientific theories."

No, everything you come up with in this regard is poor.

Most examples turn out to be poor. This is why underdetermination isn't taken as a serious problem.

However, you have a hard time actually coming up with a scientific example.
There a number of problems with this. One of them is that simply labeling alternative possibilities as "not scientific theories" does not alter the fact that we have multiple possibilities for the same data. We have to rely on non-empirical philosophical principles to select among empirically identical competitors. One of them (at least for you) is defining (perhaps narrowly) what constitutes a "scientific theory" and eliminating those that don't fit the definition. But this will have no relevance to the veracity of the "scientific theories" we accept unless we have some philosophical grounds for thinking that nature's preferences are similar to ours.

Almost every physicist accepts quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics gives an actual description of things. The interpretations of quantum mechanics have no bearing on this. It doesn't seem to be to be very important to anything empirical what interpretation we choose.

Come up with an empirically important creationist theory, and perhaps we'll see something interesting.
Let me be clear: I am not saying that this annihilates the rationality of science, but I am saying that the underdetermination of theories is a pervasive problem in science and prevents us from wholly relying on empirical data when it comes to deciding which theories (or maxi-theories) to accept.

Since science doesn't care about maxi-theories, I'll grant you your point there.
Did I ever say in this thread that evolution was false, irrational, or anything of the sort? No. All I said is that creation and evolution are empirically underdetermined. And this happens to be true.

If you could come up with a creationist theory that has some sort of explanation for the observations, I might be inclined to believe you.

To be clear, "there was a designer who created everything exactly how we find it" is not much of a theory. It may lead one into giddy reflection, but it does nothing in terms of actually dealing with the world. "There was a process by which all the diversity we see was produced from previous organisms," isn't much of a theory either. Nobody believes in such an idea, unless it is because of some more particular belief.

In actual scientific practice, there are many pieces of evidence for various parts of actual evolutionary science. What is the creationist science and what is the evidence for it? Is it merely, "every specific example that we don't have direct evidence for yet is created, and as we discover more direct evidence, we'll pull that thing off the table"?

Edited by Kwalish Kid on 10/27/07 - 03:43 PM
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein
Kwalish Kid
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Posted 10/27/07 - 03:52 PM:
quote post
#405
And while we're at it, why don;t we go over the most ludicrous part of that logical argument, the part that really needs to be looked at.
Justification for S -> P

The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over right and wrong above us mortals would by definition be some form of pantheism. A more general definition of God is “the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality.” Pantheism is simply equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence. It should be noted that some of the traditional aspects of God—like omnipotence and consciousness—are not necessarily associated with pantheism. Thus a pantheistic God may seem like a relatively harmless implication, but even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics.

What definition of pantheism could possibly be used to justify such a bizarre inference?

Additionally, this is the most pathetic definition of "God" I have ever seen. Why not simply give the argument that, since things exist, God must exist. Really, really weak.
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein
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Posted 10/30/07 - 01:10 AM:
quote post
#406
Tist,

TMB wrote:

You have now modified the previous position that OM carries supreme authority.


I have? Where?


This comment amazes me. Either you are laughing your arse off at me, or you are doing whatever you can to avoid confronting the issues in your argument. In your original post detailing symbolic logic, you offered a sentence that said OM commands behavior, the next one said it is a supreme authority to command behavior. This is why I pointed out that you managed to move from a position that OM commands authority, in the next you modify this to say it is supreme authority without offering any support or logic as to why this should be so (apart from it helping your argument).


If this authority is supreme, why is it that we see so many examples in human society where the attempt to prescribe behavior is not supreme. ie. it varies with cultures, groups, timing, contexts and does not manage to ever supremely prescribe human behavior.


[Off topic alert; since I am primarily defending the statement that if objective morality exists then it is evidence for the existence of God]


Except that supreme does not mean objective neither does objective mean supreme. Your position should be that IF this authority is OBJECTIVE, but you also manage to slip in SUPREME as a second assumption. By mixing terms in this way, you use it your advantage when they are different (ie. supreme can easily then become divine, and when you want to introduce supreme, you say its the same as objective).

No, of course not. Statement X being objectively true does not necessarily mean that everyone will know of it. Similarly, there is no logical inconsistency with people getting objective moral truths wrong.


I agree that the application of relative morality is not evidence that objective morality does not exist. Except that the only evidence we do have is for relative morality, and no evidence for objective and absolute. It also means that you are taking an assumptive position of being objective and qualified to dismiss others as being relative.

Not even the "brute fact" position? If so why? Remember, I'm talking about given objective morality exists, what plausible explanations for its existence are there?


Nope not even the "brute fact" position. This is because there is no way to make the connection to a moral position from something that describes the reality of existence. Reality is not a moral position about how things 'ought' to be, it is about the way they are. If however, you do consider that the way things actually are does direct the way we things they ought to be, then I agree with you. This is still a relative position because of competing lifeforms looking for advantage to help them prevail - ie. remain in reality.

Please provide one specific example of a statement that misused symbolic logic. (Bear in mind I have already responded to some of your previous objections, and my statements specifically saying that some of the premises would have to be justified via English anyway; I never claimed putting it in symbolic logic made my argument a rigorous proof.)


Just one more dance, then I need to wash my hair. We have done this one to death. If you can't answer the specific criticisms then be a real man and acknowledge you are out of your depth. My original response to your symbolic disaster took apart each point, if you are confused refer back to that. Stop prevaricating.

I'll try explaining this again. According to the brute fact position, the sole the sole metaphysical basis for moral values existing is simply existence itself (as opposed to a person or culture). So if objective morality is a brute fact, objective morality's sole metaphysical basis is existence itself. Do you agree with this?


I agree that morality is derived from objective reality, but only the principle is driven this way, the specifics vary as each entity uses moral positions to their advanatge. Your argument on brute fact shows no mechanism or reason to move from the basis of existence to a moral position. There needs to be an agent to do this. In our case, it is human judgment, and this is what makes our morality relative. In order to retain control over our existsnce, as individuals, and as a species, we construct our morality to specific advantages.

For example - consider an asocial, asexually reproducing organism. Whatever is good for its existence, is therefore 'moral', just because it exists. If it has limited social mixing, and the group has some value, then its morality needs to be maintained. So for brief periods leopards have moral position for the pair (leoaprds are predomiantly solitary), the mother leopard extends the morality to cover her cubs until she kicks them out. Then is every leopard for himself again. This is an automatic mechanism in non human animals, we have made an art form of it, built up religion, metaphysical beings etc, to garnish the plate.

Now we come to the question of "who or what says how we ought to behave?" The proper answer is "existence," because it is existence that is the sole metaphysical basis of objective morality (under this view). The prescriptive nature of morality permits this otherwise bizarre implication.


I agree with your position that existence underlies the creation of morality, however this only means that an objective mechanism exists that morality is built upon, not that the moral standards themselves will be objective. In order to exist you must survive, therefore you might decide that anything that promotes your survival is moral. This then brings in conflict with other individuals, groups etc as they strive to survive, often in direct conflict with others need to survive. This requires the development of selfish morality at various levels. As individuals, as species, as nations, religions, races, etc. This is why you have rules that define acceptable behavior at all levels, some of these are then describd as wrong/right/good/bad rather than just antisocial.

I do not see why you think it bizarre to have a link between morality and existence, and quite how it is that morality being prescriptive permits this. I also do not see that existence is metaphysical. My understanding the term metaphysical is based upon that world that cannot be validated as we do with existence. ie. if it exists in the sense that it is factual, intuitive and bears scrutiny, it is not metaphysical.
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Posted 11/11/07 - 02:54 PM:
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#407
Kwalish Kid wrote:


You sure about that? I could be wrong, but I seem to remember that Dawkins appears willing embrace what I said above as an acceptable explanation when it comes to a belief he doesn't like (confer when he talks about the fine-tuning argument regarding the physical constants of the universe).


There is no fine-tuning argument. There are some specious discussions of fine-tuning


Just because you think the argument is specious doesn't mean it's not an argument (even if it is a "specious" argument, which I'm not sure it is given the lengths Dawkins seems willing to go to in order to reject it).


In essence, you are saying that Dawkins comes up with a specious response to an actual argument because he doesn't like the conclusion.


I said Dawkins was willing to accept the many-universes scenario if it means he can reject a belief he doesn't like. The belief he doesn't like: the universe was designed. The argument: the fine-tuning idea. One acceptable (to him) alternative to the belief he doesn't like: the many-universes scenario. Your response to my claim that Dawkins is willing to accept the many-universes idea if it means he can reject a belief he doesn't like: "That's a nice attack against Dawkins that is not grounded in any fact." Bottom line: that response was mistaken.




Since you don't seem to want to call this scientific belief a "theory," let's call it a "maxi-theory" (and the same thing for the creationist theory I described earlier). The maxi-theory of evolution has been modified quite a bit throughout the years, and so not all sub-theories of evolution have stuck with us, though the maxi-theory remains accepted today. Although maxi-theory of evolution can discard some sub-theories in favor of others (just as the maxi-theory of creation has done so among creationists), this does not really resolve the problem of underdetermination regarding which maxi-theory (creation or evolution) to accept. In the end we still have two possibilities that are perfectly consistent with all the data. You have not, for instance, provided even one specific example of an empirical datum that doesn't fit in either maxi-theory.


Who cares?


I do, because it demonstrates the existence of the underdetermination of theories, which is what I was arguing.




This will vary depending on the specifics (just as with evolution), but one could say that the creator in question created the "basic types" of plant and animal life on Earth. To get a definition of "basic type" I recommend reading Chapter 8 of Mere Creation. The bottom line, again, is that we have two distinct possible explanations for how life came about, and both are underdetermined by the empirical data.


Ah, so you do believe in magic!


Huh? I've read that chapter and there's no reference to magic, deities, or the supernatural.




Of course we now have reason to believe that heliocentrism is true. Nonetheless, at that time we had two empirically identical theories.


In the same way that evolution and creationism are empirically identical?


Perhaps not exactly the same way, but at the end of the day the two maxi-theories are empirically identical.




You still didn't answer my question as to what we would call this belief [evolution, definition 4b] that is clearly embraced in science. If we can't call it a "theory" (when even the dictionary seems to do so) what do we call it?


Well, we call what you presented an incredibly vague, useless statement.


Okee dokee.




Let me be clear: I am not saying that this annihilates the rationality of science, but I am saying that the underdetermination of theories is a pervasive problem in science and prevents us from wholly relying on empirical data when it comes to deciding which theories (or maxi-theories) to accept.


Since science doesn't care about maxi-theories


Scientists certainly do. Atomic theory and the theory of evolution are both examples of maxi-theories that scientists care very much about. The specifics have changed over time, but they are still theories (or as you might like to call them, "incredibly vague, useless statement[s]") widely accepted in the scientific community. Even respected maxi-theories like evolution suffer from underdetermination. You may think you have adequate grounds for accepting evolution over its main empirically identical competitor (creation) but that still does not alter the reality of underdetermination.




Did I ever say in this thread that evolution was false, irrational, or anything of the sort? No. All I said is that creation and evolution are empirically underdetermined. And this happens to be true.


If you could come up with a creationist theory that has some sort of explanation for the observations, I might be inclined to believe you.


I've already done that before in another thread (regarding the pattern of gaps in the fossil record). I even gave quotes of evolutionists to support the idea of small gaps between species and larger gaps between major groups (stemming primarily from post #79 of this thread). That thread seemed to be going nowhere (you often missed points that I addressed, constructing questions/criticisms that depended on ignoring these points, misconstrued my position, unwittingly took things out of context, etc.) so I gave up on it long ago. Sufficed to say that creation explained one particular feature of the fossil (though you ostensibly believed that evolution explained it better).
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 11/11/07 - 02:58 PM:
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#408
Kwalish Kid wrote:
And while we're at it, why don;t we go over the most ludicrous part of that logical argument, the part that really needs to be looked at.


Justification for S -> P

The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over right and wrong above us mortals would by definition be some form of pantheism. A more general definition of God is “the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality.” Pantheism is simply equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence. It should be noted that some of the traditional aspects of God—like omnipotence and consciousness—are not necessarily associated with pantheism. Thus a pantheistic God may seem like a relatively harmless implication, but even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics.


What definition of pantheism could possibly be used to justify such a bizarre inference?


If you re-examine the quote, you'll see the answer is "equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence."
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 11/11/07 - 03:30 PM:
quote post
#409
TMB wrote:
Tist,

TMB wrote:

You have now modified the previous position that OM carries supreme authority.


I have? Where?


This comment amazes me. Either you are laughing your arse off at me, or you are doing whatever you can to avoid confronting the issues in your argument. In your original post detailing symbolic logic, you offered a sentence that said OM commands behavior, the next one said it is a supreme authority to command behavior.


These positions, however, are not inconsistent with each other. This is not really an instance of me changing my position.



If this authority is supreme, why is it that we see so many examples in human society where the attempt to prescribe behavior is not supreme. ie. it varies with cultures, groups, timing, contexts and does not manage to ever supremely prescribe human behavior.


Simply because a rule (e.g. "Thou shalt not kill") prescribes behavior does not imply that people will follow that rule. Again, the existence of an objective truth regarding how we ought to behave does not imply that people will get it wrong. A similar thing is true when it comes to objective facts of the physical world (e.g. atomic theory).



Except that supreme does not mean objective neither does objective mean supreme. Your position should be that IF this authority is OBJECTIVE, but you also manage to slip in SUPREME as a second assumption.


One seems to logically follow from the other given how I am using the terms. If morality is objective, then its truths (e.g. thou shalt not kill) have supreme authority; there is no human opinion or command that "overrides" these truths on how we ought to behave.

So why think in this case that "supreme does not mean objective neither does objective mean supreme"?


Except that the only evidence we do have is for relative morality, and no evidence for objective and absolute.


I respectfully disagree with that statement. I have seen no real evidence for relative morality. And I think that the absurdities that ethical relativism and ethical noncognitivism imply are good evidence for ethical objectivism. But of course, if you honestly think that implications as "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" are sane and reasonable, we'll just have to agree to disagree.



Not even the "brute fact" position? If so why? Remember, I'm talking about given objective morality exists, what plausible explanations for its existence are there?


Nope not even the "brute fact" position.


Er, that doesn't answer my question. If objective morality is real, what [other than theism and the "brute fact" position] plausible explanations for its existence are there?




Please provide one specific example of a statement that misused symbolic logic. (Bear in mind I have already responded to some of your previous objections, and my statements specifically saying that some of the premises would have to be justified via English anyway; I never claimed putting it in symbolic logic made my argument a rigorous proof.)


Just one more dance, then I need to wash my hair.


Not even one specific example? I thought so.



My original response to your symbolic disaster took apart each point, if you are confused refer back to that.


I can play that game too. If you are confused about my rebuttals to your original response, refer back to my previous posts.

I have seen this game played before--the one that looks like a wild goose chase. I ask for a specific example, point, or response and I am referred to some extremely vague reference to "previous posts" without so much as a quote or even a post number. If you can't think of a specific example, feel free to just say so (note: I am only asking for one). If on the other hand you are capable of at least finding a quote of a post that does so, please present that quote.




I'll try explaining this again. According to the brute fact position, the sole the sole metaphysical basis for moral values existing is simply existence itself (as opposed to a person or culture). So if objective morality is a brute fact, objective morality's sole metaphysical basis is existence itself. Do you agree with this?


I agree that morality is derived from objective reality, but only the principle is driven this way, the specifics vary as each entity uses moral positions to their advanatge. Your argument on brute fact shows no mechanism or reason to move from the basis of existence to a moral position.


You didn't quite answer the question (at least not clearly). If objective morality exists and if it is a brute fact, is it the case that objective morality's sole metaphysical basis is existence itself?




Now we come to the question of "who or what says how we ought to behave?" The proper answer is "existence," because it is existence that is the sole metaphysical basis of objective morality (under this view). The prescriptive nature of morality permits this otherwise bizarre implication.


I agree with your position that existence underlies the creation of morality, however this only means that an objective mechanism exists that morality is built upon, not that the moral standards themselves will be objective.


You're kind of missing the point I was trying to make. If existence is the sole metaphysical basis of objective morality (and if objective morality exists), is it not the case that the answer to the question of "who or what says how we ought to behave?" is "existence"?



I do not see why you think it bizarre to have a link between morality and existence


The part that seemed bizarre to me was that existence says how we ought to behave, and that it has supreme authority to do so (overriding e.g. what Hitler thought of how he should behave).
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Kwalish Kid
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Posted 11/11/07 - 04:34 PM:
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#410
Tisthammerw wrote:

What definition of pantheism could possibly be used to justify such a bizarre inference?

If you re-examine the quote, you'll see the answer is "equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence."

This is a useless definition of pantheism. Using this definition, if the universe exists, then pantheism is true. No further argument is needed.

Surely you don't mean to use a definition this broad. Surely if someone believes in pantheism, they believe in something more than simply that the universe exists.
Who cares about maxi-theories?
Scientists certainly do. Atomic theory and the theory of evolution are both examples of maxi-theories that scientists care very much about. The specifics have changed over time, but they are still theories (or as you might like to call them, "incredibly vague, useless statement[s]") widely accepted in the scientific community. Even respected maxi-theories like evolution suffer from underdetermination. You may think you have adequate grounds for accepting evolution over its main empirically identical competitor (creation) but that still does not alter the reality of underdetermination.

Scientists only believe in these so-called maxi-theories because they are part of more specific, actual theories. What is the more-specific creationist theory? Seriously, your link doesn't work. Please don't bring up some kind of fossil record gap argument; that's too painful.
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

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TMB
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Posted 11/13/07 - 02:45 PM:
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#411
Tist,


These positions, however, are not inconsistent with each other. This is not really an instance of me changing my position.


Really? It would be a first if you changed your position. How can I ever forgive myself for suggesting it?

But thats not my criticism. You are adding another dimension to your argument without any support.

Simply because a rule (e.g. "Thou shalt not kill") prescribes behavior does not imply that people will follow that rule. Again, the existence of an objective truth regarding how we ought to behave does not imply that people will get it wrong. A similar thing is true when it comes to objective facts of the physical world (e.g. atomic theory).


Then quite what value or how is it possible to validate the existence of supreme authority, except by referencing your fertile imagination?

One seems to logically follow from the other given how I am using the terms. If morality is objective, then its truths (e.g. thou shalt not kill) have supreme authority; there is no human opinion or command that "overrides" these truths on how we ought to behave.


Once again you twist around to avoid staring the contradiction in the face. One more twist and you could disappear up your own nostril.

So why think in this case that "supreme does not mean objective neither does objective mean supreme"?


I usually need reasons to make connections like this. Apparently you dont.


I respectfully disagree with that statement. I have seen no real evidence for relative morality.


I suspect that you have not seen no real evidence for anything. Certainly, none you have shown me.

And I think that the absurdities that ethical relativism and ethical noncognitivism imply are good evidence for ethical objectivism.


You have come a long way by embracing absurdity so why does this worry you now?

But of course, if you honestly think that implications as "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" are sane and reasonable, we'll just have to agree to disagree.


Help me here. What exactly do you consider to be reasonable? You might just be the best example of how this it is possible to be unreasonable and yet still have a position.


Er, that doesn't answer my question. If objective morality is real, what [other than theism and the "brute fact" position] plausible explanations for its existence are there?


Er, good question. Since we are assuming that OM is valid, I think you will find arguments justifying how else it might be objective, will be quite scarce. If you found something more plausible that 'IF OM exists', it would be worth exploring other options. However you have no support that OM does exist, so why waste time debating causes for something that does not appear to exist? That was a hard question. (not).

I can play that game too. If you are confused about my rebuttals to your original response, refer back to my previous posts.

I have seen this game played before--the one that looks like a wild goose chase. I ask for a specific example, point, or response and I am referred to some extremely vague reference to "previous posts" without so much as a quote or even a post number. If you can't think of a specific example, feel free to just say so (note: I am only asking for one). If on the other hand you are capable of at least finding a quote of a post that does so, please present that quote.


You are much cleverer than I gave you credit for. You can play games? If you have not playing a game all along with your posts, you need to have your tyres rebalanced.

You didn't quite answer the question (at least not clearly). If objective morality exists and if it is a brute fact, is it the case that objective morality's sole metaphysical basis is existence itself?


Er, one small snag with this. How do you jump from 'existence', something physical, to the metaphysical?


You're kind of missing the point I was trying to make. If existence is the sole metaphysical basis of objective morality (and if objective morality exists), is it not the case that the answer to the question of "who or what says how we ought to behave?" is "existence"?


Er, nothing follows on, if there is no existence, to build fictitious things like OM. You need to say 'IF' a little less, and 'Er' a lot more, if you want to get some disciples.


The part that seemed bizarre to me was that existence says how we ought to behave, and that it has supreme authority to do so (overriding e.g. what Hitler thought of how he should behave).



It is not existence telling us how to behave. It is the need to exist that causes us to construct mechanisms to aid with existence. This is relative morality. It is an issue to consider that RM is the system we operate under. This makes us look for reasons to justify systems like OM. It is the need to prevail with existence underlies it. This is different to saying that it then becomes OM just because existence is. Er.

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Posted 11/17/07 - 03:37 PM:
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#412
Kwalish Kid wrote:


If you re-examine the quote, you'll see the answer is "equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence."

This is a useless definition of pantheism. Using this definition, if the universe exists, then pantheism is true.


Not necessarily. There is a difference between believing X exists and that X is God possessing e.g. supreme authority to say how everyone ought to behave. Pantheism may sound strange, but the existence of its adherents continues to this day.




Scientists certainly do. Atomic theory and the theory of evolution are both examples of maxi-theories that scientists care very much about. The specifics have changed over time, but they are still theories (or as you might like to call them, "incredibly vague, useless statement[s]") widely accepted in the scientific community. Even respected maxi-theories like evolution suffer from underdetermination. You may think you have adequate grounds for accepting evolution over its main empirically identical competitor (creation) but that still does not alter the reality of underdetermination.

Scientists only believe in these so-called maxi-theories because they are part of more specific, actual theories.


Providing specific theories is nice, but that doesn't change the logic of the circumstances. Maxi-theories are still accepted when their sub-theories come and go (atomic theory and evolution are good examples). More to the actual point, the underdetermination of theories still remains regardless of any philosophical values you may have to select among empirically identical theories.



What is the more-specific creationist theory?


There are a number of them out there. You may think they are wrong, proven false etc. but they still exist. As an example, read Mere Creation. I've already told you about the creationist concept basic type as an instance of a sub-theory (you can read about it there as well).
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Posted 11/17/07 - 04:08 PM:
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#413
TMB wrote:


These positions, however, are not inconsistent with each other. This is not really an instance of me changing my position.

Really?


Yes. It's not as if there is only one issue I can have a position on.



Simply because a rule (e.g. "Thou shalt not kill") prescribes behavior does not imply that people will follow that rule. Again, the existence of an objective truth regarding how we ought to behave does not imply that people will get it wrong. A similar thing is true when it comes to objective facts of the physical world (e.g. atomic theory).


Then quite what value or how is it possible to validate the existence of supreme authority, except by referencing your fertile imagination?


Reductio ad absurdum, as I mentioned earlier. Of course, we may disagree whether statements like "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" is a reasonable belief (whereas I consider it an absurdity).




One seems to logically follow from the other given how I am using the terms. If morality is objective, then its truths (e.g. thou shalt not kill) have supreme authority; there is no human opinion or command that "overrides" these truths on how we ought to behave.


Once again you twist around to avoid staring the contradiction in the face


Huh? What contradiction? How does this argument even remotely approach a contradiction?



So why think in this case that "supreme does not mean objective neither does objective mean supreme"?


I usually need reasons to make connections like this.


Er, okay. Can you please answer my question?




But of course, if you honestly think that implications as "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" are sane and reasonable, we'll just have to agree to disagree.


Help me here. What exactly do you consider to be reasonable?


That seems a broad question. I consider logic to be reasonable, for starters. I also believe that accepting my basic perceptions as at least sometimes reliable (memory, sensory perceptions, basic mental perceptions [knowing what my own thoughts are etc.]) unless I have good reason to believe otherwise is reasonable.

In any case, do you accept an implication as "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" is sane and reasonable?




Er, that doesn't answer my question. If objective morality is real, what [other than theism and the "brute fact" position] plausible explanations for its existence are there?


Er, good question. Since we are assuming that OM is valid, I think you will find arguments justifying how else it might be objective, will be quite scarce.


That still doesn't answer my question. My argument has been that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. If you think my argument is unsound, can you come up with even one viable alternative for the metaphysical basis of objective morality or not?




You didn't quite answer the question (at least not clearly). If objective morality exists and if it is a brute fact, is it the case that objective morality's sole metaphysical basis is existence itself?


Er, one small snag with this. How do you jump from 'existence', something physical, to the metaphysical?


Existence is necessarily metaphysical, whether that metaphysics be materialism, dualism, or idealism. It similarly makes sense to call the basis of morality the metaphysical basis (for one thing, it is not immediately obvious from the mere existence of morality that its basis must be physical). Bear in mind that metaphysics is "a division of philosophy that is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality" and so the basis of objective morality in reality seems to fit that just fine.




You're kind of missing the point I was trying to make. If existence is the sole metaphysical basis of objective morality (and if objective morality exists), is it not the case that the answer to the question of "who or what says how we ought to behave?" is "existence"?


Er, nothing follows on, if there is no existence, to build fictitious things like OM.


You didn't answer my question. My argument has been if objective morality exists, then [so and so follows]. Can we agree that if objective morality exists, then what I have been saying (above and elsewhere) would be true?



It is the need to exist that causes us to construct mechanisms to aid with existence. This is relative morality.


Out of curiosity, which form of ethical relativism do you accept? There is cultural relativism, which says moral right and wrong are relative to what the culture says. If for instance the culture said there is nothing morally wrong with slavery, then slavery is morally okay (for that culture) regardless of what individuals or other cultures think.

Then there is ethical subjectivism, which says that moral right and wrong are relative to what the individual believes. If for instance the individual thinks there is nothing morally wrong with slavery, then owning slaves is ethically acceptable (for that individual) regardless of what the culture or other individuals think.

As a side note, there is also ethical noncognitivism which says there is no moral right and wrong. Of course, people may believe in morality but noncognitivism says such people are mistaken.
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Kwalish Kid
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Posted 11/18/07 - 08:51 AM:
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#414
Tisthammerw wrote:
Not necessarily. There is a difference between believing X exists and that X is God possessing e.g. supreme authority to say how everyone ought to behave. Pantheism may sound strange, but the existence of its adherents continues to this day.

Thank you for being so frank. Now we can address the equivocation going on here. Your premise for the pantheism section of your argument is that it is part of the nature of the universe that there are moral rules. This is not the same this as saying that the universe itself is an entity with authority, which is the conflation that you are making.

Even if we do grant the universe has authority in some sense, we need not claim that this is divine authority.
Providing specific theories is nice, but that doesn't change the logic of the circumstances. Maxi-theories are still accepted when their sub-theories come and go (atomic theory and evolution are good examples).

Why are they good examples? In the case of atomic theory, we have specific theories that better explain the phenomena involved. In the case of quantum theory, we do not even believe in particles in the same way that older atomic theory held that particles existed. Quantum theory can explain why we would be lead to believe in classical particle behaviour, but it explains the world better without classical particles. Thus the "maxi-theory" of particles has changed dramatically, if indeed it is still held by physicists.

In the case of evolution, it would be silly to simply believe in the maxi-theory. No scientist does (well, no reputable biological scientist).
More to the actual point, the underdetermination of theories still remains regardless of any philosophical values you may have to select among empirically identical theories.

Who cares about the underdetermination of theories that make no predictions?
There are a number of them out there. You may think they are wrong, proven false etc. but they still exist. As an example, read Mere Creation. I've already told you about the creationist concept basic type as an instance of a sub-theory (you can read about it there as well).

Please provide some specifics. It is not really surprising that you don't actually want to engage actual science, since that will soon show the flaw in your arguments and is antithetical to works like Mere Creation, but it would be nice to see some attempt.
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein
TMB
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Posted 11/20/07 - 01:35 PM:
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#415
Tist, you say




Yes. It's not as if there is only one issue I can have a position on.


I am sure you are right on this, however my issue was of you holding inconsistent positions




Reductio ad absurdum, as I mentioned earlier. Of course, we may disagree whether statements like "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" is a reasonable belief (whereas I consider it an absurdity).


in which case (if there are people who do not consider it absurd), it does not qualify as Reduction ad absurdum. I suggest you try and construct positions from first principles and stick to basics, you do not help your argument by using clever terms incorrectly.

You have introduced another variable into a ebate on morality. You are now using a criteria of reason and absurdity. There is no rule that asks moral views to be reasonable and or not absurd. I have not suggested that the view on the Holocaust is reasonable or sane, merely that the moral standard for some people nade it possible to rationalise it as morally acceptable. You are using your own relative moral standards as if they are objective. It might be argued that this is an absurd position to take.

Huh? What contradiction? How does this argument even remotely approach a contradiction?


Objective is not the same as supreme, as you selectively use them to suit various points in your argument. Just because a position is objective does not mean it automatically acquires supreme authority (unless you add other evidence to justify this). You are jumping between disconnected positions. By saying that no human opinion overrides these also needs to be qualified. If we assume that an objective position existed behind the holocaust, we then see that by humans driving the holocaust they overrode any possible objective position behind it. This does not mean the objective position does not exist or even and absolute one, just that subjective human perceptions (ie. yours and mine) are not in a position to establish this.



Er, okay. Can you please answer my question?


Look at the definitions of the words. Supreme only implies ascendancy over other positions, not that it needs to be objective. Objective has nothing to do with being ascendant, it is just a state independent of subjectivity. In the case of morality, even though it defines how we ought to behave, an objective position might not be supreme (unless you can twist your definitions to fit this).


That seems a broad question. I consider logic to be reasonable, for starters. I also believe that accepting my basic perceptions as at least sometimes reliable (memory, sensory perceptions, basic mental perceptions [knowing what my own thoughts are etc.]) unless I have good reason to believe otherwise is reasonable.

In any case, do you accept an implication as "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" is sane and reasonable?


You have come back to another implied value into morality. That of being sane and/or reasonable. Are you saying the in order to have morality, sanity and reason is required? I am quite sure that many unreasonable people have moral views, or still hold moral views at moments when they lack reason, probably even truly insane people as well. I could think that the holocaust was insane and unreasonable, but this does not remove the possiblity that those practicing it were able to morally justify it based upon their own subjective views. What is reasonable is clearly defined, however the judging of sanity is far harder. If true insanity means the inability to be reasonable or even coherent, its possible a truly insane person has no capacity to form a moral judgment. However I understand from reading that those who perpetrated the holocaust did hold moral views (however you might judge these, they were still based upon how they ought to behave, the justifications just do not line up with yours). The suicide bombers of 9/11 were also judged to be sane people, and by a process of reason were able to justify it with a religious position, yet you might also consider their actions to be morally wrong.


That still doesn't answer my question. My argument has been that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. If you think my argument is unsound, can you come up with even one viable alternative for the metaphysical basis of objective morality or not?


No I cannot, nor I should not be expected to. You are the one that has taken the position that OM exists, not me. Why on earth would you think I should be able to help support a position I do not hold? I do not think the divine or the brute fact are viable either. How do you think I would be able to find yet another support for a position I find untenable. I hope you made this last comment of yours as a joke. If not, it has to rate as the dumbest thing you have said thus far.


Existence is necessarily metaphysical, whether that metaphysics be materialism, dualism, or idealism. It similarly makes sense to call the basis of morality the metaphysical basis (for one thing, it is not immediately obvious from the mere existence of morality that its basis must be physical). Bear in mind that metaphysics is "a division of philosophy that is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality" and so the basis of objective morality in reality seems to fit that just fine.


Note that metaphysics also has a range of meanings different to your usage. I accept your usage in this context.

However to return to your point that OM sole metaphysical basis is existence, I agree, but this is not specific enough, and does not support the brute fact. Humans are also part of existence and so are relative moral standards.



You didn't answer my question. My argument has been if objective morality exists, then [so and so follows]. Can we agree that if objective morality exists, then what I have been saying (above and elsewhere) would be true?


No, what you say does not logically follow. If OM did exist, it is not a useful or valid conclusion to say that existence therefore tells us how we should behave. You might say that because existence 'is', then manifestations like objective morality and relative morality are both possible, so existence can also be said to tell us how we create relative morality just as easily as an objective one. Its not a position that tells us anything sensible. As I said previously, being a prerequisite does not guarantee that OM then arises from existence, relative morality arising is equally logical. Anothier invalid and futile position that could use the same useless logic would be that existence defines deception and truth. Both of these only manifest because of existence, but they are opposites, and so cannot co-exists under such a position (note that this is not what I consider a sensible argument in case you use your unerring intellect to deduce this).

Out of curiosity, which form of ethical relativism do you accept? There is cultural relativism, which says moral right and wrong are relative to what the culture says. If for instance the culture said there is nothing morally wrong with slavery, then slavery is morally okay (for that culture) regardless of what individuals or other cultures think.

Then there is ethical subjectivism, which says that moral right and wrong are relative to what the individual believes. If for instance the individual thinks there is nothing morally wrong with slavery, then owning slaves is ethically acceptable (for that individual) regardless of what the culture or other individuals think.

As a side note, there is also ethical noncognitivism which says there is no moral right and wrong. Of course, people may believe in morality but noncognitivism says such people are mistaken.



I do not fit into your neat morality clubs. I am not familiar with the specifics inside each system, and I am sure despite your best intentions, your single line probably does not do them credit.

There are two approaches to taking a position on relative morality, aside from the variations that various clubs decide they want to espouse. If you note that there is no reliable evidence for an objective or absolute system of morality, either through a divinity or through some external mechanism, you are left with some form of relative morality.

The second approach is to observe how moral standards change between cultures and over time, as well as a logical process for seeing how some form of RM could have arisen. This process is not trivial and relies upon understanding preceding mechanisms, before you get to any position on morality.

Although not familiar with the different systems you mention (although I do recall covering this specific discussion in an earlier post), I will take your summary to be accurate and sufficient. CR says that the culture will decide what is right and wrong. If there is no external viewpoint upon that culture, then there is no way to assess alternatives, except as they arise in that culture. I then agree with this position that a culture can decide that slavery is acceptable if it applies to another culture. However without the benefit of another cultural view, namely that of 21st century western, there is no counter position. This is not the same as saying that the view on slavery will then be objectivley and absolutely Ok, it just means that culture has that collective opinion and it is held by those in power. The difficulty with this is trying to pin down the boundaries of culture. Aside from some amazonian tribes it is likely that no single culture is unaffected by another, meaning the moral standards of various cultures in various apects are very mixed. This is a complication and does not mean that cultures do not define moral standards.

ES does not conflict with CR, it is just a level of granuality. People do have different moral values and standards, mostly derived from their culture, however they acquire them imperfectly, and are also corrupted by selfish motives and circumstances. This might cause some direct conflicts between individual and cultural values, however the mechanism is the same.

EN seems to take the position that OM does not exist, and when people believe that OM does exist, they say that RM might exists and people believe that the RM positions they hold are in fact OM, then the EN positions tells them they are mistaken. Therefore I agree with this I position. This is how I am judging your position. You are unable to consider that your moral values are relative, you seem to think that other people violate your sense of moral (which you take to be objective). The issue appears to be that morals need to be considered objective, if they are top be validly applied and command behavior. If they are not then our moral systems will be subject to abuse (which we see in practice), but admitting this weakens any position that is held on the basis of relative morals.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 12/01/07 - 08:11 AM:
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#416
Kwalish Kid wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

Not necessarily. There is a difference between believing X exists and that X is God possessing e.g. supreme authority to say how everyone ought to behave. Pantheism may sound strange, but the existence of its adherents continues to this day.


Thank you for being so frank. Now we can address the equivocation going on here. Your premise for the pantheism section of your argument is that it is part of the nature of the universe that there are moral rules. This is not the same this as saying that the universe itself is an entity with authority, which is the conflation that you are making.


If you'll recall, my pantheism section was a bit stronger than morality being "part of the nature of the universe." It had specifically to do with the universe/reality/existence having supreme authority in saying how we ought to behave.


Even if we do grant the universe has authority in some sense, we need not claim that this is divine authority.


Well, that might depend on how you define "divine." Some more naturalistic forms of pantheism exclude the universe having a separate consciousness, for example. In pantheism, we must use the more general definition of God as "the supreme metaphysical reality." It does appear that the universe wielding supreme metaphysical authority over moral right in wrong (and thus supreme authority over us mortals in saying how we ought to behave) would seem to fit the definition here.




Providing specific theories is nice, but that doesn't change the logic of the circumstances. Maxi-theories are still accepted when their sub-theories come and go (atomic theory and evolution are good examples).


Why are they good examples? In the case of atomic theory, we have specific theories that better explain the phenomena involved.


Fine, but it still doesn't change the logic of the circumstances or affect the veracity of my claim. Both maxi-theories of creation and evolution are capable of applying more specific sub-theories (e.g. the creationist concept of baramin). Even apart from that and more to the actual point (i.e. my claim here), it is still the case that we have two empirically identical explanations for the data. The underdetermination of theories remains.



In the case of evolution, it would be silly to simply believe in the maxi-theory. No scientist does (well, no reputable biological scientist).


There must be some sort of misunderstanding going on here. It is obviously true that most (albeit not all) biologists accept "that the various types of animals and plants have their origin in other preexisting types and that the distinguishable differences are due to modifications in successive generations." (Definition of evolution from Merriam-Webster)




There are a number of them out there. You may think they are wrong, proven false etc. but they still exist. As an example, read Mere Creation. I've already told you about the creationist concept basic type as an instance of a sub-theory (you can read about it there as well).


Please provide some specifics. It is not really surprising that you don't actually want to engage actual science, since that will soon show the flaw in your arguments


Unfortunately when I engage in "actual science" we often seem to be going nowhere. You often missed points that I addressed, constructed questions/criticisms that depended on ignoring these points, misconstrued my position, unwittingly took things out of context, etc. (If you wish I can provide you with specific examples.) So far now I'll just stick with philosophy of science and keep things simple: the underdetermination of theories.

It is possible to use philosophical principles in picking between two empirically identical theories. I won't deny that. But answer me this: am I not correct in saying that the two maxi-theories of evolution and creation empirically identical? If I am not correct, can you pick even one specific example of a datum that is not compatible with either theory?
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Kwalish Kid
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Posted 12/01/07 - 08:35 AM:
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#417
But answer me this: am I not correct in saying that the two maxi-theories of evolution and creation empirically identical? If I am not correct, can you pick even one specific example of a datum that is not compatible with either theory?

Here's an example of data that lead to the rejection of certain creationist theories before Darwin: the types of organisms that one find in a region are related as much (if not more) to the organisms of nearby areas than they are to animals that share distant regions of the same environment. (You can pick any specific environment you'd like to get the specific data.)

This runs counter to the claim that creatures are specially designed for their environment. If creatures were specially designed for their environment, we'd find the same creatures in the same environment.

If you are actually interested in biology, do some research. Don't turn to a dictionary. Using a dictionary is one of the weakest of all philosophical arguments and almost always leads to some form of fallacious reasoning. In this case, we have equivocation and appeal to inappropriate authority. Again and again you mistake part of the content of a scientific theory with the entire theory. Again and again you refuce to engage in the actual reasons that scientists come to specific conclusions. As TMB has noted, this is hardly surprising.

Edited by Kwalish Kid on 12/01/07 - 08:45 AM
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein
Kwalish Kid
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Posted 12/01/07 - 08:40 AM:
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#418
Tisthammerw wrote:
If you'll recall, my pantheism section was a bit stronger than morality being "part of the nature of the universe." It had specifically to do with the universe/reality/existence having supreme authority in saying how we ought to behave.

No, your section was weaker because it relied on this inane equivocation. You started with the claim that morality was part of the universe and you then equivocated this into an authority claim of a differnt sort.

Essentially, you are saying the same sort of thing that, since the laws of physics are part of the universe, then the universe has the authority to tell objects how to move. This is simply silly.
Well, that might depend on how you define "divine." Some more naturalistic forms of pantheism exclude the universe having a separate consciousness, for example. In pantheism, we must use the more general definition of God as "the supreme metaphysical reality." It does appear that the universe wielding supreme metaphysical authority over moral right in wrong (and thus supreme authority over us mortals in saying how we ought to behave) would seem to fit the definition here.

This is exactly the point. You want to say that this authority is divine, so you pick the definition that you like. However, if we are looking at this logically, we see that there is nothing that forces a particular definition here.
"Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive nature of things." - KM, V, P and P

"A fishnet is made up of a lot more holes than strings, but you can't therefore argue that the net doesn't exist. Just ask the fish." - Jeffrey Kluger

"…Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people." -Ben Stein
Tisthammerw
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Posted 12/02/07 - 05:30 PM:
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#419
Kwalish Kid wrote:


If you'll recall, my pantheism section was a bit stronger than morality being "part of the nature of the universe." It had specifically to do with the universe/reality/existence having supreme authority in saying how we ought to behave.


No, your section was weaker because it relied on this inane equivocation. You started with the claim that morality was part of the universe and you then equivocated this into an authority claim of a differnt