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Language and the other-minds problem

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Language and the other-minds problem

Cuthbert
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Posted 08/07/08 - 06:34 AM:	#31
I think that I do accept the conclusion of the argument above--that one cannot know how to ascribe mental states to oneself unless one also knows what it means to ascribe mental states to others. Doesn't that objection assume that to say e.g. "I'm in pain" is to ascribe a mental state to oneself? Perhaps "I'm in pain" does not ascribe any kind of mental state. We don't observe that we are in pain and then report it as a fact about our mental state. If that's what we were doing, then we could be mistaken whether we are in pain and mis-report something as pain that we have not properly observed. But that doesn't make sense. There isn't room for mistakes in the way that there is in the ascription of mental (or other) states. Rather, "I'm in pain" is part of what we do to express being in pain. It's a pain-signal, like a groan. By contrast "he's in pain" is to ascribe a mental state and not to evince pain. I think Strawson's point is that the concept 'pain' does both these jobs and yet it's a single concept. He's saying - there just are some concepts like that, that's how the language works.

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Posted 08/07/08 - 08:25 AM:	#32
Cuthbert wrote: Doesn't that objection assume that to say e.g. "I'm in pain" is to ascribe a mental state to oneself? Perhaps "I'm in pain" does not ascribe any kind of mental state. We don't observe that we are in pain and then report it as a fact about our mental state. If that's what we were doing, then we could be mistaken whether we are in pain and mis-report something as pain that we have not properly observed. But that doesn't make sense. There isn't room for mistakes in the way that there is in the ascription of mental (or other) states. Rather, "I'm in pain" is part of what we do to express being in pain. It's a pain-signal, like a groan. By contrast "he's in pain" is to ascribe a mental state and not to evince pain. I think I see what you mean. But I'm not convinced that "I am in pain" is an expression of pain. - First, we can say this without being in pain. - Second, even if we can be said to 'express' pain that we do not feel, it still seems to me that "I am in pain" is true or false, depending on whether I am in pain. - Third, I don't see any reason stemming from our inability to be mistaken about our own pain to deny this. I'm not sure what you mean by "observed"--if you mean we don't infer that we are in pain from other signs, then I agree. But we can be aware of our pain without "observing" it--we are aware of it because we feel it. And we can't be wrong about whether we are in pain precisely because a feeling as of pain ispain. So I will never (odd cases aside) be mistaken about whether I am in pain. So I think "I'm in pain" and "He's in pain" do the very same job--ascribe a mental state to a person. We're never mistaken about the first because of the special kind of access we have to our own pain; we can easily be mistaken about the second because we have to infer his pain from various signs. Cuthbert wrote: I think Strawson's point is that the concept 'pain' does both these jobs and yet it's a single concept. He's saying - there just are some concepts like that, that's how the language works. I'd want to say that if "is in pain" does both of the jobs you're talking about--evincing pain and ascribing pain--then while "pain" may still be associated with a single concept, the predicate "is in pain" is ambiguous. In any case, I don't think it is ambiguous. I think it does only one of these jobs, namely, ascribing pain. "Ouch" expresses pain; "I am in pain" never does. (Unless perhaps when it is uttered in a pained voice, just like "I have a cold," said with a nasal voice, may express a cold as well as report it).

Cuthbert
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Posted 08/07/08 - 11:38 PM:	#33
I agree with a lot of that. Yes, there are truth-conditions as well as sincerity-conditions for utterances such as 'I'm in pain'. But if you grant that I will never be mistaken or deceived about whether I am in pain - but I can easily be mistaken or deceived about whether someone else is in pain - then I think we can infer that the evidential base for ascription of the predicate differs, depending on whether I ascribe it to myself or others. Even if the truth-conditions are the same, the evidential warrant differs. And that is just Strawson's claim, according to makerowner, I think - makerowner wrote: P-predicates are predicates that can be applied to others or to oneself on the same evidence, eg. "is tall" is applied to oneself based on visual observation, just as it is to others; M-predicates on the other hand are applied using different evidence for oneself and for others, eg. "is sad" is applied to others based on their behaviour, but to oneself based on internal feelings. But Strawson denies that there's a 'logical wedge' to be driven between self- and other-ascription, by which I think he means there's no difference in the truth conditions (i.e. the concept is the same), despite the difference in evidential warrant. Strawson wrote: ....in order for there to be such a concept as that of X's depression, the depression which X has, the concept must cover both what is felt, but not observed, by X, and what may be observed, but not felt, by others than X. It may well be that we acquire the concept first by learning how to apply it to others, and then applying it to ourselves. But that seems consistent with Strawson's claim, at least in the quoted passage. Having acquired the concept, we can then use it identically in self- and other-cases, but with different evidential warrants. In my own case the warrant is that a feeling as of pain is pain (as you say). And in the case of someone else it's because I've stamped on his foot which I know hurts like hell.

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Posted 08/08/08 - 07:36 AM:	#34
Cuthbert wrote: But Strawson denies that there's a 'logical wedge' to be driven between self- and other-ascription, by which I think he means there's no difference in the truth conditions (i.e. the concept is the same), despite the difference in evidential warrant. I'd jsut add that he seems to think there is no logical wedge because the concept of pain is univocal. I'm still not seeing this, partly because I don't know what he means by 'logical wedge.' If the "logical wedge" means room for doubt about whether people besides myself are ever in pain, then I'm not sure how he is helped by the idea that there is one concept of pain, applied to self and others on different kinds of evidence. It seems like we still can't know for sure that others feel pain. Does he think that signs of pain in others guarantee pain, in the same way that a feeling of pain guarantees pain in ourselves? What about fakers?

Cuthbert
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Posted 08/08/08 - 08:44 AM:	#35
I think he means that if there were a difference in the truth conditions between self- and other-ascription, then that would open the way for solipsism or other-minds scepticism. But he's denying that. He's saying that when I say X is in pain I mean precisely the same by '..in pain' as when I say that I am in pain. However, although the truth conditions are the same, the evidential warrant required is different. That's because I can observe but not feel X's pain and he can feel but not observe his own. Then I think he's saying that the difference in evidential warrants doesn't provide the opening for other-minds scepticism. That's because the truth-conditions are identical. When I refer to X's pain I'm not talking about something-I-know-not-what about X that I assume perhaps wrongly to be pain. I am talking about his pain. It's consistent with that view that our evidential warrants can be inadequate or vitiated in various ways, if not in our own case, at any rate in the case of others. So of course X could be faking and I merely think he's in pain when he isn't. But when the warrants are OK, then I'm talking about X's pain and I'm not merely talking about something that is analagous to the only thing that I can know is pain, namely, my own. (As well as fakers there are the brave souls in agony who show no sign. So there's a question now about what kind of evidential warrant behaviour is with regard to sensation. It's certainly not as simple as behaviour <-> sensation. But that's another topic. The nature of the evidential warrant is different from the question of the truth conditions.)

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Posted 08/08/08 - 09:25 AM:	#36
I think I understand you now. Writhing doesn't guarantee pain, but the univocality of the concept of pain guarantees that writhing, grimacing, etc. is evidence for pain, not evidence for some other thing we know not what. It's a further question whether writhing, grimacing, is adequate evidence for knowing that someone is in pain (or the absence of any such signs for knowing that someone is not in pain). But this further question is no different from the question of whether seeing someone's lights on is adequate evidence for knowing they are home. There is no special problem confronting knowledge of other minds. I find this reasoning congenial, but I wonder if it would really satisfy someone who is impressed by the problem of other minds. At least we can come to know that lights on in a house is a fairly reliable indicator of the homeowner's presence. We come to know this by seeing lights and seeing homeowners. But when it comes to pain, all we ever have to go on are the lights, so to speak. So there still seems to be a special obstacle to the acquisition of knowledge of other minds. Edited by Pete on 08/08/08 - 09:33 AM

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Posted 08/09/08 - 05:31 AM:	#37
Pete wrote: but I wonder if it would really satisfy someone who is impressed by the problem of other minds. So there still seems to be a special obstacle to the acquisition of knowledge of other minds. Back to square one.

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Posted 08/09/08 - 09:24 AM:	#38
Cuthbert wrote: However, although the truth conditions are the same, the evidential warrant required is different. That's because I can observe but not feel X's pain and he can feel but not observe his own. No, you cannot ‘observe’ X’s pain. You can only observe X’s behaviour. And obviously he can feel and observe his own pain. There is no distinction between feeling my own pain and observing it. They’re one and the same. Then I think he's saying that the difference in evidential warrants doesn't provide the opening for other-minds scepticism. That's because the truth-conditions are identical. When I refer to X's pain I'm not talking about something-I-know-not-what about X that I assume perhaps wrongly to be pain. I am talking about his pain. You may be talking about X’s pain but you’re ‘generalizing’ about it from a third person perspective. Pain is only every known via first person. My pain is always a specific pain. Your pain is generalized. But when the warrants are OK, then I'm talking about X's pain and I'm not merely talking about something that is analagous to the only thing that I can know is pain, namely, my own. Your guesses about third person pain may be correct sometimes and false at other times. But whether your guess is correct or not cannot be verified. You may even be able to imagine what X’s specific pain ‘is like’ based on and triggered by memories of your own pain, creating an actual feeling in your own body. But imagining ‘what it is like’ may not be ‘what it is like’. You cannot imagine or bring on the full intensity of the pain X may be experiencing. Plus the context that the pain is experienced in would be different. The ‘context’ may affect the experience of the pain, modifying it to some extent. Context being, psychological disposition, other pain occurring at the same time, other types and feelings of pain, history of this particular pain etc. etc. In fact X’s whole life experiences are the context for X experiencing pain-p1 as pain-p1 and not pain-p2.

Cuthbert
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Posted 08/11/08 - 02:16 AM:	#39
Well, we're only looking at a few planks in a bigger argument. In the passage quoted Strawson is attacking the view that truth conditions for other minds must be different merely because the evidential warrants are different. He's trying to show that the truth conditions might be the same, even though the evidence required is different in self- and other-cases. Then he's showing that the truth conditions are the same, because that's the 'structure of the language', i.e. that's how we use concepts like 'depression' or 'pain'. But (in the passage quoted) he hasn't begun to show that we are justified in using concepts in that way. That is, we could state that the truth conditions for psychological concepts must be the same in self- and other-cases (that's how the concepts work), and then we apply evidential warrants on that basis, and yet our warrants are systematically vitiated by some factor or other. So your pain, if you have pain, is just as much pain as my pain. It must be. That's what we mean by 'pain'. Yet as far as the argument takes us to this point, it could still be false that anyone feels pain except me. We'd need another argument to deal with the latter objection. E.g. an anti-private language argument might do it.

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Posted 08/11/08 - 05:41 PM:	#40
All of that sounds right to me. I sure hope, though, that we don't have to depend on an anti-private language argument to save the day. I'll never understand those arguments.

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