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Knowledge: is the justification condition needed?

Knowledge: is the justification condition needed?

RichardW
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Posted 06/16/09 - 03:02 AM: Subject: Knowledge: is the justification condition needed?	#1
Hi. I've recently been reading about epistemology in various internet philosophy sources (including the Stanford Encyclopedia). It seems to be universally accepted that knowledge is justified true belief, though philosophers disagree on the nature of justification and whether any addditional conditions are needed. But I haven't seen any serious defence of the need for a justification condition. The condition is added in order to exclude beliefs arising by "epistemic luck", but I've seen no good case made for why such beliefs should not be considered knowledge. I can see the intuitive appeal of such a restriction, but I've seen no evidence that such a restriction is justified by the way the word "knowledge" is normally used. And it seems to create additional problems, like the Gettier problem. Why not just drop it? Can someone please give me a good reason for the justification condition, or point me to an internet source that gives one?

treysuttle
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Posted 06/16/09 - 05:34 AM:	#2
Consider what you are doing right now...you are asking for justification for the justification condition. Justification is what makes the difference between a 'defense' and just an opinion...and clearly you value a defense. First, the justification condition is a necessary condition for knowledge, not necessarily a sufficient condition (even in conjunction with belief and truth). The reason justification is necessary for knowledge, is because without justification there is no distinction between mere opinion / belief and knowledge. The notion of knowledge becomes vacuous. As I have suggested elsewhere, when one makes this move, one has also rejected rationality. One cannot do this either in theory or in practice (although surely one can 'be irrational' in various respects). While justification would seem to be one check against luck, the push of Gettier is that we can have good justification and still not have knowledge...we can have JTB, and still perhaps not have knowledge in some circumstances. This is why JTB may be necessary for knowledge, but perhaps not sufficient - we need those...but even together they may not be enough. This can all get very tricky.

Hanover
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Posted 06/16/09 - 11:26 AM:	#3
RichardW wrote: Hi. I've recently been reading about epistemology in various internet philosophy sources (including the Stanford Encyclopedia). It seems to be universally accepted that knowledge is justified true belief, though philosophers disagree on the nature of justification and whether any addditional conditions are needed. But I haven't seen any serious defence of the need for a justification condition. The condition is added in order to exclude beliefs arising by "epistemic luck", but I've seen no good case made for why such beliefs should not be considered knowledge. I can see the intuitive appeal of such a restriction, but I've seen no evidence that such a restriction is justified by the way the word "knowledge" is normally used. And it seems to create additional problems, like the Gettier problem. Why not just drop it? Can someone please give me a good reason for the justification condition, or point me to an internet source that gives one? I agree with Treysuttle's response that if you eliminate the J requirement of the JTB theory, then you're left with what may be true beliefs that you just happened upon and for which you have no justification. It woudn't be a satisfactory explanation if someone asked you why you believed in X, and you simply said that you weren't required to have a justification. I think the Gettier problem is not the result of the J element. I think the Gettier problem is the result of not requiring the T element to be attached to the J element. That is, if the epistimological theory were True Justified True Belief (instead of Justified True Belief), then the Gettier problem would be eliminated. If we required that our justification be true (and not just that our belief be true), then we would have what we consider knowledge. That's my humble opinion anyway. I would call it TJTB theory. To not require that the justification be true (i.e. objectively correct), then you are left with subjective knowledge based upon subjectively valid justifications. If you see no problem with that, then simply remove the T element altogether and declare that knowledge is justified belief, even if it's entirely objectively invalid. All of this is to say that JTB theory is only a beginning point as an epistimological theory because the real challenge is in explaining how you can know (note the circularity) what Truth is. That is, if Knowledge = Justified True Belief, but you can't really gain actual knowledge of the objective Truth, then how can you ever have knowledge?
"Nothing is impossible for the man who will not listen to reason." John Belushi, "Animal House" "I have opinions of my own --strong opinions-- but I don't always agree with them." G.W. Bush

JezCave
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Posted 06/16/09 - 11:29 AM:	#4
I agree with Treysuttle's response that if you eliminate the J requirement of the JTB theory, then you're left with what may be true beliefs that you just happened upon and for which you have no justification. It woudn't be a satisfactory explanation if someone asked you why you believed in X, and you simply said that you weren't required to have a justification. I agree, and it smells like faith to me.
"What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust?" C.S Lewis Rights? "Nonsense on Stilts" Jeremy Bentham

Aetixintro
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Posted 06/16/09 - 11:41 AM:	#5
Without the justification-criterion, how are you supposed to know who's holding the very true belief? Beliefs are held in one's head and there will be no way to differentiate between two opposing views or two views at all. Indeed, everything may be granted as true beliefs as soon as it is thrown into the air, comes out of the mouth. As the logic goes, without proper justification, one is not guaranteed that true beliefs are ever found because the true beliefs are not intuitive or plausible hence Einsteins theory or other.
Efficacy of "for since it is at present manifest to me that even bodies are not properly known by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding alone" - Descartes, Meditation II I'm always wanting more, Anything I haven't got, Everything, I want it all, I just can't stop - The Cure, Want

treysuttle
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Posted 06/17/09 - 04:32 AM:	#6
Hanover, I wouldn't require that justification be true (or at least, that it be known to be true), but only that it be probable. So, one might ask, 'What is your justification for believing that a book is on the table?'. A response: 'Because I see it'. Of course, it is not certain that because you see it, it is there. But it is highly probable that if you see it, it is there. Seeing a book on the table justifies believing a book is on the table...and if a book in fact is there, then there is knowledge. But let's say that there is not a book there, but I still see a book. I am still justified in believing that a book is on the table...but of course I do not have knowledge. Truth is too strong a restriction on justification (unless you are a skeptic...then you would want to push for that perhaps). Justification, as I see it, is about having good reasons for beliefs. If I read in the New York Times that the President was in Chicago over the weekend, I am justified in believing that (even if it is not true), but if I read in the National Enquirer that the President went to Mars over the weekend (or read that he was in Chicago, for that matter) I am not justified in believing it (even if it is true). There are many ways of dealing with Gettier counterexamples (I recount a few contenders), but each 'kind' of counterexample has to be dealt with individually. There is no cut and dry, black and white, method when we are dealing with empirical claims. Let's consider the 'barn facade'. For those not familiar: Sam is riding through the countryside littered with red barns. Unbeknown to her, one or several of the barns are barns facades (those really good ones, like they used in the old western movies). She happens to look out at one and form the belief, 'What a mighty fine barn that is'. Now, she happens to form this belief based on one of the real barns, and so she has a justified true belief. But she just as easily could have picked out one of the facades - her evidence for her belief would be the same, yet in that case she would not have knowledge - her having knowledge in the first case seems to be a matter of luck. Of course, one route is to accept the counterexample and suppose that we need some kind of restriction that guards us against luck. I think this is what Hanover is suggesting with a 'truth' restriction on justification. But another route (preferable to me) would be to say that in both cases, given that her belief is formed based on observation, that her justification is pretty weak (it's better than nil, but on the probability factor it could be much stronger...and good reasons for observation beliefs should typically take into account more sense data than mere vision). So, sometimes we can have empirical knowledge as a matter of luck, but in the cases of such knowledge, our justification is rather weak...and to avoid luck, we ought to strive to make our justification for such claims fairly strong -- or the stronger the justification, the stronger the claim to knowledge. Another route might be to suggest that we take into account the context of the justification. So, if Sam is riding through the countryside in the midwest U.S. (where there typically are not barn facades - or at least we have no good reason to think there are barn facades) then her belief is perfectly justified and is knowledge, even though it just happens that she chose a real barn over a facade. If she is riding through Universal Studios, Hollywood (I think that is where it's at), then even though she happens to chose a real barn, her justification is not very good because she is in a place where facades are a relevant factor to consider in forming observation beliefs. That is a very rough approximation....we would of course have to flesh out details. Another route might be to question the extent to which 'possibilities' are relevant to empirical claims. Now, we can 'conceive' that Sam might have chose another barn, but in fact she did not. But saying her knowledge is a matter of luck is a result of giving pretty strong weight to our 'conceivability'. The issue here, as I see it, it not whether conceivability is ever relevant to empirical claims...but when and to what extent. Finally, there is the entailment issue. I talk about this in another post dealing with skepticism more generally, so I will just briefly state that it seems to me that Sam need not know that there are barn facades present in order to know that the barn she happens to chose is a 'mighty fine barn'. The reason is because 'know' does not hold across entailment -- 'If p then q, then if s knows p then s knows q' does not hold - and therefore she can know just fine that the object of her observation is a 'mighty fine barn' without knowing that the other barns around are barn facades. Granted, none of those contenders may be adequate as stated, but I think they all provide for fruitful areas of inquiry -- and even if they do not turn out to be adequate at the 'end of the day', I do think they raise our appreciation for the complexity of justification in relation to empirical claims.

Hanover
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Posted 06/22/09 - 11:27 AM:	#7
treysuttle wrote: Hanover, I wouldn't require that justification be true (or at least, that it be known to be true), but only that it be probable. I don't think that this works. Probabilities are based upon what we know. You must start with a given "Truth" for you to declare a probability. There is a 1 in 6 probability that you will roll a 4 on a die. That probability is based upon the fact that we know there are 6 possibilities. If we find that the number 4 comes up every other roll (a trick die), then we alter our odds to say that the odds are 1 in 2. For you to declare that there is probably a book on the table because you see it there, then you have to show your proof that your vision more often than not (i.e. > 50%) correlates to the Truth. Or, more generally stated, you must show that your justifications are objectively correct more often than not. That quest is impossible unless you have a way to directly access the truth and compare it to what you think is true. It is for that reason that I don't accept subjective justifications as being meaningful. They are simply opinions that are firmly believed in. Justification, as I see it, is about having good reasons for beliefs. If I read in the New York Times that the President was in Chicago over the weekend, I am justified in believing that (even if it is not true), but if I read in the National Enquirer that the President went to Mars over the weekend (or read that he was in Chicago, for that matter) I am not justified in believing it (even if it is true). You can't use the term "good" to describe reasons for your beliefs unless you are referencing some objective truth. A good reason is a "correct" reason, right? To admit on the one hand that everything that you observe may be incorrect, but then to say that you really don't doubt that which you claim to doubt (as you clearly believe that your perception of the existence of the existence of the book is likely correct), is simply to say that you really don't doubt your perceptions. What I'm saying is that to declare that something "likely" is true is an affirmative statement about the world, no more qualified than saying that something "certainly" is true. To assert a percentage assumes certainty at some level about the true nature of the world, regardless of whether that certainty level is 1% or 100%. My conclusion is that I cannot pretend to doubt the existence of the book on the table. Therefore, I have no problem stating that my justification for the book (i.e. that I see it) is true. For me to deny the truth of my perceptions based upon a philosophical doctrine of uncertainty of knowledge when I really don't take that doctrine seriously at any level poses no real problem unless I pretend there to be one.
"Nothing is impossible for the man who will not listen to reason." John Belushi, "Animal House" "I have opinions of my own --strong opinions-- but I don't always agree with them." G.W. Bush

jonobrow
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Posted 07/05/09 - 06:03 PM:	#8
"It seems to be universally accepted that knowledge is justified true belief" Well then appearances are deceiving. Once upon a time this was widely accepted. Now, no longer. "Can someone please give me a good reason for the justification condition" Well it's simple enough. Examples abound in real life all the time of people who have true opinions but not knowledge. Have there never been situations in your life when someone's opinion has been correct through pure luck? If not, I should introduce you to some of my friends...

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