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Knowledge and the justification criterium

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Knowledge and the justification criterium

Morrandir
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Posted 05/24/05 - 04:32 AM: Subject: Knowledge and the justification criterium	#1
Even at the risk of starting another boring thread with a lot of miscommunication about knowledge and truth and all things related, I would discuss the justification criterium in the definition of knowledge as justified (true) belief. (Truth is in parentheses, because there are some that would omit it, and I do not particularly crave for the discussion about that at the moment.) 1. The problem. Basically the problem stems from one thought I had a while ago: how can a proposition that is justified be false? If it is false, why would we say that it is justified? If we hold on to this view, how should justification be understood? 2. Of Gettier. I will start my considerations from Gettier, who has famously presented arguments against knowledge as justified true belief. Without going to further details, I think that Gettier's counter-examples to the classic definition is knowledge does not concern knowledge as justified true belief per se, but the ambiguity of justification. The Gettier-examples for instance construct a case where we would grant justification for one's belief, yet it still would not be knowledge - even in the case where it was true. If I do not problematise the truth-part, nor the belief part (I think both are fairly clear and unambiguous), I am left wondering: why would we say someone is justified in believing x? 3. Justification and understandability. It crossed my mind, that justification has been misapplied. Let us consider a simple example: John struck Peter because Peter made fun of John's grandmother's death. Now I think it is fairly obvious that this does not constitute a justified act - it is, I believe, so that in court John would be considered as guilty and obliged to, for example, pay Peter. But when someone asks "Why did John strike Peter?" and I explained the situation, that someone might well sigh that "well, it was understandable". Understandable, but not justified, eh? What does understandability mean? Basically it seems to mean that someone considers it so that he projects himself into the shoes of John, and believes that he might have done the same thing. Even if it was not justified, we could easily imagine ourselves doing the same thing in the same situation with the same state of mind and same beliefs as John had. What is the relation between understandability and justification? What about this: understandability is in question when we consider it so that the person whom we try to understand is seen as believing that he has a justification (there are, of course, some problems in this in relation to the above example, because we might consider that John wasn't thinking at all, but reacting, and thus had no beliefs about justifications - he might even consider it unjustified and still do it. But because I will steer this to more epistemological matters after this easy-to-understand example, I think it is not relevant to consider this problem here.) Basically, what I am saying is, when we think it is understandable that x did y, we think that from the point of view of x, it seemed justified for x. That is, x believed he was justified - the fact that he wasn't would then be explained by added premises that x was not aware of (something that the attempted solutions of Gettier-examples are trying to do.) 4. Of understandability and justification in relation to knowledge. Can something that we believe be true and justified, yet not amount to knowledge? I do not think this is possible. I think that the problem we face here is that justification has been confused with understandability. This is linked with the fact that justification is considered an intersubjective thing - we consider, for example, science to give adequate justification for Earth's roundness. But because this is a convention, it is always easy to step outside the bounds of these conventions and show that either we were not justified after all, or that this justification (of a true belief) did not in fact amount to knowledge (this is the little hole the skeptic tries to squeeze himself through.). This is what the Gettier-examples do: they assume a more general point of view (the point of view of the narrator, who knows all the relevant details in the situation) that is beyond the beliefs of the person in question, and shows that what we consider as justified true belief (for the person) is in fact not knowledge. (The Gettier-examples always start with a picturing of a situation, where the reader is led to believe that justification exists (which it does, in that point of view), and then given additional knowledge that renders the knowledge questionable (because we step to another system.) I think this is confused, because it should read: what is justified and true belief for x, is not a justified and true belief for y <=> what is knowledge to x, is not knowledge to y. Y is of course the narrator in Gettier-examples, which allows him to seriously question x's knowledge, even if he accepts his belief's justification and truth. The Gettier examples, simply, change the point of view in the middle, which causes the paradox or contradiction. Therefore I claim that we should speak of understandability instead of justification. Let me give an example. I believe that pi is irrational. I think on this for a while, wondering why this is so, and come up with a proof. But the problem with the proof is, unbeknownst to me, that it is faulty. Say that it in one point misses a single tiny detail, and even though it does lead to the irrationality of pi, and I believe it, the proof itself is false. Now according to the standard view, I am nonetheless justified in believing what I do. The proof is good enough, it is rational and well argumented but for the one detail, so I have every reason to assume that it is correct, and I can most probably explain every detail of it. But wait a minute! How can it be justified, if it is an erroneous proof? I contend that it is not, in fact, justified. What we mean by "he was justified in his belief" is really that "it was understandable that he believed so" - that I believed I had justification, and that you consider it so that if you were me, you would too have believed this (that is, I didn't miss out anything that I shouldn't have missed - the only reason I did that was because I didn't have the proper knowledge to pull the proof through). My point is: justification is always justification from the point of view of x. Justification is given by science, because it is scientific justification. We give science the ability to give justification because we have noticed that it works. It works for us. Saying that knowledge is justified true belief is simply too ambiguous, because it fails to recognize the fact that justification is always a relational term: x is justified in y, where y is some system of beliefs or truths, such as science. Therefore, I conclude, there is no such thing as justified true belief in general. This is why the Gettier-examples are so powerful: only our imagination is the limit in considering more and more general cases where the narrator knows something the protagonist doesn't, and therefore can either claim that there was no knowledge, or there was no justification. What we mean when we speak of justification in these cases is really understandability. What is understandability's relation to justification exactly? Basically this: consider x and y, and their relative belief-systems A and B. We can now assume that the statement p is true. Now let us say that x believes that p. x's belief that p is understandable to y insofar as y can relate to A (instead of B) and agree that if A is assumed, then p is justified. That is, y will say "x's belief is understandable" if he considers it justified to believe p in A. Note that the crux of the matter is that y might still consider it unjustified for x to believe in p, because the belief-system B holds some information about A that would render the justification null - such as that my proof was actually faulty. Justification in general is simply understandability from the point of view of an omniscient being. Or, perhaps more precisely, the system of the omniscient being can give us justification in general, because there is no greater system that could affect the premises in the system and render it merely understandable. 5. Ending remarks. This has been a rather vague explanation of an idea. It is vague simply because the matter is very complicated, and perhaps also because I have not given it enough thought as of yet. This survey can be seen as presenting two lines of argumentation: one showing that there is a problem with the justification-criterium because of its ambiguity, thus calling for a need to define justification, and another trying to solve the problem by presenting a distinction between justification and understandability. Because of the lack of proper definitions for justification and understandability both (B's understanding of A is surely something that is hard to define strictly), the presentation is somewhat vague and general. Therefore I would ask some opinions on the whole approach in general as well as propositions to better define the terms. Pointing out any ambiguity is surely useful, even though some of them might be beyond reach at this moment. Please bear in mind that the Gettier-examples, however nuisance they are considered, are still unsolved in many cases and show a real problem in the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. My suggestion, in general, is that instead of adding demands for knowledge, we should instead labour to define the used terms better. In this, the relationality of justification plays an important part. In fact, for those to whom it says something, I consider at least some of the Gettier-examples to be paradigm cases of the fallacy of arguing from one set of axioms to another. This goes unnoticed by both parties, if the relationality of justification is not properly attended to. ~M~ Edited by Morrandir on 06/01/05 - 03:11 AM
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Cuthbert
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Posted 05/24/05 - 05:29 AM:	#2
Morrandir wrote: Please bear in mind that the Gettier-examples, however nuisance they are considered, are still unsolved in many cases and show a real problem in the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. If I mistake a rock for a sheep I'm not justified in believing there is a sheep in the field, even if there is a sheep hiding out of sight behind the rock. The reason that I am not justified in believing such a thing is that I made a mistake. What I thought was a sheep was in fact a rock. My eyesight let me down. If someone challenges my justification and then hands me a pair of binoculars so I can check it, then I have to admit it all falls down. So it turns out that my justification was not an adequate justification at all. Now Gettier's point is that I did have a justified belief, because there was a sheep in the field, after all, hiding behind the rock. I could ask for no better justification than the truth of what I believed. So I had a justified true belief, but I did not have knowledge. Therefore knowledge is not justified true belief. This won't do, however. If the mere truth of a belief is adequate justification for it, then the word 'justified' in the expression 'justified true belief' is redundant. In that case, the claim that knowledge is 'justified true belief' collapses into the claim that knowledge is true belief, which is clearly false. Of course, if my belief is to qualify as knowledge, it must as a minimum be true. But I must also be able to say why I believe it, why the reasons for my believing it are good enough reasons, why any objections to my belief are not reasonable objections etc. etc. Justification is about being able to give good reasons. Gettier mistakes the existence of the sheep for the existence of good reasons for thinking the sheep exists. The sheep itself is there to testify to its existence, but a mumbled account of how some rock looks a bit white and woolly just will not do to justify my belief, however true my belief might be. Knowledge is true belief that is justified by something other than the truth of the belief. On that formulation, I think Gettier problems just don't arise. They are an artefact of a lack of clarity in the phrase 'justified true belief'. Edited by Cuthbert on 05/24/05 - 06:02 AM

Morrandir
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Posted 05/24/05 - 06:02 AM:	#3
Cuthbert wrote: If the mere truth of a belief is adequate justification for it, then the word 'justified' in the expression 'justified true belief' is redundant. In that case, the claim that knowledge is 'justified true belief' collapses into the claim that knowledge is true belief, which is clearly false. There is another interesting approach, though. Instead of saying that truth implies justification (as is done here), we could say that justification implies truth. Of course, in this approach, justification should be greatly revised - this is related to my question: how come something be justified yet be false? This approach leads of course to knowledge collapsing into justified belief, but this is not as implausible as it being a true belief (a happy guess). After all, this is only unpreferable to a realist - coherentic and other epistemological or pragmatic theories do postulate knowledge as justified belief. In these, however, justification is to be well-defined, and needs to have stricter conditions than it currently seems to have. It can also be asked whether justification is given such a weak status to give room for truth. If justification was strong enough to deal with knowledge, then as knowledge implies truth, justification would imply truth. To avoid this, we must tone the justification criterium down so that some room is left for truth. This has a motivation that I do not conform to, so of course I would be opposed to such behaviour. Knowledge is true belief that is justified by something other than the truth of the belief. On that formulation, I think Gettier problems just don't arise. They are an artefact of a lack of clarity in the phrase 'justified true belief'. I agree to some extent. At least to the former part about the lack of clarity. I would like to clarify the point in this thread. The Gettier-examples seem to say that we can either have justification where we consider that none exists, or that we can know without justification - either of these routes must be taken, or so it seems. My approach is to clarify the concept of justification by dividing justification to understandability and justification, so that this problem could be avoided. Basically the point in understandability is that it is relativistic justification. This is to what the Gettier-examples concentrate on: there are ways of considering the same situation that either produce justification or do not. Some of the Gettier-cases actually seem to first give justification, then take it away, and then give it back, by constant changing of the relevant facts. What the Gettier-examples are actually doing is applying understandability while speaking of justification. Another thing that arose into my mind is that justification and understandability can be viewed as a way of demarcating between knowledge and certain knowledge. Certain knowledge would be justification regardless of the system of beliefs, whereas knowledge is always system-bound. This would be an epistemological equivalent to possible worlds semantics considering necessity. (Note that certainty should not be confused with certainty considering beliefs: that is an attitude towards an assumption, a state of mind, whereas certain knowledge is basically something that one cannot rationally (whatever that means) doubt). So a certain piece of knowledge would be something to which no (rational - I will leave this open for now) system of belief can be invented which would make it only understandable. That is, this knowledge is justified in every system of belief, and thus is, simply, justified. Pieces of knowledge are then such that one could invent such a system (or hold one) where this justification for this piece of knowledge would render it only understandable, not justified. In this view, we could demarcate between justification and understandability so that the Gettier-problems would be fallacies (because they don't take into account the different sets of beliefs) and there would be no possibility for a statement that is "justified yet false" - only "understandable yet false". I think it links neatly with common sense too. ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

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Posted 05/24/05 - 06:10 AM:	#4
I don't disagree with you Morrie, but couldn't you boil it down further from there? In a nutshell, you seem to be pointing to the difference between subjectively justified and objectively or intersubjectively justified beliefs. This leaves us with subjective/personal knowledge (I know I'm right), which we wouldn't normally refer to as knowledge, and objective/intersubjective knowledge (the earth is round), which seems to be what we are seeking to understand. Why keep justified at all? The distinction seems to be not in the justification, but in the point of view. Knowledge is intersubjective belief. Justification is inherent/redundant in that formulation. We can discard the problematic justification completely.
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Posted 05/24/05 - 06:13 AM:	#5
Oh, I'm still editing previous post to get my thoughts in order - I shouldn't post so soon! - can't spend more time on this now!

Morrandir
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Posted 05/24/05 - 06:53 AM:	#6
Reformed Nihilist wrote: In a nutshell, you seem to be pointing to the difference between subjectively justified and objectively or intersubjectively justified beliefs. Yes, basically. Yet it should be understood that I am not saying exactly that, because I also retain a possibility of "getting into each others' shoes", so to speak. There are no solely subjective justifications that are linked with knowledge, because knowledge itself is intersubjective. Say, if you have a justified belief and you think that this amounts to knowledge, then you interpret the "justified belief" as "subjectively justified belief", you have mere subjectivity, and no intersubjectivity. But I do think that knowledge should be something that can be expressed intersubjectively. What subjective justification means here is that it is a justification within a subject's belief-system. There is nothing that prevents us from even formalising this belief system (if I believe that the Earth is round, it is something that can be expressed, and thus can be taken to intersubjectian consideration). Therefore the subjective justification is something that others can relate to and even appraise. So it is NOT to be taken as a subjectivistic theory of knowledge or anything. So, basically, we have only intersubjective systems of beliefs, where some of the systems can be held by subjects (whereas others might be merely constructed, not held). This leaves us with subjective/personal knowledge (I know I'm right), which we wouldn't normally refer to as knowledge, and objective/intersubjective knowledge (the earth is round), which seems to be what we are seeking to understand. In my view it does not. Only the misinterpretation of subjective set of belief leads to this. I do not think, as you don't it seems, that anything wholly subjective can be knowledge. Knowledge is, more or less, a subjective opinion taken to intersubjective domain to be evaluated. On the other hand, there can be no such thing as objective knowledge, if it is not meant to say "knowledge of an objective state of affairs" (to which I do not believe in, but which is not contradictory). Therefore, all knowledge is intersubjective. In some cases, we have only one subject considering something knowledge (as in cases where someone first comes up with something, or is the last one to hold a view etc), sometimes many. Why keep justified at all? The distinction seems to be not in the justification, but in the point of view. No, it is not in the point of view per se. The justification is aspectual, it is relative. That is what I am saying. Thus I speak of understandability. Justified is needed to avoid wholly subjectivistic view of knowledge - and I try to avoid this. I think there is little worth in theory of knowledge that postulates that all knowledge is fully subjective. Knowledge is intersubjective belief. Justification is inherent/redundant in that formulation. We can discard the problematic justification completely. Just because you put something as inherent in some formulation it does not follow that you can omit it. There is many things inherent in "belief", but we should be aware of them, and when needed, be able to analyse what we mean by "belief". That is, you cannot discard justification and then hold that it is inherent in the formulation. You can, if you can reduce it, but in order for you to do that, you should be able to define what you mean by it. Otherwise you do not show its redundance, but simply ignore it - and that won't do. Moreover, what is that you mean by "intersubjective belief". It seems to me like a real monster of philosophical discourse, a nightmare of conceptual horror. Isn't belief by definition something that an individual holds? I can say that "you and I have the same belief", but I don't really mean that: I mean that our beliefs refer to the same thing, not that our belief is the same belief - because beliefs exist in consciousness, it would demand a sort of intersubjective consciousness between us. In any case, I think the expression is vague at best, and most probably horrid . Intersubjective belief should then be defined. What I think is included in this term is indeed the concept of justification. We have reasons to believe something, and that does not reduce to the belief itself. The intersubjective belief IS a shared knowledge, or it must be. But this does not render justification as useless. Indeed, it would seem to me to be a wholly disastrous way of thinking of knowledge, because then there would be no point in asking "why do you believe that" or any way of distinguishing between something that is known and something that is not. Erroneous view would at best be something that no one held, whereas all beliefs that are held are knowledge. I don't think your concept of intersubjective belief amounts to knowledge without further specification, and I believe that in the course of that specification, the justification you swept under the rug will pop up with a vengeance. But you are surely free to try ~M~
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Posted 05/24/05 - 07:26 AM:	#7
I am not responding to the opening remarks, because I do not disagree. Morrandir wrote: Just because you put something as inherent in some formulation it does not follow that you can omit it. There is many things inherent in "belief", but we should be aware of them, and when needed, be able to analyse what we mean by "belief". That is, you cannot discard justification and then hold that it is inherent in the formulation. You can, if you can reduce it, but in order for you to do that, you should be able to define what you mean by it. Otherwise you do not show its redundance, but simply ignore it - and that won't do. Would I do that? A belief is "something that is held to be true", can we agree on that? Can we also agree that anything that is held to be true is so held for a reason (good bad or otherwise)? Justification seems to be a reason that we generally (intersubjectively) agree is valid or worthwhile. If we can agree that beliefs have reasons, then when we take an intersubjective (or imagined objective) point of view, then justification is redundant. It is a belief from a point of view, that has a reason (considered good from that point of view). Moreover, what is that you mean by "intersubjective belief". It seems to me like a real monster of philosophical discourse, a nightmare of conceptual horror. My, aren't we dramatic today. Isn't belief by definition something that an individual holds? No. Sorry. I can say that "you and I have the same belief", but I don't really mean that: I mean that our beliefs refer to the same thing, not that our belief is the same belief - because beliefs exist in consciousness, it would demand a sort of intersubjective consciousness between us. In any case, I think the expression is vague at best, and most probably horrid . It's really not. If I am watching a history documentary, it would be quite understanable if I heard "It was believed that the world was flat until...". This statement described the intersubjective belief of the 14th century (or whatever). It's not talking about one person beleiving it, but that the belief was generally universal. Intersubjective belief should then be defined. That which is held to be true by most people. What I think is included in this term is indeed the concept of justification. We have reasons to believe something, and that does not reduce to the belief itself. The intersubjective belief IS a shared knowledge, or it must be. But this does not render justification as useless. Indeed, it would seem to me to be a wholly disastrous way of thinking of knowledge, because then there would be no point in asking "why do you believe that" or any way of distinguishing between something that is known and something that is not. Erroneous view would at best be something that no one held, whereas all beliefs that are held are knowledge. I'm missing what is so disasterous about saying that justification is redundant when intersubjectivity is introduced. Why not just say reasoned (I thought that was implicit, but it seems more accurate that justified)? I don't think your concept of intersubjective belief amounts to knowledge without further specification, and I believe that in the course of that specification, the justification you swept under the rug will pop up with a vengeance. But you are surely free to try ~M~ Well, you have accurately descibed my housekeeping skills, but I always hoped my reasoning skills were stronger than my cleaning skills. I think I have expressed above why justification seems redundant to me, in this system...but I'm sure you'll let me know if I'm wrong (read unjustified). Edited by Reformed Nihilist on 05/24/05 - 10:08 AM
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Posted 05/24/05 - 09:50 AM:	#8
So a certain piece of knowledge would be something to which no (rational - I will leave this open for now) system of belief can be invented which would make it only understandable. That is, this knowledge is justified in every system of belief, and thus is, simply, justified. Pieces of knowledge are then such that one could invent such a system (or hold one) where this justification for this piece of knowledge would render it only understandable, not justified. Can you expand on the above? I think that either you have solved it with this statement or you have made a mistake, but its too subtle for my feeble mind...

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Posted 05/24/05 - 10:05 AM:	#9
Morrandir wrote: Just because you put something as inherent in some formulation it does not follow that you can omit it. There is many things inherent in "belief", but we should be aware of them, and when needed, be able to analyse what we mean by "belief". That is, you cannot discard justification and then hold that it is inherent in the formulation. You can, if you can reduce it, but in order for you to do that, you should be able to define what you mean by it. Otherwise you do not show its redundance, but simply ignore it - and that won't do. Moreover, what is that you mean by "intersubjective belief". It seems to me like a real monster of philosophical discourse, a nightmare of conceptual horror. Isn't belief by definition something that an individual holds? I can say that "you and I have the same belief", but I don't really mean that: I mean that our beliefs refer to the same thing, not that our belief is the same belief - because beliefs exist in consciousness, it would demand a sort of intersubjective consciousness between us. In any case, I think the expression is vague at best, and most probably horrid . Intersubjective belief should then be defined. What I think is included in this term is indeed the concept of justification. We have reasons to believe something, and that does not reduce to the belief itself. The intersubjective belief IS a shared knowledge, or it must be. But this does not render justification as useless. Indeed, it would seem to me to be a wholly disastrous way of thinking of knowledge, because then there would be no point in asking "why do you believe that" or any way of distinguishing between something that is known and something that is not. Erroneous view would at best be something that no one held, whereas all beliefs that are held are knowledge. I don't think your concept of intersubjective belief amounts to knowledge without further specification, and I believe that in the course of that specification, the justification you swept under the rug will pop up with a vengeance. But you are surely free to try ~M~ If a major and minor premise are true does not the conclusion follow? Is the conclusion not inherent? Of course it [knowledge of the word; propositions and such] is intersubjective; a social product of social activity and not independent. But if someone asks, “What of, objects of knowledge, which are not produced by men’; objects that operate independently of our knowledge, or experience? Would not the answer be the same in the end; knowledge produced by the social activity of science; that is, by the use of another social construct: language. Moreover, what is that you mean by "individual belief". It seems to me like a real monster of philosophical discourse, a nightmare of conceptual horror. What would be an example of a “individual belief”? Can one belief be isolated from another?
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Posted 05/24/05 - 12:11 PM:	#10
Darkcrow wrote: Moreover, what is that you mean by "individual belief". It seems to me like a real monster of philosophical discourse, a nightmare of conceptual horror. What would be an example of a “individual belief”? Can one belief be isolated from another? Pardon? I looked through my post and still didn't find any reference to "individual belief". As far as I know, I have never used such a term, so I can't really say what I mean by such. I think you might have taken too many pills lately, or then it is me, but I think your comment has nothing to do with what I have said. What's the deal? I will respond to other things tomorrow, but I would like to have an explanation of this waiting at my desk first thing in the morning. ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

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