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Knowledge and the justification criterium

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Knowledge and the justification criterium
AKG
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Posted 05/26/05 - 11:23 PM:
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#41
Reformed Nihilist wrote:
Why would it be a coincedence? Justification doesn't make something true, it's just a way to test if something is true. It's not airtight, but it works pretty well.
Yes, justification is just a way to test if something is true, and that is why it would be a coincidence. The people back then thought that their standard was a way to test if something is true, and they made major mistakes because they presumed too many things. People probably suffered from less angst back then. So their standard wasn't really a way to test if things were true, because it was a flawed test. Not entirely flawed, but still majorly flawed. When justification is as it is appropriately defined, it is as defined in your second sentence, and the example above demonstrates that this condition can go unsatisfied even when the community thinks it is satisfied. This goes to show that contradictory to your own claims, there is more to justification than just the community standard.
Huh? The belief that a theft happened maybe? Intersubjective is a perspective. If a thaft happens, it can be view subjectively, intersubjectively, ar perhaps (in theory at least) objectively. The theft itself is an event, that begs no particular point of view.
Well your whole point was that justification is intersubjective because it required proving something, and you interpreted this to mean that:

To prove that something is reasonable, we must be proving it to someone, correct? Justification is by it's very defintion intersubjective.

So the simple fact that proving is commonly seen as an interaction between two subjects was taken to imply that it is intersubjective. If this is so, then theft is equally intersubjective because it requires one man (a thief) interacting with another man (the victim). In fact, to make sure there is no contest to the word "interaction," we can say that the robbery was done at gun point where the thief was wearing a mask. Then the interaction here is as real as the interaction when one proves something to another, so theft really would be intersubjective. On the other hand, if this makes you say "Huh?" (as it should), you mean to say that the theft itself isn't intersubjective, and so similarly, proving something is not intersubjective just because it requires two subjects.
If he didn't know he had been robbed, he would not be justified in accusing the thief of robbery, even thought he was right.
But what if the community agrees that the accused is culpable? Then he is justified, even though he's wrong (I'll get to that later). You go on to say that if credible people tell him this, and the person had a known history of theft, then he would be justified. But this is only "justified" according to modern standard. But if you believe, "that which counts as correct justification can change with the times," then if the community is not so reasonable, the person can be accused for bad reasons, and you'd still be saying that this accusation was justified even though it wasn't. Have you seen Malena? She was accused for bad reasons. Think of the Salem Witch Trials. You are telling us that since community standards are the be all and end all of what is considered justified, then the witch burnings were justified. They weren't. The community believed they were justified, and that's all. But just as you claim that x would be justified if he had credible witnesses and knew of a history of theft, we know that actually good reasons, those that actually lead to true results and not just those that are believed to do so, are what makes something justified. They actually didn't have good reasons to believe the women were witches, despite what the community thought, so they weren't justified, despite your definition of "justified."

Now, you're wrong when you say, "even though he was right?" He was never right. I gave two examples. One where he didn't know he was robbed, but believed he was. The other where he believed he was robbed and even accuses a man, but is wrong.
No more or less intersubjective that theft. I might subjectively judge something reasonable, while society might jusge it unreasonable.
Wow! I think we agree on everything, you just somehow end up with results that are the opposite of where the premises lead. Again, I agree, "reasonable" is no more or less intersubjective than theft. And theft isn't intersubjective! A theft happens regardless of whether people believe it or not. And the same is true for "reasonable." Certain reasons lead to truth better than other "reasons", despite what people believe as to which reasons are which.
Who said the 'truth of results' was subjective? I have only said that beliefs were objective, and justification was intersubjective.
But, I repeat, "reasonable" means based on good reasons, and good reasons tend to lead to true results, and there's no guarantee that what the community thinks will lead to true results, so this key aspect of "reasonable" is only realized if, coincidentally, the community is actually reasonable. Countless historical examples demonstrate that it really is a coincidence, and many communities in the past have done many things for reasons that really did not lead to the truth, despite what everyone thought.
Yes, that's why justification works pretty well.
The sentence said, "if the community is reasonable." Rather than saying, "that's why it works so well," you should be saying, "wow, I'm lucky." Justification wasn't present at all times (as opposed to being able to adapt in definition to suit any time and context); we know many times when the reasons of the past led to false results." So the fact that the antecedent is satisfied now is a coincidence.
By our standards? By yours? If not, by whose? How can you judge reasonableness without applying standards?
We apply "standards" when determining the mass of an object. That doesn't mean that the mass of the object depends on anything intersubjective.
And justification is arbitrary how?
Uh, the whole point was that it isn't, but your definition makes it so.
Only if his reasons were impulsive or whimsical.
And there's no guarante that the reasons will not be so, as history demonstrates. We happen to live in a time where community reasons are normally not impulsive (some still are, of course), but there's obviously no guarantee that this will be the case, and hence there's no guarantee that whatever is considered "justified" by your definition actually is justified, only falsely believed to be so.
I think I've already made it clear that you can be justified and wrong about something.
No, not at all. Your decision is understandable, it is not justified. You're confusing the two.
When it 'turned out' to be false, then you would be justified in believing I was wrong. So would I. 'Turned out' implies new data, or new criteria for judging.
It's not just a new criteria. The theft doesn't become a truth because new criteria came about. It always was a truth, so if an old criteria led to a false belief about the theft, and the new criteria leads to a true belief, then the new criteria is correct and the old one is wrong. Also, this depends on new criteria ever coming out. If a theft happens, it happens. If everyone always believes a false thing about it based on bad reasons because new criteria never come about, then by your definition, they would always be justified. No, they'd always be wrong. They would always think that they used reasons that lead to true results, but the never did, since their reasons led to false results.
They would be wrong. They would also be justified in believing it (if you were convincing enough). What's the problem?
We'd understand them for being so gullible, or perhaps that it was the normal thing to do to take my word, and so we'd understand them for that. But they'd never be justified, because they came to false results, so clearly they couldn't have used reasons that led to true results, hence they really were unjustified, but they just believed otherwise.
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Posted 05/27/05 - 05:08 AM:
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#42
Morrandir wrote:
Another thread indeed, but I think it is only produced by your use of temporal expressions in A. I can't dine at every restaurant in town TONIGHT, but I can dine at every restaurant in town in my LIFETIME. I can't doubt everything I know for certain AT ONCE, but I can doubt everything in their turn. This lack of temporality in B amounts for it to be far more plausible than A. In fact, A may be true in cases where there are, for example, only two restaurants in the town.


Damn, and I was so proud of that argument, too!

Though, as you say, we can't doubt everything at once. A project of doubting has to take place in a broader setting of myriad things we don't doubt at that particular time (I'm thinking of Peirce).
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Posted 05/27/05 - 08:28 AM:
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#43
AKG wrote:
Yes, justification is just a way to test if something is true, and that is why it would be a coincidence. The people back then thought that their standard was a way to test if something is true, and they made major mistakes because they presumed too many things. People probably suffered from less angst back then. So their standard wasn't really a way to test if things were true, because it was a flawed test. Not entirely flawed, but still majorly flawed.


Standards develop because the standards in question work better than arbitrary standards. If the standards were arbitrary, then it would be a coincedence. To say the standards were not entirely flawed (even if they were majorly flawed), and then to say it was a coincedence that justification had any correlation to truth, makes no sense.

When justification is as it is appropriately defined, it is as defined in your second sentence, and the example above demonstrates that this condition can go unsatisfied even when the community thinks it is satisfied.


Which sentence?

This goes to show that contradictory to your own claims, there is more to justification than just the community standard.


I'll wait until you clarify the above question.

Well your whole point was that justification is intersubjective because it required proving something, and you interpreted this to mean that:

To prove that something is reasonable, we must be proving it to someone, correct? Justification is by it's very defintion intersubjective.

So the simple fact that proving is commonly seen as an interaction between two subjects was taken to imply that it is intersubjective. If this is so, then theft is equally intersubjective because it requires one man (a thief) interacting with another man (the victim). In fact, to make sure there is no contest to the word "interaction," we can say that the robbery was done at gun point where the thief was wearing a mask. Then the interaction here is as real as the interaction when one proves something to another, so theft really would be intersubjective. On the other hand, if this makes you say "Huh?" (as it should), you mean to say that the theft itself isn't intersubjective, and so similarly, proving something is not intersubjective just because it requires two subjects.


Stealing is taking property from someone. Justifying is appealing to a point of view. Do you understand what intersubjective means? It is a point of view that is held commonly within a group of people. So when I say justifying is intersubjective, I am not saying it is a group activity, I am saying that it is, by definition, and appeal to a common point of view. Is that clearer?

But what if the community agrees that the accused is culpable? Then he is justified, even though he's wrong (I'll get to that later). You go on to say that if credible people tell him this, and the person had a known history of theft, then he would be justified. But this is only "justified" according to modern standard. But if you believe, "that which counts as correct justification can change with the times," then if the community is not so reasonable, the person can be accused for bad reasons, and you'd still be saying that this accusation was justified even though it wasn't. Have you seen Malena? She was accused for bad reasons. Think of the Salem Witch Trials. You are telling us that since community standards are the be all and end all of what is considered justified, then the witch burnings were justified. They weren't. The community believed they were justified, and that's all.


Ok. If community doesn't set the standards for justification, and it's not personal belief, how are standards set? God? Are you claiming that there is some standard of justification that exists seperate from humanity? I'd like to hear how you 'justify' that.rolling eyes

But just as you claim that x would be justified if he had credible witnesses and knew of a history of theft, we know that actually good reasons, those that actually lead to true results and not just those that are believed to do so, are what makes something justified. They actually didn't have good reasons to believe the women were witches, despite what the community thought, so they weren't justified, despite your definition of "justified."


They didn't have good reasons according to our standards. Likely in a hundred years, people will say our standards are out to lunch. Who knows, maybe they'll realise that witches put a spell on humanity of our time, making us believe that witchcraft was a fairytale and that their sisters in satan were actually scapegoats. They'll say "Those poeple of the 21st century had lousy standards for justification, their standards wouldn't even allow them to see the spell they were under".

Now, you're wrong when you say, "even though he was right?" He was never right. I gave two examples. One where he didn't know he was robbed, but believed he was. The other where he believed he was robbed and even accuses a man, but is wrong.


Look again. I answered both scenarios.

Wow! I think we agree on everything, you just somehow end up with results that are the opposite of where the premises lead. Again, I agree, "reasonable" is no more or less intersubjective than theft. And theft isn't intersubjective! A theft happens regardless of whether people believe it or not. And the same is true for "reasonable." Certain reasons lead to truth better than other "reasons", despite what people believe as to which reasons are which.


You seem to think (which I have repeatedly, and explicitly denied) That I am asserting that 'If a community judges something to be justified, that it is necessarily true'. I am not commenting on the quality of justification criteria, I am commenting on it's existence, it's inherent intersubjective nature, and the role it plays in JTB.

But, I repeat, "reasonable" means based on good reasons, and good reasons tend to lead to true results, and there's no guarantee that what the community thinks will lead to true results, so this key aspect of "reasonable" is only realized if, coincidentally, the community is actually reasonable. Countless historical examples demonstrate that it really is a coincidence, and many communities in the past have done many things for reasons that really did not lead to the truth, despite what everyone thought.


And I repeat the question "reasonable from who's point of view?". How am I to judge your claims that these historical communities' beliefs were unreasonable? From my POV? Your's? Logic's POV? Perhaps you could give me logic's e-mail, and I will ask him. The point is, what is logical/reasonable/rational must be judged by someone. So when we judge something to be rational to ourselves, we call it a belief. When we take that belief and tell the community why we think it is rational, when they agree, it is justified. If this belief also corresponds with the events or objects of reality, then it is true. JTB: Knowledge.

The sentence said, "if the community is reasonable." Rather than saying, "that's why it works so well," you should be saying, "wow, I'm lucky." Justification wasn't present at all times (as opposed to being able to adapt in definition to suit any time and context); we know many times when the reasons of the past led to false results." So the fact that the antecedent is satisfied now is a coincidence.


So? False results happen. Irrelevant.

I think it unlikely that it is 'lucky' that I live in a 'reasonable' society. I think it is likely that 1) I buy into societies notion of reasonable for the most part, and 2) a society that was unreasonable in all ways would have perished long before I came along. That's evolution baby.

We apply "standards" when determining the mass of an object. That doesn't mean that the mass of the object depends on anything intersubjective.


No, but if you are trying to assert that the mass of the object is X, you had better have standards to determine that, don't you think? The standards for judging don't guarantee the truth, but they are still needed. Someone (individual or group) has to hold these standards. Unless standards exist without humanity as well.

Uh, the whole point was that it isn't, but your definition makes it so.


The whole point of my question was to find out why you think so. I see absolutley no reason why justification is arbitrary according to my argument.

And there's no guarante that the reasons will not be so, as history demonstrates. We happen to live in a time where community reasons are normally not impulsive (some still are, of course), but there's obviously no guarantee that this will be the case, and hence there's no guarantee that whatever is considered "justified" by your definition actually is justified, only falsely believed to be so.


Because the justification criterea in the past wasn't as good as it is now, justifiaction isn't an intersubjective activity? You're a logical guy, tell me how that follows. I can find no case where societies standards have been whimsical or impulsive. I can find many cases where we have since learned that other standards work better.

No, not at all. Your decision is understandable, it is not justified. You're confusing the two.


No I'm not. Understanable means that someone can comprehend the causal reasons for me to say something is true (without necessarily agreeing that it is), Justified means that someone(s) agrees that the rationale behind my belief is true.

It's not just a new criteria. The theft doesn't become a truth because new criteria came about. It always was a truth, so if an old criteria led to a false belief about the theft, and the new criteria leads to a true belief, then the new criteria is correct and the old one is wrong. Also, this depends on new criteria ever coming out. If a theft happens, it happens. If everyone always believes a false thing about it based on bad reasons because new criteria never come about, then by your definition, they would always be justified. No, they'd always be wrong. They would always think that they used reasons that lead to true results, but the never did, since their reasons led to false results.


You state that according to what I say they would always be justified, and respond with "No, they'd always be wrong". You are equivocating justification with right/correct/true. They're not equivalent, and quite franky, I'm getting tired of pointing it out. If you disagree, and think that they are, could you address it directly and get it out of the way.

We'd understand them for being so gullible, or perhaps that it was the normal thing to do to take my word, and so we'd understand them for that. But they'd never be justified, because they came to false results, so clearly they couldn't have used reasons that led to true results, hence they really were unjustified, but they just believed otherwise.


So something is justified only when it is true? Why bother including truth in JTB? Just saying 'justified belief' would necessarily entail truth (according to you), so there is no value in explicating 'truth'. Don't you think that 'justified' must (for this reason) not necessarily entail truth in the context of JTB? I'm speaking of justification as it is described in JTB. Maybe we got off track and forgot this.



Edited by Reformed Nihilist on 05/27/05 - 08:34 AM
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Posted 05/27/05 - 12:06 PM:
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#44
Morrandir wrote:
Reformed Nihilist,
Thanks for explicating, by the way. It is often hard to see whether one is disagreeing on one point alone, or through that point everything the other says. That is, it is hard to see what kind of basis the criticism sets for the whole system.


My pleasure.


On this thread, we can agree to that. With a minor addition: the belief is held true by an individual - or a group of individuals. When we say "Finns believe that...", we mean that they share the same belief - not that there is a conscious entity, Finns, that believe something collectively. This point can be argued, though, but perhaps it is easiest not to, at least here. I agree that the words can be used in such an such a way, but this is not what I mean when I speak of beliefs in my justification-criterium.


Yes. We agree that there is no entity called 'Finns'. We also agree (I think) that a group can have collectively shared beliefs about standards for justification.


So, you are saying that because beliefs have reasons, then if we assume that the group x has a belief (the people comprising the group believe the same thing), the group has its reasons, and these reasons are then intersubjective, and therefore able to constitute justification - or make justification redundant because the intersubjective reasons are enough?


Intersubjective critetria would have been a better way of putting it. I'm saying it is a belief that meets the standards that the community deems acceptable to describe true statements. Maybe that doesn't make the concept completely redundant.

I am saying I guess you can do that, but then you are not speaking of the same thing. The problem is that the reasons I might have for believing whatever are mostly not epistemological reasons in any way: my belief that there went a car past my window is based on the direct perception of the sound of a car, and then on some implicit non-cognized reasoning. Only after someone asks "WHY do you believe that", I can start poking into myself to see why I in fact did. Often a perception is behind it all, sometimes we can only shrug helplessly and say "I don't know - I just thought that it was so for some reason".


Here we see a difference between the subjective grounds for believing something (the reason - it might even be a causal reason, mind you!) and the intersubjective grounds for believing something. I have no justification for my belief that it is day outside, but I can formulate a justification by referring to my perception, perhaps even showing someone that it is bright outside. The justification is something that is uttered, or formulated, or communicated in some other way. I have a host of beliefs (probably millions all the time) that are not epistemological - but can be made such when questioned. This is the difference between reason and justification. The reason is no justification. Justifications are reasons that are held to be good enough to hold - that is, we give those to people who question something. This is the point in knowledge in general: knowledge is subjective dispositions taken to objective/intersubjective world through communication, and perhaps through somehow comparing those dispositions to reality.

I do not think a group can have reasons in the same sense as you say individual's beliefs have reasons. It is important to understand that the reason behind a belief might be a mere causal procedure (my reason for believing a perception is that this perception was caused by a firing neuron in my head), but this causal procedure is no justification. If it was so, then everything we did was justified just because everything we do is done for a reason. Causal or otherwise.



So let's back up. You ask yourself "why do I believe X?". What are you trying to glean exactly? Isn't it the causes for you to think it is true? Your reasonable belief is reasonable, because you know the (causal) reasons you hold it.

Now you want to know if it's justified, right? If the community agrees that what caused you to believe X, would also cause them to belive X (collectively/in general), then you are justified. The second we discuss something in terms of if it is knowledge, we are applying our standards. We are judging if we would be caused to believe that X is true.


Simply because having a reason does not amount to having a justification.


If I said that, I misspoke. Having a reason that a community can generally agrees 'makes sense' (would make them think the same) amounts to having justification. Having a reason is nothing more than an expression of causality.



Well, I am sure you have your reasons... sticking out tongue


They might even be justified...sticking out tonguesticking out tongue


Very much true, I think. Knowledge differs from mere subjective assumptions in the same sense.


I think so too.



"having a reason" is not the same thing as "being reasonable". It is an expression in language that is misleading. To have a reason is best translated as to have a cause (either mechanistic, or perhaps a reason based on will etc). Being reasonable is very different - and equating these can amount to a host of problems in your stance. "Come on, be reasonable" does not mean the same as "Come on, have reasons". That is because "reasoning" is NOT the same thing as "having reason", and this is because the underlying words are different: reason means either our cognitive faculty to make rational assumptions or some such, or it means a cause of something.

Our beliefs as having reasons is simply not the same thing as them being reasonable. When we say that "your beliefs are reasonable", we say that they are considered well, that is, reason is applied to them well. This is a simple categorical mistake here. It might be a linguistic slip, or it might be something that grounds your way of seeing justification and reason - you should give this some thought.


Actually, our friend Gassendi might point out that a word can have different meanings, or just different senses. I think I might almost agree with him here. MW online defines reason like this:

mw online wrote:
1 a : a statement offered in explanation or justification <gave reasons that were quite satisfactory> b : a rational ground or motive <a good reason to act soon> c : a sufficient ground of explanation or of logical defense; especially : something (as a principle or law) that supports a conclusion or explains a fact <the reasons behind her client's action> d : the thing that makes some fact intelligible : CAUSE <the reason for earthquakes> <the real reason why he wanted me to stay -- Graham Greene>


Now have you ever heard the adage "man is not a rational creature, man is a rationalising creature"? When we say something is reasonable, we do mean that something has a rational ground for it, right? But what is rational grounds? Well that is justifiable rationale (or reasons). Now I do acknowledge that in common usage, reasons (causal), and reasoning (cognitive) have different conotations. But does it tell us anything that they are homonyms? Cognitive reasoning is what happens when we make consious the causal reasoning of a belief.
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AKG
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Posted 05/28/05 - 10:34 AM:
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#45
Standards develop because the standards in question work better than arbitrary standards. If the standards were arbitrary, then it would be a coincedence. To say the standards were not entirely flawed (even if they were majorly flawed), and then to say it was a coincedence that justification had any correlation to truth, makes no sense.
There are communities on Earth today that still believe things happen because mystical spirits make them happen. Then there are communities which believe things because they discover actual reasons for those things to happen. The community you're born into is coincidence. It is just a coincidence that you don't live in a society where mystical spirits are used to explain things, and thus it is just a coincidence that your definition of justified coincides with what really is justified, most of the time.

Now you admit that some standards work better than others. So don't those standards more correct when they claim that certain beliefs are justified? Your definition of "justified" really does result in coincidences. Because if we arbitrarily choose a community standard from some point in time for some community on Earth, then if this standard works well, it's just a coincidence. The people who believed all sorts of false (and true) things for wrong reasons were not justified, since their reasons didn't tend to lead to true conclusions. So they would be "justified" according to your definition, but wouldn't really be justified. On the other hand, if you pick modern society, you're likely to find a strong relationship between community standards of justification and a set of reasons that actually do tend to lead to true results. Your definition of justification, and actual justification happen to coincide here. It happens that the community standard is a good standard. But there is no reason why this must be so, it is only a coincidence that we picked the right community. So, like I said, if all people were reasonable and were able to tell which reasons tended to lead to true results, then the community standard would always be a good standard of justification, and "justified" as it is actually defined would happen to coincide with "justified" as you've defined it. But this is a huge contingency, which is why your definition is so flawed.
Which sentence?
The second sentence I quoted: "Justification doesn't make something true, it's just a way to test if something is true." Yes, justification is a way to test if something is true, whereas testing something against the community standard is only a way to test if something's true if we're lucky. Isn't it possible that the community's standard is way off the mark - that many of the things they think are true are not, and vice versa? And more importantly, many of the reasons that they think are good are not, and vice versa?
So let's back up. You ask yourself "why do I believe X?". What are you trying to glean exactly? Isn't it the causes for you to think it is true? Your reasonable belief is reasonable, because you know the (causal) reasons you hold it.

Now you want to know if it's justified, right? If the community agrees that what caused you to believe X, would also cause them to belive X (collectively/in general), then you are justified. The second we discuss something in terms of if it is knowledge, we are applying our standards. We are judging if we would be caused to believe that X is true.
Well no. If I were drugged, then the community may agree that they would also believe X if they were drugged, but that wouldn't make me justified. If my community were idiots, then even if certain causes would have made them believe X, that doesn't make me justified. It means I can explain why I have my beliefs to idiots. It doesn't give me a way to test if my beliefs are true, it gives me a way to test if my beliefs are believable by idiots. At best, your standard of justification only tells me how much I think like my community, not whether I think well or not (thinking well means thinking using reasons that lead to true results). And, again, it is only coincidence if the community thinks well.
Stealing is taking property from someone. Justifying is appealing to a point of view. Do you understand what intersubjective means? It is a point of view that is held commonly within a group of people. So when I say justifying is intersubjective, I am not saying it is a group activity, I am saying that it is, by definition, and appeal to a common point of view. Is that clearer?
No, that's not what justifying is. Justifying is showing something to be correct. You could even be showing it to yourself (so "intersubjectivity" is not required). But suppose we were showing it to someone else. Then yes, another point of view would be involved in the situation in some sense, but justification isn't simply appealing to a point of view. Duping someone into believing X does not constitute justifying the proposition. To justify X is to justify the claim that X is true. Justification is not about appealing to a common point of view, because the common point of view may be wrong. If I'm trying to dupe some idiot community into believing X, then I would appeal to their standards to "justify" X. On the other hand, if I am trying to justify X, I am trying to provide reasons for believing X such that these reasons tend to lead to true results. A community of idiots may accept reasons that tend to lead to false results as often as they lead to true results, so they would accept bad reasons. Giving bad reasons for X does not constitute justifying X, it constitutes duping idiots into believing X. This is why the "community standard" idea of justification doesn't work. It's only a coincidence when "justifying" by your definition is any different from "duping idiots."
Ok. If community doesn't set the standards for justification, and it's not personal belief, how are standards set? God? Are you claiming that there is some standard of justification that exists seperate from humanity? I'd like to hear how you 'justify' that.
Communities do set their own standards, but their standards can be wrong. Why do you think I gave my Malena or Salem Witch Trials examples? To say that something is justified is to say that it is based on reasons that lead to true results. We don't need God to tell us whether certain reasons lead to true results. When it comes to mathematics or logic, certain reasons lead to true results by definition. When it comes to science, we know that certain reasons tend to, more often than not, lead to true results, and in such cases we're satisfied with this lesser degree of certainty, since it's still good enough, and it has proven to work much of the time. Take any reason, use it in a number of situations where we know what's true and what's not, look at what results the reason leads to, and see if the reason tends to lead to true results. Compare this to a different reason. This way, we can objectively see how one result compares to another. There is no test for chocolate vs. vanilla similar to this, because "tastiness" is not like truth. Something is either true or isn't, regardless of our opinion. Something is tasty if and only if it is our opinion that it is. So we can determine when someone's reasons are better than others, we can't tell when someone has better taste in ice-cream than others, however.
You seem to think (which I have repeatedly, and explicitly denied) That I am asserting that 'If a community judges something to be justified, that it is necessarily true'. I am not commenting on the quality of justification criteria, I am commenting on it's existence, it's inherent intersubjective nature, and the role it plays in JTB.
But justification is a way to tell if something's true. If a "justification criteria" is bad, then it's not a way to tell if something's true, then it's not really a justification criteria. And if something is "justified" according to a bad criteria, it isn't really justified.

If you're hungry, and people have a bunch of reasons that they use to justify the belief that you're not hungry, then you know that the reasons that these people use aren't good reasons. You know that the standard they're using does not tell if something's true, in fact, it's tell them that false things are true. As you said, "justification is a way to tell if something is true," and you know that their standard is not a way to tell if something's true, so you know that they're standard isn't a real standard of justification. And so their claims are not really justified.
And I repeat the question "reasonable from who's point of view?". How am I to judge your claims that these historical communities' beliefs were unreasonable? From my POV? Your's? Logic's POV? Perhaps you could give me logic's e-mail, and I will ask him. The point is, what is logical/reasonable/rational must be judged by someone. So when we judge something to be rational to ourselves, we call it a belief. When we take that belief and tell the community why we think it is rational, when they agree, it is justified. If this belief also corresponds with the events or objects of reality, then it is true. JTB: Knowledge.
Yes, and when we measure mass, it must be measured by someone. But that doesn't mean that the mass that they measure is purely a result of the measurer's point of view, and similarly, that doesn't mean that reasonableness is dependent on point of view. Just as a person is required to measure mass, it is possible that he does the measurement incorrectly, that despite his point of view, he can be wrong. Similarly, even though a person may say whether or not X is reasonable, that person could be wrong. He might think that X is based on reasons that tend to lead to true results, but he might be wrong, and those reasons that X is based on might actually lead to false results. Truth and falsehood is more or less objective. I don't want to get into this, but we can agree that there are many things that are true regardless of what one's point of view is. If truth and falsehood are objective in this sense, then whether a given reason tends to lead to true results or not is also objective in the same sense. And whether or not a reason leads to true results or not is precisely the condition required to say that this is a good reason, and that beliefs based on such reasons are justified. Which reasons a community will accept as good reasons is a subjective or intersubjective thing, but which reasons really are good reasons is not.
So? False results happen. Irrelevant.

I think it unlikely that it is 'lucky' that I live in a 'reasonable' society. I think it is likely that 1) I buy into societies notion of reasonable for the most part, and 2) a society that was unreasonable in all ways would have perished long before I came along. That's evolution baby.
It's entirely relevant. If "justification" is a way to test if something's true, then if some standard leads to false results, then it's not really a way to test if something's true, no more than a pile of sticks that blows away under the slightest breeze is a real house.

And no society can be unreasonable in all ways, since "reasonable" just depends on the community's definition, so all societies are all reasonable in all ways according to their standards. Given this, why would any society perish?

And you should feel lucky. You should feel lucky that you were born in this time, and not long ago while there were a bunch of unreasonable communities perishing. It's really just luck that your definition of justification corresponds to the community's standards, it's luck that your community holds decent standards.
No, but if you are trying to assert that the mass of the object is X, you had better have standards to determine that, don't you think? The standards for judging don't guarantee the truth, but they are still needed. Someone (individual or group) has to hold these standards. Unless standards exist without humanity as well.
Yes, and it is possible that the standards are wrong. It is possible that I live in a community with a scale that no one knows is broken, so all of our measurements are wrong. If the scale doesn't really tell us the mass properly, then it's not really a good standard of measurement. Our claims that X has a mass of m kg would be wrong. Similalry, a community with a bad standard of justification could be wrong if they claimed that Y was justified.
Because the justification criterea in the past wasn't as good as it is now, justifiaction isn't an intersubjective activity? You're a logical guy, tell me how that follows. I can find no case where societies standards have been whimsical or impulsive. I can find many cases where we have since learned that other standards work better.
Justification is a way to test if something is true. There is no guarantee that an arbitrary bunch of people will know properly how to tell if something's true. Thus there is no guarantee that an arbitrary group of people will be able to give a standard of justification. So the intersubjective activity of the group coming up with some standard does not lead to the group coming up with a standard of justification (it's a standard that they think tests justification, but doesn't), so there's more to a standard of justification than just intersubjective point of view.
No I'm not. Understanable means that someone can comprehend the causal reasons for me to say something is true (without necessarily agreeing that it is), Justified means that someone(s) agrees that the rationale behind my belief is true.
Justified means that the rationale behind the belief really is "true," not just that someone else thinks that's the case.

You can understand why someone believes X, but not believe that he is justified in believing X.
You can understand why someone believes X and believe that he is justified in believing X.
Someone can actually be justified in believing X.

In the first case, you look at the reasons someone gives for X, see them as bad reasons, but can understand that someone might think they're good. In the second case, you look at the reasons and you yourself also think they're good. In the third case, the reasons are good, regardless of what people think. A good reasons is a reason that tends to lead to truth. This is a purely objective matter that doesn't depend on opinion. Certain reasons will tend to lead to truth, even if you and I think otherwise.
So something is justified only when it is true? Why bother including truth in JTB? Just saying 'justified belief' would necessarily entail truth (according to you), so there is no value in explicating 'truth'. Don't you think that 'justified' must (for this reason) not necessarily entail truth in the context of JTB? I'm speaking of justification as it is described in JTB. Maybe we got off track and forgot this.
Personally, I think "justified" should imply truth, but we can relax that condition and say that "justified" should at least tend to lead to truth. So a JTB would be a true belief based on reasons that tend to lead to truth. But your definition of "justified" gives us no guarantee of this, except by coincidence. Given any reason that meets an arbitrary community's standard, there's no guarantee that it will lead tend to true results. We're just lucky if we live in a society where most of the reasons do have that tendency. But since a community may have a number of reasons that don't have that tendency, then there are many propositions that might be accepted according to that community's standard but not be justified, so long as it appealed chiefly to those bad reasons.

Suppose a community has 1000 reasons in it's standard, 5 of which almost always lead to false results. Suppose X justifies a claim according to just those 5 reasons. Then the community would say X is justified, and you and I would agree that X is "justified" according to that community. I would add that since he appealed to reasons that tended to lead to false results, he would not actually be justified, you, on the other hand, would say that the idea of being "actually justified" is meaningless, and that whether or not he appealed to reasons that tended to lead to false results or not was irrelevant, so long as the community coincidentally happened to accept those reasons.


Edited by AKG on 05/28/05 - 12:24 PM
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Posted 05/28/05 - 10:51 AM:
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#46
AKG,

Please respond to the last portion of my post. We can both go around asserting justification means whatever we want. The question is, what is a usefull definition/interpretation within the context of the disscussion.
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Posted 05/28/05 - 12:41 PM:
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#47
I did, that's what my last two paragraphs were about. I've edited in a quote from you in my post to make this more obvious.

Basically, I say that something is justified if it is based on reasons that tend to lead to true results. You say that something is justified if the community believes that it is _________.

In case you fill in "based on reasons that tend to lead to true results," for the blank, there is no guarantee whatsoever that something that a community thinks is based on reasons that leads to true results is actually based on reasons that lead to true results. The reasons may usually lead to false results, and the community wrongly believes otherwise.
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Posted 05/28/05 - 04:44 PM:
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Ok. So a proposition doesn't have to be true to be justified? You said the opposite earlier (but you are allowed to change your mind).

What is the standard then? How do we decide what leads to true results? Surely every belief is thought to be true, so where does the standard for judging it justified come from? I have offered one alternative, you say it is wrong, but offer nothin to exchange it with.


Edited by Reformed Nihilist on 05/28/05 - 04:50 PM
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Posted 05/29/05 - 11:55 PM:
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Reformed Nihilist, how would you fill in that blank? Anyways, like I said, a proposition should be true to be justified, but for the purposes of this discussion, I am willing to work with a more relaxed definition, that being that a proposition is justified when it is supported with reasons that tend to lead to true conclusions.
What is the standard then? How do we decide what leads to true results?
Well suppose we give a reason for a belief, saying that the reason is that John told us and John is an expert at the subject at hand. Everytime John has told us something about this subject, it's turned out to be true. So "because John said so, and it relates to his subject of expertise," would be a reason that tends to lead to true results. I don't see how it's all that hard to tell which reasons lead to true results and which don't. It's as hard as determining whether something's true or not. If we have someone give us his belief and his reasons, and we find that they're true, then we have one instance demonstrating that those reasons led to a true result. If we observe a tendency for those reasons to lead to true results, then that's all there is to it.

On the other hand, if John is the leader of a small community, and nothing John has said relating to a given subject has ever been verified, but the people believe him anyways, then the people wouldn't be justified if they believed things just because John said so. The community would be wrong. Why wouldn't you say that their standards are wrong? They're putting their blind faith in an incompetent man. They wrongly believe that he is a good authority on certain matters, but he's not. Their trust is misplaced, and they don't even have good reason to put their trust in him, they just blindly follow him. How is it not obvious that these people have a bad standard?
Surely every belief is thought to be true, so where does the standard for judging it justified come from? I have offered one alternative, you say it is wrong, but offer nothin to exchange it with.
You haven't given a standard for judging if it's justified, you've given a standard for judging if it's something the community would believe. Surely, you don't believe that "justified" is whatever the community thinks is justified. You must have your own belief for what's justified, then you determine whether you agree with the community's standards or not, right? Or do you believe that your opinion is necessarily inferior to the community's? Again, you're lucky because you live in a large community with many experts in various fields, with a generally reasonable community. What if we lived in a small community, and you were the smart educated one, and the rest were a bunch of stupid simpletons? Then you'd know better as to what's justified and what's not. You can see tell bad reasoning when you see it, right? My reasoning must be flawed, since you believe yourself to be right, and I don't, right? But suppose the community were full of people like me. Then would you just cave? Would you ever disagree with the standards of the community you were a part of? If so, then how can you say that the community standard is the standard while disagreeing with it at the same time? If not, then you've made the decision to not think for yourself, and allow your standards of justification to be whatever the community dictates to you, even if they were a community of idiots.
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Posted 05/30/05 - 07:15 AM:
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AKG wrote:
Reformed Nihilist, how would you fill in that blank?


I thought I did already, with intersubjectivity. The communinty in question.

Anyways, like I said, a proposition should be true to be justified, but for the purposes of this discussion, I am willing to work with a more relaxed definition, that being that a proposition is justified when it is supported with reasons that tend to lead to true conclusions.


So we agree that the justification criterea for JTB does not entail truth, but should support truth.

Well suppose we give a reason for a belief, saying that the reason is that John told us and John is an expert at the subject at hand.


Ok. Here we hit an issue already. John is an expert, because he is recognised to be one by his community. Expertise also needs standards.

Everytime John has told us something about this subject, it's turned out to be true. So "because John said so, and it relates to his subject of expertise," would be a reason that tends to lead to true results.


I agree that it would.

I don't see how it's all that hard to tell which reasons lead to true results and which don't. It's as hard as determining whether something's true or not. If we have someone give us his belief and his reasons, and we find that they're true, then we have one instance demonstrating that those reasons led to a true result. If we observe a tendency for those reasons to lead to true results, then that's all there is to it.


The problem is, you have just described belief. I always beleive what I think corresponds with true propositions. If I thought they were false, I wouldn't believe them. So there has to be some other criterea besides belief involved. I have to have 'good reason' to believe it. Now I can judge the value of my reasons myself, but then they will all be judged as good. If I happen to be an idiot, then these propositions that I claim are true and I claim I have good reason (justification) to beleive, will be false quite often, and accidentally true often as well. So there must be a way to judge whether an idea is good or not, without relying on an individual's opinion solely. Social justification. A group of people (6 or 6 billion) generally agree.


Surely, you don't believe that "justified" is whatever the community thinks is justified.


I don't? Could have fooled me. It's what I've said a number of times to you. I don't believe that every community is always correct about everything (which you seem to be interpeting). But When it comes to the question of knowledge, I think justified means when a belief passes a groups (or even I suppose one other persons, just not mine alone) standards for what is considered true.

You must have your own belief for what's justified,


Yes. My belief. If justification is defined by what I think is justified, then we have another redundency. We end up with true belief. No need for justification.

then you determine whether you agree with the community's standards or not, right? Or do you believe that your opinion is necessarily inferior to the community's?


Yes and no. I developed my own standards of justification by learning from my society. I test my beliefs against societies to see how they match. What happens if I see something odd, and unbeleivable? I ask people around "did you see that?" to test my belief that the oddness actually occured, and I wasn't just seeing things. Damn good thing we have this feedback, or delusional people would never know they were delusional. They have to believe what eveyone tells them, because their observations inform them falsely.

Again, you're lucky because you live in a large community with many experts in various fields, with a generally reasonable community. What if we lived in a small community, and you were the smart educated one, and the rest were a bunch of stupid simpletons?


Well, I think you are mistaking community here, and maybe that's what the problem is. I mean simply 'group of people', they certainly don't have too be geographically connected. As long as they have common beliefs about what is reasonable. If I had been educated, chances are I would use the justification criterea of the group that educated me to judge if my beilief on a matter was justified.

Then you'd know better as to what's justified and what's not. You can see tell bad reasoning when you see it, right? My reasoning must be flawed, since you believe yourself to be right, and I don't, right? But suppose the community were full of people like me.


Well, let's look at this closely. We have opposed beliefs, you and I. I believe P, you believe ~P. Why are we discussing? What are we doing to convince each other? We are appealing to logic, and standard definitions. As a matter of fact, a great deal of what the initial debate was about was you telling me that 'justification' means something different than what I claimed. Now, I can only assume you meant that the 'standard' definition was different than what I claimed. This is appealing to a community standard. When you cite historical communities that were clearly wrong, and claim our current society is more likely to be right, because we are more advanced or educated, you are espousing community standards (not that you don't personally believe them yourself).

Then would you just cave? Would you ever disagree with the standards of the community you were a part of?


Well, I would very seriously consider my own beliefs, if everyone in the community in question (this is all context based) disagreed.

If so, then how can you say that the community standard is the standard while disagreeing with it at the same time?


Can we both agree on logic, but disagree about the conclusions to a problem of logic? Of course. But the standard of logic is still there. I can have true beliefs, that are not justified by a community. If a belief is judged to be false by a community, and you still believe it, how do we decide if you are right, or every one else is? How do we know if the community is stupid or insane, or if you are?

If not, then you've made the decision to not think for yourself, and allow your standards of justification to be whatever the community dictates to you, even if they were a community of idiots.


Well, I have reasons for my beliefs. My beliefs are seemingly true to me. My conviction to those beliefs varies dependent on a multitude of factors. But to call my beliefs knowledge, rather than just belief, I need to meet a criterea that shows that I had good reason to hold that belief. Now if they were my own criterea, then judging my beliefs against the standards that I believe, gives us nothing but a epistemically solipsitic circle. "I believe something because it conforms to my beliefs". Now I don't really have a problem with that, but then JTB is nothing but B. So again, for the purpose of discussing JTB, mustn't we have a reference for J that is not subjective? Thus intersubjectivity.

I hope this clears some things up. I don't think anyone is claiming that any particular group of people cannot be flawed in their standards. But to judge if their standards are flawed, we must use other standards. We have two categories of standards to choose from. Subjective (our own standards), and intersubjective (common wisdom, common sense). Intersubjective can include any number and configuration of subjects. If I (which I am doing) tell you that I am right about this, I am actually trying to appeal to your standards of sense. We both share very nearly the same ideas of what is a good reason to hold a proposition true. So in this case, we are the community. I am appealing to our shared standards, and you are doing the same. We are both justifying our beliefs to the other.



Edited by Reformed Nihilist on 05/30/05 - 07:36 AM
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