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Knowledge and the justification criterium

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Knowledge and the justification criterium

darkcrow
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Posted 05/24/05 - 12:38 PM:	#11
Morrandir wrote: Pardon? I looked through my post and still didn't find any reference to "individual belief". As far as I know, I have never used such a term, so I can't really say what I mean by such. I think you might have taken too many pills lately, or then it is me, but I think your comment has nothing to do with what I have said. What's the deal? I will respond to other things tomorrow, but I would like to have an explanation of this waiting at my desk first thing in the morning. ~M~ I had to look again but only so that I could paste it…” Isn't belief by definition something that an individual holds?”.” I agree; you did not use the words… “individual belief,” but I wonder, what do you call a belief an individual hold that is not intersubjective (collective from society somewhere down the line)? Now I honestly came to the conclusion I came to; I believe there is only intersubjective belief’; if not what name does this belief go by, if not individual?
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Morrandir
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Posted 05/24/05 - 01:06 PM:	#12
Darkcrow wrote: I had to look again but only so that I could paste it…” Isn't belief by definition something that an individual holds?”.” I agree; you did not use the words… “individual belief,” but I wonder, what do you call a belief an individual hold that is not intersubjective (collective from society somewhere down the line)? Yes, I did say that, and I did notice that, but I didn't really think that you would actually interpret it in that way. Just as a car that an individual holds is not an individual car. The sentences speak of wholly different things, actually, because in the former one the individual is the person holding the car, in the latter the individual is the car. There is a world of difference between an individual belief and a belief of an individual. A belief I consider to be something like RN said: something that a subject holds to be true. (I have reservations, but I will leave them for now.) A belief would be something that is then by definition an individual's belief - of course, many individuals can hold the same belief in some sense (might be the source of the different views), but I contend that this "holding of the same belief" means simply that they both have a belief (in their mind) that holds the same thing to be true. If we both believe that Normandy's invasion was the turning point of the second world war, we take the same thing (proposition?) to be true - but the intentional state that is directed at this (assumed) truth is different for us both. That is, basically, analogous to both having the sensation of red (and thus the same sensation in one sense) without having the same sensation. That is, their extensions or referents or causes or whatever you wish to call them are the same (redness), but the actual states of mind are securely locked within our individual minds. I think we interpret intersubjectuality very differently here. I am NOT saying that an individual, subjective belief could be detached from every other belief or the beliefs of others and the culture those beliefs comprise. But the reasons we have a belief, and whatever this belief relates to, do not make the belief itself intersubjective. (Reformed Nihilist: I think you should instead say "common belief" than "intersubjective belief", because a common belief is something held by many people, whereas an intersubjective belief would be something that can be held only by the collection of people). Basically, then, I am just saying here that a belief is something an individual holds. Not that many individuals couldn't hold the same belief (extensionally), nor that this belief could be somehow independent of other beliefs and the beliefs of others. Just like "The Earth is round" is an individual statement, an individual fact, an individual piece of knowledge, even though it can be (and is) held by many people, and it surely is not independent from other statements/facts/pieces of knowledge. I am not trying to put down your view here, however, but simply explaining mine. Perhaps if you interpret "intersubjectuality" as something that is held by many people and is related to many people, then we might have intersubjective beliefs. But that is not the way I would interpret this. Intersubjectuality means something along the lines of "being in a relation between subjects". But again, even with this interpretation, you could, with a nice combination of interpretations of words such as "belief" construct an intersubjective belief. But I claim: a belief as the intensional state of mind is always subjective. Its referent or extension may be an intersubjective thing. My pain is mine alone, even if you could experience the same kind of pain. Now I honestly came to the conclusion I came to; I believe there is only intersubjective belief’; if not what name does this belief go by, if not individual? I believe what you are saying is that all beliefs have a relation to the society, and are thus grounded on intersubjective relations. I agree. When you look at the definitions given in this thread to belief and to systems of beliefs, you will see that what is relevant is that a subject has a system of beliefs (that is, propositions of sorts that she takes as true). It is also relevant that others can get information of these beliefs (necessary for the whole idea of understandability), so the beliefs must have an intersubjectively accessible objects - the extensions of the beliefs. But this does not, by any means, entail that the beliefs are not always held by subjects instead of intersubjective entities. These beliefs that are held by subjects I called "belief that an individual holds" - not the same as individual belief. Perhaps because of this interpretation I had I was too harsh on intersubjective beliefs. What I took that to mean was a belief that was held by an intersubjective entity. But I believe all beliefs are held by subjects, whereas the beliefs relate to intersubjective entities, and through that can be held by different subjects. An intersubjective belief would entail intersubjective conscious minds capable of holding beliefs. This is why I considered it so horrid. Also, this whole episode shows clearly that I was right in demanding a definition, because as such, it fails to distinguish between the belief as held and the belief as the extension of a belief that is held, for one. It also fails to explicate whether intersubjectuality means a relation between subjects, something accessible by many subjects, or something that belongs within many subjects. For example, culture is an intersubjective entity, because it cannot exist if only one subject exists - it exists only through the relation of subjects. But a belief is not such a thing, even thought beliefs are, of course, related to external world and thus to other subjects. Perhaps this is enough of this matter? ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

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Posted 05/24/05 - 11:40 PM:	#13
Morrandir wrote: [/i] There is another interesting approach, though. Instead of saying that truth implies justification (as is done here), we could say that justification implies truth. Of course, in this approach, justification should be greatly revised - this is related to my question: how come something be justified yet be false? This approach leads of course to knowledge collapsing into justified belief, but this is not as implausible as it being a true belief (a happy guess). After all, this is only unpreferable to a realist - coherentic and other epistemological or pragmatic theories do postulate knowledge as justified belief. In these, however, justification is to be well-defined, and needs to have stricter conditions than it currently seems to have. I think the distinction you are making is between justification for a belief, which is the grounds for holding it, and vindication of a belief, which is the event of its turning out to be true. I may be justified in believing that p, even though p is false. That is because my justification is weak. My belief, though justified, will not be vindicated. I may be unjustified in believing that p (have insufficient grounds for believing it), but my belief may be vindicated when p turns out to be true. (Look, there was a sheep in the field after all, even though my grounds for believing it were shaky, depending as they did upon a mistake.) Your 'understandable' means justified, and your 'justified' means vindicated (I think.) With regard to moral actions, your 'understandable' needs to be unpacked, I think, into 'excusable', 'justifiable' and 'comprehensible'. If I knock my cup of coffee into your lap and it's not due to excessive carelessness, then I've done you harm, but all things being equal it's excusable. It's not justifiable, because I have no reason to spill coffee over you. If I knock you over because you are about to attack an old lady in the street, then I've done you harm, but it's justifiable, because I had a good reason, i.e. preventing your attack. There's a sense of 'understandable' in which even inexcusable actions are understandable and comprehensible. That is, there may be insufficient excuse for an action, but I may nevertheless understand the motivation of the person who did it. I may even empathise with the person and shudder at the thought that I too might have been tempted to do that inexcusable thing. This moral attitude is summed up in the expression: 'There, but for the grace of God...' Suppose certain knowledge is justified true belief for which there are no possible rational grounds for doubt. This definition sets a standard of certainty that is so high nothing can conceivably meet it and so is an abuse of the concept. Given possible circumstances that are strange enough, I may doubt any particular thing of which I am certain. It does not follow from this that I may doubt everything about which I am certain. This is a point about the logic of 'no', 'any' and 'every', not a point about knowledge or certainty. Consider: A. There is no restaurant in town at which I may not dine tonight. Therefore, I may dine at every restaurant in town tonight. B. There is nothing that I certainly know that I may not doubt. Therefore I may doubt everything that I certainly know. I would be interested to hear anyone's thoughts on why we are often taken in by B but would not for a moment be deceived by A. But that might be another thread. I may justify my belief that p and I may then be required to justify my justification for my belief that p. There is potentially no end to justifying. Again, it does not follow from the fact that I may be required to justify any given justification, that every belief is unjustified.

jaoman
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Posted 05/25/05 - 09:39 AM:	#14
Morrandir, you may be taking the horse for the messenger. And predictably, the horse slurs its words. Take your example. Morrandir wrote: It crossed my mind, that justification has been misapplied. Let us consider a simple example: John struck Peter because Peter made fun of John's grandmother's death. Now I think it is fairly obvious that this does not constitute a justified act - it is, I believe, so that in court John would be considered as guilty and obliged to, for example, pay Peter. But when someone asks "Why did John strike Peter?" and I explained the situation, that someone might well sigh that "well, it was understandable". Understandable, but not justified, eh? What does understandability mean? Basically it seems to mean that someone considers it so that he projects himself into the shoes of John, and believes that he might have done the same thing. Even if it was not justified, we could easily imagine ourselves doing the same thing in the same situation with the same state of mind and same beliefs as John had. I find it strange that you would look to a third person perspective to award the title of justification to a first person view. When John wallops Peter, if John is thinking - which is an oxymoron not far from the famous "military intelligence" - John believes he is justified. He has assessed the situation, and based on those facts finds justification to hit Peter. In other words, John has a justified belief that hitting Peter is the way to go. On the other hand, based on my experience, I believe violence doesn't solve anything - well, rarely. I've a justified belief John is wrong. However, in both cases, as in all cases, justification is entirely subjective in nature. What distinguishes John and me is the social ruling. John has no legal right to strike Peter, and is condemned by the court. For all that John found justification for his belief, when considered "globally" - to say, with all the facts - it proved to be false. The "true" element of justified true believe acts as the go-between with the outside world, as opposed to justified, which is there only to insure a criteria for belief in general. Edited by jaoman on 05/25/05 - 09:44 AM
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Posted 05/25/05 - 10:01 AM:	#15
jaoman wrote: However, in both cases, as in all cases, justification is entirely subjective in nature. Not true. Just like belief, justification can be common (agreed on by many subjects), and can be expressed by a group (intersubjectively). Look at self defence laws. You can kill someone, and be justified leagally and personally if society deemed it self defence. However, we are speaking of a belief/justification that applies to knowledge, and not ethics/law. We are justifying that what we say or beleive is right in the sense of accurate. Isn't this what science books do all the time? Describe the justification (the community standard) of a belief. Edited by Reformed Nihilist on 05/25/05 - 10:09 AM
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jaoman
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Posted 05/25/05 - 10:20 AM:	#16
Reformed Nihilist wrote: Not true. Just like belief, justification can be common (agreed on by many subjects), and can be expressed by a group (intersubjectively). Look at self defence laws. You can kill someone, and be justified leagally and personally if society deemed it self defence. However, we are speaking of a belief/justification that applies to knowledge, and not ethics/law. We are justifying that what we say or beleive is right in the sense of accurate. Isn't this what science books do all the time? Describe the justification (the community standard) of a belief. True. However, the process and experiences which sums up into justification is subjective in each event. Suppose I buy into your argument. I would believe it to be justified. That makes two of us. But so what? Your justification remains within you and mine within me. A shared thought is no less arbitrary for that it's shared. Whereupon, truth is still in the hands of history. Take the time old belief that earth is flat. They had justification for that. The justification was shared, just as was the belief. That did not make each individual instance in any less a subjective response to the environment - more, in fact. Nor was it true. Edited by jaoman on 05/25/05 - 10:51 AM
"With no relation to class or social background, whether it suits them or not, people yearn for a dream. Sustained by a dream, hurt by a dream, revived by a dream, killed by a dream. And even after being abandoned by a dream, it continues to smolder from the bottom of one's heart... probably until the verge of death. A man should envision such a lifetime once. A life spent as a martyr to the god named "dream." - Kentaro Miura

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Posted 05/25/05 - 11:22 AM:	#17
jaoman wrote: True. However, the process and experiences which sums up into justification is subjective in each event. Suppose I buy into your argument. I would believe it to be justified. That makes two of us. But so what? Your justification remains within you and mine within me. A shared thought is no less arbitrary for that it's shared. Whereupon, truth is still in the hands of history. Well, the two of us could barely be considered a community. And if we were, then we would be justified in believing it, and if everyone else disagreed, they would clearly be irrational or insane. That is how community standards work. Take the time old belief that earth is flat. At the time, anyone would tell you that it was known that the earth is flat. They had justification for that. The justification was shared, just as was the belief. That did not make each individual instance in any less a subjective response to the environment - more, in fact. I don't deny subjectivity, although I don't agree with subjectivity being variable. How can something be more subjective? How less? Nor was it true. That's a whole other can of worms. The justification factor is being examined here. Let's leave truth for another thread (as if there haven't been enough of them already ).
Nobody ever became a famous philosopher by being a champion of ecumenical hybridism Daniel Dennett Freedom Evolves

jaoman
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Posted 05/25/05 - 12:20 PM:	#18
Reformed Nihilist wrote: Well, the two of us could barely be considered a community. And if we were, then we would be justified in believing it, and if everyone else disagreed, they would clearly be irrational or insane. That is how community standards work. Well, suppose a man comes along to the community and says, "No, no, fellas. I've studied this quite a bit and the Earth is definitely round." Are you telling me this man is irrational or insane? Community standards aside, this is not a very effective way to judge or define knowledge. Reformed Nihilist wrote: That's a whole other can of worms. The justification factor is being examined here. Let's leave truth for another thread (as if there haven't been enough of them already ). Oh! A sound blow! I shall endeavor to apply myself to your wisdom.
"With no relation to class or social background, whether it suits them or not, people yearn for a dream. Sustained by a dream, hurt by a dream, revived by a dream, killed by a dream. And even after being abandoned by a dream, it continues to smolder from the bottom of one's heart... probably until the verge of death. A man should envision such a lifetime once. A life spent as a martyr to the god named "dream." - Kentaro Miura

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Posted 05/25/05 - 12:49 PM:	#19
jaoman wrote: Well, suppose a man comes along to the community and says, "No, no, fellas. I've studied this quite a bit and the Earth is definitely round." Are you telling me this man is irrational or insane? Community standards aside, this is not a very effective way to judge or define knowledge. My point is we can't judge knowlege 'community standards aside', or it just becomes belief. If this man explains his position in full, and we (the community) do not agree that his reason for believing is a good one (justified), then to us (remember, were the community, and we set the standards by which knowledge is judged), we have knowledge, and he has false belief. I am saying that justification comes from the attempt to divorce our beliefs from subjectivity, by appealing and accepting a community as judge. Oh! A sound blow! I shall endeavor to apply myself to your wisdom. I wasn't sure how to take this, so I think charity dictates 'playfull irony'? I promise you my wisdom is nothing but toilet paper. I'm just trying to wipe the crap away, and be left with a shiny, clean issue.
Nobody ever became a famous philosopher by being a champion of ecumenical hybridism Daniel Dennett Freedom Evolves

jaoman
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Posted 05/25/05 - 01:13 PM:	#20
Reformed Nihilist wrote: My point is we can't judge knowlege 'community standards aside', or it just becomes belief. If this man explains his position in full, and we (the community) do not agree that his reason for believing is a good one (justified), then to us (remember, were the community, and we set the standards by which knowledge is judged), we have knowledge, and he has false belief. I am saying that justification comes from the attempt to divorce our beliefs from subjectivity, by appealing and accepting a community as judge. RN, your position may be accomplishing the very opposite of its intent. Or I may be giving knowledge (as per JTB) a faulty standard; namely, that it has to be factual. That more than one person believes something does not insure against error. In my view, justification is just another word for reason; and while I'm all for the divorce from subjectivity, it has often been commented on the degree to which a crowd can be far dumber than the individual. If a belief is justified only because a group of people thinks it so, than reason becomes divorced from the argument. Knowledge degrades to the opinion of the majority, and the only real criteria that stands for it is that it's believed. Therefore, say, Galileo has justified facts in our time, but not during his lifetime. And yet, the contents of Galileo's mind and, we hope, the universe never changed. I find this unsatisfactory. Facts are not subjugated to the opinions of people. If they were, everything would work, or nothing. Other opinions may be a good test of reason. But that too is for another thread. Reformed Nihilist wrote: I wasn't sure how to take this, so I think charity dictates 'playfull irony'? I promise you my wisdom is nothing but toilet paper. I'm just trying to wipe the crap away, and be left with a shiny, clean issue. Actually, it was "playfull seriousness." As for the toilet paper...no difference in the foundamental atoms, so you're not far off. Edited by jaoman on 05/25/05 - 01:56 PM
"With no relation to class or social background, whether it suits them or not, people yearn for a dream. Sustained by a dream, hurt by a dream, revived by a dream, killed by a dream. And even after being abandoned by a dream, it continues to smolder from the bottom of one's heart... probably until the verge of death. A man should envision such a lifetime once. A life spent as a martyr to the god named "dream." - Kentaro Miura

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