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Kant vs Hume

Kallisti23
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Posted 04/27/07 - 01:23 PM:	#11
Morradir, you also said: Morrandir wrote: Critique of Pure Reason is mostly about trying to show the possibility of such judgments. These have been considered very problematic, of course, but mostly because they are taken apart from Kant's overall philosophy, in the context of which they make a lot of sense. Could you elaborate on this?

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Posted 04/27/07 - 03:26 PM:	#12
I am not sure what there is to elaborate, exactly. As I said, Kant's system is very complex and one needs to take a lot into account. When that is taken into account and the system is seen by its own lights, one sees that synthetic judgments a priori are something that clearly follows. Just like Kant seemed to think -- he never seemed to pay much attention to their proof, as if he had thought of them nigh trivial. Direct approach to such judgments is useless, because they are based on Kantian system as a whole. It is like taking Quantum Mechanics apart from the rest of physics and assessing it in its own right, probably ending up with the thought that such a wacky theory cannot be true. ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

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Posted 04/27/07 - 09:50 PM:	#13
Morrandir wrote: The basic idea is that every experience has a matter and a form, the former of which is the given part of experience (i.e. what is experienced) and the latter part is the set part of experience (i.e. how this something is experienced). How is this "matter/form" bifurcation justified? Isn't it a "synthetic a priori judgement" by which Kant derives his argument for the possibility of "synthetic a priori judgements?" If he is correct and we add something to every experience, then this added part is a priori (because it is added to experience, not drawn from it) and it is synthetic (because it concerns the world, not just concepts). Hume argues that we cannot be certain of the world and Kant says we can only be certain of the 'form' our minds impose on the world but not certain of the world's 'content' ... So, science discloses, as Hume suggested, more about our "habits and customs" (i.e. cognition) than it does about the world (i.e. 'things in themselves' / content sans form?); what has Kant really accomplished by reformulating "habits and customs" transcendentally? It seems to me that Kant merely shifts Hume's 'skepticism' from ontology to epistemology (from 'doubt of causal connections' to 'doubt of causes' ...), thus arguing that "god" "immortality" and "freedom" must be taken on 'faith' (i.e. merely as 'regulative principles'). Within Kant's system all these intricate distinctions and reformulations may make sense ... but what does this system mean?
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

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Posted 04/29/07 - 02:41 AM:	#14
180 Proof wrote: How is this "matter/form" bifurcation justified? I think that ultimately it is based on empiricism's inability to explain the possibility of experience. So, as Kant somewhere in CPR says, we must accept transcendental idealism as the sole possible explanation for (actual) experiences. That is, if matter/form distinction is not made (on a transcendental level), then we cannot explain the possibility of the experience we clearly have. (According to Kant, that is.) Isn't it a "synthetic a priori judgement" by which Kant derives his argument for the possibility of "synthetic a priori judgements?" I fail to understand what you are saying. That is, I don't see the problem. If you manage to produce a valid and true synthetic a priori judgment, then have you not shown that there are synthetic a priori judgments? If that is what you mean, then I guess, but since that is not a problem, you probably mean something else? Hume argues that we cannot be certain of the world and Kant says we can only be certain of the 'form' our minds impose on the world but not certain of the world's 'content' ... Of course this is so. So, science discloses, as Hume suggested, more about our "habits and customs" (i.e. cognition) than it does about the world (i.e. 'things in themselves' / content sans form?); what has Kant really accomplished by reformulating "habits and customs" transcendentally? He would say that he has accomplished in showing that there are necessary laws of nature as well as laws of mathematics etc. Hume did not believe in any necessities, so I think that is, if successful, an accomplishment with regard to Hume. (Note that according to Kant science is based on certain necessary a priori laws of nature, such as persistence of matter etc.) It seems to me that Kant merely shifts Hume's 'skepticism' from ontology to epistemology (from 'doubt of causal connections' to 'doubt of causes' ...), thus arguing that "god" "immortality" and "freedom" must be taken on 'faith' (i.e. merely as 'regulative principles'). I am not sure what you mean, but certainly Kant never attempted to show that we could be sure of EVERYTHING -- on the contrary, he always stresses that empirical matters are uncertain. What is the problem you see here? Within Kant's system all these intricate distinctions and reformulations may make sense ... but what does this system mean? I am not going to start a discussion on the basis of questions like "What does Kant's system mean." Sorry It would probably take me far more time than I have to spare. ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

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Posted 04/29/07 - 06:16 AM:	#15
Morrandir wrote: That is, if matter/form distinction is not made (on a transcendental level), then we cannot explain the possibility of the experience we clearly have. (According to Kant, that is.) All this means, as far as I can tell, is that we cannot explain experience transcendentally (aka metaphysically), although empirical cognitive/neurological sciences can do the trick. The distinction, then, is heuristic not axiomatic, which is only a problem insofar as Kant's architectonics are not as 'sound' as he'd like us to believe ... If you manage to produce a valid and true synthetic a priori judgment, then have you not shown that there are synthetic a priori judgments? My point is that Kant's argument seems only to prove what it already assumes, and thus, in effect, proves nothing. He would say that he has accomplished in showing that there are necessary laws of nature as well as laws of mathematics etc. Hume did not believe in any necessities, so I think that is, if successful, an accomplishment with regard to Hume. (Note that according to Kant science is based on certain necessary a priori laws of nature, such as persistence of matter etc.) If Kant said that, I think he would be exaggerating. Kant's system, to my mind, only demonstrates that we can conceive of necessary rules for judging phenomena; no doubt there's considerably more conceptual machinery involved, yet there's no more "necessity in itself" (so to speak) than there is in the more succinct account by Hume. Kant's 'necessitities' pertain to the form of cognition not the content (i.e. nature); I don't see how this non-necessary content is any different from Hume's explicit uncertainty: "habits and customs" or "synthetic a priori judgements" -- the functions are indistinguishable (i.e. accounting for the regularity/reliability of knowledge) even though the implications of the latter are "universalist" (i.e. speculative) and that of the former is "pluralistic" (i.e. adaptive). I don't agree that Kant's "transcendental" move was progress but rather an elaborate metaphysical restatement of Hume's skeptical anti-metaphysics. Hume seems to derive his epistemology from an uncertain ontology whereas Kant excludes ontology (except as an "opaque" substrate) from his epistemology; nonetheless, I simply fail to see how Kant's world, ontologically speaking, differs significantly from Hume's.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

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Posted 04/29/07 - 02:30 PM:	#16
180 Proof wrote: All this means, as far as I can tell, is that we cannot explain experience transcendentally (aka metaphysically) I have no idea what you are talking about. Not only is the equating of transcendentally and metaphysically rather strange if not blatantly wrong, it seems to make little sense to say that in Kant's system we could not explain experience transcendentally, because that is exactly what Kant seems to be doing. The distinction, then, is heuristic not axiomatic, which is only a problem insofar as Kant's architectonics are not as 'sound' as he'd like us to believe ... Again you have lost me with your comments about "soundness" of Kant's architectonics. It can, as far as I can tell, mean a hundred different things. My point is that Kant's argument seems only to prove what it already assumes, and thus, in effect, proves nothing. If I make an analytic judgment (i.e. define "analytic" and then show a judgment that is analytic according to the definition), don't I prove that there are analytic judgments? Why would this be a problem? If Kant said that, I think he would be exaggerating. Kant's system, to my mind, only demonstrates that we can conceive of necessary rules for judging phenomena; It shows, if correct, that there ARE necessary rules for judging phenomena, not only that we can conceive of them. no doubt there's considerably more conceptual machinery involved, yet there's no more "necessity in itself" (so to speak) than there is in the more succinct account by Hume. Even with the "so to speak" I cannot fathom what "necessity in itself" could ever mean. And really if Hume's philosophy does not allow for necessity, and Kant's does, how can you think there is no difference? Kant's 'necessitities' pertain to the form of cognition not the content (i.e. nature); The nature is the synthesis of the form and matter of cognition. Laws of nature are part of nature. According to Kant laws of nature are necessary, and that simply is a whole lot more than Hume could ever admit to. I don't see how this non-necessary content is any different from Hume's explicit uncertainty Hume does not have necessary forms. Kant does. Hume does not have necessary laws of nature, Kant does. Hume does not have the necessity of causal relations, Kant does. Hume does not have thoroughgoing causal determinism of nature, Kant does. Etc etc. I don't agree that Kant's "transcendental" move was progress but rather an elaborate metaphysical restatement of Hume's skeptical anti-metaphysics. I can't see how you could ever read Kant that way, honestly. Hume seems to derive his epistemology from an uncertain ontology whereas Kant excludes ontology (except as an "opaque" substrate) from his epistemology The whole of Transcendental Analytic is "ontology" according to Kant. ; nonetheless, I simply fail to see how Kant's world, ontologically speaking, differs significantly from Hume's. And I fail to see how you fail to see it. But it is rather unimportant whether I see your point or not, isn't it? ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

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