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Kant and Levinas on the Primacy of Ethics

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Kant and Levinas on the Primacy of Ethics

Morrandir
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Posted 11/13/06 - 10:11 AM: Subject: Kant's and Levinas's Ethics	#1
This is an attempt to sketch an important relationship between Kant and Levinas (without an attempt to explicate all the basic technical terms and philosophical theses required to understand these thinkers; that is, I presuppose some knowledge of the philosophy of these two). In his essay "Is Ontology Fundamental?" Levinas states twice that of all ethical systems Kant's is the one closest to his. At first glance, this might seem quite surprising. It would perhaps appear that Kant's purely formally deduced ethical system that lacks any references to love, empathy, or any other humane emotions associated with ethics, could in fact have some similarities with Levinas's ethics based on the Other* that compels us or even rules over us. I will make an attempt at explaining how these two so very different thinkers can indeed be seen as arguing for the same idea, from the same stance. The most fundamental connection between these two is the fact that both of them found ethics on transcendence. For them, the basis of ethics is something that is not found in the (empirical) world. For Kant ethics is impossible without freedom, and freedom is only possible in the noumenal realm - whereas the empirical realm is governed by a thoroughgoing determinism. The noumenal self is what allows for ethics, and it is transcendent. For Levinas ethics is based on the Other. According to him, the mere (empirical) analysis of things cannot account for the Other. The Self is not a thing, and this is also true of the Other. The Other therefore transcends the empirical realm of things (the field of ontology) and is therefore in the end unreachable. However, both of these transcendent aspects appear or manifest themselves to us. In Kant's system the fact that there is spontaneity, that experience is organized, requires or at least hints at freedom beyond the scope of the organized world: the organizer does not appear as itself in the world of the organized, for the latter logically presupposes the former. Yet the mere presence of organization implies the organizer, like the footprint in the snow betrays the presence of the one that left it. For Levinas, the presence of the Other is manifest in the Face (a name, I suppose, for something quite like empathy). When I look in the eyes of my friend, the Otherness shines through, the subjectivity of him is clearly manifest even if I cannot utter the exact way it manifests itself. This is most clearly, if also most horribly, demonstrated in the empty eyes of the corpse that stares at us, void of the Otherness that once inhabited the husk. For both philosophers, the foundation of ethics is transcendent yet it presents itself, even challenges us, from the beyond. There is another striking similarity in the systems of these two thinkers: for both of them ethics is based on obligation, on duty. Both are deontologicists. For Kant the obligation is for the autonomous reason that alone can produce general and universal ideas that are independent of the fickles of nature. Simply: the spontaneity of reason allows it to work independent of the contingent sensible matter fed to us through sensibility and understanding. Only in the autonomous use of reason can the ethical law be presented in its full glory, as the categorical imperative. For Levinas, however, the obligation is for the Face, the manifestation of the Other that compels us. Before the Face of the Other we are challenged, or as Levinas says, the Face demands of us: "Do not kill!" It could be said that in the weaving of his ethical theory Kant discovered something essential about ethics, yet at the same time he lost the connection that holds between ethics and the ethical subject. There is nothing familiar in the ethics of Kant, and a lot that is foreign. We are not awakened into morality by our autonomous reason, but through empathy, compassion, love and caring, through our relation to other beings in the world. Kant loses this aspect, yet the transcendent, autonomous nature of his ethics seem indispensible. Levinas - it could be said - fixes Kant's system. In Levinas's ethics the obligation is still towards something transcendent, towards something that is independent of the contingent states of affairs of the world we inhabit, yet it is also towards something that is alive: it is towards the Otherness itself that we direct our empathy and love. Ethics is once again given back to us, as something that manifests itself in our everyday life, but that has become articulated through philosophy. In Kantian terms, the Other is another transcendental subject. For Kant the world is my world (do not miss the reference to Wittgenstein either!), since it is the world I have constructed for myself from the matter given to me. The world, so to speak, wears my face. Yet because of the universality of this construction, the world is not mine alone. There are other transcendental subjects, if one can say so, that have constructed the same world (as a result of which we experience the same world), so the world is no longer mine, nor is it yours. If there were no other transcendental subjects, the world would be ours, and we could do whatever we pleased with it. But there are others - indeed, Others - and so there is ethics. This is also the reason why ethics cannot be thoroughly analysed in ontology, the study of things, since it is only through these transcendental subjects that these things are, strictly speaking, born. And so we have stumbled upon something very interesting. For Levinas ethics is fundamental, it is "first philosophy". Yet this is to some extent true of Kant as well. It is on spontaneity of reason that the world of appearances is (in part) based - on the transcendental subject. And so, it is based on freedom. Ontology as the study of everything empirical - i.e. the study of the world of things - is not able to touch that which is transcendent. Ethics, as something based on transcendent freedom, lies beyond ontology, and is ever prior or primary to it. Is it not arguable, then, that through these similarities between these thinkers we come to realise that Kant too holds ethics as the "first philosophy"? Even if he never utters it? Yours truly, ~M~ * "other" is an empirical thing outside me - empirically external -, whereas the capitalised "Other" is a transcendent thing outside me, and so transcendentally external.
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

Hypothesis
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Posted 11/13/06 - 10:40 AM:	#2
I am not an expert on Kant or Levinas, but from reading your post it appears as though Lavinas is definately a Mystic (as is Wittgenstein), my question is, is Kant a Mystic as well ? The idea of the transcendent in ethics, and of things in-themselves points in that direction. Of course my estimation might be wrong but I would like to hear your opinion as you know Kant better then I. Sorry if this appears slightly off topic.
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Morrandir
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Posted 11/13/06 - 11:15 AM:	#3
Hi and thanks for the question. If you mean Mystic in the Wittgensteinian sense (in the sense that there is something transcendent that only shows itself and cannot be expressed), then I would say that Levinas is a Mystic. Kant is a bit more tricky since he thinks that he can also speak a lot about certain transcendent things (such as the thing in itself and freedom). Whereas Wittgenstein sort of shows the (transcendental) place of ethics by remaining (almost) silent about it, Kant speaks about it quite freely. Of course, it could be said that Kant is a Mystic in the sense that he believes there are things that cannot be experienced or cognized, but that nonetheless "show" themselves - he simply does not extend his "mysticism" to linguistic expressions. Furthermore, one could argue in the following manner. According to Kant one can only think noumenal things, such as thing in itself and noumenal self. This means, essentially, that the thoughts have no sensible or experiencible content - no empirical referent, if you will. If we read Wittgenstein as speaking about expressions as something that have such a content - they say something in that sense - then his denial that we could speak of ethics does not touch the way in which Kant speaks of ethics. In fact, Wittgenstein probably wouldn't claim that we cannot say things about ethics (such as that it is transcendental), but only that there would be no content (no meaning) in this expression. If expressibility is restricted to meaningful utterances, then it could be said that both Wittgenstein and Kant (as well as Levinas) think that ethics are inexpressible. However, it is worth stressing that this is true only from our posterior perspective: Kant himself would not (probably) consider himself any sort of a Mystic. (Nor would Wittgenstein consider Kant to be one, I presume.) There are deep differences between Kant and Wittgenstein, of course, but one could well argue that the gaps could be bridged without hurthing either of the thinkers. Hope that helps! ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

Hypothesis
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Posted 11/13/06 - 11:56 AM:	#4
I have a few more questions Morrandir wrote: Of course, it could be said that Kant is a Mystic in the sense that he believes there are things that cannot be experienced or cognized, but that nonetheless "show" themselves - he simply does not extend his "mysticism" to linguistic expressions. Furthermore, one could argue in the following manner. I think this could be seen as Mysticism. How can something which shows itself and yet we can neither experience nor cognise it. It seems as though the object which shows itself doesn't exist at all. Morrandir wrote: According to Kant one can only think noumenal things, such as thing in itself and noumenal self. This means, essentially, that the thoughts have no sensible or experiencible content - no empirical referent, if you will. Yes there are thoughts which have no empirical referent. But yet we do have 'objects'. And we also have thoughts which relate to this object, wouldn't this be empirical reference to the object ? So, if something shows itself we can say something about it ("experinced or cognised"). So I don't see how Kant can hold that: Morrandir wrote: there are things that cannot be experienced or cognized, but that nonetheless "show" themselves. The only way that things cannot be experienced, is if they don't "show" themselves. So I am not sure if Kant's mysticism is founded or not.
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Posted 11/13/06 - 12:30 PM:	#5
Hypothesis, hypothesis wrote: I think this could be seen as Mysticism. How can something which shows itself and yet we can neither experience nor cognise it. It seems as though the object which shows itself doesn't exist at all. Well, you could for instance think of an analogical case: the birth of the universe, that is, the Big Bang. One cannot experience nor cognize the actual "boom", if you will, but we can still deduce its necessity through certain measurements on the expansion of the universe. In any case, the thing in itself cannot be experienced, since if you would experience it, it would be the thing as it appears (to you). Yet, according to Kant, we must postulate it, since, as he says, otherwise there would follow the absurdity that there is an appearance without something that appears. After all, that-which-appears (in appearance) cannot in turn be an appearance itself, but a thing in itself. Of course, there remains the problem whether everything we cognize is an appearance, but the idea itself is coherent (if not yet demonstrably true, since no proof is offered here - nor will be offered ). Yes there are thoughts which have no empirical referent. But yet we do have 'objects'. And we also have thoughts which relate to this object, wouldn't this be empirical reference to the object ? The "object" of the concept "thing in itself" is nothing sensible. It has no reference (in the sense of Sinn und Bedeutung or intension and extension). So, if something shows itself we can say something about it ("experinced or cognised"). So I don't see how Kant can hold that: [...] The only way that things cannot be experienced, is if they don't "show" themselves. So I am not sure if Kant's mysticism is founded or not. The idea is analogical to the footprint. The one who produced the footprint shows itself through the footprint, yet we do not experience (in this case) the actual "perpetrator". Or my neighbour can show his existence through knocking on the wall when I play my music too loud, yet I do not experience him in that case, only what he causes. Of course, one could say that if we experience the effect we experience the cause, but that is not what Kant and others mean by "experience". And it would be somewhat odd a claim to make anyway: do I really experience Caesar through the fact that I am under the influence of the causal chains he set in motion? Wouldn't it be, indeed, more prudent to say that Caesar is shown through these causal chains? [EDIT: Actually, yes you can think so in the case of empirical things, if you widen the concept of experience enough, but not in the case of transcendent beings, since they are not a part of the causal chain at all (in Kantian philosophy, since cause is a category and as such only applicable to empirical things). Unfortunately, clarifying this would in turn require a lot of Kantian mumbo-jumbo.. .] Anyway, remain unsure if you will But the idea is analogical to that which is expressed above, plausible or not. Regards, ~M~ Edited by Morrandir on 11/13/06 - 12:39 PM
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

nixnxin
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Posted 11/13/06 - 02:15 PM:	#6
Morrandir wrote: ..Kant too holds ethics as the "first philosophy"? If ethics requires freedom, then how could ethics come before freedom? IÂ´d say ethics is on the same level as ontology, i.e. categories. hypothesis wrote: I think this could be seen as Mysticism. Depends on whether we use a "two-worlds" or a "two-aspects" interpretation of KantÂ´s thing. IÂ´m not sure about the former, but the latter does not imply mysticism.

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Posted 11/13/06 - 02:24 PM:	#7
nixnxin, nixnxin wrote: If ethics requires freedom, then how could ethics come before freedom? IÂ´d say ethics is on the same level as ontology, i.e. categories. I don't think I have said ethics comes before freedom, but the other way around. As far as categories are concerned, they apply to appearances, and the world of appearances is thoroughly determined: there is no freedom there. That is why Kant needs to postulate the noumenal self (the phenomenal self is determined) that is free in order to account for ethics. And that is why ethics, as based on freedom (that cannot be found in the world of appearances, in the world into which categories apply), is founded on transcendence. For this reason ethics cannot be on the same level as categories (freedom is not strictly speaking transcendental, but transcendent), and if ontology is the study of things under the influence of categories, then ethics is not on the same level as ontology. (There is also the primacy of practical reason.) ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

nixnxin
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Posted 11/13/06 - 02:39 PM:	#8
Hi Morrandir, Morrandir wrote: ..if ontology is the study of things under the influence of categories, then ethics is not on the same level as ontology. Ok, but if that is ontology, then what is empirical research? Surely a study of things under the influence of the categories is empirical research, whereas ontology is the study of what exists, i.e. in its most basic sense. IÂ´d say ontology in a Kantian sense is a study of the categories; not of things under the influence of the categories.

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Posted 11/13/06 - 02:39 PM:	#9
By the way, nixnxin, why do you think the choice between two-worlds (does anyone even defend this anymore?) and two-aspects interpretations makes a different with regard to the question of mysticism? If we are speaking about Wittgensteinian mysticism, then it is merely a matter of what can be said and what cannot yet manifests itself in some sense. ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

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Posted 11/13/06 - 02:53 PM:	#10
To propose knowledge of unknowable things is a mystic proposal, and that applies both to Tractatus and a two-worldÂ´s interpretation of CPR.

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