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Just a thought

onisani
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Posted 07/09/09 - 06:07 AM:	#31
xzJoel, I agree that there are different kinds of facts. "My mother hit me" - description of a past state of affairs. "Gravity causes things to fall" - statement of a cause for an observed phenomenon. "Things fall at an accelerating rate of 9.8m/s^2" - description of an observed phenomenon, etc... Despite their differences however, I think they are all facts. This is because they share a certain property which is definitive of facts. Also, I think other sentences lack that property, which is why they are not facts, but beliefs. Examples are "God exists", "when we die we go to heaven," etc. I am interested to find out what that property in question is and suggest the following: the first group of statements can be falsified in principle, the second cannot. The important point is that this difference cannot be denied. If someone argues that the statement "God exists" is no different from "falling objects accelerate at 9.8m /s^2", they are wrong, because there is a difference: the first statement can't be falsified, the second one can. They are free to reject the relevance of this difference and insist that both falsifiable and non-falsifiable statements are facts. But I can't think of any other difference between facts and beliefs, and I'm reluctant to accept that they are identical. I don't want to abandon actual facts for theoretical ones. "Your mother hit you" is a fact, simply because it is possible in theory for me to prove that she didn't. Whether in practise I can get my hands on the necessary evidence is not relevant. MarchHare, thanks again for the reply and the quoting instructions, much appreciated. You write that I'm not using the standard definition of the terms "fact" and "belief", and that there is no problem with the standard definitions. I don't agree, and that is actually why I'm pursuing this exercise: first, I think our definitions of facts and beliefs are vague, and secondly I find that problematic. To illustrate the first point, ask someone what the difference between a fact and a belief is. The answers you get will probably be highly debatable. What I find problematic about this is that beliefs and facts lie at the foundation of many philosophical discussions. If we are confused about what they are, our discussion about religion, ethics etc. will likely get messy. Also, with respect to my own life, I want to be able to distinguish my facts from my beliefs. I have suggested a definition which I think would be a useful standard definition. I haven't yet seen a better alternative. I realise I've contradicted myself in my previous postings, apologies, let me clarify. I wrote somewhere that facts are in the world, that they exist independently. I now think that is misleading. States of affairs exist in the world. Facts are statements about those states of affairs, whose existence depends on an agent formulating or holding them. The act of relating a fact (a statement) to a corresponding state of affairs is called "knowing". States of affairs can also be called "reality" or "truth". They are in-the-world independently of us. It is possible for us to align our facts with truth. In that case, we know the truth. But it is not possible for us to be sure that our facts are in alignment with truth. That is because facts cannot be conclusively verified. It is always possible that we are mistaken in our facts. Beliefs are also statements about states of affairs. They too only exist if an agent holds them. However, they are different from facts in at least one respect (otherwise they are identical, which doesn't make sense). One difference is that, as opposed to facts, beliefs are not falsifiable in principle. Can anyone state another difference? I was unclear when I wrote that under certain circumstances anyone could believe child abuse to be ok. I did not mean that there are certain cases of child abuse which are regrettable but necessary. What I meant to say was that any person could be brought up to believe child abuse to be ok. That is because our belief that it is wrong is contingent on our society, our upbringing, even our genes perhaps. But all those are determined by chance, which makes the belief arbitrary. Nice point about agents being necessary for moral situations. I like the analogy with inflation. I wrote "If no-one is there to think stealing is wrong, it isn't." Of course, it would be much better to put it differently: whether you think stealing is right or wrong, it really is neither. It may be right or wrong to you, but that is only to you. There is nothing I can possibly do to prove you wrong, so believe what you will. If however you argue that dropped objects always fly away, I can prove you wrong by dropping something on the floor. Edited by Incision on 07/09/09 - 01:15 PM. Reason: merged posts

Maxvilly
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Posted 07/09/09 - 07:51 AM:	#32
xzJoel wrote: Falsifiability relates to whether a statement is true, not whether something occurred. The point is Gravity, not if something occured or not, that was how this debate started of onisani. Dropping a stone from over your head is indeed clear evidence of Gravity. xzJoel wrote: Again, epistemology. How do we know what we know? How do we know? How do we NOT know?? That's simply a better question to ask yourself in my own opinion. If we ask a retarded disabled child how they know what they know? I mean come on! And my point on this is simple, we either know something or we do not know. To a higher degree or less degree If we are an certified doctor we are supposed to have deeper knowledge in this field. If we done a college degree in business managment, we have more knowledge of business managment than those having NO, little knowledge and intrest in this topic. This is Not a lot to fuss over in MY world. To me it's a scale of less and more knowledge, then it's up to me to filter the good for the bads out of it. The true for the falsy. The less falsy for the true. On and on. That is a question of epistemology, not ontology. It is a "question" of something, but it simply lacks in meaning of to add to in this discussion and on top of it none is any better than the one another. I can have the cookie and eat it to. Or can I. Is this a "true statement"? Do you see this two as if they are means to prove a point. That's not the case. You wish to prove to others you saw something, but dragging Bigfoot before them is not proof that you saw Bigfoot, it is proof that they are seeing Bigfoot. Either you saw Bigfoot or you didn’t. Did you get my part from my "bigfoot" example? I have yet to see any concret evidence for any bigfoot. And then I mention... A fact and belief to me is that they differ because if I could drag a bigfoot in to anybodies hallway and say "Do you believe me now?" But if it's indeed seems like what has been precived as bigfoot(in meida, movies etc), I then cut it wide open(the bigfoot) and we send the remainings to a lab for DNA testifying, could I have then had provided enough evidence to prove my point about a bigfoot towards. Or do I have more work infront of me? As mentioned, this is more evidence in my stance that imaginable "highly fictional" out of the world characteristics and concepts are a waste of blody time and put it in to discussion has no meaningful impact and shall not be put up with from serious philosophers. As in bigfoot, alien, dwarf little midgets who can fly and have an x-ray vision along with a navigation system as a cyborg. "What if" This is simply unheard of and unthinkable for wise people to even go as far as to say you are bloody insane. We can try to walk up to people and talk about the "cookiemonster". Sane people will be hiding in a corner if I put them through my own wildered fantasies. I could get positive attention if I speak of something set in real life as slong the weather or "nice scarf". I am thinking of writing a letter to the various philosophers telling them to stop using their imaginations; hypothetical situations - right out. That some alien entity may be able to falsify things that we cannot does not make our factual claims any more or less certain. The type of example as you did use I would applaud you for writing on a letter and send it to them. To rid of that TYPE of imagination in discussions. I suggest putting your imaginations(fictional characteristics) into life instead of on to other people as it brings no positive feedback to you. Painting and creativie tasks are made to rid this side of temptation.
I had details here, ones.

Maxvilly
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Posted 07/09/09 - 08:04 AM:	#33
Here is on Knowledge v.s. Belief Knowledge entails belief, so the statement, "I know the sky is blue, but I don't believe it", is self-contradictory (see Moore's paradox). On the other hand, knowledge about a belief does not entail an endorsement of its truth. For example, "I know about astrology, but I don't believe in it" is perfectly acceptable. It is also possible that someone believes in astrology but knows virtually nothing about it. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief[/quote] Edited by Maxvilly on 07/09/09 - 09:10 AM
I had details here, ones.

xzJoel
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Posted 07/09/09 - 08:43 AM:	#34
Maxvilly wrote: Here is on Fact v.s. Belief Your quote is both useful and illustrative. You keep collapsing "fact" and "knowledge". You say "fact vs. belief" and then give "knowledge vs. belief." What we know and how we know it is epistemology. Facts are (in part) what we know things about. What facts are is ontology. You can't disprove a fact, you can only show that a statement does not correspond to a fact. You may show that the sentence” My mother hit me" is false because it does not correspond to a fact, but the truth or falsity of a sentence does not change the existence of the fact to which your sentence is supposed to correspond. Knowledge is sometimes spoken of as a “justified true belief.” You can consider “knowledge” to be a special subset of “belief”. This sentence is borne out by your quoted sentence “knowledge entails belief.” If you know something, then you believe it. Because every instance of knowledge includes belief, knowledge is a subset of belief. Edited by xzJoel on 07/10/09 - 08:52 AM
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onisani
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Posted 07/09/09 - 03:06 PM:	#35
xzJoel wrote: What we know and how we know it is epistemology. Facts are (in part) what we know things about. What facts are is ontology. You can't disprove a fact, you can only show that a statement does not correspond to a fact. Interesting point. I think there is a problem with placing facts in the realm of ontology though. Remember that it used to be a fact that the earth is flat. In that case, the fact did not correspond to reality. However, if facts are ontological, they couldn't possibly differ from reality, as they would be identical with it. You could say that it was a fact that the earth is round all along, and the statement that the earth is flat was a mistake. But how do we know that our understanding that the earth is round is a fact, and not just another mistake? We can't. If facts are ontological, they are forever out of reach, because nothing can be conclusively verified. I therefore think facts are better placed in epistemology. A fact is a statement that we hold to correspond to something in the world. A fact can therefore be disproven. I think this is a very interesting debate, looking forward to your comments.

xzJoel
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Posted 07/10/09 - 09:10 AM:	#36
onisani wrote: Interesting point. I think there is a problem with placing facts in the realm of ontology though. Remember that it used to be a fact that the earth is flat. In that case, the fact did not correspond to reality. However, if facts are ontological, they couldn't possibly differ from reality, as they would be identical with it. You could say that it was a fact that the earth is round all along, and the statement that the earth is flat was a mistake. But how do we know that our understanding that the earth is round is a fact, and not just another mistake? We can't. If facts are ontological, they are forever out of reach, because nothing can be conclusively verified. I therefore think facts are better placed in epistemology. A fact is a statement that we hold to correspond to something in the world. A fact can therefore be disproven. I think this is a very interesting debate, looking forward to your comments. Sadly I have no comments worth making. The precise meaning of a "fact" is a debated topic and is probably better argued by people not me. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/facts/ I'd like to stuff my definition of a fact down your throat, but there is some appeal to the notion that if a word is to mean anything, it must intelligibly differentiate one thing from another. So if facts are "forever out of reach" by my definition, I can't every say, "X is a fact and Y is not." Your desire to place a fact into epistemology is not out of place. That said, I still think "the world is flat" is either true or false depending on whether the world is actually flat. If the world is flat, the statement is true. If not flat, the statement is false. How the world actually is is a fact and a statement attempting to describe the world is true or false based upon the accuracy of its description. Using the word "fact" to describe a theoretical truth like, "If you accept the definition of mathematics, 2+2=4 is a fact" is a bit off to me. Something may be "true" in the limited context of your hypothetical, but that does not make it factually so. I am not a realist. (That is to say I don't believe that theories exist in the world and can be "facts" for sentences to correspond to.) In other words, I come to the issue of facts with a great deal of baggage that I recognize you might not have. We would have to make explicit our respective positions and somehow agree before we could ever understand "fact" in the same way. However, in a scientific realist type world, I think there is a use of "fact" that is accepted. When having a general conversation, I tend to assume the position of scientific realism including the ability for epistemology to know something ontologically the case. Therefore, I think to say that "facts" are something that we "know" things about is quite mainstream an acceptable. What else do we know things about if not facts? Is there some other single word for a discrete state of affairs that you would prefer I use? What would you understand the difference between these sentences to be? (* being your word) It is a fact that the Bears beat the Giants. (Pick whatever football game you want where in this happened.) It is a * that the Bears beat the Giants. It is a fact that hydrogen has a single proton. It is a * that hydrogen has a single proton. It is a fact that I am typing on a computer. It is a * that I am typing on a computer.
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oag
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Posted 07/10/09 - 09:56 AM:	#37
Moral standards are based on the idea that some behaviors are just wrong. The assignation of right and wrong to any behavior is entirely subjective, fluid, amenable to any number of variables, as has been suggested. Where they become virtually constant is in a social group wherein they are simply agreed upon. That consistency is virtual though and not actual as there might still be dissent within the group as to whether something is actually wrong. Let's say, for the sake of illustration, that there is a universal, moral guiding principle X. X states that engaging in Y is always immoral. X does not allow for cultural differences or mitigating circumstances. However, human life is rife with cultural differences and mitigating circumstances and it is likely that someone, somewhere will find a way to reasonably justify violating X and engaging in Y and it will be acceptable within his social group. From our hypothetical, objective POV Y is still immoral due to X. For that social group there is no perception of X. It doesn't exist.

onisani
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Posted 07/10/09 - 11:35 AM:	#38
Never mind that SEP article, I personally prefer a more handy definition of facts. I'm sure it's possible to find one. xzJoel wrote: We would have to make explicit our respective positions and somehow agree before we could ever understand "fact" in the same way. That's what we're doing. xzJoel wrote: That said, I still think "the world is flat" is either true or false depending on whether the world is actually flat. If the world is flat, the statement is true. If not flat, the statement is false. How the world actually is is a fact and a statement attempting to describe the world is true or false based upon the accuracy of its description. The world is "in a certain way". There is a truth about the world out there, and only one truth. Then there are statements with which an agent describes the world. These statements can either correspond to the truth, or not. We agree so far. I suggest calling these statements "facts", provided it hasn't been proven that they don't correspond to the truth. There is a problem with attaching the label "facts" to the ontological truth in the world rather than to the statements relating to it: We can never be certain that we know the truth. Thus we could never be certain that we know the facts. Of what use are uncertain facts? xzJoel wrote: However, in a scientific realist type world, I think there is a use of "fact" that is accepted. When having a general conversation, I tend to assume the position of scientific realism including the ability for epistemology to know something ontologically the case. Epistemology can be in line with ontology. When that is the case, we know the truth, our facts correspond to the truth. What we can't know is whether that is the case.

xzJoel
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Posted 07/10/09 - 12:38 PM:	#39
onisani wrote: Never mind that SEP article, I personally prefer a more handy definition of facts. I'm sure it's possible to find one. That's what we're doing. The world is "in a certain way". There is a truth about the world out there, and only one truth. Then there are statements with which an agent describes the world. These statements can either correspond to the truth, or not. We agree so far. I suggest calling these statements "facts", provided it hasn't been proven that they don't correspond to the truth. There is a problem with attaching the label "facts" to the ontological truth in the world rather than to the statements relating to it: We can never be certain that we know the truth. Thus we could never be certain that we know the facts. Of what use are uncertain facts? Epistemology can be in line with ontology. When that is the case, we know the truth, our facts correspond to the truth. What we can't know is whether that is the case. I don't want to be a jerk, but is it possible for you to source your use of the language? I am not familiar with "facts" being truth bearers. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#TruBea It seems that we are going to have a protracted fight over some fairly common words that you appear to be attempting to use in a novel and unexpected way. What is wrong with the language as it is currently used and discussed? http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fact Dictionary.com wrote: fact - noun 1. something that actually exists; reality; truth: Your fears have no basis in fact. 2. something known to exist or to have happened: Space travel is now a fact. 3. a truth known by actual experience or observation; something known to be true: Scientists gather facts about plant growth. So I am using the very first definition in the dictionary. The second agrees with me (but in this case is epistimological since it is something we "know" to exist/be a fact). The third is "truth known". This third definition will quickly run us off course. As you noticed, the first defintion included "truth" as one of its options. "True" can be defined as conformity with fact. Hopefully you will agree that if you use a more "handy" definition of "fact" and "truth" that you will start running in a never ending circle. I'm willing to listen to a compelling argument as to why we should decide that "true" and "fact" mean what you want, but it seems to me that in the philosophical literature "true" and "fact" mean something closer to what I have written. And this from Wiki. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact Wiki wrote: Fact in philosophy In philosophy, the concept fact is considered in epistemology and ontology. Questions of objectivity and truth are closely associated with questions of fact. A "fact" can be defined as something which is the case, that is, the state of affairs[14] reported by a true proposition. Facts may be understood as that which makes a true sentence true. For example, the statement "Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system" is made true by the fact Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system. Facts may also be understood as those things to which a true sentence refers. The statement "Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system" is about the fact Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system. Misunderstanding of the difference between fact and theory sometimes leads to fallacy in rhetoric, in which one person will say his or her claim is factual whereas the opponent's claim is just theory. Such statements indicate confusion as to the meanings of both words, suggesting the speaker believes that fact means "truth," and theory means "speculation." I am not trying to make appeals to authority or out source you, I just don’t know what we would accomplish by agreeing to use language in an un-conventional way for the sake of this one thread when the language is already used in a particular way in all other philosophical contexts. Perhaps you could relate your specific usage of the words “fact” and “truth” to the general point of what a “moral fact” is and whether the existence of such negates the proposition of the OP that all of morality is opinion. P.S. I quote the great Banno “I most certainly am Banno. I am writing this post. This is not just opinion, it is the state of affairs; this is what the world is like. These are facts.” http://forums.philosophyforums.com...true-statements-34434.html at something like post 424. Edited by xzJoel on 07/10/09 - 12:50 PM
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oag
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Posted 07/10/09 - 07:17 PM:	#40
onisani wrote: Of what use are uncertain facts? That is the thing about certainty though. We can never have it in an absolute sense but we can have it in a workable, comfortable, error free sense. We can be certain that a dropped object heavier than air will fall toward the ground. We can't extend that beyond Cartesian doubt to absolute certainty but we don't have to in order for us to utilize that observation and depend upon the consistency of it. We don't have to be certain of our observation's correspondence with objective reality (or know that it is a computer generated experience sent to our BIAV) in order to remain certain of what we have observed and that we will continue to observe it that way.

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