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Is there a such thing as an undeniably true statement?

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Is there a such thing as an undeniably true statement?

Prime_Mover
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Posted 05/10/08 - 06:37 AM:	#26
Frague wrote: Subjectivity immediately defeats an undeniable truth, so it must be asked if true objectivity is possible.... Really, deniability is the essence of subjectivity. If something can be denied, it is subjective. If truth is subjectively determined, then undeniable truths can exist and do exist, because that condition lowers the standard for which something may be classified as "undeniable". For a religious zealot going to blow himself up in a mosque, it is undeniably true that a Supreme Being exists and that entity will reward him upon his sacrifice. I pick this example because few here will agree that this can be true, yet it is clearly, undeniably, but ultimately subjectively true to the person who thinks it, ultimately subjectively false to any rational persons. Frague wrote: Language is automatically subjective because it demands meaning to be determined (subjective) as was previously stated. If I read this correct, this statement says that a bit of language is meaningful only because the speaker/thinker finds meaning in it, subjectively. I urge you to look at the arguments for semantic externalism, which says that the meaning of language is, at least in some ways, contained within things external to the speaker/thinker. There is a thread called "Narrow Mental Content" (http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/narrow...) in this Metaphysics/Epistemology forum that deals with the Twin Earth thought experiment and support for semantic externalism.
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Posted 05/10/08 - 01:15 PM:	#27
The_Rational_Animal wrote: For a religious zealot going to blow himself up in a mosque, it is undeniably true that a Supreme Being exists and that entity will reward him upon his sacrifice. He only requires the ability to deny it for subjectivity, and he certainly has the ability. This is what I refer to. Not whether or not somebody does deny, just whether or not the ability is present. The_Rational_Animal wrote: I urge you to look at the arguments for semantic externalism I'm pre-college enrollment, don't be too surprised if there is a great number of arguements I've not heard. P.S. I read the post and I would seem to be an internalist, although honestly I can't see that arguement as having a right or a wrong to it, it would appear to be solely within an individual's own interpretation. Edited by Frague on 05/10/08 - 03:01 PM

philomooseophical
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Posted 05/20/08 - 11:46 PM:	#28
"I exist." Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/29/08 - 07:35 AM

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Posted 05/21/08 - 03:22 AM:	#29
"Is everything subject to interpretation?" is what is in question. Philomooseophical has the right idea, I believe that there can be an undeniably true statement. You cannot deny that at very least your thoughts exist. There is no skeptical viewpoint that can deny thought, there is no subjectivity to the existence of something. This would stand to defend semantic externalism as well (far better than the thought experiment would). To think, "This thought exists." Is undeniable. There would be no justification in denying it, which is what was likely the intended meaning in the initial question.

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Posted 05/21/08 - 11:55 AM:	#30
philomooseophical wrote: "I exist" Prove it
Why is the word 'dictionary' in the dictionary? If you need to know how to spell it, the word is right on the cover, if you need to know what the definition of 'dictionary' is, you wouldn't exactly know to look in a dictionary would you?

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Posted 05/21/08 - 03:49 PM:	#31
Do you doubt you exist Bronze?

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Posted 05/21/08 - 06:15 PM:	#32
phil wrote: Do you doubt you exist Bronze? Is it impossible that he does? Maybe he just doubts that you exist. Either one seems possible

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Posted 05/22/08 - 02:44 AM:	#33
Buddahchuck wrote: Is it impossible that he does? Maybe he just doubts that you exist. Either one seems possible He can doubt that I exist, but I can't. But then, I can doubt that he exists because I have little proof that he does. However, say he was another existing mind, then yes, it would be impossible for him to doubt his own existence for by doubting his existence, he proves it. That is why I said that, to me, it is the one undeniably true statement, "I exist". But not to you. For you the statement "I" would have to refer to you.

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Posted 05/22/08 - 02:54 AM:	#34
It's a minefield of scope, index and reference problems. I doubt whether I can get through it unscathed but here goes: Bronze might doubt whether he is Bronze, for example, if he forgets he's a member of PF and starts to read his own posts as if they've been written by a stranger. Bronze might also doubt whether Bronze exists, for example, if he thinks there is nobody called 'Bronze'. I don't think it's possible for Bronze to doubt whether he himself exists. If he doubts, he exists; and if he doesn't exist, he can't doubt.

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Posted 05/29/08 - 03:45 AM:	#35
I don't think it's possible for Bronze to doubt whether he himself exists. If he doubts, he exists; and if he doesn't exist, he can't doubt. This of course is only if you accept a "he". To doubt one's own existance is entirely possible. Is there a such thing as an undeniably true statement? There are a few things to consider: - We doubt the truth of our senses. - We doubt the truth of our thoughts, because we doubt our existance. What are we left with? A set of logical rules to dertermine validity, and mathmatics. A mathmatical statement is always true if you accept the axioms. If you do not accept these axioms, the way they came about is still valid. So as long as we take all humanity out of the equation we can find "truth".
“What do I think of Western civilisation? I think it would be a very good idea.” --Mahatma Gandhi

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Posted 05/29/08 - 04:39 AM:	#36
I think "there is at least one true statement" is probably an analytic truth. Because "all statements are false" is analytically false. Also, statements like "the cause of e caused e" are analytic truths. And "2+2=4", etc. But perhaps what you really want to know is whether there are any absolutely undeniable synthetic statements. This seems like a lot to ask.

Postmodern Beatnik
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Posted 05/29/08 - 07:33 AM:	#37
Bronze wrote: Is there a such thing as an undeniably true statement? The question suffers from ambiguity. Statements come in many varieties, not all of which are assertions (e.g. some are commands, as in "Duck!"). As such, "all bachelors are unmarried males" -- insofar as it is just a statement -- might not be the kind of thing that can even be true or false. It might be the secret password to your clubhouse, for instance. A proposition, however, is the kind of thing that is truth-apt. As such, we would be smart to limit our inquiry to propositions.¹ But we cannot make a judgment regarding the truth of a proposition until after we have decided it's meaning.² Now, propositions are language-independent. "Schnee ist weiss" is a (German) token of the same proposition as the (English) token "snow is white." If one wanted, he could stipulate that he is actually speaking a coded language in which "all bachelors are unmarried males" refers to the same proposition as "snow is white" does in English; but as we have been given the proposition "all bachelors are unmarried males" without qualification, we are justified in assuming the standard English meanings of these words. Anyone with a proper understanding of those words will see that the proposition is true (undeniably true, assuming that we are not taking the superficial ability to utter a denial as a substantive counterexample). And since propositions are not language-dependent, our judgment regarding the English token applies to the proposition itself (and all other tokens thereof). So yes, "all bachelors are unmarried males" is necessarily true and thus undeniable in any substantive sense.³ That and a nickel will get you a stick of gum. I'm sure that was the original intention, but the ambiguity has already caused problems on this thread. This is not to say that semantic issues are logically prior to all other issues, but only that they have a strong tendency to be procedurally prior. Even this tendency, however, is merely practical. One could show, for example, that a given situation could not obtain prior to demonstrating that it is something any given theory might be committed to. We are typically presented with statements first, however, and explanations later (though the idea's history vis-a-vis the original presenter may be much different -- an intuition that is then pinned down in words). If the Quinian denies this, then so much the worse for the Quinian -- particularly since I had no need of the analytic/synthetic distinction to make this argument. Indeed, the argument could conceivably be used as a starting point for a defense of the distinction (though I withhold judgment on how likely the success of any such endeavor might be).
A leopard went round his cage from one side back to the other side, he stopped only when the keeper came around with meat; A boy who had been there three hours began to wonder, "Is life anything like that?" --Charles Ives, "The Cage"

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Posted 05/29/08 - 08:05 AM:	#38
philomooseophical wrote: "I exist." Seems like we need a rationalist companion paper to Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." The cogito is very convincing, but it is not an airtight argument. For while Descartes can be sure that there is thinking going on (and, therefore, that there is existing going on), his determined skepticism does not give him grounds to say that what is doing the thinking and existing is him. Even if thinking must be the action of some thing (and thus something that exists), Descartes could just be a very convincing dream. Yes, a dream requires a dreamer -- but the dreamer need not be Descartes. (There is excellent contemporary scholarship on the topic of Cartesian skepticism and precisely what role in plays in Descartes' Meditations. This objection to the strong, deductive interpretation of the cogito, then, should not be taken as fatally damaging to the project of that or any of Descartes' works.)
A leopard went round his cage from one side back to the other side, he stopped only when the keeper came around with meat; A boy who had been there three hours began to wonder, "Is life anything like that?" --Charles Ives, "The Cage"

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Posted 05/29/08 - 08:27 AM:	#39
Baudin wrote: This of course is only if you accept a "he". ... To doubt one's own existance is entirely possible. You can say 'I doubt my own existence'. But if you doubt something, then you exist. That is, it cannot be the case both that you are doubting and that you don't exist. So although you can utter the sentence, you cannot entertain the doubt. If there is no 'you', then it's not the case that you are doubting. So even if there is no 'you', you cannot doubt your own existence.

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Posted 05/29/08 - 08:44 AM:	#40
Alice was told she was only a character in the Red King's dream in Through the Looking Glass and she would cease to exist when he woke up. But if she believed this, then she could not doubt her own existence, because, for her to doubt something there must be a 'her' to do the doubting. She could not even wonder whether the Red King was dreaming about a little girl who was doubting her own existence. Again, for her to wonder anything about the Red King, she must exist. I don't see how Alice can frame a coherent doubt in this situation or how we can frame it on her behalf. Perhaps: "There is doubt occurring about my existence. But if the doubt is well-founded, then it isn't my doubt. It's possibly not the case that I just had the thoughts of the last two propositions." It might be possible to argue that such a speech is coherent. But I'm struggling...

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Posted 05/29/08 - 09:10 AM:	#41
Cuthbert You are quite right that if one does not exist, he cannot doubt his own existence. The question is what justification the doubting Descartes has to go from "there is doubt" to "I am doubting." That is, the skeptical stumbling blocks that Descartes puts in his way force him (conceptually) to deny everything he can possibly doubt. Anyone who has ever had a particularly vivid dream knows that they can involve very deceptive elements, including years worth of back-story that the characters (including one's own, assuming a first person dream) "know" and "remember." If we are truly being fastidious in our doubt, the cogito is insufficient for a definitive and deductive proof that the first person experience now going on is not just this sort of a dream, and that some other entity -- perhaps one quite like the ones we seem to be -- is not simply imagining all this as he sleeps. The very fact that we have had dreams during which the cogito could apply to our character is enough to secure this point. Perhaps you have not had such dreams, but I have. As such, I find the cogito convincing, but lacking decisiveness.
A leopard went round his cage from one side back to the other side, he stopped only when the keeper came around with meat; A boy who had been there three hours began to wonder, "Is life anything like that?" --Charles Ives, "The Cage"

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Posted 05/29/08 - 11:23 AM:	#42
I was just going to say that very thing- much less articulately. Though I am not sure you have had such dreams. ade90212 wrote: All bachelors are unmarried. That depends on your definition of 'bachelor,' or perhaps on mine. Less so on the definition of unmarried. I suppose you could say: "All unmarried men are unmarried." That I will have to ponder.
It is what it is.

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Posted 05/29/08 - 11:31 AM:	#43
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Yes, a dream requires a dreamer In your and my reality, yes. Who says that a dream requires a dreamer outside of our dream? Perhaps this dream is a bit of accidental chaos, floating about in a general nothingness.
It is what it is.

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Posted 05/29/08 - 03:31 PM:	#44
Absolutely Relative wrote: I was just going to say that very thing- much less articulately. Though I am not sure you have had such dreams. I don't need you to be sure to convince myself. Absolutely Relative wrote: That depends on your definition of 'bachelor,' or perhaps on mine. Less so on the definition of unmarried. I don't see how the definition of "bachelor" could be any more or less problematic than "unmarried." We're either using the standard English definitions or we're not. If we are, the statement is necessarily true. If we are not, all bets are off. But read what I said about propositions. What we are really concerned with is whether or not the proposition represented by the English token "all bachelors are unmarried males" is undeniably true. Given the standard English definitions, it is. Absolutely Relative wrote: In your and my reality, yes. Who says that a dream requires a dreamer outside of our dream? Perhaps this dream is a bit of accidental chaos, floating about in a general nothingness. If you want to take it that far, you are free to do so. Typically, though, philosophers try to make their point while employing as few controversial theses as necessary (thus making it easier to convince a wider set of people). After all, anyone willing to accept the more controversial theses in favor of a point doesn't really need much convincing! Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/29/08 - 03:36 PM
A leopard went round his cage from one side back to the other side, he stopped only when the keeper came around with meat; A boy who had been there three hours began to wonder, "Is life anything like that?" --Charles Ives, "The Cage"

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Posted 05/29/08 - 04:00 PM:	#45
philomooseophical wrote: Do you doubt you exist Bronze? We don't know absolutely what existence is, I don't know empirically that thought proves existence on any level, perhaps my own existence is some illusion; I retain at very least 'some' doubt, yes.
Why is the word 'dictionary' in the dictionary? If you need to know how to spell it, the word is right on the cover, if you need to know what the definition of 'dictionary' is, you wouldn't exactly know to look in a dictionary would you?

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Posted 05/29/08 - 06:05 PM:	#46
You can't say there is no undeniabley true statement. If you did then that would mean that statement was undeniabley true thus proving itself incorrect (and correct at the same time). Saying no statement is true is a paradox is the same vein as "Everything I say is a lie." The statement "this statement is undeniabley true" also seems to prove that an undeniabley true statement can exsist.

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Posted 05/30/08 - 12:05 AM:	#47
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Cuthbert You are quite right that if one does not exist, he cannot doubt his own existence. The question is what justification the doubting Descartes has to go from "there is doubt" to "I am doubting." That is, the skeptical stumbling blocks that Descartes puts in his way force him (conceptually) to deny everything he can possibly doubt. Anyone who has ever had a particularly vivid dream knows that they can involve very deceptive elements, including years worth of back-story that the characters (including one's own, assuming a first person dream) "know" and "remember." If we are truly being fastidious in our doubt, the cogito is insufficient for a definitive and deductive proof that the first person experience now going on is not just this sort of a dream, and that some other entity -- perhaps one quite like the ones we seem to be -- is not simply imagining all this as he sleeps. The very fact that we have had dreams during which the cogito could apply to our character is enough to secure this point. Perhaps you have not had such dreams, but I have. As such, I find the cogito convincing, but lacking decisiveness. It's quite possible to have a dream in which one thinks the words: "I wonder whether I exist", and to have feelings of wonderment, puzzlement and doubt associated with that statement. It's even possible to do that when not dreaming. So I'll happily grant that we can seem to ourselves (in a dream or not) to be doubting whether we exist. But if we seem to ourselves to be doing something, then we exist. So if I doubt whether I exist, then I exist. And if I merely seem to myself to doubt whether I exist, then I exist. In either case there seems to be no foothold for my doubt to enjoy any kind of coherence. Of course we can doubt whether our memories are false memories or whether our bodies and characters are as they appear to us or whether we are dreaming. But I think D allows those doubts. Still, if I have a false memory or a false perception or a dream, then I exist. If I did not exist, then I would have no memories or perceptions at all, not even false ones, and I would not be able to dream. I see that 'I am doubting' does not follow from 'There is doubt'. But I think that 'There is doubt - and it may or may not be mine' is not altogether coherent. It's perhaps a close call.

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Posted 05/30/08 - 05:03 AM:	#48
Cuthbert My point is that it's possible to have a dream in which "we" are not "us," but rather "someone else" insofar as we are "playing" (or maybe "watching") a character. That is, I may have a dream in which "I" (by which I mean the first person perspective experienced in the dream) am a 31-year-old electrician named Sam taking a philosophy course. During the course of that dream, I can become convinced that I (that is, Sam) must exist because the very fact of my (Sam's) doubt means that I (Sam) exist. Assuming that Sam really is a dream, the cogito is not decisive. Sam is not entitled to the conclusion that he exists, but only to the conclusion that something (some thinking thing) exists. Under the heavy constraints of Cartesian skepticism, it cannot be concluded that thoughts are evidence of the particular integrated consciousness to whom they appear to belong. Sam's thoughts appear to belong to him, but they don't. The thoughts are mine, and Sam is a figment of my imagination. (And if Sam isn't a dream, this whole existence -- to which we are attempting to apply the cogito presently -- becomes problematic.) If it is possible to have dreams during which there is no means of discerning whether or not it is a dream, then the cogito (in its Cartesian context) cannot give us decisive proof that this life we seem to be experiencing isn't one of them.
A leopard went round his cage from one side back to the other side, he stopped only when the keeper came around with meat; A boy who had been there three hours began to wonder, "Is life anything like that?" --Charles Ives, "The Cage"

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Posted 05/30/08 - 07:22 AM:	#49
I'm sure you can become mistakenly convinced that you are Sam. And I'm also sure you can doubt whether you are Sam. (Obviously it would be right to doubt whether you are Sam, since you aren't Sam!) You can also doubt whether Sam exists, which is again a well-founded doubt, since Sam is only a dream person. I don't object to the possibility of any of those doubts or convictions. But doubting whether you are Sam and doubting whether Sam exists are different doubts from doubting whether you yourself exist. If you apply the cogito to yourself in the dream then you will reach one correct conclusion, namely, that you exist - and it's true, you do exist, and if you did not exist you could not be having a dream. But you will unfortunately be deceived about a second and incorrect conclusion (one that cannot be derived from the proposition 'cogito'), namely, that you are Sam. For that is merely a dream. I think Descartes allows for that distinction. On the one hand, if I think, then I exist. On the other hand, everything that I think I am (physically, historically, etc) might be merely a dream. I might doubt whether Cuthbert exists, in the sense that I might forget that there is a PF member called Cuthbert and that it is me. I might doubt whether I am Cuthbert in the sense that I might suspect somebody else wrote all the posts attributed to Cuthbert. But neither of these doubts amounts to doubting whether I exist, even though I am Cuthbert. I think it's a minefield of intensionality, indexicality and reference and I'm not totally convinced my defence of the cogito stands up - but I don't see it obviously falling down. Edited by Cuthbert on 05/30/08 - 07:31 AM

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Posted 05/31/08 - 11:23 AM:	#50
When Descartes applies his cogito to himself, the conclusion he believes follows is that he, Descartes, exists. Granted, he allows that the nature of "Descartes" might be different than he previously believed, but he takes his arguments as establishing the existence of this mind that calls itself (and whatever it thinks it consists in) "Descartes." When Sam applies the cogito, the conclusion he believes follows is that he, Sam, exists. Assuming he is as philosophically sophisticated as Descartes, he would also grant that his nature might be different than it appears to be. But the cogito is at least supposed to establish that one exists -- unlike dreams and dream characters. So what has gone wrong? Sorry to repeat myself, but it seems that what has gone wrong is that Sam is not, in fact, entitled to the conclusion that he (Sam) exists. Rather, he is only entitled to the conclusion that something exists (some thinking thing) because all he can be sure of is that "thinking is going on." Similarly, then, Descartes is not entitled to that conclusion, either. It begs the question, after all, to say "but Descartes isn't a dream" since someone under the constraints of Cartesian skepticism needs the cogito to establish just that. I think you are correct about the issue being "a minefield of intensionality, indexicality and reference." Nor do I think the failings of the cogito are at all obvious. Indeed, I take the argument as convincing, even if not decisive. But I do take it that, once we untangle the mess of references, the argument does not work as a deductive proof of our individual existence.
A leopard went round his cage from one side back to the other side, he stopped only when the keeper came around with meat; A boy who had been there three hours began to wonder, "Is life anything like that?" --Charles Ives, "The Cage"

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