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Is language innate?

Philopage
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Posted 08/01/08 - 04:02 PM:	#11
Kelby wrote: I also believe that some ideas can be simply rejected. But what if some ideas have good ideas within them? It seems like you're throwing out the baby along with the bath water.

Kelby
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Posted 08/01/08 - 04:09 PM:	#12
Well, if there are good ideas within them, then yes...work with it. Just don't forget that the water was soiled because the baby was in it. The baby can very well be the very thing that needs to be tossed. swstephe wrote: What are the implications of a "universal grammar" that make it objectionable? : Mind and body split, reason as apriori or autonomous, cognitivistic stances that sees reason and cognition as formal, innate ideas, cartesianism, superiority of human essences, etc. Edited by Kelby on 08/01/08 - 04:38 PM
Embodied Cognition: http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/embodcog.htm#H2

Pete
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Posted 08/01/08 - 07:11 PM:	#13
Kelby wrote: Mind and body split, reason as apriori or autonomous, cognitivistic stances that sees reason and cognition as formal, innate ideas, cartesianism, superiority of human essences, etc. I don't get this. The idea that we innately represent the rules of a UG isn't a spooky idea. It's an empirically resolvable question. And since the rules are supposed to be encoded by the structure of the brain, I don't see how the UG implies a "mind and body split." I think it may really be the case, as Chomsky argues, that an innate UG is the best explanation for certain surprising facts about language acquisition, e.g. how children's syntactical competence explodes at a certain age, how they acquire this competence despite the inadequacy of the evidence available to them, how they make characteristic grammatical mistakes that they have never heard anyone make, etc. His opponents need to offer a better explanation for this data. The pre-Chomskyan idea was that we learn grammar entirely by inference from our observations of the linguistic behavior of others. I'd be very surprised if this idea were resuscitated by his opponents. So I figure they must postulate some innate contribution, even if it doesn't take the form of a UG. This is what I'm curious about.

swstephe
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Posted 08/01/08 - 08:04 PM:	#14
Better back up a bit. The OP is referring to Chomsky's specific theory of "Universal Grammar" -- it is a set of descriptive observations about natural languages. "All natural languages have nouns and verbs", and "All natural languages recognize words as sequences of consonants and vowels" ... and so on, about properties and tendencies of languages. It implies that if I came across a completely unknown language, learned a few grammatical rules, I would be able to construct many of the rest of the rules instinctively, (because, somehow, our brains are hard-wired to incorporate these rules). The weakness of Universal Grammar is that it tends to be playing very loose with terms so any exceptions can be explained away, but never falsify Universal Grammar. What about a language that had no nouns? Could humans communicate without referring to concrete or abstract objects at all? Would a language be effective if it only consisted of vowels, (making you sound a bit like "Curly" from the Three Stooges, I suppose). It explains how a child, just learning to talk, will often make "mistakes" that are actually correct, grammatically, but violate some exception. For example, a child who quickly learns that the past-tense of words, in English, is formed by adding "ed" at the end, might mistakenly say "goed" instead of "went". Universal Grammar also relies on the tendency of languages to utterly reject phrases that are ungrammatical -- even if the intent was clearly understood. I just don't see any consequence of postulating that the brain functions in such a way that resulted in all the variety of natural languages. People who "reject" theories tend to be the types who have some dogma that might be threatened if it were pursued. But why would it be pursued unless it were useful? Just pick another, more useful, theory and run with it until UG gets discarded -- if wrong.
Ethics is the measuring of morality. Morality is the measuring of good. Good is the measuring of benefit. Benefit is the measure of values.

larryn
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Posted 08/01/08 - 09:59 PM:	#15
Chomsky talks about how language originates from a faculty or module inside the brain, and I think this is where there is some disagreement, perhaps less among linguists and more from cognitive scientists. This module (called the language acquisition device) would imply that there is a language 'center' that we can manipulate or even separate out of our heads. However, the brain is so malleable that all we know is that the left side of the brain has a connection to our speech ability. Our ability for language is so complex that it requires many different factors, and some do not believe that a single module can compensate for all of it. Couldn't it be that the brain itself is the language processor as a whole, instead of it being likened to a computer with a separate language processor? This relates to what Kelby said about the mind-body split. Chomsky gets a lot of influence from Descartes, which may be where the LAD comes from. The UG simply says that if the LAD is true, then there would be a common set of principles that are innately present in all languages. But, if we go all the way back to the beginning languages, and follow it's spread, maybe we could find that the UG we are attributing to all languages is simply from a common source, making the common structures passed down over time. Linguistic nativism implies that language exists before we learn it and is something external from us, needing to be processed. Instead it's something that was created as a result of environment, and is a useful tool that must now be passed down, much like the knowledge of fire, shelter, or anything else. The brain seems to mainly observe, learn, and remember. The fact that language is learned through observation and teaching would already mean that it is not an instinctive ability, even if it is useful for survival. We create language based on our environment, which is why it is so ambiguous and we speak differently in the first place. A lot of the problem also comes from thinking that children acquire a full language and its rules through limited stimulus. Though it's true that a child can perhaps guess at the grammatical rules, the child actively learns most of the grammar after being corrected for their mistakes. All of this assumes that the 'module' is factual; the scientists who do not agree with the idea of the LAD will thus end up denying the validity of UG. The brain functions wholly, and pinpointing an ingrained module is hard to do. A theory is not necessarily denied because it is a threat. If one believes that there is substantial evidence against something, then it may be more logical to not fully adopt it until there is a satisfying amount of evidence. (Kelby gave his example of "penguins"). I agree that theories should not all be thrown out the window at inception, but should be weighed based on the validity of its analysis. Language innateness may very well be true, and I would happily accept it if we do find that module. However I do agree that there is also validity in the arguments against it, which is why I proposed the question. Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 08/03/08 - 01:06 PM. Reason: forum error

Kelby
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Posted 08/02/08 - 02:57 AM:	#16
Pete wrote: ...And since the rules are supposed to be encoded by the structure of the brain, I don't see how the UG implies a "mind and body split." So inside our brains we have a language processing module that is encoded or hardwired? If it is hardwired, then it is autonomous, and the mind is autonomous according to Cartesian thought which Chomsky so likened to. If it is autonomous, then it works independently of our bodies and of any external influence. This is like saying that there is a "thing" that works and processes language. He likens the brain and UG to a computer(brain) and a hardware(UG)...and we all know software is stored in the hardware. This line of thought is called Cognitivism, which we know now is false. Now Chomsky does not quite put it in these terms, but it is what his ideas imply that so many linguists and cognitive scientists have problems with. Chomsky takes language to be mathematical in nature, or formal...formal because mathematics is formal. Mathematics according to Descartes was a priori, innate, autonomous, and we know that Chomsky takes on a form of Cartesianism. So Chomsky implies that language, as formal, and thus mathematically driven, which is a priori, is innate and autonomous...which is a masked version of what Descartes called "the Mind." Pete wrote: His opponents need to offer a better explanation for this data. The pre-Chomskyan idea was that we learn grammar entirely by inference from our observations of the linguistic behavior of others. I'd be very surprised if this idea were resuscitated by his opponents. So I figure they must postulate some innate contribution, even if it doesn't take the form of a UG. This is what I'm curious about. I agree that opponents may need to postulate some "innate contribution" but the very aspects of what innateness is must be greatly altered. At the same time, a "resuscitation" may not be the wrong way to go...afterall, no ideas should be permenantly rejected right? I believe the body needs to be paid attention to. We should not focus so much on cognitive processes alone while disregarding the body in its environment. Before we became thinking creatures, we had to be creatures in action...and our actions, our goal-directed activities could very much be a huge, if not the defining factor of how language gains its structure. Instead of the structure being innate, UG superimposing itself on Humans, forcing us to obey it, perhaps we rather superimpose the UG on language through unconscious sensorymotor processes. This is quite different from an innate language acquisition device in our brains...instead it is our embodiment that creates the "device," if we must continue using such terminology.
Embodied Cognition: http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/embodcog.htm#H2

Pete
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Posted 08/02/08 - 11:52 AM:	#17
Kelby wrote: [quote=Pete]So inside our brains we have a language processing module that is encoded or hardwired? If it is hardwired, then it is autonomous, and the mind is autonomous according to Cartesian thought which Chomsky so likened to. If it is autonomous, then it works independently of our bodies and of any external influence. Modules usually need sensory input, so they are in this sense susceptible to external influence. They are autonomous only in the sense that they are not responsive to cognition. For example, perception itself is modular. This is why we continue to see a stick in the water as bent even when we know it is not bent. A module takes input from the senses, computes a representation from it, and makes this representation available to cognition. Cognition, however, has no influence over the representation the module supplies. This is the sense in which modules are "cognitively impenetrable." But I'm still puzzled what you mean by 'independently of our bodies.' Do you think the brain is not a body part? Kelby wrote: I agree that opponents may need to postulate some "innate contribution" but the very aspects of what innateness is must be greatly altered. At the same time, a "resuscitation" may not be the wrong way to go...afterall, no ideas should be permenantly rejected right? I believe the body needs to be paid attention to. We should not focus so much on cognitive processes alone while disregarding the body in its environment. Before we became thinking creatures, we had to be creatures in action...and our actions, our goal-directed activities could very much be a huge, if not the defining factor of how language gains its structure. The idea that we acquire language entirely by inference from observations is the most cognitivist theory of language acquisition out there. I would have thought someone who thinks we overfocus on cognitive processes would find this picture anathema. But I may be misunderstanding your view.

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Posted 08/02/08 - 12:23 PM:	#18
larryn wrote: Chomsky talks about how language originates from a faculty or module inside the brain, and I think this is where there is some disagreement, perhaps less among linguists and more from cognitive scientists. This module (called the language acquisition device) would imply that there is a language 'center' that we can manipulate or even separate out of our heads. However, the brain is so malleable that all we know is that the left side of the brain has a connection to our speech ability. Our ability for language is so complex that it requires many different factors, and some do not believe that a single module can compensate for all of it. Couldn't it be that the brain itself is the language processor as a whole, instead of it being likened to a computer with a separate language processor? The UG module is only supposed to explain our astonishing ability to pick up the syntax of whatever natural language we are exposed to. We come equipped with innate grammatical parameters that we then set on the basis of just a few observations. No doubt our linguistic abilities are not entirely modular in the way that, say, early perceptual processes are. We do not tacitly know the grammar of any natural language in advance of experience--we only tacitly know the parameters under which the grammar of any natural language falls. Nor do we know the meanings of any words in advance of experience. So our linguistic competence as a whole calls on much more than the UG module--it requires observation, reasoning, and remembering. Are Chomsky's opponents simply making this point? If so, I'm sure he'd happily concede it. Or are they suggesting instead that since there is no neuroanatomical evidence for a UG module, there may not be one? If there isn't, I'm not sure that really matters. Maybe Chomsky thought that eventually neuroanatomists would be able to point to the UG module. But it seems to me that what really matters is whether there is anything in the brain functioning as a UG module, whether its functioning is isolated neuroanatomically or not.

Kelby
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Posted 08/02/08 - 01:10 PM:	#19
I see where the misunderstanding lies partly because of definition and current research. I do not believe we acquire language entirely by inference from observations, because observations are conscious endeavors. Most of our thought is unconscious. We can perceive things without being conscious of these things. A good example is just a simple aomeba. Now I know it has no nervous system, but the point can be made by taking note of its sensory systems which allow it to cateorize. It only take in certain foods to break down and all of this is an unconscious endeavor. Likewise, many of our perceptual systems, sensorymotor systems, giev rise to categorization in our brains, allowing us to better function in our world. Concept formation likewise stems from categorization. So this entire process is far from a conscious "learning." It just happens. Pete wrote: Cognition, however, has no influence over the representation the module supplies. This is the sense in which modules are "cognitively impenetrable." As for representations...cognition does have influence over the representations perception supplies. I believe this is where we disagree, and this is what I call remnants of the mind/body problem. In your stance illustrated above cognition cannot impede on the module...this means it is auonomous from brain processes. This is the very problem Chomsky runs into. You say that modules need sensory input to create a representation, and thus this representation would then be stable. That is the exact problem. The representation is not stable and untouched. If representations were not influenced by cognition, and the representation was a sort of mirrored product of reality given to us by our senses, then eye witness testimony would be dead accurate. Well...we know that is not the case. "Representations" are distorted during cognition and they are interpreted by cognition. Consciousness is not a mirror. I also see what you are saying about the stick in water: we know that the stick is straight but our eyes say otherwise...so if our perceptual modules were influenced by cognition then wouldn't we see the stick as straight instead of bent? I believe this is what you are saying. If it is, then the problem is that our conscious knowledge of something is only an aspect of cognition. Most cognition is unconscious, so whether we know something or not wouldn't affect our perception because not all cognition is conscious. This is the basic tenet of Descartes when he said that all thoughts were conscious, and thus all of the mysteries of the mind could be known through introspection. Clearly this is not the case. But I think we are disagreeing to agree, because I believe Chomsky is saying that we do not need sensory input for a module to work. Maybe I have misunderstood Chomsky, but it is surely the implications that are at fault. Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 08/03/08 - 01:27 PM. Reason: forum error
Embodied Cognition: http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/embodcog.htm#H2

larryn
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Posted 08/02/08 - 01:40 PM:	#20
Lakoff and Johnson Philosophy in the Flesh: "To be autonomous, it cannnot be affected causally by input from any "not purely syntactic" parts of the brain. The "syntax module" must therefore take no input that could have a causal effect from any parts of the brain concerned with perception, motor movement, attention, other kinds of memory, cultural knowledge, and so on." I see what you are saying Pete, but there is an issue. You said that "our linguistic abilities are not entirely modular in the way that, say, early perceptual processes are." My question to you is then what type of module would it be? It's either a module or it's not. What set of rules are you applying here to modules? Some modules work in the way of xyz while others work in the way of abc. How do we know modules even exist in the brain? That's the problem. We cannot observe modules because they are not parts of the brain, nor can we experiment with them. They seem to be metaphors for our brain's amazing ability to do things, but this does not make modules empirically "real." I know you pointed that out. But Chomsky's UG model depends on his Language Acquisition Device being true. It does matter if there is a module or not because if there is no module then UG has no foundation. It would be mere observation of commonalities in languages. I agree with practically everything you're saying up until the module part being unimportant. If we assume our brain is composed of many modules for our wonderful abilities, then we can say that we have modules for everything from cooking, making fire, making plastic bottles, driving cars, and fermenting wine. In these examples, isn't it important to know whether there are actual modules or not for them? Maybe we have a module that allows us to create the basic form of a bottle, but in our life experiences we are introduced to different types of materials and shapes and so forth. Is it necessary to claim our bottle-making-abilities as a module, innate, and autonomous from cognition? Why can't the brain be the module itself? Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 08/03/08 - 12:58 PM

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