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Is Aristotelian Teleology sui generis?

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Is Aristotelian Teleology sui generis?
Mr. J
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Posted 06/22/09 - 06:44 AM:
Subject: Is Aristotilian Teleology sui generis?
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The Teleological stance seems very useful and often seems fundamental. Take the idea that an acorns purpose is to grow into an oak tree; it’s hard to do biology without that approach; more controversial perhaps that man has a purpose related to his nature. Such as, man has a social nature so his purpose is fulfilled in being part of a society, and man has a reasoning nature so his nature is fulfilled by use of his reason. Now this can be made fun of by taking base or silly things than calling them part of man’s nature, but also inherent in the teleological stance is a hierarchy of teleologies. That man’s cooperative nature and reasoning nature are higher than his growing nature and his sensing nature. Also that each person finds his own purpose such as it is my purpose to be a basket ball player or my purpose is to farm and so on…. In Aristotle I think it is sui generis and that is the most natural way to see it. In modern science maybe it would be called an emergent property, but I have problems with the emergent property idea. I think people use the term emergent property but it dose not actually explain anything to call it an emergent property.

So i want to ask is the Teleological stance an accidental construct or is it sui generis and how do support that answer?

For myself, I am on the fence; one day I think it is sui generis and the next I think it is constructed. This is exhausting so I wonder what others think.

Maybe you know some material that you think sheds light on this subject I have only read Nicomachean Ethics and have a science background.
treysuttle
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Posted 06/22/09 - 07:00 AM:
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Consider it this way...everything has some potential as to what it can be. An acorn has a potential to be an oak tree. A human has a potential to be a social animal. It's not guaranteed that an acorn will be an oak tree, or a human a social animal. But if placed in the right conditions (which is an important part of Aristotle's theory) then it is pretty likely these potentialities will actualize. Of course, they still may not...say there is some birth defect, right.

Aristotle's insight was that this is not just a random process in nature. In the right conditions, acorns will typically become oak trees...in the right conditions, humans will typically become social animals.

For Aristotle, the actuality lies in the 'form' (he used 'morphos' as opposed to 'eidos'), not the matter. In the case of a human being, the form is what organizes the matter in a specific way that allows for our potentials to be actualized. Say a baby human is immersed in a particular kind of environment (say one conducive to its development). The baby's form (what organizes the matter, (genes, maybe..from a modern standpoint?) is such that in the right conditions, the baby will grow to become a social animal. Aside from birth defects and what not, even if the baby was in an unconducive environment, it had the potential to become a social animal...even if it doesn't.
treysuttle
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Posted 06/22/09 - 07:04 AM:
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I think there are some pretty good reasons for thinking that there are emergent properties, but this is a topic that probably should be discussed in the 'metaphysics' forum.
Mr. J
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Posted 06/22/09 - 08:30 AM:
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I am wondering how Aristotle’s teleology fits into ontology. Is it a basic sort of thing? Is it sui generis? Or is it some sort of accidental or constructed thing?
treysuttle
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Posted 06/22/09 - 08:57 AM:
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Well, for Aristotle, 'ontology' consists of the basic categories by which we can understand the world. Aristotle's strategy is via language...the different ways in which we can say that something 'is'. He gives a list of ten such ways...he doesn't mention teleology here.

The primary way that something might 'be' is simply as a 'this' -- a particular object. I don't think teleology is a factor here (at least given what I have read of Aristotle). A particular acorn simply is a particular acorn...pure and simple. 'Socrates' is simply Socrates...('man' would be species and is a 'secondary substance' for Aristotle -- as I'll kinda mention below, its kinda fuzzy here what role teleology might play).

Where teleology is a factor is in 'physics', understanding the fundamental processes of objects. To understand objects requires that one know the 'causes'. One of the causes, or we might think of as the 'what it is' of the 'this', requires knowing it's final cause -- the potentiality of which it is capable for it to actualize. Think about it like this...an acorn is just an acorn...but you don't really understand 'what' an acorn is, unless you also understand that it has the potential to be an oak tree.

In terms of basic, an object's potential is part of the process of nature. In terms of sui generis....saying 'what' Socrates is requires saying that he is a man, and saying what a man is requires stating the formula....which seems to include a man's potential towards whatever actuality (i.e. rationality). It is not constructed...these are 'artifices' for Aristotle. Accidental for Aristotle is a characteristic of some things properties...a property that is not essential to the 'what' something is. You might say that a man can be a man without being 'fully rational'...but I don't think you could say that a man is a man if he has no rationality and no potential for rationality...so that is essential to man, but it is already there in his form...it's something he can progressively actualize in the right conditions.

I don't know, maybe that helps some and maybe not. You gotta just dig into some texts and commentaries and see what you come up with.

Edited by treysuttle on 06/22/09 - 09:25 AM
Mr. J
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Posted 06/22/09 - 11:50 AM:
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Yes actually this is helping.

I think I am restating you but technically what I gather is that the basic thing is substance and that substance is essence and essence is nature and nature is defined by purpose.

"3. There are three kinds of substance-the matter, which is a 'this' in appearance (for all things that are characterized by contact and not, by organic unity are matter and substratum, e.g. fire, flesh, head; for these are all matter, and the last matter is the matter of that which is in the full sense substance); the nature, which is a 'this' or positive state towards which movement takes place; and again, thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two, e.g. Socrates or Callias. "
-metaphysics book 12 part 3.

http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/phil...ics/aristotl/m11203c.htm#3

Maybe I’m not completely correct the way I put it above because when you get into metaphysics Aristotle never seems to reach a conclusion, but I think I am correct as seeing purpose (teleology) as being fundamental to Aristotle’s world view.
But now given all that we discussed I have a tension that I am trying to resolve over this purposeful stance and a modern stance in which purpose is not fundamental. But after reading Aristotle I can’t see how purpose is not actually fundamental.

I think you helped me to define the problem here but maybe I need to use the metaphysics form to answer it. (I’ll ask to move the topic because I want to keep this first part defining what we are talking about.)
treysuttle
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Posted 06/22/09 - 12:45 PM:
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Only substance in the last sense is 'substance' unqualified. Neither matter nor form can exist alone independently of one another, for Aristotle (except form perhaps as God). There are only particulars...and he identifies matter with the potentiality and form with the actuality...together, they make 'Socrates'. It is the form which contains the 'end' which organizes the matter (which is only potentially something, as conceived alone)...form organizes the matter in such a way that the matter can actualize to its fullest potential -- this is where the teleology is at (which is fulfilled ultimately through the pure act of God).

I would suggest book 12 of the metaphysics not be your departure. Some good places to start are chapters 4 and 5 of the categories (these are essential). Book 2, chapter 3 (the 4 causes) and 8 (which discusses the 'end' of nature) of the Physics. Book 5, chapter 1 and 2, which discusses accidental and essential change. Metaphysics, book 1 chapter 3, book 4 chapter 1, 2, 3, (all on the different senses of 'being'), book 7, chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 16, and 17 (all extremely important).

MarchHare
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Posted 06/23/09 - 06:23 AM:
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Mr. J wrote:
Take the idea that an acorns purpose is to grow into an oak tree; it’s hard to do biology without that approach;


It is true that we use the same verbs to describe natural phenomena as we do to describe the behaviour of conscious agents: I swept away the steps, the wind swept away the leaves etc. However, Aristotlean teleology as a philosophical idea does not play a role in biology; one can go through years of biological research prior to even hearing about metaphysical functions.

Doubt requires a reason to doubt.

Nothing is immune from potential doubt.

The correct response to a question isn't always to try to give the question's answer.
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