indeterminacy vs underdetermination: Philosophy Forums

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indeterminacy vs underdetermination

indeterminacy vs underdetermination

amos
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Posted 10/28/04 - 01:29 AM:	#1
To begin with, I have no education in philosophy, I just read a few compilations so forgive me if I misuse or misunderstand the terms. As I understand it, Chomsky's criticism of Quines indeterminacy is to say that what he is describing is just underdetermination, and as such, invalid. I fail to understand the difference between indeterminacy and underdetermination, unless it is just that underdetermination is assumed to be 'fixable' in some way. If we just dig a little deeper, ask a few more questions or test a few more responses we will soon discover beyond a shadow of a doubt just what 'gavagai' means. It may be indeterminate at the moment, but we can always get to the answer. Question 1: is my understanding of this question accurate? Question 2: if the answer to question 1 is correct, is chomsky not saying that meaning is probabilistic (bad news, I'm making up words...) like the position of an electron at any given moment? Because if meaning is 'honed in on' as it were, one can never be sure that there is not more 'honing' left to be done. If the answer to question 2 is yes, then Quine is right, you can think you know what something means, but you can never be sure. Chomsky's line of refutation confirms Quines correctness. If the answer to question 1 is no, please elaborate, thanks.

Reformed Nihilist
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Posted 10/28/04 - 12:42 PM:	#2
amos wrote: To begin with, I have no education in philosophy, I just read a few compilations so forgive me if I misuse or misunderstand the terms. As I understand it, Chomsky's criticism of Quines indeterminacy is to say that what he is describing is just underdetermination, and as such, invalid. I fail to understand the difference between indeterminacy and underdetermination, unless it is just that underdetermination is assumed to be 'fixable' in some way. If we just dig a little deeper, ask a few more questions or test a few more responses we will soon discover beyond a shadow of a doubt just what 'gavagai' means. It may be indeterminate at the moment, but we can always get to the answer. Question 1: is my understanding of this question accurate? Question 2: if the answer to question 1 is correct, is chomsky not saying that meaning is probabilistic (bad news, I'm making up words...) like the position of an electron at any given moment? Because if meaning is 'honed in on' as it were, one can never be sure that there is not more 'honing' left to be done. If the answer to question 2 is yes, then Quine is right, you can think you know what something means, but you can never be sure. Chomsky's line of refutation confirms Quines correctness. If the answer to question 1 is no, please elaborate, thanks. I think Chomsky's point wat that we may never be able to know 'perfectly' what something means, but that is a far cry from saying we don't know what it means. Sorry, but you don't get the award for cunning use of language (say nothing ) for probabilistic. Main Entry: prob·a·bi·lis·tic Pronunciation: "prä-b&-b&-'lis-tik Function: adjective 1 : of or relating to probabilism 2 : of, relating to, or based on probability - prob·a·bi·lis·ti·cal·ly adverb from http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/diction...va=probabilistic&x=16&y=14
Nobody ever became a famous philosopher by being a champion of ecumenical hybridism Daniel Dennett Freedom Evolves

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