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In Defense of Objective Morality

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In Defense of Objective Morality

baden511
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Posted 11/05/09 - 07:47 AM:	#21
reincarnated wrote: Immoral simply means "inconsistent with good morals", and morality is simply the distinction between good actions and bad actions, or between right actions and wrong actions. The problem is that there is no universal objective definition of what is good and what is bad, and of what is right and what is wrong. For the human mind to reach beyond itself to grasp universal objectivity would be for it to be no longer human. I don't think that's at issue. I interpret the aim of this thread as an exploration of the possibility of building from our common humanity a certain objectivity based on our shared human characteristics.
"Now kill all the boys. And kill every woman who has slept with a man, but save for yourselves every girl who has never slept with a man." Moses (Numbers 31:17-18) "Do not harm little children" - Satanic Bible. Rule no.9 "And the prize is: Eternal heavenly bliss. Or a peanut. Your choice." - The Divine Game Show Host

reincarnated
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Posted 11/05/09 - 07:58 AM:	#22
baden511 wrote: I interpret the aim of this thread as an exploration of the possibility of building from our common humanity a certain objectivity based on our shared human characteristics. Wouldn't that be intersubjective, as opposed to objective?
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Yahadreas
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Posted 11/05/09 - 10:25 AM:	#23
Cuthbert wrote: ... the fact that I'm wearing a hat is not altered by my referring to it as "trousers". And that's the point. The label isn't that important when it comes to the real substance of the matter. It's only useful for successful communication. What if I were to invent my own language and use the word "smoo" to refer to hats? What if I were to invent my own language and use the word "trousers" to refer to hats (that this invented word is the same as a common English word is just a coincidence)? The label itself doesn't change what it is you are trying to mean by the expression. Some people (the English) use the word "chair" to refer to the thing upon which I am sat. Some people (the French) use the word "chaise" to refer to the thing upon which I am sat. Which is the "real" label? Some people use the word "immoral" to refer to that which harms. Some people use the word "immoral" to refer to that which opposes God's wishes. Which is the "real" meaning? Edited by Yahadreas on 11/05/09 - 10:43 AM
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Yahadreas
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Posted 11/05/09 - 10:49 AM:	#24
reincarneted wrote: A wig is not a hat, but is worn on the head. A hurricane is not immoral, but it harms. Yes, I was being imprecise. Obviously there's a much longer and specific definition involved, but I was only trying to put forth general examples to express my views. The problem is that there is no universal objective definition of what is good and what is bad, and of what is right and what is wrong. And that's my very point. It's just words referring to some meaning. Some use "good" to mean "in accordance with the behavioural directives given to us by God", others use "good" to mean "maximizing happiness for the greatest number of people". It only "matters" what label-sense associations you use when it comes to communication. You can use the words "immoral", "good", etc. any way you like. But if you use them differently to how I use them then we're going to have difficulty understanding each other. But that's not to say one of us is wrong. Otherwise I might as well tell all French people that they're always wrong when they speak French. Which is ridiculous.
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Wolfman
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Posted 11/05/09 - 11:37 AM:	#25
reincarnated wrote: Is there such a thing as a perspectiveless account of morality? No. I am not advocating this view. I am merely entertaining it for analytical purposes. reincarnated wrote: The question imho is not whether morality IS objective (its clearly not), its whether morality ever COULD BE objective. Taken from my post in "Moral skepticism sometimes misses the point": "The good is that which is life-affirming and promotive of individual and collective well-being. The objective aspect of morality is its propensity towards the latter. This objectivity is not propositional in the sense that it can be determinably true outside of ethical parameters. Thus any notion of seeking unconditional truth, in this regard, is rather curious, and to engage in projecting any such notion upon my position would be a futile and misled enterprise… Practical truth is unlike mathematical truth in that 1+1 always equals 2. Practical truth concerns activities which are coherent, consistent, and self-sustaining in relation to individual and collective well-being. Thus it is a truth that certain activities can be more or less apt to promote the good. Furthermore, there is not always one path up the mountain. Virtue ethics allows for moral pluralism. It is unwarranted to assume that, because moral questions are open and debatable, moral pursuits are rendered any less objective." Edited by Wolfman on 11/05/09 - 12:54 PM
"That which is done out of love is always beyond good and evil" - Nietzsche "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." - Aristotle "It is better to do one's own duty, however defective it may be, than to follow the duty of another, however well one may perform it. He who does his duty as his own nature reveals it, never sins." - Lao Tzu "Experience without theory is blind, but theory without experience is mere intellectual play." - Kant

baden511
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Posted 11/05/09 - 11:20 PM:	#26
reincarnated wrote: Wouldn't that be intersubjective, as opposed to objective? I would say that we have to start from somewhere, and intersubjectivity is really all we have as a basis for steps towards objectivity. As Husserl pointed out the objective world is essentially related to intersubjectivity. I think this metaphysical notion is relevant to any attempts towards a normative ethics.
"Now kill all the boys. And kill every woman who has slept with a man, but save for yourselves every girl who has never slept with a man." Moses (Numbers 31:17-18) "Do not harm little children" - Satanic Bible. Rule no.9 "And the prize is: Eternal heavenly bliss. Or a peanut. Your choice." - The Divine Game Show Host

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Posted 11/06/09 - 12:27 AM:	#27
Wolfman wrote: The good is that which is life-affirming and promotive of individual and collective well-being. I can accept that this is an objective definition, but how does one apply it in practice? How does one measure the magnitude of a “life-affirming” action, or of “collective well-being”? Is “well-being” to you always the same as “well-being” to me? Is this concept of “well-being” additive, in the sense that the “collective well-being” of a group of people is simply the numerical sum of their “individual well-beings”? To what extent does the “well-being” of the individual outweigh the “well-being” of the group (if it ever does)? How do we compare “well-being” between individuals and between groups? My point is that we can create an artificial objective moral code based on ambiguous notions of “well-being”, but putting that code into practice entails subjective value judgments of various aspects of “well-being” from different perspectives and in different situations, which then renders the (practical) application of morality subjective (or at best intersubjective) rather than objective. baden511 wrote: I would say that we have to start from somewhere, and intersubjectivity is really all we have as a basis for steps towards objectivity. I fail to see how one can reach an objective viewpoint purely on the basis of iterating intersubjective viewpoints? Could you explain how we achieve this? baden511 wrote: As Husserl pointed out the objective world is essentially related to intersubjectivity. I think this metaphysical notion is relevant to any attempts towards a normative ethics. How is it related? How do we make the leap from an intersubjective view of morality to an objective view of morality?
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Mako
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 11/06/09 - 02:24 AM:	#28
reincarnated wrote: I fail to see how one can reach an objective viewpoint purely on the basis of iterating intersubjective viewpoints? Could you explain how we achieve this? How is it related? How do we make the leap from an intersubjective view of morality to an objective view of morality? Inter-subjectivity does not go far enough in my opinion, in offering an explanation as to what morality is or how it functions within a community of agents. The objective point of view is essentially the perspective of a hypothetical 'authority.' It's a third-person perspective. Objectivity is manifested in real terms through the application of an authoritative set of norms and criteria, typically in the form of rules, decision procedures and guiding ideals. These effectively displace personal, subjective (and inter-subjective) considerations , although both perspectives may occasionally coincide. As for contrasting inter-subjectivity with objectivity, I'll use an example: The 'process' of forging a 'equal-partnership' contract/agreement is an inter-subjective one in that the contract reflects the mutually agreed-upon, subjective principles, strategies and goals of the individual contractors. Once an agreement is reached, the contractual conditons apply to all parties equally, and are henceforth provisionally accepted as a set of binding, non-contingent (i.e.objective) norms . So for instance, in the event of a contractual dispute, both parties agree to refer their grievances to some kind of objective standard, i.e., a third-person, adjudicative process (either an actual authoritative body or an adjudicative procedure). Thus the terms which define an agreement become an authority-unto-themselves, a set of stipulations/rules which supercede the subjective, personal considerations of the individual contractors. An example of an intersubjective act would be two people agreeing to play a game of chess. Yet the actual 'game-rules which apply to both players, exert their normative authority from a 'metaphorically external standpoint" ( i.e.objectively), in that those rules do not rely on subjective viewpoints. Quite the contrary, as I stated above, a set of rules, being a class of universally-binding, normative features, 'replaces' and thus 'supercedes' subjective (personal) reasons, intentions and judgements. This is not to say that subjectivity is banished entirely. It is still manifested through the range of allowable, substantive, strategies and goals of the individual players (e.g. In a chess game, though both players are bound by the same set of rules, each player assesses and decides upon his/her own strategies. Consequently, there's a discretionary space (freedom) for subjective considerations. I would say it's the same for all agreements, both formal and informal. Although I should note here that I don't subscribe to the notion of Kantian-type categorical duties, I would still claim that morality functions in a more broader role as an objective class of general values and guiding, formal criteria which apply universally between rational agents, Each individual moral agent however still retains a range of personal, discretionary power (i.e. a range of freedom) to act upon his/her subjective strategies and goals. Another way of looking at it is that the objective stance (expressed through the application of the rules) is analogous to the formal boundary of an agreement) , while the subjective and inter-subjective positions are analogous to that which is contained within the boundary, that is, the allowable subjective 'content' of the agreement. In other words, within the bounds of any agreement, there's a allowable/discretionary range for personal, substantive considerations (i.e. contingent strategies/goals) which are outlined and thus permitted by the rules of the agreement. Edited by Mako on 11/07/09 - 07:29 AM
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Wolfman
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 11/06/09 - 04:23 PM:	#29
reincarnated wrote: How does one measure the magnitude of a "life-affirming" action, or of "collective well-being"? Succinctly put, through trial and error. Traditional eudaimonism is a practical science. Its aim is not to establish curious absolute imperatives of morality or deduce some sort of hedonistic calculus to determine moral outcomes (both mislead endeavors in my estimation), rather to act in the light of knowledge. Its data is modifiable by science, and we should not expect precise formulations. reincarnated wrote: Is "well-being" to you always the same as "well-being" to me? There are instances in which well-being for you might be the same as well-being for me, in a more general sense. For example, people prefer pleasure to pain and dignity to humiliation, and prefer to avoid unnecessary suffering. However, there are also instances in which well-being for you might not be the same as well-being for me. If, for example, you are a very large man and I am a man of a more modest stature, you will naturally require heftier portions of foods to sustain yourself. reincarnated wrote: Is this concept of "well-being" additive, in the sense that the "collective well-being" of a group of people is simply the numerical sum of their "individual well-beings"? To what extent does the "well-being" of the individual outweigh the "well-being" of the group (if it ever does)? How do we compare "well-being" between individuals and between groups? These questions are suggestive of a sort of utilitarian cost-benefit analysis of well-being. But I think to presume that well-being is quantifiable is to assume too much. It is unclear if well-being between two or more people is even commensurable. Ranking outcomes based on some kind of general well-being index is not my aim, and to suppose that we can may be a doomed enterprise from the start (see utilitarianism's problem of quantifying utility). Right now, the only distinction I am making is between well-being and a lack of well-being. See my definition of well-being at the end. Furthermore, I am not concerned with rules and principles, rather character development and proper deportment. In this sense, virtue ethics is dispositional, while utilitarian and deontological systems are procedural. I am asserting that sometimes there is no single right way of acting, rather several possible ways that may be equally coherent and equally promotive of the good. reincarnated wrote: My point is that we can create an artificial objective moral code based on ambiguous notions of "well-being", but putting that code into practice entails subjective value judgments of various aspects of "well-being" from different perspectives and in different situations, which then renders the (practical) application of morality subjective (or at best intersubjective) rather than objective. This criticism is not one relevant to my position. Read my last post (#25) for my explanation of how ethics are objective (I never claimed that it is objective in any of the ways you are suggesting). However, the gist of your post seems intent at extracting some definition of well-being or eudaimonia from me. I define well-being, in the most basic sense, as fulfilling natural desires, i.e., needs (as opposed to acquired desires, i.e., wants).
"That which is done out of love is always beyond good and evil" - Nietzsche "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." - Aristotle "It is better to do one's own duty, however defective it may be, than to follow the duty of another, however well one may perform it. He who does his duty as his own nature reveals it, never sins." - Lao Tzu "Experience without theory is blind, but theory without experience is mere intellectual play." - Kant

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Posted 11/07/09 - 09:52 PM:	#30
reincarnated wrote: How does one measure the magnitude of a "life-affirming" action, or of "collective well-being"? Wolfman wrote: Succinctly put, through trial and error. Traditional eudaimonism is a practical science. Its aim is not to establish curious absolute imperatives of morality or deduce some sort of hedonistic calculus to determine moral outcomes (both mislead endeavors in my estimation), rather to act in the light of knowledge. Its data is modifiable by science, and we should not expect precise formulations. Thank you for your answer, but that doesn’t tell me how one goes about measuring the magnitude of a "life-affirming" action, or of "collective well-being". It’s a bit like me asking “how does one measure the wavelength of light”, and you answer “by trial and error” – the answer doesn’t tell me how you actually go about measuring the wavelength of light. Wolfman wrote: There are instances in which well-being for you might be the same as well-being for me, in a more general sense. For example, people prefer pleasure to pain and dignity to humiliation, and prefer to avoid unnecessary suffering. However, there are also instances in which well-being for you might not be the same as well-being for me. If, for example, you are a very large man and I am a man of a more modest stature, you will naturally require heftier portions of foods to sustain yourself. Thus “well-being” is often subjective? Even saying that people prefer pleasure to pain is only a generalization, once one starts to analyse the kinds of pleasures and pains that people prefer, one will find significant differences between individuals. reincarnated wrote: Is this concept of "well-being" additive, in the sense that the "collective well-being" of a group of people is simply the numerical sum of their "individual well-beings"? To what extent does the "well-being" of the individual outweigh the "well-being" of the group (if it ever does)? How do we compare "well-being" between individuals and between groups? Wolfman wrote: These questions are suggestive of a sort of utilitarian cost-benefit analysis of well-being. What other way would you suggest that we approach it? If our objective is to maximize collective well-being, then we need to have ways to measure the magnitude of this well-being, which brings us inevitably to questions such as “is the concept of well-being additive?”? Wolfman wrote: But I think to presume that well-being is quantifiable is to assume too much. But you already answered my question as to how one might measure the magnitude of “well-being” with the answer “by trial and error”. If “well-being” is not quantifiable, in what possible way can we claim it is somehow an objective measure of morality? How are we to determine whether one system leads to greater (or less) collective “well-being” than another system, if “well-being” is not quantifiable? Wolfman wrote: It is unclear if well-being between two or more people is even commensurable. I agree – but again this implies that we cannot then use this “well-being” as an objective measure of morality, doesn’t it? Wolfman wrote: Ranking outcomes based on some kind of general well-being index is not my aim, and to suppose that we can may be a doomed enterprise from the start (see utilitarianism's problem of quantifying utility). Right now, the only distinction I am making is between well-being and a lack of well-being. See my definition of well-being at the end. Furthermore, I am not concerned with rules and principles, rather character development and proper deportment. In this sense, virtue ethics is dispositional, while utilitarian and deontological systems are procedural. I am asserting that sometimes there is no single right way of acting, rather several possible ways that may be equally coherent and equally promotive of the good. How does one determine whether they are “equally” coherent or “equally” promotive of the good if one is at the same time saying that this measure of good (“well-being”) is not quantifiable? You seem to want to use quantitative language (“equally”) whilst at the same time (a) denying that the objective is in any way quantifiable, and (b) admitting that “ranking outcomes” is not your aim. Wolfman wrote: This criticism is not one relevant to my position. Read my last post (#25) for my explanation of how ethics are objective (I never claimed that it is objective in any of the ways you are suggesting). OK. I am not necessarily trying to criticize your position, rather I am trying to better understand your position and determine whether it leads us to any useful or practical conclusions about morality. You seem to claim that the objective aspect of morality is its propensity towards collective well-being. But we seem to agree that this collective well-being is not quantifiable, not measurable. It follows, then, that we cannot necessarily determine whether any particular system leads to a greater or lesser collective well-being than another system. How can this possibly give us access to something which is “objective” about morality? What practical application does this so-called “objective” view of morality have, if we cannot measure it? Wolfman wrote: However, the gist of your post seems intent at extracting some definition of well-being or eudaimonia from me. I define well-being, in the most basic sense, as fulfilling natural desires, i.e., needs (as opposed to acquired desires, i.e., wants). Ok, thank you for clarifying this. But, though most humans do indeed share many “natural desires” in a general sense (the desire to live, to enjoy life, to eat, to sleep, to learn, to indulge in recreation, etc etc), the relative importance of these various desires varies from society to society and especially from individual to individual. Thus if you have no way of quantifying this well-being at an individual level, I do not see how you can necessarily arrive at any firm conclusions about whether any particular system leads to greater or lesser collective well-being than any other. Which means that one is left with hand-waving and generalizations. Would you agree?
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

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