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Identity Crisis
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Identity Crisis

Jehu
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Posted 10/17/09 - 02:07 PM:	#41
reincarnated wrote: For X to be an object of awareness does not entail that X is aware. There is no object (knowledge) without a subject (awareness), for the two are the interdependent and complementary elements of every phenomenal experience; and given that they are interdependent, they (awareness and knowledge) cannot be entirely different (separate) elements. I daresay that Socrates' awareness is real. But how do I distinguish "Socrates' awareness" from the awareness of all other aware entities (in order to identify Socrates)? Socrates’ is not identifiable by his awareness, but by his essential characteristics, that is to say, his unique: physical appearance, feelings, preferences, concepts, behaviour, etc. With respect to his awareness, however, it is undifferentiable from the awareness of any other sentient being who has ever lived. Consciousness is merely a form of awareness - and differing degrees of awareness will give rise to different levels of consciousness. As I have said, I have merely employed the term ‘awareness’ so that we will be able to converse, however, the term, as I have employed it here, is not equivalent to consciousness, but is that which makes consciousness, or any other thing, possible. Perhaps it might be better defined as ‘knowing’ or ‘having knowledge’.
It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.

Jehu
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Posted 10/17/09 - 05:34 PM:	#42
Simple Occam wrote: Would you consider these to be just made up definitions or is there something presuppositionless or self-evident about them? Just taking your Principle of Identity and substituting your definition of "self", it states that everything is the same with that which is real and which underlies the appearance of the thing. What ‘exists’ exists [Law of Identity], and what ‘does not exist’ does not exist. [Law of excluded Middle], and we cannot assert the existence of that which does not exist [Law of Contradiction]; thus it follows that there exists only ‘that which exist’ (existence) and naught else (non-existence). Then, given that there exist only existence, it follows that existence is necessarily a singular and continuous domain, for there is naught else that might partition it into separate existents, and it cannot separate itself from itself. Therefore, it may be asserted that all things are one and the same with respect to their existence, for a thing either exists or it does not [Law of Excluded Middle], and as there is no intermediate ground, there can be no qualitative or quantitative distinctions regarding the existential being of things. Why doesn't the identity of a thing include it's appearance, too? Appearance does not factor into to the existential being of a thing, but into it essential being. Further, I resist the argument that reduces a substance to the sum of its properties. Unless we can preserve the common sense distinction between a substance, say Roman Polanski, it its properties and attributes... widower, rapist, repentant genius... we end up with a nonsensical ontology derived from from contrived, made up deifinitions... and no way to step into the same river, even once. Indeed, for we cannot step into the same river twice. You see, everything abides in a state of perpetual change (becoming), and nothing endues from one instant to the next. Rather, it is our cognizant awareness that links these successive instances of experience together, and which gives them the appearance of an entity that persists over time (being); just as it links together a succession of still pictures together so that they give the appearance of motion.
It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.

reincarnated
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Posted 10/17/09 - 07:54 PM:	#43
Jehu wrote: Socrates’ is not identifiable by his awareness, but by his essential characteristics, that is to say, his unique: physical appearance, feelings, preferences, concepts, behaviour, etc. One problem is that each of these "essential characteristics" changes throughout his lifetime - thus Socrates at one age is not the same as Socrates at another age, there is no "unique identity" which picks out Socrates. Another problem is that none of these so-called "essential characteristics" is necessarily unique - in principle two people could have the "same" physical appearance, feelings, preferences, concepts, behaviour, etc. - which one, then, would be Socrates? Edited by reincarnated on 10/17/09 - 08:50 PM
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

reincarnated
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Posted 10/17/09 - 08:13 PM:	#44
Simple Occam wrote: Maybe the problem is not with our intuitions but with the confused epistemological approach of just making up a definition, then trying to apply it to something real. Even something as basic as identity. Rather, I'm suggesting, why not try considering identity as a relation that applies only to a material substance enduring through change over time. Old Roman Polanksi is substantially the same guy who lost his young wife Sharon Tate to the Manson murders and who, admittedly, raped a 13 year old child, with her mother's default consent. The same guy skipped bail and paid restitution to the family. The same guy who won and Oscar and now sits in prison, tragically or not. The point is lots of things can change but the identity remains. He still counts as one. I agree – but “substantially the same” is about as far as we can go. Old Polanski is not numerically identical but is qualitatively identical with Young Polanski. But all humans are qualitatively identical – the difference is simply one of degree. Again, the notion of a “rigid designator” which necessarily picks out some unique physical object which endures through time is false. Let’s say I develop a matter-replicator, which produces an “identical copy” of any given object (where “identical” here simply means indistinguishable from the original – there is no physically significant difference between the original and the copy which allows you to identify the original). I can then use my replicator to produce a copy of the apple on my desk. If all information which allows you to identify the original is lost, then you have no way to distinguish original from copy. When I refer to “the apple on my desk”, you now have no idea which of the two apples I am referring to. Now let us put Polanski into the replicator. We end up with two Polanski’s. If all information which allows you to identify the original is lost, then you have no way to distinguish original from copy. When I refer to “Polanski”, you now have no idea which of the two Polanski’s I am referring to. What has happened to the “rigid designator”? mutemaler wrote: Where is this much alluded to problem of "sameness"? In identity? That is in the name surely, but need only be abstractable from the object, not identical to it. Kind of like Orion in the sky, identity as a kind of constellation, and we do point at the sky and say that "is" Orion, but that seems more a way of speaking, and leads to thinking that there is a problem where none really exists. If an individual is to be indentified by allegedly unique physical characteristics, and we then duplicate that individual by duplicating those physical characteristics, it then becomes physically impossible to distinguish original from copy – there IS no unique individual any more. In the above example, where we had one Polanski, we now have two, each fitting the Polanski identity. The notion of a “rigid designator” which picks out one and only one individual is false.
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

mutemaler
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Posted 10/18/09 - 02:30 AM:	#45
reincarnated wrote: ...If an individual is to be indentified by allegedly unique physical characteristics, and we then duplicate that individual by duplicating those physical characteristics, it then becomes physically impossible to distinguish original from copy – there IS no unique individual any more. In the above example, where we had one Polanski, we now have two, each fitting the Polanski identity. The notion of a “rigid designator” which picks out one and only one individual is false. The apple (or was it a lemon?) is identified by agreement. The use of particular names is also by agreement. Names or the first sort (all words) are neither absolute (constant) nor are they arbitrary, they are simply constant enough to work. You could argue that a particular name is constant since it "stays with" the particular instance. All you need to do is to be able to track it, normally a bit of common sense is sufficient. And you CAN construct a thought experiment where the constellation you are using is not suffifient, but then at that point you would add more to it, you would make it more detailed. So words are in a sense the minimal necessary for identification, kind of a conservation of constellation. And it simply does not matter that the "object" being referred to is constantly changing (as are ALL things), naming (and identification) continue to function uninterrupted as long as the constellation (the pattern) matches. I see a universe that is intersubjective through and through, don't make an exception for humans (and the so-called objective a special case intersubjective), and am anything but enamoured by this distinction of our tradition into a subjective/objective, along with many other things actually. Likewise I see no need to defend a "rigid descriptor" (unless you want to put this in terms of constancy). Consider the distinction itself (obviously) prescriptive. And that makes it difficult for me in a thread like this. I don't want to be a thread stopper either, but I think at least if you want to say something is subjective as a criticism, realize that I see a different way, and at least say it in some other words. Maybe something along the lines of when we use a word, what is it that we require of it for it to work (for example), our expectations of a word, and why what I say does or not not fulfill these. What bothers me the most though I think is all of the energy going into trying to figure out what to do when things change, as it this "ruins" everything, creates all manner of intractable problems etc., when I do not see a problem, which is why I don't agree with many of the base assumptions in our tradition come to think of it, we create problems with our theories, consider them necessarily problems for all worldviews (because we are such resolute universalists), and then these sit so deep we are loathe to simply jettison them and try something else. About the "perfect" clone. Theoretically you could make something identical in all respects (although I don't think its possible, unless it is an abstract construct), to where they are indistinguishable - as object "an sich". This would correspond to what you call call the internal identity (or one which we create and/or abstract from it). But an object an sich is a rather mystical thing, I just don't see it in a universe where everything is related, where being itself might be better seen as being in relation. What you have then is what you might call trivial identity which involves timespace, a positioning in spacetime, in a world graph so to speak. And this is often what we would use to track the particular occurrences anyway. So in the clone case if you had one clone here and the other clone there where you really couldn't say which was which on the basis on internal identity, they would nonetheless remain distinct on the basis of this "trivial" uniqueness, which of course is not really so trivial at all, since it would set them apart. And that seems the whole purpose of identity I would think, identity is what makes things differentiable, distinguishable. A particular entity though is never the same, nor does it need to be for identity, for naming to work. I think they should just release him by the way. And an international war crimes tribunal drag his accusers before the court. Some times things are just too bizarre for words. But it is often about control of the language, notice that, controlling guiding discourse you might say, and I think the subjective and objective distinction does not offer any solution to that, aggrevates a larger problem if anything. Edited by mutemaler on 10/18/09 - 02:47 AM

Jehu
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Posted 10/18/09 - 06:17 AM:	#46
reincarnated wrote: One problem is that each of these "essential characteristics" changes throughout his lifetime - thus Socrates at one age is not the same as Socrates at another age, there is no "unique identity" which picks out Socrates. Indeed, because a thing’s characteristics are not its own, but are attributed to it by the subject, different things are able to share the same characteristics. However, because we mistakenly hold these characteristics to have their origin and cause in some external and independent entity – as its properties, we believe that it is the thing itself (i.e., entity) that endures from moment to moment, and negate the role of the subject in making it appear so. Another problem is that none of these so-called "essential characteristics" is necessarily unique - in principle two people could have the "same" physical appearance, feelings, preferences, concepts, behaviour, etc. - which one, then, would be Socrates? First, it is not possible that two individuals can share exactly the same essential characteristics, for even were they absolutely identical at their birth (which they are not), from that moment on, each twin would experience the world from its own unique point of view, and through its own unique set of experiences. Consequently, each would develop its own unique physical appearance, feelings, preferences, concepts, behaviours, etc. However, if such a case were possible, then the only way to differentiate between the two individuals would be by their spatial location and their name; for two different things cannot occupy the same space at the same time, and every distinct existent (thing) must have a distinct existential designation (name) [Law of Identity].
It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.

MasterSean2k
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Posted 10/18/09 - 12:31 PM:	#47
My thinking regarding the original post is a bit different: An apple is merely the particular reflection of the Formal apple, ideal and independent of time and space. The "Apple" as an instance is a form of the Form—it is the set of characteristics that constrain the Form within material and sensible boundaries (e.g. size, shape, weight, color, scent, taste, etc.). To speak of "this apple" is to speak of "this" apple and "this form of" apple. "This" is the the material existence to which we are referring. It is less defined by characteristics so much as its state of being. It is, and, independent of characteristics, is numerically identical to itself. "This form" is the projection of the Formal apple onto "this". It is here where the boundaries of form are instilled upon "this", and from here that essence derives. Form is not rigid, but bounded, which allows for a degree of variation in each essential attribute. So long as the instance remains within the form, it is still identifiable as an expression of the Form. The form itself is substantial and static, although the instance's essential attributes are insubstantial and variable. It is not the attributes that define a thing, but its form. If you have two apples, what distinguishes them is their "this". Having a separate "this" and same form amounts to qualitative identicality between the two apples. A single apple across time and space maintains the same "this" and same form and is numerically identical with itself, due to the insubstantiality of the instance attributes. What my argument boils down to is that the definition/identity of a thing depends upon its discrete existence and its form, and not on its specific properties.
~MS2k

reincarnated
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Posted 10/18/09 - 08:34 PM:	#48
Hi mutemaler Some well considered ideas in your post, I appreciate the time you have taken to respond. mutemaler wrote: The apple (or was it a lemon?) is identified by agreement. The use of particular names is also by agreement. Names or the first sort (all words) are neither absolute (constant) nor are they arbitrary, they are simply constant enough to work. You could argue that a particular name is constant since it "stays with" the particular instance. All you need to do is to be able to track it, normally a bit of common sense is sufficient. And you CAN construct a thought experiment where the constellation you are using is not suffifient, but then at that point you would add more to it, you would make it more detailed. So words are in a sense the minimal necessary for identification, kind of a conservation of constellation. And it simply does not matter that the "object" being referred to is constantly changing (as are ALL things), naming (and identification) continue to function uninterrupted as long as the constellation (the pattern) matches. Such names continue to function only so long as there IS agreement on what they identify (what they designate) – I cite again the examples of the apple in the OP. So far, nobody has attempted to answer all of the questions posed in the OP – why not? I suggest simply because our acceptance of such answers would entail an implied agreement which is not necessarily there – two people addressing these questions may not provide the same answers. Which means that the meaning of such names, and the objects in the world that such names designate, is entirely subjective. The same name may mean different things (may identify or designate different things) to different people. This is inevitable if, as you say, objects are identified by agreement. But this is not all – for any instance of agreement on the designation of a word we can ALWAYS conduct a thought experiment where we tweak ever-so-slightly the so-called constellation of unique properties which designates the object(s) in question, and create a situation in which there is now ambiguity in meaning. Hence the implications for so-called “rigid designators” mutemaler wrote: I see a universe that is intersubjective through and through, don't make an exception for humans (and the so-called objective a special case intersubjective), and am anything but enamoured by this distinction of our tradition into a subjective/objective, along with many other things actually. Likewise I see no need to defend a "rigid descriptor" (unless you want to put this in terms of constancy). Consider the distinction itself (obviously) prescriptive. And that makes it difficult for me in a thread like this. I don't want to be a thread stopper either, but I think at least if you want to say something is subjective as a criticism, realize that I see a different way, and at least say it in some other words. Maybe something along the lines of when we use a word, what is it that we require of it for it to work (for example), our expectations of a word, and why what I say does or not not fulfill these. Acknowledging the fact that meaning is subjective is not meant to be a criticism on my part. It is not subjectivity in meaning which causes the problem I am referring to. Rather I am trying to explore the consequences of the notion of identity, and one consequence has implications for the coherency of rigid designators. mutemaler wrote: What bothers me the most though I think is all of the energy going into trying to figure out what to do when things change, as it this "ruins" everything, creates all manner of intractable problems etc., when I do not see a problem, which is why I don't agree with many of the base assumptions in our tradition come to think of it, we create problems with our theories, consider them necessarily problems for all worldviews (because we are such resolute universalists), and then these sit so deep we are loathe to simply jettison them and try something else. With so many things in life, there is no problem if one does not push the envelope (or step outside the box). But philosophy is (or to my mind should be) all about pushing the envelope. If one maintains one’s worldview within the constraints implicit in the assumptions underlying “rigid designators”, if one stays inside that box, then it follows that the concept of “rigid designators” works fine. But step outside of the worldview which defines that box, tweak the conditions, push the envelope, and the notion of “rigid designators” fails. So yes, one can maintain that one “does not see a problem” so long as one stays within the boundaries wherein such problems do not manifest themselves. mutemaler wrote: About the "perfect" clone. Theoretically you could make something identical in all respects (although I don't think its possible, unless it is an abstract construct), to where they are indistinguishable - as object "an sich". Why do you think it impossible to create a perfect copy of an object (perfect in this sense simply meaning indistinguishable from the original)? There is no principle that I am aware of which would render such a feat impossible. mutemaler wrote: This would correspond to what you call call the internal identity (or one which we create and/or abstract from it). But an object an sich is a rather mystical thing, I just don't see it in a universe where everything is related, where being itself might be better seen as being in relation. What you have then is what you might call trivial identity which involves timespace, a positioning in spacetime, in a world graph so to speak. And this is often what we would use to track the particular occurrences anyway. So in the clone case if you had one clone here and the other clone there where you really couldn't say which was which on the basis on internal identity, they would nonetheless remain distinct on the basis of this "trivial" uniqueness, which of course is not really so trivial at all, since it would set them apart. And that seems the whole purpose of identity I would think, identity is what makes things differentiable, distinguishable. A particular entity though is never the same, nor does it need to be for identity, for naming to work. If in the case of the clones one “really couldn’t say which was which”, then how do you propose to identify the original? To say “they would nonetheless remain distinct” helps us not at all in this identification game – ontic distinction is of no use to us if we are faced with epistemic indistinction. You say that this distinction “would set them apart” – but what information is available to you that allows you to set the two apart? There is no such information accessible to you. Now Jehu here presents a defence of rigid designators: Jehu wrote: First, it is not possible that two individuals can share exactly the same essential characteristics, for even were they absolutely identical at their birth (which they are not), from that moment on, each twin would experience the world from its own unique point of view, and through its own unique set of experiences. Consequently, each would develop its own unique physical appearance, feelings, preferences, concepts, behaviours, etc. This is exactly the "staying inside the box thinking" that I am referring to in my reply to mutemaler. Please point to the law of logic or of nature which says that it is impossible in principle for two people to share the same characteristics? ("same" here meaning "indistinguishable"). I know of no such law, and if there IS no such law then your assumption is one of the constraints which places you inside a conceptual box. Jehu wrote: However, if such a case were possible, then the only way to differentiate between the two individuals would be by their spatial location and their name; for two different things cannot occupy the same space at the same time, and every distinct existent (thing) must have a distinct existential designation (name) [Law of Identity]. How does spatial location figure in the identity of Socrates? Are you trying to suggest that the clone at point X has more claim to the name of Socrates than the clone at point Y? If so, why? How do you propose to gain access to this thing that you call the "distinct existential designation" (is this something like a rigid designator?) in order to allow you to distinguish the true Socrates from the false clone? Edited by reincarnated on 10/18/09 - 08:40 PM
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Jehu
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Posted 10/19/09 - 09:05 AM:	#49
reincarnated wrote: Please point to the law of logic or of nature which says that it is impossible in principle for two people to share the same characteristics? ("same" here meaning "indistinguishable"). I know of no such law, and if there IS no such law then your assumption is one of the constraints which places you inside a conceptual box. The ‘Law of Identity’ (i.e., the first principle of reason) states: that everything is the same with itself, but different from another. From this comes the ‘Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals’ which states: that if there is no discernable difference between the two things, then they are not two different things, but one and the same thing. Conversely, if there is any discernable difference between two things, then the two are different things, and not one and the same thing. How does spatial location figure in the identity of Socrates? Are you trying to suggest that the clone at point X has more claim to the name of Socrates than the clone at point Y? If so, why? I have no preference for which individual is called Socrates, however if you insist on calling both individuals ‘Socrates’, then I will not know which of the individuals I am to bring to mind when I hear the name. Consider the case of rural Wales, were there are so many people who have the same name (e.g. Ron Jones), that other people, in order to converse about them, find it necessary to extend their names (e.g., Ron Jones the Mailman) so that others will know which individual they mean by the name. How do you propose to gain access to this thing that you call the "distinct existential designation" (is this something like a rigid designator?) in order to allow you to distinguish the true Socrates from the false clone? As I said before, two individuals cannot have exactly the same essential characteristics, for each would have followed its own unique path of evolution.
It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.

Incision
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Posted 10/26/09 - 07:25 PM:	#50
reincarnated wrote: There is an apple on the left side of my desk. If I pick up the apple and move it to the right side, is the apple which is now on the right side of my desk identical with the one that was previously on the left side? I'll go against the grain and claim it is. Would you say this is the reasoning here? (1) Apple₁ is on the left side. (2) Apple₂ is not on the left side. (3) If apple₁ is numerically identical to apple₂, then if apple₁ is on the left side, then apple₂ is on the left side (instance of the indiscernibility of identicals). (4) Therefore, apple₁ is not numerically identical to apple₂. It looks to me like this argument is unsound because (1) and (2) aren't both true; they only become true if temporally indexed. (1) and (2) should either be true presently (at the current time), or they should be true timelessly. But they're obviously not presently true, because there's presently no apple on left, so (1) is false if it's meant temporally. In fact, there is no time at which (1) and (2) are temporally true. And they aren't timelessly true, either: the thought experiment is only intuitively plausible if we imagine their truth-values changing over time. What is timelessly true is that (1') Apple₁ is on the left side at t₀. (2') Apple₂ is not on the left side at t₁. (3') If apple₁ is numerically identical to apple₂, then if apple₁ is on the left side t₀, then apple₂ is on the left side at t₀. But with that clarification, the conclusion (4) Therefore, apple₁ is not numerically identical to apple₂. doesn't follow. There's no reason why a single apple can't have both the properties of being on the left side at t₀ and being on the right side at t₁. So I'd say there's a temporal-indexing solution to this type of problem: without it, the premises are false; with it, the form is invalid.

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