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Identity Crisis
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Identity Crisis
brainpharte
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Posted 10/15/09 - 06:08 AM:
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#31
reincarnated wrote:

– but how do we then address this problem? Must we accept that the concept of sameness simply IS slippery, plastic, vague and ambiguous, no matter how much we try to refine it and pin it down? Or can we pin it down in more rigorous definitions which allow us to avoid the ambiguity, without defining it out of existence altogether?

...

It seems to me that there is something fundamentally wrong with our intuitive ideas of identity and “sameness”, and the problems we have coming to grips with pinning down what “sameness” actually means is evidence that there is something wrong.

I think that people's concept and use of "same" and "different" and "identical" (as well as "alike") is commonly vague, ambiguous, imprecise. There is no unanimously agreed upon precise meaning for these terms--but all we have to do is to ask for clarification whenever someone uses them.

If someone asserts that "A and B are the same" (or identical or different or alike), all we have to do to disambiguate the claim is ask what aspects (what predicates) they actually have in mind. Inevitably, since it's impossible for things to be exhaustively the same (or different) some possible predicates are included, and some are ignored. Those included are what that person judges to be the relevant predicates for his purposes.



But IS he the same guy? This is the whole point. He might be a completely reformed character now, with a different personality. If we believed that people are always the same and never change then why do we ever release offenders from jail – if they are the same as when they were first locked up then surely they will simply commit the same offences again?

Besides specifying the aspects they have in mind, what else can anyone say but that he's the same guy in some aspects and a different guy in other aspects?


I get the feeling there's a spooky REALLY IS stalking this issue.

"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit.

"No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."
mutemaler
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Posted 10/15/09 - 01:09 PM:
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#32
reincarnated wrote:
There is an apple on the left side of my desk. If I pick up the apple and move it to the right side, is the apple which is now on the right side of my desk identical with the one that was previously on the left side?...

It makes things easier to just note that the "that" over there (what we "apple") never stays the same period. You pointed that out in detail. What stays the same is the pattern we use, the word apple, it (the pattern) is the identity, it is not necessary for it to be "in" that thing over there at all, only that it stays sufficiently constant and/or recognizable to apple it successfully.

When you move it to the other side of the table and ask "is that the same apple" the formulation is odd to me. Because you have an instance of patterning something, and are then asking if the second instance of patterning refers to the original object. But it has nothing to do with the object itself staying the same or not (it does not), not even whether it is the same pattern (it is), but more whether the second instance refers to the same object as the first instance. In this case yes, clearly, since you yourself put it from one side on the desk to the other. I don't see any real crisis of identity involved.

I think part of the problem is that our tradition holds language to be fundamentally descriptive. And you can avoid the problems this creates by seeing language as "carving up the world", as fundamentally prescriptive.

The apple "is" not red, we red it.


Edited by mutemaler on 10/15/09 - 01:14 PM
Jehu
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Posted 10/15/09 - 05:46 PM:
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#33
reincarnated wrote:

OK, to take an example, what exactly is the “self” you refer to which is “real” and which underlies the appearance of Socrates, which endures through the lifetime of Socrates? Can we pin it down?

The nature of existence is essentially cognizant, and so comprises two interdependent and complementary elements, one of which is real (absolute), and one of which is merely apparent (relative). That which is real I call ‘awareness’, and that which is only apparent, I call ‘knowledge’; however, it must be understood that these are not what the elements are, but merely what I have chosen to call them, for we cannot speak of them without that they first have a name and a definition.

Awareness, though it is that which makes it possible that anything can be perceived or imagined, cannot itself be perceived or imagined, for it is devoid of any quality. Because it partakes of an absolute existence, it is not dependent upon any other, and so is forever immutable (being); and it is this immutable awareness that endures from one moment to the next. Knowledge, on the other hand, as it partakes of only a relative existence, is fully dependent upon other things, and so abides in a state of perpetual flux (becoming).

This is the point I still do not get. How do you make the leap from “each thing is the same with itself” (ie looking at individual instances of “things”) to “the nature of ALL things is numerically identical” (ie concluding that all “things” are numerically identical)?

As all things derive their existence from the field of awareness wherein they are perceived or imagined, and given that all fields of awareness are undifferentiable one from another, it follows that all fields of awareness are fundamentally one and the same field.

This is analogous to the dream state, wherein everything that appears in the dream, including the dream persona who appears to experience the dream, are nothing more than the awareness of the sleeping mind operating upon the subjective knowledge of the dreamer. Thus it may be said that everything in the dream is the same with itself (in its existence) , but different from another (in its essence).

It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.
reincarnated
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Posted 10/16/09 - 08:31 AM:
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#34
brainpharte wrote:
I think that people's concept and use of "same" and "different" and "identical" (as well as "alike") is commonly vague, ambiguous, imprecise. There is no unanimously agreed upon precise meaning for these terms--but all we have to do is to ask for clarification whenever someone uses them.
If someone asserts that "A and B are the same" (or identical or different or alike), all we have to do to disambiguate the claim is ask what aspects (what predicates) they actually have in mind. Inevitably, since it's impossible for things to be exhaustively the same (or different) some possible predicates are included, and some are ignored. Those included are what that person judges to be the relevant predicates for his purposes.

I agree 100%. But doesn’t this suggest that the whole idea of (Kripke’s) “rigid designators” is just so much “wishful thinking”, and is wrongheaded and unworkable? Basically what you are saying (and I agree) is that whether A is judged the same as B (or not) is “subjectively dependent” on the criteria that one uses to judge “sameness”. There IS no objective criterion to judge sameness (since numerical identity does not apply to physical objects) – the only criteria we can use are our personal preferences. But if sameness is judged on the basis of personal preferences then it necessarily becomes subjective – so how can we claim “rigid designators”?
brainpharte wrote:
Besides specifying the aspects they have in mind, what else can anyone say but that he's the same guy in some aspects and a different guy in other aspects?

Agreed. Which again reinforces my contention that “sameness” is subjective, which in turn implies that so-called “rigid” designators are actually quite floppy and flexible.
mutemaler wrote:
It makes things easier to just note that the "that" over there (what we "apple") never stays the same period. You pointed that out in detail. What stays the same is the pattern we use, the word apple, it (the pattern) is the identity, it is not necessary for it to be "in" that thing over there at all, only that it stays sufficiently constant and/or recognizable to apple it successfully.

But all this means is that we can identify “an apple” – but not necessarily the SAME apple. If the pattern of an apple was enough to specify the identity of an apple, then all apples would be numerically identical. The word “apple” picks out certain criteria which allow us to (vaguely and approximately) identify certain objects which satisfy these criteria, but these criteria are insufficient to pick out one particular apple. The problem is that when we want to pick out “one particular apple” we then fall into subjectivity.
mutemaler wrote:
When you move it to the other side of the table and ask "is that the same apple" the formulation is odd to me. Because you have an instance of patterning something, and are then asking if the second instance of patterning refers to the original object. But it has nothing to do with the object itself staying the same or not (it does not), not even whether it is the same pattern (it is), but more whether the second instance refers to the same object as the first instance. In this case yes, clearly, since you yourself put it from one side on the desk to the other. I don't see any real crisis of identity involved.

OK, that’s fine. But what about the other questions in the OP? Is the apple plus fingerprint identical with the original? Is the apple with a small piece of skin removed identical with the original? Is the bruised apple identical with the original?
What kinds of changes are we allowed to make to the apple before this identity relation is lost?
mutemaler wrote:
I think part of the problem is that our tradition holds language to be fundamentally descriptive. And you can avoid the problems this creates by seeing language as "carving up the world", as fundamentally prescriptive.

And subjective.
Jehu wrote:
The nature of existence is essentially cognizant, and so comprises two interdependent and complementary elements, one of which is real (absolute), and one of which is merely apparent (relative). That which is real I call ‘awareness’, and that which is only apparent, I call ‘knowledge’; however, it must be understood that these are not what the elements are, but merely what I have chosen to call them, for we cannot speak of them without that they first have a name and a definition.
Awareness, though it is that which makes it possible that anything can be perceived or imagined, cannot itself be perceived or imagined, for it is devoid of any quality. Because it partakes of an absolute existence, it is not dependent upon any other, and so is forever immutable (being); and it is this immutable awareness that endures from one moment to the next. Knowledge, on the other hand, as it partakes of only a relative existence, is fully dependent upon other things, and so abides in a state of perpetual flux (becoming).

Sorry, but how does this answer my question? What exactly is the “self” you refer to which is “real” and which underlies the appearance of Socrates, which endures through the lifetime of Socrates? To say “awareness” does not help, since all humans are aware, but not all humans are Socrates.
Jehu wrote:
As all things derive their existence from the field of awareness wherein they are perceived or imagined, and given that all fields of awareness are undifferentiable one from another, it follows that all fields of awareness are fundamentally one and the same field.

All fields of awareness are undifferentiatable one from another? I don’t think so. I can differentiate my “field of awareness” of things which are Socrates from my “field of awareness” of things which are apples.

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Jehu
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Posted 10/16/09 - 04:43 PM:
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reincarnated wrote:
Sorry, but how does this answer my question? What exactly is the “self” you refer to which is “real” and which underlies the appearance of Socrates, which endures through the lifetime of Socrates? To say “awareness” does not help, since all humans are aware, but not all humans are Socrates.

Indeed, but all things are aware, in that they can only manifest (come to exist) within the field of awareness of a sentient subject; for to exist is to be an object of awareness (to be known). It is the cognizant awareness which underlies the manifestation of Socrates that is real, and it is this alone which endues over the course of his life. Without this thread of continuity, Socrates’ life would be no more than a meaningless succession of unrelated momentary experiences.

All fields of awareness are undifferentiatable one from another? I don’t think so. I can differentiate my “field of awareness” of things which are Socrates from my “field of awareness” of things which are apples.

It is not the field of awareness itself that may be differentiated, but the contents of that field (knowledge). Awareness is awareness, and varies neither in quality nor quantity; however, it is not to be misconstrued with ‘consciousness’, which is a thing (i.e., object of awareness).

It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.
reincarnated
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Posted 10/17/09 - 04:29 AM:
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#36
Jehu wrote:
Indeed, but all things are aware, in that they can only manifest (come to exist) within the field of awareness of a sentient subject; for to exist is to be an object of awareness (to be known).

For X to be an object of awareness does not entail that X is aware.

Jehu wrote:
It is the cognizant awareness which underlies the manifestation of Socrates that is real, and it is this alone which endues over the course of his life. Without this thread of continuity, Socrates’ life would be no more than a meaningless succession of unrelated momentary experiences.

I daresay that Socrates' awareness is real. But how do I distinguish "Socrates' awareness" from the awareness of all other aware entities (in order to identify Socrates)?

Jehu wrote:
It is not the field of awareness itself that may be differentiated, but the contents of that field (knowledge). Awareness is awareness, and varies neither in quality nor quantity; however, it is not to be misconstrued with ‘consciousness’, which is a thing (i.e., object of awareness).

Consciousness is merely a form of awareness - and differing degrees of awareness will give rise to different levels of consciousness.

crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts...
we all talk a different language, talking in defence...
and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok...
(Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")
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Posted 10/17/09 - 09:11 AM:
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We can't describe nature in function of "likeness" but only in decreasing or ascenting amount of difference. Why ? Because something can't be more or less identical in a logical system only based on the concept of identical. Since difference is undeniable, we have to use a language based upon it if we want to communicate properly. I would say that "identical" is a special (non physical) existing subset of numerical differentiation. 2 objects are the same when the amount of difference between them is 0. But how much times in nature is something exact 0 ? As reincarnated pointed out correctly,this NI has no physical legitimity, but i think it must be used for the sake of adequate communication between people.
Simple Occam
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Posted 10/17/09 - 11:21 AM:
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reincarnated wrote:
Simple Occam wrote:
This definition of NI is just made up, anyway. It is not self-evident or based on observation. Defining NI as the sum total of all qualitative identities might seem somewhat attractive at first but there is nothing that compels us to define it in this way. Rather than define it out of existence, maybe we should try to be clearer about the ontology underlying the whole notion of identity.


I agree with you. It seems to me that there is something fundamentally wrong with our intuitive ideas of identity and “sameness”, and the problems we have coming to grips with pinning down what “sameness” actually means is evidence that there is something


Maybe the problem is not with our intuitions but with the confused epistemological approach of just making up a definition, then trying to apply it to something real. Even something as basic as identity. Rather, I'm suggesting, why not try considering identity as a relation that applies only to a material substance enduring through change over time. Old Roman Polanksi is substantially the same guy who lost his young wife Sharon Tate to the Manson murders and who, admittedly, raped a 13 year old child, with her mother's default consent. The same guy skipped bail and paid restitution to the family. The same guy who won and Oscar and now sits in prison, tragically or not. The point is lots of things can change but the identity remains. He still counts as one.
mutemaler
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Posted 10/17/09 - 12:03 PM:
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Simple Occam wrote:
...Rather, I'm suggesting, why not try considering identity as a relation that applies only to a material substance enduring through change over time. Old Roman Polanksi is substantially the same guy who lost his young wife Sharon Tate to the Manson murders and who, admittedly, raped a 13 year old child, with her mother's default consent. The same guy skipped bail and paid restitution to the family. The same guy who won and Oscar and now sits in prison, tragically or not. The point is lots of things can change but the identity remains. He still counts as one.

Actually he plead quilty to having sex with a minor as part of a plea bargain. Also served out the penalty, at which point the judge decided to not abide by the agreement. Just to set that straight. I think the whole affair is strange, incongruous call it.

In any case - and not that he's an apple - but the difference is only that you have a generic name versus a particular name, and the principle still seems the same. To show sameness you merely have to show that the "object" of the first instance of naming is also the second instance (or any in between). It is not necessary nor is it the case that the "object" remains exactly the same, only that the naming continues to function. All things change. It is the labels which we hold constant. As a held constant in the flow.

Where is this much alluded to problem of "sameness"? In identity? That is in the name surely, but need only be abstractable from the object, not identical to it. Kind of like Orion in the sky, identity as a kind of constellation, and we do point at the sky and say that "is" Orion, but that seems more a way of speaking, and leads to thinking that there is a problem where none really exists.

Edited by mutemaler on 10/17/09 - 12:10 PM
Simple Occam
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Posted 10/17/09 - 12:15 PM:
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Jehu wrote:


Now, the Principle of Identity states: that everything is the same with itself, but different from another; and by the term ‘self’ it is meant: that which is real and which underlies the appearance of the thing. In other words, it tells us that that which is real and which underlies the appearance of things is one and the same (numerically identical), and so that whatever differences there may appear between things is purely a matter of the essential characteristics that we attribute to it. Thus, since the existential nature of all things is numerically identical, and given that a thing’s existential and essential natures are mutually exclusive, it follows that there can be no numerical identity within the essential nature of things – but only qualitative identity. What’s more, this qualitative identity can never be absolute, for this would constitute a numerical identity, and this is not permissible.



Would you consider these to be just made up definitions or is there something presuppositionless or self-evident about them? Just taking your Principle of Identity and substituting your definition of "self", it states that everything is the same with that which is real and which underlies the appearance of the thing. Why doesn't the identity of a thing include it's appearance, too? It's not self-evident what you propose. It might be true or it might not. Further, I resist the argument that reduces a substance to the sum of its properties. Unless we can preserve the common sense distinction between a substance, say Roman Polanski, it its properties and attributes... widower, rapist, repentant genius... we end up with a nonsensical ontology derived from from contrived, made up deifinitions... and no way to step into the same river, even once.
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