#1

I was thinking about putting this in the introduction/factual forum, but thought that this thread might get a better treatment here. If this is the wrong forum for it, feel free to move the thread administrators.

What I would like to accomplish here is a proper understanding of Hume's is ought problem. I'm not really interested in solutions to the problem, just whether I am correctly interpreting Hume's analysis of descriptive and evaluative statements. Please feel free to offer your thoughts on what needs to clarified, added, etc.

In the Treatise of Human Nature Book I Part I, Hume states:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs, when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

According to Hume, evaluative ought statements can not derive from descriptive statements or statements of fact. For example:

P1. The cat is in pain

C1. We should alleviate the cat's pain

According to Hume's analysis, a premise is missing in order for the argument to be valid. To do so we would need to insert the following premise:

P1. The cat is pain

P2. If something is in pain, we should alleviate that pain.

C1. So, we should alleviate the cat's pain.

The argument itself is now valid, but whether the argument is sound is debatable. Hume thought that the conditional statement in P2 is asserted but not deducible from P1. Observation alone does not provide us with knowledge of moral values. We may be able to know facts about the world based on observation, but how we observe what we should or ought to do is unclear. No matter how long you stare, smell, or listen to a cat in pain you won't be able to observe any "ought" or "should". Hence Hume argues values are "imperceptible". So simply put, how do we get the …should" from the …is"? Unless one is able to justify the necessary condition in P2, Hume's objection has to be taken seriously.

This is how I characterize Hume's is ought problem. The fundamental problem, it seems, is whether normative value is "imperceptible". In a narrow sense I take impereptible to mean empirically verifiable (according to Hume's empirical verificationism). In a wide sense I take "imperceptible" to mean epistemicly justified.

Is this a correct understanding of what Hume has to say? Any help is much appreciatted.

#3

In understanding Hume's Is/ought problem, it was helpful for me to consider the different kinds of oughts relevant to morality. My understanding is that Hume was only talking about imperative oughts.

Imperative ought – An ought that is put forward as somehow universally binding regardless of people’s needs and preferences.
- No means has ever become generally accepted by which reality makes such oughts binding. Till some means by which reality makes such oughts universally binding has become generally accepted, I will feel free to refer to Imperative oughts as ‘magic’ oughts.
- Enforced cultural norms (moral standards) may be commonly presented as universally binding. But it is empirically true that when following them would be against the needs and preferences of the group as a whole, such norms suddenly become less binding. Mindlessly following them can even be viewed as deserving punishment (being immoral). For example, mindlessly following "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" when dealing with criminals and in times of war.

Instrumental ought – An ought whose burdens are rationally justified based on facts and overriding needs and preferences.
- For example, it might be argued that "Based on factual knowledge X, people ought (instrumental ought) to accept the burdens of Y morality if they desire to increase their experience of Z (perhaps durable well-being over their lifetime)".

Emotional ought – An ought motivated by emotions triggered by our moral intuitions.
- These can be quite powerful and motivate people to act directly contrary to even their overriding needs and preferences, such as those for durable well-being over a lifetime.
- The experience of emotional oughts are biological adaptations that increased the reproductive fitness of our ancestors even though they sometimes motivated behaviors, such as bravery and loyalty, which decreased individual reproductive fitness.
- Human moral intuitions are critically based on another biological adaptation. Over time, our moral intuitions can automatically transform whatever cultural enforced norms (nominal imperative oughts) we accept the burdens of into emotional oughts that can be immune to reason or considerations of personal well-being. So far as I know, this biological adaptation does not have a name, except perhaps conscience, but that does not seem to me to capture its power.

#5

Really? Could you clarify?

Just as backkground:

From the SEP, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning-normativity/

"An instrumental norm (ought) tells us what to do in order to reach a certain goal, what means to employ to a certain end."

There is no logical problerm with basing instrumental oughts on facts and desires.

Imperative oughts are sometimes called non-insturmental oughts. However, this negative form does not distihguish them from emoptional oughhts. Failing to distingush them from emotional oughts seems to me one of the chief sources of confusion about the is/ought distinction.

Instrumental oughts and emotional oughts are very real. For example, when we see kittens being tortured most of us are unwilling to claim the normative motivating force of that ought is imaginary.

Imperative oughts have, so far as I know, no basis in reality.