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How is consciousness even possible?
materialism implies it cannot exist

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How is consciousness even possible?

Simple Occam
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Posted 05/19/08 - 12:17 PM:	#191
reincarnated wrote: Agree with almost all of the above, except that both reflection and self-awareness are states of consciousness, thus if one is self-aware, or if one is reflecting on one's experience, then one is conscious. I understand that 'consciousness' is commonly used in the sense of 'self-awareness' or 'reflection' on one's own psychological states. But the philosophical problem of mind does not arise for these usages. "Reflection" as I mean it, is limited to the functioning of the uniquely human part of our brains: i.e., the part that is responsible for the use of language. In this sense, reflection is a representation, in the linguistic part of the brain, of another representation, the activity in another part of the brain, the part responsible for perception. It's the having of perceptual qualia (sights, sounds, tastes, smells, tactile feelings and emotions), specifically, that I mean by "consciousness". We could (conceivably) be self-aware, in the sense of having memories of our past that we take to be co-existent with our present state of mind (what we are now perceiving or thinking about) and with our continued existence into the future... but still have no apparent phenomenal properties. That is to say, it's logically possible that it not be like anything to be an animal like us. That's why the notion of a p-zombie can be talked about at all. The p-zombie could be self-aware, remembering its past and projecting it's future. It could be intelligent and do math, for example. It would even perceive things and generate adaptive behaviors. It just would not be conscious, in the sense of having qualia. One of the big confusions of this issue comes from not making these distinctions clear. Reflection and consciousness are NOT the same thing. Reflection IS a representation (a linguistic one) and consciousness IS NOT a representation. Perception IS a representation of the way our sensory organs interact with the environment. The way our brains process that information to generate adaptive behaviors is what is useful from an evolutionary perspective. Not the consciousness. That is, as I keep saying, what it is like to be the perceiving animal. That's why other animals have qualia, too. Don't forget, the mammalian part of our brain had our pre-human ancestors perceiving and generating adaptive behaviors. They saw sights, heard sounds, experienced pain and pleasure... and the rest of it. They were conscious. But they were not self-aware in the sense that we are. Because the language part of their brains had not yet evolved, they could not represent their internal psychological states as public cultural objects: artifacts of the operation of the neo-cortex.

Simple Occam
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Posted 05/19/08 - 12:50 PM:	#192
theescapist wrote: In the phenomenon known as blindsight, a person will report that they can see nothing in a particular area of their visual field. But if they are encouraged to guess what is there, they do far better than would happen by chance. Their brains are processing sensory data, but it doesn't seem that it is like anything for them to be seeing what they are seeing. Doesn't this falsify your claim above? Interesting you mention blindsight. This condition actually serves to validate rather than falisfy the claim that qualia are identical to appropriate brain states. Not EVERY brain state is identical to qualia, of course, so I didn't mean to imply that ANY brain activity is such that it is like something to be it. Whatever brain activity did account for it would have to do so in a way that also explains the unity of consciousness and not just each individual "quale" of blueness or sweetness. If we locate consciousness in nature as the intrinsic nature of the electromagnetic waves generated by the thalamic projection to the neocortex, it's not surprising that subjects with the 'blindsight' report an absence of visual qualia, since this projection (for whatever physical cause) is what is what is observed to be missing in these subjects. Their unlikely success in "guessing" could be explained by the visual processing still going on in different parts of the brain outside the forebrain, ie, in the reptile portion of the brain that uses visual input to guide behavior and projects waves to a different region of the thalamus. So they actually do process visual data, but not in a way that produces qualia. I encourage you to research this independently of what I say and let me know if there's a problem with the neurophysiology of what I wrote. But assuming there's not a problem, I think I showed how blindsight does not falsify and may actually serve to validate this view of consciousness. Edited by Simple Occam on 05/19/08 - 01:08 PM

reincarnated
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Posted 05/20/08 - 02:28 AM:	#193
Simple Occam wrote: It's the having of perceptual qualia (sights, sounds, tastes, smells, tactile feelings and emotions), specifically, that I mean by "consciousness". Since there are different types and degrees of consciousness, such consciousness as you refer to is often referred to as "phenomenal consciousness" (or p-consciousness) to avoid ambiguities. Simple Occam wrote: One of the big confusions of this issue comes from not making these distinctions clear. I agree completely - which is why I suggest we stick to the term "p-consciousness" when specifically referring to phenomenal conscioiusness. Simple Occam wrote: That's why other animals have qualia, too. This is an assumption. Could you demonstrate that other animals have qualia?
�If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

Simple Occam
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Posted 05/20/08 - 07:24 AM:	#194
Do you doubt that your puppy has feelings?? Or that the source of your steak dinner felt no pain? Or what about you and me? Can we "demonstrate" that the other one has phenomenal properties? What would such a demonstration consist of? If you are introducing the empiricist's problem of other minds here as it relates to out-of-species consciousness, then fine. But it's pretty much the same problem. The only difference is that human subjects can use language to give reports describing their psychological states. What we observe are the reports, not the psychological states. But humans also provide non-linguistic representations in body-language and other non-verbal cues that are consistent with similar reactions throughout the animal kingdom. We certainly recognize what an animal in pain looks like and draw the same kind of inference we do with humans to their own psychological states. So, yes, we infer to the existence of other minds. It's an important aspect of our survival mechanism to imagine the psychological states of other people. To get inside their heads and try to understand what they were thinking when they did or said something. The metaphysical argument is that if mind and brain are identical, other animals having similar neurophysiology must have a similar consciousness. What it is like to be somthing varies with what that something actually is. Can I "prove" that, by being both me and someone or something else. Can I BE you? No, obviously I can't. So, if that is the only test that will satisfy you, then, no, I can't demonstrate it. But that unreasonable standard is what seems to be required in your question. Of course, it's an assumption. What else could it be? But what, would you say, is a reasonable standard of proof? I'm suggesting that it's reasonable to assume it if, by assuming it, we can explain the most with the simplest set of assumptions. It's certainly more reasonable to assume they have qualia than that they don't. Indeed, if we explain our own consciousness as the intrinsic nature of the functioning brain, and also recognize that our brains evolved from earlier life forms, then it would be metaphysically inconsistant to hold that other animals are not conscious (in their own ways), too. And, yes, we can't address the problem of mind without doing metaphysics. Assume that when I refer to consciousness, I mean p-consciousness. But I want to emphasize that reflection and self-awareness or self-consciousness are NOT instances of having qualia. The referents that we are picking out when we refer, as philosophers, to qualia, are the objects of immediate awareness that appear in perception. These are distinct from the objects of immediate awareness that appear in in reflection, such as appear when doing mathematics or geometry. There is no qualitative aspect to these objects of immediate awareness, as there is for perception.

The Escapist
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Posted 05/20/08 - 10:08 AM:	#195
Simple Occam wrote: different parts of the brain outside the forebrain, ie, in the reptile portion of the brain that uses visual input to guide behavior and projects waves to a different region of the thalamus. So they actually do process visual data, but not in a way that produces qualia. I encourage you to research this independently of what I say and let me know if there's a problem with the neurophysiology of what I wrote. But assuming there's not a problem, I think I showed how blindsight does not falsify and may actually serve to validate this view of consciousness. But you said "Sometimes the brain is processing sensory data. Sometimes it's not. I'm saying that whenever it is functioning in that way, there are phenomenal qualities because these are nothing more or less than what it is like to be the animal with the brain that is processing sensory data." I think you are simply contradicting yourself.

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Posted 05/20/08 - 11:36 AM:	#196
Escapist, I understand why you say that. But you can't think my claim was that any or all brain actvity was identical with having qualia. It's only the part responsible for THAT kind of processing that has the kind of intrinsic nature that appears as phenomenal consciousness to the animal. The language-processing faculty, for instance, does not have a qualititive aspect. So using the word 'green' does not result in having green qualia, whereas, seeing a groomed baseball field does. The word my suggest the image of something green and THAT may generate a memory of opening day at the ballpark and the imagining of green. But that image would be gererated elsewhere in the brain from where the language is processed. In the case of blindsight, the processing of visual data is going on in a more primative brain function than the one in the mammalian brain which processes information related to color, but can give a vague notion of shape or position. I would be contradicting myself only if I said that the SAME part of the brain, functioning in the same way both did AND did not have the intrinsic aspect identical to qualia. I hope this clarifies it for you.

The Escapist
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Posted 05/20/08 - 02:49 PM:	#197
Simple Occam wrote: I hope this clarifies it for you. No, it doesn't really, I think you are just shifting your ground. What is the "vague notion" you claim is present when blindsighted people are shown objects? They deny having any such notion. The language-processing faculty, for instance, does not have a qualititive aspect. So using the word 'green' does not result in having green qualia, whereas, seeing a groomed baseball field does. Thinking and using words does have a qualitative aspect; in your terms there is something it is like to be thinking the word "green". You've said: If an animal has any sort of perceptual abilities, it has some form of consciousness. and It's the having of perceptual qualia (sights, sounds, tastes, smells, tactile feelings and emotions), specifically, that I mean by "consciousness". When we are dreamlessly asleep we can perceive a pin prick in our foot. We do have perceptual abilities. We do not have consciousness, in your terms. We are not having a tactile feeling, there is nothing it is like for us.

Gort
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Posted 05/20/08 - 06:14 PM:	#198
To those who claim Mind exists (i.e. Mind as a substance) I would ask the following. Specify a procedure that can objectively find a Mind in a body that is not one's own. Bob Kolker

MDH
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Posted 05/20/08 - 10:26 PM:	#199
Hmm. I may be a bit rusty. Now this is paranormal, you don't need to take it seriously, it's an old practice that was mentioned to me by a practicing psychic medium years ago. First of all, find someone's name, and spell it out word by word in your mind, visually or otherwise. Say you wanted to understand that fine old skeptic (not) James Randi. You would break his name into number of words, then have a complete comprehension of his name. Them, literally assume their position in first person. You are them, in a class somewhere, and don't assume any details about the class. The teacher says your name, last name first and first name second and you look up at them as that person. Supposedly she used this to litreally put herself in someone's body and understand their perception of life. Is it a subconcious thing? I have always wondered that myself because of the subconcious ability to assume a personality and creatively fill in the gaps. One time I tried to trick her about four years ago. I said, please can you tell me about the acting personality of Joan Meli because I wanted to know more about her. She said it was like she hit a "null", something that didn't exist. She was probably the least fraudulent or most authentic practicing psychic I have ever personally met...

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Posted 05/20/08 - 10:28 PM:	#200
Hmm. I may be a bit rusty. Now this is paranormal, you don't need to take it seriously, it's an old practice that was mentioned to me by a practicing psychic medium years ago. First of all, find someone's name, and spell it out word by word in your mind, visually or otherwise. Say you wanted to understand that fine old skeptic (not) James Randi. You would break his name into number of words, then have a complete comprehension of his name. Them, literally assume their position in first person. You are them, in a class somewhere, and don't assume any details about the class. The teacher says your name, last name first and first name second and you look up at them as that person. Supposedly she used this to litreally put herself in someone's body and understand their perception of life. Is it a subconcious thing? I have always wondered that myself because of the subconcious ability to assume a personality and creatively fill in the gaps. One time I tried to trick her about four years ago. I said, please can you tell me about the acting personality of Joan Meli because I wanted to know more about her. She said it was like she hit a "null", something that didn't exist. She was probably the least fraudulent or most authentic practicing psychic I have ever personally met...

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