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Gettier counterexamples

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Gettier counterexamples

Paul
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 04/05/02 - 05:35 PM:	#1
The traditional analysis of knowledge says that to know that p, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) you believe that p (2) you have justification that p (3) p is true . Many people seem to believe that this theory has been shown wrong by Gettier counterexamples. But, are they justified in this belief and is it a true belief that the traditional analysis doesn't work? Here's an example situation: a) The clock on the wall reads 1:00 right now b) You believe that it's 1:00 c) the clock has always been accurate before: in the past whenever the clock has read 1:00 it's really been 1:00 d) c probabilistically implies that it's now 1:00 e) it really is (in reality) 1:00 f) however, the clock broke 12 hours ago Gettier's supporters would explain it this way: You believe it's 1:00, you're justified in believing that it's 1:00, and it's true that it's 1:00... but you don't really know that it's 1:00. Gettier would want to use this to tack on a 4th condition. There are, however, a couple of ways to dismiss Gettier. The first way would be to simply call the above situation knowledge. The second way is to attack the status of it as knowledge using the traditional analysis, by calling the true belief unjustified. To me, it seems obvious that the justification wasn't good enough. The example simply secures the position of the skeptic, demonstrating that what we consider to be justification isn't always good enough. Myself, I'd actually reduce the requirements for absolute knowledge to this. (1) you believe that p (2) you can fully justify that p If it's fully justified, then it's automatically true so there's no need to involve an extra condition of truth. Gettier's examples only serve as skeptical arguments, demonstrating how difficult it is to have full justification, despite his intent to make them into more than that.

bertie
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Posted 04/05/02 - 07:41 PM:	#2
Paul, you owe us an account of 'full' or adequate justification of belief. How do we distinguish 'full' justification from that which is 'not good enough'?

Paul
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Posted 04/05/02 - 09:04 PM:	#3
Full justification is what I'd consider unattainable, because there's always something missing at the base. To use Keith Lehrer's example, you can't justify your belief that there aren't any super-intelligent Googols messing with your thoughts without appealing to evidence that itself depends on the assumption that there aren't any Googols around. I think of absolute knowledge as being what we attempt to approach, rather than what we actually achieve. Absolute knowledge is the limit which is approached by an infinite level of justification. It seems like maybe there should be a second category of knowledge to cover what we really achieve instead of just what we strive towards: relative knowledge. This would be where the justification is good enough that it makes sense to other people. These are beliefs that can be considered knowledge if you grant a certain set of basic unjustified beliefs. We can't be sure that it's valid, but we call it knowledge anyway since it tends to convince us. Basically, whatever is convincing to other people when used as an argument is adequate justification of relative knowledge. Even with relative knowledge, it seems to me that Gettier counterexamples are useless... they just show that things in your basic group of assumptions can be false.

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Posted 04/06/02 - 04:22 AM:	#4
As to Gettier, I don't believe I know the gentleman! However, I think the clock example is an interesting point for discussion. I see it, as with many such principles, being a point(s) of dividing the community; those who feel that, say, "Good enough is all right with me" and those who feel the need to pursue answers ad infinitum. Naturally, the majority probably have feelings between those extremes, in varying degrees. My own view is that past experiences and evaluations have shown the clock to be true, so its probably true this time. And, its interesting to note that in the example, even though its a day late, its still, nevertheless, 1:00 O'Clock, isn't it? However, just to give it some perspective, if I'd really lost an entire 24-hour period somehow without knowing it, I'd probably be very hungry and thirsty! That, in itself, should make me ignore the clock, whether it was right or wrong. My own personal view of this, and of philosophy in general, is usually based on how the theories affect our lives. Its one thing to delve deeply into a theory as an exercise in mental gymnastics, but at some point, it will probably never have any real bearing on our lives. I.e., true enough is okay with me. Baron Max

Paul
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Posted 04/06/02 - 05:25 PM:	#5
It seems you're misunderstanding the example, I guess I didn't explain it very clearly. It's not saying that you lost a 24 hour period, only that the clock broke. You think it's 1:00 PM on April 6th, and it really is 1:00 PM on April 6th... but do you really know that when your justification is looking at a broken clock? Gettier agrees with you that what we commonly call justification is ok... he's not a skeptic. That's why he thinks there has to be a 4th condition for knowledge. I just think he's mislead and simply showing that what we commonly consider knowledge isn't infallible... he'd be better off as a skeptic. Here's Edmund Gettier's paper "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?": PDF \| HTML

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Posted 04/07/02 - 12:03 PM:	#6
Originally posted by Paul It seems you're misunderstanding the example, I guess I didn't explain it very clearly. It's not saying that you lost a 24 hour period, only that the clock broke. You think it's 1:00 PM on April 6th, and it really is 1:00 PM on April 6th... but do you really know that when your justification is looking at a broken clock? To be even more clear it should be explained, which is what I attempt to do here, that since the clock broke 12 hours ago (at 1:00 am instead of 1:00 pm) the belief that the clock displays the correct time is unjustified. This is because the evidence for the belief that it is 1:00 pm comes from a clock that displays the time 1:00 am. I totally agree with Paul's beautiful analysis of Gettier's examples. For the past few years, ever since I first heard the counterexamples myself, I have always thought that they were not correct. I thought I was alone in this but it is good to hear that I am not. I am even planning to write something on the subject. Gettier's examples, which I reccomend everyone to read, try to show that the JTB (justified, true, belief) account is not sufficient for knowledge. However, like Paul, I believe that those examples are simply unjustified beliefs. Gettier seems to hinge his ideas upon entailments. This would normally be okay; there is nothing wrong with entailments. However, those entailments that Gettier uses are what I call imaginary ones. They are not true entailments. In his first example (probably the best one he gives) the "entailment" is from a false belief to a true one. This seems illogical. But, because of this many philosophers have sought to add to the JTB account by incorporating another requirement that eliminates all entailments of this kind. This gives credence to Gettier's example and I think that it is a mistake. An "entailment" of this kind is no entialment at all. Further, Gettier's second example rests on an even more readily imaginary entailment. In the example, Smith has good reason (is justified) in believing that Jones owns a Ford. Based on this belief he makes the following "entailments:" -- Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston -- Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona -- Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk Now, Gettier states that Smith accepts all of these propositions and they are all justified because the belief that entailed them is justified. Well, it turns out that Jones is driving a rental Ford so the original belief is false. But it just so happens, by sheer coincidence mind you, that Brown is in fact in Barcelona. Gettier believes that this a problem for the JTB account of knowledge. He could be no further from the truth. Like in the first example, the entailment comes from a false belief. But, even more ridiculous is the way the "entailments" are formulated. For example: Either my belief is true or q, where q is any random statement you wish to make. Now, I understand the basics of logical statements and an OR statement is still a true statement if only one half is true. Unfortunately for Gettier though, stating that this kind of proposition can be a correct entailment when there is nothing inherent in the belief (Jones owns a Ford) that could imply (entail) the q that follows is false. Therefore, the JTB account is not only vindicated when it can be shown that the Gettier counterexamples are mistakes, it is strengthened. (c) copyright, Joshua Chambers 2002. Note: I would like to thank Paul, who seems to me to be a wonderful philosopher with much breadth, for introducing this discussion to the forum. Keep up the good work. -- Josh (www.geocities.com/philosophy_rules)

Jason
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Posted 04/16/02 - 11:56 PM:	#7
Logically, they do entail. Epistemologically, they don't follow. I think you're right, Josh. Smith is not justified in believing the proposition "Brown is in Barcelona," which represents the truth. Not only is he not justified, but there is no good reason why he would form the belief in the first place (assuming Smith is not in fact a psychic!).

Lance
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Posted 08/02/02 - 03:12 AM:	#8
I totally agree with Paul's beautiful analysis of Gettier's examples. For the past few years, ever since I first heard the counterexamples myself, I have always thought that they were not correct. Josh, I agree that Gettier's counterexamples don't seem (or perhaps I should say feel) correct. I'm not sure I agree with Paul's analysis though. In any case there are some point that need to be clarified: (1) the term "justification" is being used fairly loosely in this series of posts. There are at least two ways it could be taken. First, it might be being used in a deontological sense that assumes an internalist conception of epistemic justification. Or, it might be being used as place holder in the analysis on knowledge. In this sense it should only be taken to represent whatever property (or conjunction of properties) is sufficient to convert a true belief into knowledge. From the context it seems that it is being used in the first sense. (2) Gettier's examples, which I reccomend everyone to read, try to show that the JTB (justified, true, belief) account is not sufficient for knowledge. However, like Paul, I believe that those examples are simply unjustified beliefs. Gettier seems to hinge his ideas upon entailments. This would normally be okay; there is nothing wrong with entailments. However, those entailments that Gettier uses are what I call imaginary ones. They are not true entailments. In his first example (probably the best one he gives) the "entailment" is from a false belief to a true one. This seems illogical. But, because of this many philosophers have sought to add to the JTB account by incorporating another requirement that eliminates all entailments of this kind. I'm not sure what the point was here. It seems that the complaint is that there is something fishy about the entailment from a false belief to a true belief. Perhaps so, but the point needs to be argued. In any case there is no logical problem (anything follows from a false proposition if a conditional is taken materially - this just is the reason why disjunctive addition is a truth preserving argument form). It could also be that the complaint concerns the underlying premise in Gettier's example that justification is closed under known implication. (If S is justified in believing that p, and knows that p entail q, then S is justified in believing q) If so, it should be noted that most additions to the JTB analysis do not try to rule out entailments. What they generally attempt to show is that the original belief, in this case, that Jones owns a Ford, is not justified. Very few philosophers reject closure of justification under known implication. I would be interested in continuing this discussion...

Unisonus
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Posted 09/09/05 - 01:34 PM:	#9
If knowledge is justified, true, belief - then any instance of justified, true, belief is knowledge - and the Gettier example only describes one such instance. What Gettier examples really show us, is that we want something more than knowledge - or - we would like to make the word mean something else.
"...take care that your style and diction run musically, pleasantly, and plainly, with clear, proper, and well-placed words, setting forth your purpose to the best of your power, and putting your ideas intelligibly, without confusion or obscurity." - Miguel de Cervantes

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Posted 09/09/05 - 09:51 PM:	#10
a) The clock on the wall reads 1:00 right now b) You believe that it's 1:00 c) the clock has always been accurate before: in the past whenever the clock has read 1:00 it's really been 1:00 d) c probabilistically implies that it's now 1:00 e) it really is (in reality) 1:00 how do we know it is NOT 1:00? if there is nothing to suggest otherwise?

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