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Free Will - A Thought Experiment
a challenge to those who believe in free will

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Free Will - A Thought Experiment

Desidude666
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Posted 11/01/09 - 11:25 PM:	#21
reincarnated wrote: My question to you is very simple. On this second time around, would you make the same decision again? Please also provide an explanation for your answer (ie if you answer that you would make the same decision again, why would you do so? Why would you not choose differently the second time around? And if you answer that you would make a different decision, why would you do so? Why would you not choose the same as the first time around?). Yes, because you know. Would you elect to not know if you can? Personally, I will not. Knowledge comes with experience, whether it is pleasant or not is a matter of subjectivity. I consider knowing to be all-important, over living even. In that sense, I would choose to elect the same path because it would then result in me knowing. Whatever happens, if it ends with me knowing, it's all worth it.
What you are, you are by accident of birth; what I am, I am by myself. There are and will be a thousand princes; there is only one Beethoven. - Ludwig van Beethoven

hanuma
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Posted 11/02/09 - 02:18 PM:	#22
swstephe wrote: I had my own mental experiment along these lines, which I turned into a small demonstration. I pull out two similar objects, say an apple and a banana. I ask someone to choose one. After they choose, I reset the experiment and ask them to choose again. In the absence of any actual meaning to the choice (presumably the choice does not preclude eating the chosen object) I don't see how the second decision is different to the first. Even if the chooser is cognisant of their first choice, whilst making the second choice, they are still picking something that means nothing to them beyond the presumption that it is going to lead to something worth listening to from whoever presented them the choice. The chooser would not have to be considering the ramifications of the choice in its relation to their own free will, it is an exercise of 'free will' to choose the game in the first place, as opposed to choosing not to participate. If we get to eat our choices then would it be an exercise in free will to allow my greed to decide that picking both options was a good bet ?

reincarnated
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Posted 11/04/09 - 08:08 AM:	#23
Hi Thank you all for taking the time and trouble to address the question posed in the OP. Most of you have put considerable effort into your posts, so I will try to do them justice by responding in kind. (Note: Where I use “he” or “his” in the below, this should be taken as meaning “he/she” and “his/her” respectively). Arkady wrote: This question never ceases to be a source of fascination, reincarnated, and for me, no philosophical question has ever provided such a gut-check. I feel the same. Arkady wrote: I don't doubt that most people (free will libertarians or otherwise) would concur that if we conducted an experiment in which we, say, fired a cannon shell, we'd get the exact same result each time, provided (as you say), the antecedent conditions are exactly the same. I think where some people run into trouble is that they have difficulty picturing their mind as a purely physical system. It certainly doesn't feel that consciousness (including conscious deliberation) is a result of pulleys, springs, and gears inside of our heads, rendering it subject to the same material, mechanistic causation as everything else in the universe. But, to believe otherwise is to commit oneself to some form of Cartesian dualism, with all of its attendant problems (a commitment which I don't think can be justified in the light of scientific findings, though philosophy of mind is not my forte: there may well be good modern arguments for dualism which I don't know about). So, I believe that one is forced to conclude that the answer to your question is YES, we would make the same decision. You’re clearly a compatibilist, if not a determinist. Cool. atightropewalker wrote: This assumes that our thoughts are solely determined by previous actions. Sorry, but the thought experiment as described makes no such assumption. I simply ask you to imagine that you can turn the clock back to a point just before your decision – where by definition your thoughts must be the same as they were the first time around. You are free to assume (if you wish) that subsequent thoughts are NOT determined by antecedent states. atightropewalker wrote: It may be possible that we have preset default positions regarding ethics, decision making etc. that exist outside of causal time. The free will is then our ability to use realworld experiences to mould our own default positions. No problem accommodating this. Such “default positions” will be the same in both cases (the first time round, and the rewind), just as all antecedent conditions will be the same. So….. you did not answer the question, atightropewalker… would you choose the same again, and why? aletheist wrote: I am a libertarian, so my answer might surprise you--I would almost certainly make the same decision again, because I would (presumably) weigh the same factors in the same way. A clever answer, which avoids the "trap" referred to by swsthephe. You say “almost certainly”? But why not “certainly”? Can you give an example of a case where you would NOT have made the same decision the second time round (and if so, why)? If you cannot give an example, could you perhaps explain why you are unable to give an example? In hindsight, then, a better question for me to have posed would have been: "Thinking of all of the non-capricious free will decisions that you have made in your life, can you think of just one example of a free will decision where you WOULD choose differently the second time round (in the rewind), and if so, why would you choose differently?" (If the decision is non-capricious then there must be a rational reason for it). aletheist wrote: There is no inconsistency here; the fact that I (probably) would not have done otherwise does not entail that I could not have done otherwise. Oh, I agree there is no inconsistency. It is indeed possible that there are genuinely random factors in our decision making (the world may in fact be indeterministic at the quantum level), in which case one could indeed do otherwise (but not from intentionality, simply from caprice). Its also instructive to note that the fact that you (probably) would not have done otherwise does not entail that you COULD have done otherwise. You simply seem to assume that you could have done otherwise. To avoid determinism, it is not enough that you THINK that you COULD have done otherwise, it is necessary that you WOULD have done otherwise on at least one occasion. Why? Because if there is not at least one occasion on which you WOULD have done otherwise, as opposed to simply THINKING that you COULD have done otherwise, then it folllows that there is a deterministic relation between antecedent states and your choices (in that for any given antecedent state of the universe, your choice is also determined). So, to get back to my new question - can you think of just one non-capricious free will decision in your life where, if you could choose again, you WOULD do otherwise, and if so, why would you do otherwise? aletheist wrote: naturalism/physicalism has yet to provide an adequate explanation for consciousness, rationality, the unified self, intrinsic value, and objective morality. It’s a little off-topic, but the last three I see as non-existent, the second as a non-issue, and the first is adequately covered in the thread “Consciousness” (especially post #21) in the metaphysics section. bouncingsoul wrote: clearly, you can only imagine yourself making the same choice, but why should we suppose otherwise? It says nothing about the issue of free will. It says volumes. IF you can only (imagine yourself to) make the same choice, THEN it follows that your choice is determined by antecedent conditions –which is a compatibiliist as opposed to metaphysical libertarian view of free will. (The metaphysical libertarian would insist that she could, indeed in some cases WOULD, make a different choice). bouncingsoul wrote: the determinist is actually the one who makes the bold and unjustified claim: that all phenomena can be explained in terms of cause and effect. in naturalistic enquiry we don't assume a particular causal relationship to hold between events until we find it. There is no evidence that human behaviour is rigidly determined by causal antecedents. None whatsoever You’re missing the point. A compatibilist does not argue that determinism is true. It may not be. The truth or falsity of determinism makes no difference to the truth of compatibilism, and determinism is certainly not assumed true in the thought experiment. bouncingsoul wrote: Furthermore there is no evidence that human behaviour can in principle be predicted by a probabilistic system that incorporates randomness (as quantum mechanics does for subatomic phenomena). Predictability is epistemic. Inability to predict behavior does not disprove ontic determinism. bouncingsoul wrote: We have no foothold on questions of human choice/will, or if you like, how, as physical systems, we initiate actions or put to use our capacities in one way or another. We certainly do have a foothold – as your answer to the question in the OP illustrates. unenlightened wrote: Winding the clock is no problem, but winding time back, I have never managed. If life was like a film, it might be done, but that is rather the question isn't it? If I imagine life as a film, then I imagine it as determined. If I imagine it as undetermined, then I cannot imagine it being wound back, and time only lasts once. This is (with respect) the typical response of the metaphysical libertarian – to refuse to accept the conditions of the thought experiment. But why? Why do you find it impossible to imagine being in exactly the same position a second time, where all antecedent conditions are the same? Could you explain? madmaxthundercats wrote: If an event is not caused, then what is it? Random? Randomness is not an argument for free will; if all of our behavior is random then we have no more control over it than if it were predetermined. To me, it seems that any event can only be caused or random, and in neither case does "free will" exist. Is there a third option? If so, please enlighten me. So, madmax, I assume you would answer the OP as “yes, I would make the same decision again”? bouncingsoul wrote: I didn't mean that the issue of determinism has nothing to do with free will. But the thought experiment itself doesn't get to the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter (for me) is not whether determinism is true or not (I see this as irrelevant), it is whether metaphysical libertarian free will is coherent or not. The thought experiment gets right to the heart of this matter. hanuma wrote: Hi. Reminds me of something I read by Nietzsche, he asked whether we would change the way we live our lives if we were told that we would have to re-live it over and over again exactly as we lived it the first time. The suggestion is naturally absurd because it pre-supposes that we are living it for the first time and that we won't get given the same prophecy in every other repetition of our life. To answer your question, yes, I am as certain as possible that I would definitely have still been too weak, at the time I am thinking of, to have taken another path, one that might have served me better by now. I'd like to know what the ramifications of that are in terms of the general concept of 'free will'. Sounds to me like you are a compatibilist. Cool. swstephe wrote: The trick is the OP is asking "why". As soon as you explain why, you give a deterministic external cause for your action. The objective alternative is that your actions at any time are random or chaotic and winding the clock back could potentially lead to a different action, without a deterministic cause that we can determine. So, it is a trap -- explaining "why" makes it deterministic. The question a libertarian would have to answer is why would free will be an advantage in a world where one's actions couldn't be predicted. A trap? Well of course it’s a trap in some sense – if the thought experiment was not designed to achieve a certain objective then it would hardly be a very useful thought experiment, would it? Why? I am asking “why” simply to establish that your choice is not capricious. If you cannot answer “why” (if there is no reason you can give for choosing the same, or for choosing differently) then you cannot expect me to believe that your choice is not capricious. Of course I have no problem with caprice – we are all free to act randomly if we choose - but please don’t expect me to believe that our entire concept of free will is based just on caprice. So, swstephe, you did not answer the OP. Would you choose the same, and why? swstephe wrote: Another aspect of the rewind is interesting. Of course, we would live our lives differently if we knew anything of the consequences of our actions. To recreate the exact same conditions, we would also have to be completely unaware that we were repeating our actions. Which is exactly what I specified in the OP. swstephe wrote: Since time travel into the past is logically impossible -- or would end up with some parallel universe interpretation, a different choice (within the same universe/timeline) would be impossible, too. I don’t think you are correct here. There are self-consistent solutions to the Einsteinian equations of motion which involve travel into the past (check Godelian universes), and as far as I know nobody has shown time travel (even within one universe) to be logically impossible. Desidude666 wrote: Yes, because you know. Would you elect to not know if you can? Personally, I will not. Knowledge comes with experience, whether it is pleasant or not is a matter of subjectivity. I consider knowing to be all-important, over living even. In that sense, I would choose to elect the same path because it would then result in me knowing. Because you know…. What? Please could you explain what knowledge you are referring to here. In summary, we have: Arkady: Would always do the same again (a compatibilist response). atightropewalker: Did not answer the question. aletheist: Claims to be a metaphysical libertarian, would “almost certainly” do the same again, but has not explained under what circumstances he might NOT do the same again. bouncingsoul: Anti-determinist, but admits that he can only (imagine himself to) make the same choice again (a compatibilist response). unenlightened: Refuses to accept the conditions of the thought experiment (hence avoids answering the question). madmaxthundercats: Does not explicitly answer the question, but seems to argue for compatibilism. hanuma: Is as certain as possible that he would do the same again (a compatibilist response) swstephe: Did not answer the question. Desidude666: Not sure I understand his response. I applaud aletheist’s admission that he is a metaphysical libertarian whilst at the same time answering the question (the only metaphysical libertarian so far I think who has been brave enough to answer the question). – but, since his answer was “almost certainly” I would be very interested to know his response to the further question as to which particular choices in life he might choose differently, if any, and why? Edited by reincarnated on 11/04/09 - 08:21 PM
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Arkady
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Posted 11/04/09 - 04:27 PM:	#24
reincarnated wrote: You’re clearly a compatibilist, if not a determinist. Cool. Nope. I'm actually an incompatibilist, in that I think determinism is true, and I believe this precludes free will (in a robust metaphysical sense). My point was that even though our minds may not feel like a physical system, they are a physical system, and thus are subject to determinism.
"Sit down before fact like a little child, and be prepared to give up every preconceived notion. Follow humbly wherever and to whatever abyss Nature leads, or you shall learn nothing." -T.H. Huxley

reincarnated
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Posted 11/04/09 - 08:13 PM:	#25
Arkady wrote: Nope. I'm actually an incompatibilist, in that I think determinism is true, and I believe this precludes free will (in a robust metaphysical sense). I did qualify my judgement with "if not a determinist" Whether you are deemed a compatibilist or not depends on one's definition of "free will". I'm a compatibilist, in that I use a definition of free will which is compatible with determinism (since the metaphysical libertarian definition of free will is incoherent thus unworkable). To me, free will is simply the ability to do what one wants to do - which is the only kind of free will which makes any sense, and is completely compatible with determinism. Edited by reincarnated on 11/04/09 - 08:26 PM
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Wirya
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Posted 11/04/09 - 10:00 PM:	#26
swstephe wrote: The trick is the OP is asking "why". As soon as you explain why, you give a deterministic external cause for your action. The objective alternative is that your actions at any time are random or chaotic and winding the clock back could potentially lead to a different action, without a deterministic cause that we can determine. So, it is a trap -- explaining "why" makes it deterministic. The question a libertarian would have to answer is why would free will be an advantage in a world where one's actions couldn't be predicted. But what if the "why" I'm trying to explain is created internally, freely, independently within myself?
"I've always believed that evil is born in a cold heart and a weak mind." - Mike Atkins

Minyun
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Posted 11/04/09 - 11:07 PM:	#27
If I had it all over again, and had no recollection of what has happened in the present/future, then I would do it exactly the same, not because I wanted to but because there is no way I could do it differently. Freedom is becoming nothing, unresponsive, unaffected, unhuman. Is it worth it?

unenlightened
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Posted 11/05/09 - 01:53 AM:	#28
reincarnated wrote: This is (with respect) the typical response of the metaphysical libertarian – to refuse to accept the conditions of the thought experiment. But why? Why do you find it impossible to imagine being in exactly the same position a second time, where all antecedent conditions are the same? Could you explain? It's great to be so predictable! If it is the exact same position, and all the antecedant conditions are the same, then in what sense is it the second time? It seems to me that you have specified that it shall be the first time -wound back to. From my hypothesised position as a thought experimenter, outside time, I can run time forward and back, but in order for it to happen the second time, it must already have happened the first time, so time has passed for the experimenter in some other dimension of time. If that dimension is also run back, then it is the first time. In other words, the notion of two times that are the same time is incoherent.
...most of our actions are the result of the past, or according to a future ideal. That's not action, that is just conformity. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

keda
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Posted 11/05/09 - 03:13 AM:	#29
It seems to me "the first time" and "the second time" isn't refering to the same time, but the second time is a time after the first. Either that or reincarnated has some two dimensional time in mind, where two events are simultaneous in dimension X but not simultaneous in dimension Y.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

keda
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Posted 11/05/09 - 03:24 AM:	#30
Assuming the first (the second doesn't make much sense) I would always choose the same thing each time the same circumstances occurrs. Another person who has (atemporally) made a different choice would in my situation choose differently, albeit always the same. That I always choose X is due to my will being a rule that dictates what I will do in a specific situation, so much like a computer program will always produce the same output given the same input, so will my will always pick the same action (or inaction) in the same situation.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

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