J. Random Hacker wrote:
If there is a god, that god knows exactly what evidence it would take for me to believe in it and is powerful enough to provide that evidence. The fact that I remain unconvinced is evidence that either such a god does not exist or does not care what I believe.

TempletonEsquire wrote:
Instant death from God.
Then they would receive instant spontaneous death from God.

TempletonEsquire wrote:
Since only the human and nature can voice an opinion on that directly to other humans and natural things, then it is ultimately up to humans and nature.

TempletonEsquire wrote:
Also, have you considered there is a omnipotent force that wishes to be unknown and that you are only frustrating it by trying to reveal its presence?

aletheist wrote:
Non-theists will occasionally offer something like the following (posted in the Debate 12 discussion thread) as an argument for not believing in the traditional God of theism.


Although this approach seems powerful at first, I think that it has several flaws, which will become more apparent if we formalize it.

1. Premise - If an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God exists, then he has the knowledge, capability, and desire to provide exactly the kinds and amounts of evidence that would be sufficient for each and every human to believe that he exists.
2. Premise - Everyone who has the knowledge, capability, and desire to do something, actually does it.
3. From 1&2 - If an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God exists, then he actually provides exactly the kinds and amounts of evidence that would be sufficient for each and every human to believe that he exists.
4. Premise - Each and every human who receives exactly the kinds and amounts of evidence that would be sufficient for him or her to believe something, actually believes it.
5. From 3&4 - If an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God exists, then each and every human actually believes that he exists.
6. Observation - Some humans do not believe that God exists.
7. From 5&6 - An omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God does not exist.

1, 6, and 7 are fairly explicit in the quoted version, and my guess is that 1 (at first) and 6 are relatively uncontroversial as stated here, even among those (like me) who reject 7. 2 through 5 are my additions, which I believe are necessary to get from 1 and 6 to 7 in a logically valid way; i.e., they are implicit in the quoted version. Some may complain that I am creating and attacking a straw man here, so please tell me if you think that there is anything inaccurate or inappropriate about my proposed formalization.

2 is somewhat problematic. For one thing, there are times when we desire to do something that is within our knowledge and capability, but choose to do otherwise. This can perhaps be countered by arguing that in such cases, another desire overrides the one at hand; for example, the desire to be ethical in general keeps me from fulfilling a desire to do some specific unethical thing in a particular situation. However, in order to preserve the argument, it then becomes necessary to qualify the term "desire" in 1 and 2, such that there could not possibly be any other desire of an omnibenevolent God that would take precedent over the desire to provide exactly the kinds and amounts of evidence that would be sufficient for each and every human to believe that he exists.

4 reflects the fairly common assumption that belief is involuntary, because genuine evidence is cognitively compelling, at least to any rational person. I find this also to be problematic, because it neglects the role of the will. Many sane and competent people adhere to claims that are demonstrably false--not because they are unaware of the evidence, but because they simply refuse to accept it. Theists are often accused of exactly this by non-theists; we supposedly believe in the existence of God because we want it to be true, not because there is any substantive evidence for it. Of course, some theists make the reciprocal claim--that non-theists do not believe in the existence of God because they do not want it to be true, not because the evidence is lacking.

In light of these comments, I would now like to offer three specific objections to the overall argument.
A. Suppose that God knows and provides exactly the kinds and amounts of evidence that would be sufficient for a given human to believe that he exists; what would prevent that person from deliberately "moving the goalposts" at that point?
B. For most theists, omnipotence means that God can do anything that is possible; but what if some people would never willingly believe that God exists, no matter what kinds and amounts of evidence they received?
C. Most importantly, who has the prerogative to establish exactly what kinds and amounts of evidence are sufficient for a given human to believe that God exists--the human, or God?

It seems to me that the issue is not whether God has provided the kinds and amounts of evidence that meet someone's arbitrary individual standard, but whether that person is conscientiously looking for the kinds and amounts of evidence that God could reasonably be expected to provide in accordance with what are understood to be his divine nature and purposes. Hence, one might not properly seek the same kinds and amounts of evidence for Allah as for YHWH, since their character and priorities are different, according to their alleged revelations. Paul K. Moser is a philosopher who has written extensively about this line of thinking, most notably in his latest book, The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology, published by Cambridge University Press (2008).

For example, Christianity teaches that God does not want each and every human merely to acknowledge his existence; he desires a mutually voluntary and permanent love relationship with himself as Lord. It is not just about the intellect, but also the will; really, one's whole being. God is not something to be known (propositionally); he is someone to be known (personally). This places an inevitable limitation on the value and efficacy of so-called "objective" and "scientific" evidence; why should we expect a personal and supernatural God to provide adequate impersonal and natural evidence of his existence? The distant, sterile God of the philosophers is not yet the immanent, intentional God of the Bible. We do not and cannot find him by our own efforts and abilities; rather, he reaches out to us in mercy and grace.

In conclusion, it seems wrongheaded and, frankly, arrogant to insist that humans should be able to dictate to God the manner in which God must reveal himself, and to complain that he is failing to adhere to our demands in this regard. Contrary to what Bertrand Russell stated, there would be no grounds for anyone who faces God in the hereafter to argue that he somehow failed to provide "enough" evidence. To paraphrase Mozart in Amadeus: There is just as much evidence as is required; neither more nor less. I look forward to some spirited feedback!