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Ethics of consciousness
Is consciousness the only thing that can cause the possibility of ethics?

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Ethics of consciousness

longfun
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Posted 11/04/09 - 01:17 AM:	#71
voyaging wrote: Consciousness essentially causes ethics. There is no possibility for ethics without consciousness. What makes consciousness so special that we can from it determine good and bad? How did something such as consciousness even evolve? My main question is this: is there any possible other quality of something that could create a possibility for ethics without consciousness? Or is consciousness a sort of "axiom" in a way, in that it is the ONLY quality that could ever theoretically occur to create the possibility of ethics? you don't need consciousness to have an existing or observable ethics. If you compare it to chemistry I can say that atom's also have ethics (rights and wrongs) and it will follow this at best. A further more complex chemistry can create by its structure its own ethics and only react with preferred materials, or react with quite incompatible material and break in a short timelimit. From that point humans are not even special only a more complex form of chemistry and matter/space displacement... the just as the atom or quark , the only thing a human can do is observe and choose actions in a very large range of actions 9consiously or unconsciously but always with a goal, and humans simply can do this on a large amount of levels(in such only much more complicated then a simple atom, and much more decision making levels then for ex. a single proton)the choice again is always based on observation of one or multiple entities Just as chemical products with limited choices and decision making levels are driven by conservation of energy and stability, so is a human driven by this same basic ethics, Thanks to the "although still limited" overview which consciousness (as added tool) gives over the different levels of action we are able to create more complex stability in order to survive... but don't make it bigger then that... unless you belief in god. But that is another problem, funny enough alos related to conservation of energy and stability.
I'm Long and I'm playing the greatest game of all.

bjolly
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Posted 11/05/09 - 09:27 PM:	#72
parameter wrote: Not at all. Even if the world is deterministic, I can regret a past decision, and if a similar situation occurs again in future I can make a different decision, I am not necessarily forced (by determinism or anything else) to make the same decision the second time around. The point was that the feelings of guilt and remorse transcend a simple, 'hey maybe I should make a different choice next time.' These feelings often last long after the situation has reappeared and we have correct the problem. My argument was that this phenomenon implies not only that we feel it was a bad decision, but that we are bad people for making that decision, and that we deserve punishment for it (via guilt remorse etc.). These forms of punishment work no better, in fact worse, than basic logic. We could simply say, that didn't work, therefore I will not do it again. Basic logic is all that is necessary, but for some reason, whether it's just or not, we punish ourselves emotionally. parameter wrote: Logically, I could have wanted to choose differently, if the antecedent states of the world had been different. But the antecedent states of the world couldn't have been different. This is similar to saying that when an apple falls from a tree it will fall upward, against the force of gravity, and then backing up the argument with the premise that it really could, if the universe had different rules. Did you get the context of my statement? Because I have to admit I find this argument pretty ridiculous. First you said 'I could have chosen a different action to the one I did choose, if I had wanted to choose differently'. I then pointed out that you are saying that you couldn't have chosen differently, and then you responded with the proposition that you logically could if it were a different universe, even though, according to your model, it couldn't be. So this is a hypothetical argument based on alternate universes? What was the intended content of the original statement? parameter wrote: Looked at the other way, why on earth would I have wanted to choose differently to the way I did want to choose if the antecedent conditions were exactly the same? The very notion is absurdly illogical. There is no logical necessity about the way the world is, it is logically contingent. If the past had been different, then I could have chosen differently. Given the past is what it is, and given that I want what I want, why would I want to choose differently? As pointed out already, the very notion that I would want to do what I do not want to do is illogical. Why would I want it? Can you give a reason? If you cannot give a reason, why do you find it so hard to accept? Yes, you keep pointing this out and I'm not quite sure why. I have never proposed anything like this, and I believe you are using bifurcation and straw-man here. First of all, you are oversimplifying and leaving a very vague description of 'want'. There are indefinable levels of want which are most often very contradictory. I don't think the argument against determinism is that we have the ability to go against our determined wants, it's that our wants aren't determined. So, if the question is why would you want to do what you do not want to do, then my response would be, what if you just killed someone? You wanted to do it at that moment, and you likely knew fully that it was the 'wrong' decision, but you were conflicted. I never found it hard to accept this argument. In fact, I ignored it since it seemed to be a digression that could spiral into a whole new discussion, and I still don't see its relevance. parameter wrote: It may seem strange to you, maybe because you are assuming a different definition of freedom. It doesn’t sound strange to me, because it’s the only kind of freedom that actually works. I am not trying to pretend that my freedom is any different to what it actually is – its predetermined, yes, but it works and it means that I can do what I want to do (and you cannot give me a logical reason why I should want to do other that what I want to do). There is no smoke and mirrors there – I’m being frank and honest about what freedom is and how it works. On the contrary, the smoke and mirrors is around the metaphysical libertarian version of freedom, which is naturalistically incoherent and requires something magical to work (but nobody will admit that it needs magic). parameter wrote: Redefining something which was previously incoherent, into a new form which is coherent, is not “smoke and mirrors”, so long as one is upfront and honest about the redefinition. Your accusation is misplaced. parameter wrote: I’m not sure what you are trying to prove here. I can define free will as I wish, I don’t see why I have to accept an absurd and incoherent definition which is imposed on me by someone else. Once again, I am not saying that your definition is bad, just your label. I am not assuming a different definition of freedom because I believe in a different definition, I am assuming simply that it has a different definition. You have taken a word and redefined it to mean the opposite. Why not just say determinism, if that's what you mean? Again, I think it would be really strange if I were to redefine god as the absence of god. If I prove his non-existence I say he doesn't exist, not he does because I'm giving his non-existence the same label. To just redefine terms to mean the complete opposite because you disagree with its original definition leads to miscommunication and misleading arguments. We live in a a social society and if my black means your white, then we are gonna have miscommunications. If you don't like the theory of freewill, that's fine, but you can't then go and say that determinism is freewill. Why don't you just say freewill doesn't exist, if you think it's so absurd, since we already have a word for what you're describing-determinism. parameter wrote: I apologise if I mistakenly assumed you were taking a particular stance, but your posts certainly looked like you were criticizing certain viewpoints. You say you haven’t made any claims for or against any position, and yet you accuse compatibilists of using smoke and mirrors? That certainly seems like a claim to me. I was criticizing your reasoning regarding the two opposing theory's compatibility. Critiquing the validity of your reasoning implies nothing of my own beliefs. I had no claim against your position, I've stated many times that it is reasonable. The claim I made was against what you labeled it as, not the content of your beliefs. parameter wrote: Certainly. What is the cause of nuclear radioactive decay? All the evidence points to the radioactive decay of nucleii being strictly probabilistic (there is simply a certain probability that the nucleus will decay within a certain period of time), but so far nobody has identified any “cause” for this decay. At the quantum level, all processes seem to be of this nature – at a microscopic level it seems the world is ruled simply by probability, not by strict cause and effect. You're right. I was wrong on this point. Let's try another premise to support the same conclusion. Could there be right or wrong without consciousness, and if so, what would define it? parameter wrote: What do you mean by “we”? I certainly use that type of reasoning with humans, because it’s the only reasoning which makes coherent sense, so please don’t assume that you speak for everyone when you say “we don’t use that type of reasoning” Again, please do not use “we” in this context. You have objected to being placed in a box, similarly I object to the implication that everyone agrees with your view of morality.. Okay, wow. I have said time and time again that I agree with your view of morality, i made that perfectly clear. What I was talking about was society's definition of it when I said 'we'. By we, I simply meant society, and I have also made it clear that I disagree with society's view. It was a generality, which there are obviously exceptions to, including me. So, no, I wasn't implying that everyone agrees with me, quite to the contrary. parameter wrote: Exactly what cannot be explained in deterministic terms? Can you give an example? You copy and pasted your answer below where you wrote this. parameter wrote: This is completely compatible with determinism. We cannot hold an individual responsible for its actions unless and until it has developed to the point where it understands the difference between right and wrong (and thus controls its actions accordingly). This is why we treat minors differently, because we make allowance for the fact that they are still developing and they may not yet have fully developed the correct sense of right and wrong. It also explains why we treat mentally deficient people differently. All completely compatible with a deterministic explanation of behavior. First off, since when is a person under 18 unable to comprehend the wrong-hood of killing? My 3 year old niece could tell you that killing is wrong. Second, why is an advanced development of right and wrong a necessary prerequisite for punishment? I thought you said we used the punishment to teach? What would it matter if we didn't have a developed sense of right and wrong, if the punishment was simply based on cause and effect? What would it matter if we had a correct sense of right and wrong or not? It would only matter if you were arguing from the perspective that we should only punish those who chose wrongly when they knew better. parameter wrote: How is any of this incompatible with a deterministic explanation? Can you be specific in explaining just how you think it is incompatible with determinism? I don’t see any incompatibility here. Did you read it? Here it is again. bjolly wrote: "The death penalty is not only argued through the logic of 'an eye for an eye', assuming that they deserved such a consequence, but it holds no greater purpose than life in prison, besides the argument that it is a greater deterrent (but I think that life in prison is a great enough deterrent.) When an attorney is defending someone for murder, the first thing they often try to do is prove that the defendant was a victim of some type of causation. They will claim that he/she is crazy or mentally unstable etc. We have first and second degree murder, which deals with the level of intent involved in the decision to kill. This is derived from the idea that one who has deliberated and premeditated a murder is worse than one who has not, because they were more conscious of their decision and not just caught up in the emotion of the moment. It assumes that since being caught up in the emotion of the moment leaves one less in control of their actions than one who has had the time to think through how they are going to kill. It presumes control." The whole point is that they are not punishing the action, they are punishing the decision, and that assumes the liberty to make more than one. Edited by bjolly on 11/05/09 - 09:32 PM

reincarnated
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Posted 11/06/09 - 04:52 AM:	#73
bjolly wrote: The point was that the feelings of guilt and remorse transcend a simple, 'hey maybe I should make a different choice next time.' These feelings often last long after the situation has reappeared and we have correct the problem. My argument was that this phenomenon implies not only that we feel it was a bad decision, but that we are bad people for making that decision, and that we deserve punishment for it (via guilt remorse etc.). If I make a bad decision then of course that decision reflects on me as a person (because I made that decision), and of course I may not feel “good” about that. There is no inconsistency with determinism here. But I certainly don’t feel that “I deserve punishment”, I simply feel that I should try better/harder next time. bjolly wrote: These forms of punishment work no better, in fact worse, than basic logic. We could simply say, that didn't work, therefore I will not do it again. Basic logic is all that is necessary, but for some reason, whether it's just or not, we punish ourselves emotionally. If one does “punish oneself” (either emotionally or otherwise) this can have positive consequences, since it then encourages one to take the situation more seriously than one might otherwise have done (had one not “punished oneself”), which may then be conducive to improved performance in the future. Again, completely compatible with a deterministic explanation. bjolly wrote: But the antecedent states of the world couldn't have been different. Logically, they could indeed have been very different. As far as we know, there is nothing logically necessary about the way the world is. bjolly wrote: This is similar to saying that when an apple falls from a tree it will fall upward, against the force of gravity, and then backing up the argument with the premise that it really could, if the universe had different rules. That’s quite correct. As far as we know, there is no logical necessity underlying the “law” of gravity, it could logically work very differently, and if it did work differently (in a different universe) then apples might not do what you expect them to do in our universe. bjolly wrote: First you said 'I could have chosen a different action to the one I did choose, if I had wanted to choose differently'. I then pointed out that you are saying that you couldn't have chosen differently, and then you responded with the proposition that you logically could if it were a different universe, even though, according to your model, it couldn't be. So this is a hypothetical argument based on alternate universes? What was the intended content of the original statement? Let me give you an example. I am presented with an apple and an orange. I want to choose the apple, so I choose the apple. Could I have chosen differently? Logically, yes I could – IF I had wanted to choose the orange THEN I could have chosen the orange (this is logically correct). The fact is that I did not want to choose the orange, so what rational sense would it make for me to choose the orange? But there is no logical necessity that I choose the apple. IF the history of the world had been different, THEN it follows that I might have wanted to choose the orange instead, in which case it would be rational for me to choose the orange. The important things is that, given the history of the world as it is, I wanted to choose the apple and not the orange – so why would I not choose the apple? bjolly wrote: So, if the question is why would you want to do what you do not want to do, then my response would be, what if you just killed someone? You wanted to do it at that moment, and you likely knew fully that it was the 'wrong' decision, but you were conflicted. OK, I was “conflicted” – but so what? Despite having conflicting desires, I still have to make a decision – in the end I have to decide what I want to do – either to kill or not to kill. Nobody and nothing is forcing me to kill against my will (ie against what I want to do) – I weigh up the pros and cons and, free from external coercion, I then make a decision about what I want to do. Are you now suggesting that NOT doing what I have decided that I want to do would somehow be a better expression of my freedom? How is this logical? How can it be rational to argue that one is MORE free if one does not do what one has decided that one wants to do (free from external coercion)? bjolly wrote: I ignored it since it seemed to be a digression that could spiral into a whole new discussion, and I still don't see its relevance. The relevance is that it gets right to the point – that freedom is no more and no less than “being able to do what one wants to do”. If you do not agree with this, then perhaps you are trying to tell me that NOT doing what I want to do somehow makes me more free – in which case you need to explain how this works (because this is illogical)? bjolly wrote: You have taken a word and redefined it to mean the opposite. I have not redefined it to mean the opposite. To me, freedom is being able to do what I want to do. Are you saying this is the “opposite” to your definition of freedom? Perhaps you could explain how your definition of freedom is “opposite” to mine? bjolly wrote: Why not just say determinism, if that's what you mean? Because I do not necessarily believe that determinism is true. I’m a compatibilist, not a determinist. bjolly wrote: Again, I think it would be really strange if I were to redefine god as the absence of god. If I prove his non-existence I say he doesn't exist, not he does because I'm giving his non-existence the same label. But I am not saying that free will does not exist, I am simply saying that free will to me is not the same as free will to you. bjolly wrote: To just redefine terms to mean the complete opposite because you disagree with its original definition leads to miscommunication and misleading arguments. How is it “the complete opposite”? There is no miscommunication if one is careful to define one’s terms. I refuse to accept that you have the right either to dictate to me how I should think of “free will”, or to refuse me the right to use “free will” in my vocabulary, just because when you say “free will” you don’t mean the same thing as I do when I say “free will”. bjolly wrote: If you don't like the theory of freewill, that's fine, but you can't then go and say that determinism is freewill. I like MY theory of free will, but not yours. Where is it said that there can be only one theory of free will, and it must be the one that you like? I have never said that determinism IS free will. You seem to be confused. bjolly wrote: Why don't you just say freewill doesn't exist, if you think it's so absurd, since we already have a word for what you're describing-determinism. Why should I say that free will does not exist, if I believe in free will? That’s like a Christian saying to a Muslim that “you can’t say that God exists, because your God is not the same as my God”. Rubbish. What I am describing is NOT determinism. Compatibilism does not assume the truth of determinism. bjolly wrote: Could there be right or wrong without consciousness, and if so, what would define it? What do you mean by right or wrong in this context? Could you give an example of something you consider to be in the category “wrong”, and the reasons why you think it belongs in the category “wrong”? bjolly wrote: First off, since when is a person under 18 unable to comprehend the wrong-hood of killing? My 3 year old niece could tell you that killing is wrong. Just because a person is deemed a “juvenile” under the law (18 years in most US states) it does not follow that the law then considers all juveniles “unable to comprehend the wrong-hood of killing”. The US juvenile system deals with offenders, it just deals with them in a different way to the adult system (the focus being more on rehabilitation and less on punishment). I am not trying to defend particular laws or justice systems, I am sure that some laws and systems of justice are not entirely rational. Indeed, one can argue that the perceived leniency of the juvenile justice system compounds its failure to rehabilitate by communicating to young people that they can avoid serious consequences for their criminal actions – again a completely deterministic approach. bjolly wrote: Second, why is an advanced development of right and wrong a necessary prerequisite for punishment? It’s a prerequisite for moral responsibility – moral responsibility entails the ability to distinguish right from wrong. You cannot rationally hold a person to be morally responsible for his/her “wrongful” actions if he/she did not have the ability to know that those actions were wrong in the first place. bjolly wrote: I thought you said we used the punishment to teach? Where did I say this? I believe what I said was: reincarnated wrote: One logical consequence of the threat of punishment for doing the wrong thing is that people will be influenced to do the right thing. (but this only works if they know the difference between right and wrong - they cannot be influenced to do the right thing if they don’t know the difference between right and wrong in the first place) and reincarnated wrote: One logical consequence of NOT punishing people for doing the wrong thing is that they (and others) will not be influenced to do the right thing. (but this only works if they know the difference between right and wrong - they cannot “not be influenced to do the right thing” if they don’t know the difference between right and wrong in the first place) bjolly wrote: What would it matter if we didn't have a developed sense of right and wrong, if the punishment was simply based on cause and effect? What would it matter if we had a correct sense of right and wrong or not? It would only matter if you were arguing from the perspective that we should only punish those who chose wrongly when they knew better. We can, and often do, use the threat of punishment, or promise of reward, to influence behavior (or perhaps you deny this?). But in the case of teaching & training, most behavioural psychologists will tell you that positive reinforcement (the promise of reward) is generally a much better motivator to learn to do the right things than negative reinforcement (the threat of punishment). If the main motivation is “avoidance of punishment for doing wrong” then this tends to lead to a situation where individuals are motivated not necessarily to do the right thing, but rather to “not do the wrong thing” – which often results simply in inaction. On the other hand, if the main motivation is “gaining reward for doing right” then this actively encourages individuals not simply to “not do wrong” but also more importantly to “do right” rather than do nothing at all. bjolly wrote: The whole point is that they are not punishing the action, they are punishing the decision, and that assumes the liberty to make more than one. "deciding to do break the law", but then not following through on that decision, is not in itself unlawful and would not be punished under the law. The law recognises the "decision plus the action" as the crime, decision alone (in absence of action) is not a crime. But even if we go along with your suggestion that we "punish the decision", why is “punishing the decision” incompatible with determinism? If X decides that he wants to murder someone, then this is something undesirable from the point of view of society. How can we try to ensure that X does NOT decide that he wants to murder someone? By a combination of (a) training and teaching during development (so that X learns that murder is wrong), and by (b) putting in place adequate disincentives (such as the threat of punishment or incarceration) for people who decide to (and actually do) commit murder (so that X realizes that he will likely be punished if he decides to, and actually does, commit murder). All completely explained based on a 100% deterministic model. In summary: We still haven't come up with any example of lawful punishment which is inconsistent with a deterministic world-view. Edited by reincarnated on 11/06/09 - 06:43 AM
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

bjolly
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Posted 11/06/09 - 08:54 AM:	#74
parameter wrote: It’s a prerequisite for moral responsibility – moral responsibility entails the ability to distinguish right from wrong. You cannot rationally hold a person to be morally responsible for his/her “wrongful” actions if he/she did not have the ability to know that those actions were wrong in the first place. Exactly. So we are not punishing someone for a negative action, we are punishing someone for a negative decision. parameter wrote: (but this only works if they know the difference between right and wrong - they cannot be influenced to do the right thing if they don’t know the difference between right and wrong in the first place) I have cats that I have influenced to do the 'right' thing. This is a very weak argument. The punishment reward system in our brain is one of its most basic and primitive aspects. parameter wrote: We can, and often do, use the threat of punishment, or promise of reward, to influence behavior (or perhaps you deny this?). But in the case of teaching & training, most behavioural psychologists will tell you that positive reinforcement (the promise of reward) is generally a much better motivator to learn to do the right things than negative reinforcement (the threat of punishment). If the main motivation is “avoidance of punishment for doing wrong” then this tends to lead to a situation where individuals are motivated not necessarily to do the right thing, but rather to “not do the wrong thing” – which often results simply in inaction. On the other hand, if the main motivation is “gaining reward for doing right” then this actively encourages individuals not simply to “not do wrong” but also more importantly to “do right” rather than do nothing at all. I agree with your statement, but it doesn't respond to my query. bjolly wrote: What would it matter if we didn't have a developed sense of right and wrong, if the punishment was simply based on cause and effect? What would it matter if we had a correct sense of right and wrong or not? It would only matter if you were arguing from the perspective that we should only punish those who chose wrongly when they knew better. Are you implying we use positive reinforcement for less developed people and negative for more developed people (ethically)? parameter wrote: Why should I say that free will does not exist, if I believe in free will? That’s like a Christian saying to a Muslim that “you can’t say that God exists, because your God is not the same as my God”. Rubbish. What I am describing is NOT determinism. Compatibilism does not assume the truth of determinism. Look back at your earlier posts and you will see that you time after time supported determinism, and denounced its contrary. Your definition of freewill is that we have 'the freedom to choose what we want'. I would ask, what aspect of choosing what we want is free? 'free' in this context is really referring to the 'capacity' to choose what you want.

reincarnated
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Posted 11/07/09 - 12:03 AM:	#75
reincarnated wrote: It’s a prerequisite for moral responsibility – moral responsibility entails the ability to distinguish right from wrong. You cannot rationally hold a person to be morally responsible for his/her “wrongful” actions if he/she did not have the ability to know that those actions were wrong in the first place. bjolly wrote: Exactly. So we are not punishing someone for a negative action, we are punishing someone for a negative decision. Sorry, but just how do you arrive at this conclusion? I explained just one necessary condition for moral responsibility, and from this you leap to the conclusion that we punish people for their decisions and not their actions? I don’t see how you get to this conclusion. bjolly wrote: I agree with your statement, but it doesn't respond to my query. bjolly wrote: What would it matter if we didn't have a developed sense of right and wrong, if the punishment was simply based on cause and effect? What would it matter if we had a correct sense of right and wrong or not? It would only matter if you were arguing from the perspective that we should only punish those who chose wrongly when they knew better. I replied to this. You are asking, in effect, why don’t we use punishment to influence behavior (regardless of moral responsibility)? I said already that: reincarnated wrote: We can, and often do, use the threat of punishment, or promise of reward, to influence behavior (or perhaps you deny this?). But in the case of teaching & training, most behavioural psychologists will tell you that positive reinforcement (the promise of reward) is generally a much better motivator to learn to do the right things than negative reinforcement (the threat of punishment). bjolly wrote: Are you implying we use positive reinforcement for less developed people and negative for more developed people (ethically)? No, I am suggesting that, when teaching and training people (regardless of whether they are more or less developed), positive reinforcement is generally a much better motivator if we want people to learn “to do the right thing” as opposed to simply “to not do the wrong thing”. Negative reinforcement, in isolation (without the promise of reward for doing the right thing), simply tends to encourage people to inaction (punishment avoidance) rather than to positive action (achieving reward) – because there IS no reward offered in this case. Evidence the pathetic social system in Eastern Europe during and just after the Cold War (I lived and worked in Eastern Europe from 1996 to 1999), when many people were motivated simply by the need to avoid being blamed for doing wrong (and hence tended to inaction rather than being motivated to do right), because the old Soviet system was largely based on a “blame culture” as opposed to a “reward culture”. bjolly wrote: Look back at your earlier posts and you will see that you time after time supported determinism, and denounced its contrary. Your definition of freewill is that we have 'the freedom to choose what we want'. I would ask, what aspect of choosing what we want is free? 'free' in this context is really referring to the 'capacity' to choose what you want. Indeed, I did look back at my earlier posts – where have I ever said that determinism is true or that I believe that determinism is true? My worldview is COMPATIBLE with determinism (that’s why its called compatibilist, thus I can accept that determinism may be true) but my worldview does not REQUIRE determinism to be true. There may be genuinely random elements in the world, I have never denied this, but what I do deny is that randomness can in any way contribute to any kind of free will worth having. A metaphysical libertarian, on the other hand, must deny that determinism can be true, and must embrace indeterminism, because such a person needs the concept of “alternate possibilities”. Free, to me, simply means free from external coercion, it means that I am free to do what I want to do. I believe that I have said this on multiple occasions already. It means, simply, that if I decide that I want to do some X, then I am free if and only if I am able to do X.
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

bjolly
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Posted 11/07/09 - 08:57 AM:	#76
parameter wrote: I agree with your statement, but it doesn't respond to my query. bjolly wrote: What would it matter if we didn't have a developed sense of right and wrong, if the punishment was simply based on cause and effect? What would it matter if we had a correct sense of right and wrong or not? It would only matter if you were arguing from the perspective that we should only punish those who chose wrongly when they knew better. I replied to this. You are asking, in effect, why don’t we use punishment to influence behavior (regardless of moral responsibility)? I said already that: reincarnated wrote: We can, and often do, use the threat of punishment, or promise of reward, to influence behavior (or perhaps you deny this?). But in the case of teaching & training, most behavioural psychologists will tell you that positive reinforcement (the promise of reward) is generally a much better motivator to learn to do the right things than negative reinforcement (the threat of punishment). bjolly wrote: Are you implying we use positive reinforcement for less developed people and negative for more developed people (ethically)? No, I am suggesting that, when teaching and training people (regardless of whether they are more or less developed), positive reinforcement is generally a much better motivator if we want people to learn “to do the right thing” as opposed to simply “to not do the wrong thing”. Negative reinforcement, in isolation (without the promise of reward for doing the right thing), simply tends to encourage people to inaction (punishment avoidance) rather than to positive action (achieving reward) – because there IS no reward offered in this case. Evidence the pathetic social system in Eastern Europe during and just after the Cold War (I lived and worked in Eastern Europe from 1996 to 1999), when many people were motivated simply by the need to avoid being blamed for doing wrong (and hence tended to inaction rather than being motivated to do right), because the old Soviet system was largely based on a “blame culture” as opposed to a “reward culture”. Again, this doesn't respond to my query, and you rephrased my question to something completely unrelated. My original question was why, in a deterministic model, would we treat a child who is less developed ethically, any different than an adult. You then responded with the argument that we cannot hold them morally responsible because they haven;t developed a sense of right and wrong. I am trying to figure out why one's moral development would be a factor in a deterministic model, which is supposed to simply be treating the problem in a strictly practical sense. If everyone's decisions are equally deterministic, young or old, why would we treat one any different than the other? reincarnated wrote: You cannot rationally hold a person to be morally responsible for his/her “wrongful” actions if he/she did not have the ability to know that those actions were wrong in the first place. Can you explain why this is true in a deterministic model? Why is the knowledge of an actions wrongness a necessary prerequisite for punishment in a deterministic model? Are you assuming since they didn't have the ability, that they don't have the capacity to comprehend the crimes wrongness after treatment?

reincarnated
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Posted 11/07/09 - 09:07 PM:	#77
bjolly wrote: If everyone's decisions are equally deterministic, young or old, why would we treat one any different than the other? Two reasons. Firstly, if someone does not properly understand the difference between right and wrong, you cannot necessarily expect the “threat of punishment if you do wrong” to have the desired effect of dissuading them from doing wrong. The “threat of punishment if you do wrong” only works properly as a disincentive to doing wrong if one properly understands the difference between right and wrong in the first place. Secondly, young people are generally held to be more impressionable, more easily influenced, than mature adults, thus it may be argued that rehabilitation is more likely to be effective (in general) with young offenders than with adults. This is the main reason why the juvenile system focuses on attempts at rehabilitation rather than punishment (although as I have pointed out already, not everyone agrees that this approach is the best – some juveniles are surprisingly mature at the age of 15 or 16 - and it can be argued that the failure to punish young offenders sends the wrong signal to other young would-be offenders, the signal that "you can commit crimes and get away with it"). Once again, I am not trying to defend any particular system of justice here, I am simply trying to show that whatever way we treat offenders, that treatment has subsequent effects on the behavior of both the offenders and would-be offenders - all compatible with a deterministic world-view. bjolly wrote: Why is the knowledge of an actions wrongness a necessary prerequisite for punishment in a deterministic model? Are you assuming since they didn't have the ability, that they don't have the capacity to comprehend the crimes wrongness after treatment? What “treatment” are you referring to here? What would you be trying to achieve by punishing someone for doing wrong if they did not have the ability to recognize that they were doing wrong in the first place? What is the objective in punishing them?
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

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Posted 11/07/09 - 10:22 PM:	#78
Hi reincarnated, Thanks for your response, I found it very clear. reincarnated wrote: What would you be trying to achieve by punishing someone for doing wrong if they did not have the ability to recognize that they were doing wrong in the first place? What is the objective in punishing them? My take was that you were saying that we use punishment as a form of negative reinforcement. I believe the objective would be to show them that what they are doing is wrong (ultimately to change their behavior), or that at least seems to be how it works in your model. But I can successfully give a baby negative reinforcement to emphasize the wrongness of a behavior. I was pointing out the primitive nature of our punishment and reward system, which works on animals as well. I thought you were saying that what we are doing with people is giving them negative and positive reinforcement in order to influence future decisions more to our liking. reincarnated wrote: You cannot rationally hold a person to be morally responsible for his/her “wrongful” actions if he/she did not have the ability to know that those actions were wrong in the first place. Why not? This goes against your belief that moral responsibility is simply a designation of the agent which did the wrongful action.

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Posted 11/08/09 - 03:32 AM:	#79
bjolly wrote: My take was that you were saying that we use punishment as a form of negative reinforcement. I believe the objective would be to show them that what they are doing is wrong (ultimately to change their behavior), or that at least seems to be how it works in your model. But I can successfully give a baby negative reinforcement to emphasize the wrongness of a behavior. I was pointing out the primitive nature of our punishment and reward system, which works on animals as well. I thought you were saying that what we are doing with people is giving them negative and positive reinforcement in order to influence future decisions more to our liking. Indeed this is what I am saying. The threat of punishment acts as a deterrent or disincentive to potential offenders. If people were to perceive that they could commit crimes and get away without being punished, then the crime rate is almost certain to go up - ergo people need to believe that wrongdoers will be punished in order to keep the crime rate down. I do not disagree that you can give a baby or an animal "negative reinforcement" (ie punishment) in an attempt to encourage that baby or animal to behave in a certain way - and this is indeed the way that some animals are trained (reward for doing what one wants them to do, and "punishment" for doing what one does not want them to do). But as I have pointed out already, positive reinforcement generally works much better (especially for humans) than negative reinforcement in issues of training and teaching. bjolly wrote: This goes against your belief that moral responsibility is simply a designation of the agent which did the wrongful action. Where have I said this? There is a difference between responsibility (simpliciter) and moral responsibility. We say that "a launch-day foam strike was responsible for the Columbia disaster", but we do not say that the "launch-day foam strike" was morally responsible for the disaster - because there is no suggestion that the "launch-day foam strike" had either any understanding of right and wrong, or control over the events. Moral responsibility, unlike responsibility simpliciter, entails an ability to understand right from wrong.
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

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Posted 11/10/09 - 12:08 AM:	#80
Hi reincarnated, Sorry I misrepresented your argument there, I think I confused you with the person I started the discourse with, although I do find it interesting that you had 'control over the events' as one of the necessary conditions for moral responsibility. According to determinism, I am no more responsible for my actions than a light bulb is for its actions. Also, why is the understanding of right and wrong necessary for moral responsibility? I understand your argument that an understanding of right and wrong are necessary for punishment, in a consequentialist sense, but there is a difference between saying that a punishment (or reward) towards agent A is undesirable for a desired change in agent A because agent A lacked the ability to discern right from wrong, and saying that agent A is no longer held morally responsible for the action because agent A lacked the ability to discern right from wrong. The only rebuttal l see to this is that your definition of moral responsibility is simply having the ability to be treated with punishment or reward, with success, or as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it, " the consequentialist view, according to which praise or blame would be appropriate if and only if a reaction of this sort would likely lead to a desired change in the agent and/or her behavior." Therefore, if being held morally responsible simply means having the ability to be punished (or rewarded) with effect, then why wouldn't animals and babies, who may not know right from wrong, be considered morally responsible for their actions, as they can be punished and rewarded for their actions with great effect. I will also bring back up the issue of the death penalty, and arguments for insanity, especially. It is illegal to give a mentally ill person the death penalty, and not a sane person. How is this explained deterministically( or 'consequentialistically', if you prefer)? A mentally ill person has a worse chance of recovery than a legally 'sane' person. Another point is that many murderers judged to be mentally-ill are released into the public without charges (most often leading to subsequent murders), or sometimes sent to a hospital. It would seem that a consequentialist society would be even more concerned about keeping mentally unstable people even further from others than they would be with non-mentally unstable people -seeing as they're mentally unstable. Remember, I am not claiming that these are your beliefs(or mine, for that matter). I am defending my claim that society does not run on, or even generally believe in a purely consequentialist view of ethics and justice. Also, why are leaders charged for war-crimes rather than the soldiers who did the action of killing? Why are the soldiers not held responsible, and how does this fit into a consequentialist model? Is this not merit-based moral responsibility, seeing that those with less control (those following orders) are considered less responsible?

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