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Ethics of consciousness
Is consciousness the only thing that can cause the possibility of ethics?

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Ethics of consciousness

reincarnated
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Posted 10/29/09 - 04:17 AM:	#61
bjolly wrote: I have spent a lot of time looking into arguments for compatiblism, and have yet to hear anything more than a much more complex understanding of determinism. Most compatiblist arguments emphasize that yes, we are the result of determinism, but we do choose what we desire to. The problem is that the desire that they refer to is just a result of causality according to their model. It's a smoke and mirrors trick, and it only works if you redefine freewill as doing what you desire, as opposed to doing what you desire without the restraint of determinism. The former is just a description of how the illusion of freewill works in the deterministic model. If I am free to do what I want to do, why would I want to do anything different? The very notion (that I would want to do what I do not want to do) is absurdly illogical. Hence, if I am free to do what I want to do then I am free in all rational and logical senses of the word free. bjolly wrote: In order to have moral responsibility, in the sense that you could have chosen a better action than you did, you must have the freedom to make more than one possible decision. Under determinism, I AM free to make more than one (logically) possible decision – but the decision I do make is the one (naturally) determined by what I want. I could have chosen a different action to the one I did choose, if I had wanted to choose differently. The whole point was that I did not want to choose differently. Thus it is what I want that determines what I do, and as long as I am free to do what I want then I am free in all rational and logical senses of the word free. The kind of ultimate moral responsibility you seem to wish for is logically impossible. In order to be ultimately responsible for what I want, I must also be ultimately responsible for the way I am (because the way I am, in absence of mere caprice, determines what I want). But in order for me to be ultimately responsible for the way I am, I would have to have intentionally brought it about that I am the way I am. But to intentionally bring about a state N, there must be some prior state N-1 which led to the intentional development of state N. This leads to an infinite regress of intentional states. Hence absurdity. I'm afraid that the only “smoke and mirrors” trick going on here is the one practiced by the metaphysical libertarian who endorses such illogical ideas of ultimate responsibility – she cannot explain how it can come about, and she needs to indulge in mumbo-jumbo and hand-waving or smoke and mirrors to get away with the illusion. bjolly wrote: If matter is necessarily causal, and we are 100% matter, and we use a definition of freedom that requires the transcendence of causality, then there is by definition a contradiction. Even if the world is not causally deterministic, there is still no escape from the infinite regress. Throwing in a few random elements does not magically create ultimate responsibility.
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Posted 10/29/09 - 08:30 AM:	#62
parameter wrote: If I am free to do what I want to do, why would I want to do anything different? The very notion (that I would want to do what I do not want to do) is absurdly illogical. Hence, if I am free to do what I want to do then I am free in all rational and logical senses of the word free. And it's fine to have that opinion. I'm not claiming one myself or refuting yours, but it still doesn't fix the fact that what you are labeling as compatiblism is begging the question of what 'freedom' is according to the ongoing argument between freewill and determinism. I don't think any determinist would claim anything different than you are. Also, the phrase, 'I am free to do what I want to do' is misleading. What you are really saying is that you are determined to do what you want to do because your desires are just as causally determined as anything else in this world. And believing in that is fine, but it does contradict certain aspects of morality, in todays terms. parameter wrote: Under determinism, I AM free to make more than one (logically) possible decision – but the decision I do make is the one (naturally) determined by what I want. I could have chosen a different action to the one I did choose, if I had wanted to choose differently. The whole point was that I did not want to choose differently. Thus it is what I want that determines what I do, and as long as I am free to do what I want then I am free in all rational and logical senses of the word free. If our wants are determined, then you are not free to make more than one possible decision -because it is determined. Any feeling of guilt or remorse for a past decision where you thought , 'I was wrong for making that choice, I should have made another one", would be completely nonsensical. 'I could have chosen a different action to the one I did choose, if I had wanted to choose differently'......but you couldn't have wanted to choose differently. Under determinism you may be able to make choices, but the choice you do make is determined. To say you are 'free to do what you want', while maintaining that your wants are deterministic, really implies a strange definition of freedom. That's saying you are free to do what you have to do. Hence the 'smoke and mirrors' trick argument. parameter wrote: The kind of ultimate moral responsibility you seem to wish for is logically impossible. In order to be ultimately responsible for what I want, I must also be ultimately responsible for the way I am (because the way I am, in absence of mere caprice, determines what I want). But in order for me to be ultimately responsible for the way I am, I would have to have intentionally brought it about that I am the way I am. But to intentionally bring about a state N, there must be some prior state N-1 which led to the intentional development of state N. This leads to an infinite regress of intentional states. Hence absurdity. I'm afraid that the only “smoke and mirrors” trick going on here is the one practiced by the metaphysical libertarian who endorses such illogical ideas of ultimate responsibility – she cannot explain how it can come about, and she needs to indulge in mumbo-jumbo and hand-waving or smoke and mirrors to get away with the illusion. I'm not wishing for anything. I'm not even claiming any position on the matter of freewill. I am simply stating that the current notion of morality accepts a liberal notion of freewill. That's it! You can spend all of the time you want calling it absurd, and you may be right, but that doesn't change the fact that this is the notion morality that we have today. I think it is important to acknowledge this, at the very least, since feelings of guilt, regret remorse, anxiety etc. all come from liberal notions of freewill. I called it a 'smoke and mirrors' trick because it redefined freewill. Your position is completely logical, but your claim that you just made two opposing things 'compatible' only worked because you redefined one of them, however absurd the original definition was -you redefined it. That's like saying, 'I just made Theism compatible with atheism', and then redefining Theism and then backing your actions with an argument of its absurdity. parameter wrote: Even if the world is not causally deterministic, there is still no escape from the infinite regress. Throwing in a few random elements does not magically create ultimate responsibility. This responds to a different point than the one I made. It seems you were quick to categorize me. I haven't made any claims for or against any position on freewill or determinism. I was making a simple point that most current concepts of morality do. I thought I was pretty clear about that. Edited by bjolly on 10/29/09 - 08:44 AM

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Posted 10/29/09 - 08:31 AM:	#63
that was to reincarnated. Why aren't my quotes working?

reincarnated
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Posted 10/29/09 - 08:38 AM:	#64
Hi bjolly bjolly wrote: I said that freewill in relation to ethics is necessarily not causal, and anything which is not conscious is necessarily causal, therefore, anything which is not conscious is not free. Why is free will in relation to ethics necessarily not causal? Is this simply an assertion, or can you show this to be the case? Why is anything which is not conscious necessarily causal? Is this simply an assertion, or can you show this to be the case? bjolly wrote: Freewill, according to you, is the ability to act on your desires. If you are not conscious, then you could not have desires (unless you have an extremely loose definition of desire or an extremely strict definition of consciousness.) Therefore, without consciousness you could not have freewill. I agree it depends on how one defines “wants” (or “desires” as you prefer to call them). I can imagine a non-conscious machine which is able to articulate what it “wants” (in terms of a course of action which it is trying to bring about), and hence could be said to act with free will in the compatibilist sense and yet not be conscious. bjolly wrote: My point was that we don't hold deterministic things such as rocks to moral standards. Would you agree that it would seem out of place to say 'that rock was immoral!' when it falls on your head? When we speak of moral responsibility we are doing much more than just designating the agent which caused something, we are claiming that it should have made a different choice (not just that the choice was bad). We don't do this with rocks falling on our heads because we know that it had no other choice. Agreed, NOT simply because the rock is controlled by deterministic forces, but rather because the rock has nothing (that we know of) that we can equate with a “want” or a “wish” or a “desire” – in short it has no "will" at all (let alone a free will) - and if an entity does not have “wants” then it cannot possibly act according to such wants – and THIS is why we do not hold such entities to be morally responsible for their actions. Again taking my example of a deterministic non-conscious machine which nevertheless “wants” to bring about a certain course of action (maybe it wants to terminate a human life), we may be able to reason with that machine on the basis that its “want” is deemed bad or wrong from a (human) moral perspective. In so reasoning with the machine, we may then be able to influence its wants and its actions so that it DOES then choose (both non-consciously and deterministically) to act according to our moral values. Isn’t that just what we do also with conscious humans? bjolly wrote: I totally agree, and when we define morality like you just have as good things or bad things, then you are correct that freewill is unnecessary. Unfortunately, people commonly associate much more with morality. Instead of simply saying, 'that choice was bad', people often say, 'that was a bad choice', implying not just that the choice was wrong, but that the person is 'wrong' for making that choice. In a sense, the person who makes a bad choice IS indeed “wrong” for making that (bad) choice – the deterministic process that the person used to arrive at the choice is (from our perspective) a “bad” process because it arrived at a bad choice. Thus we would wish to influence or change that person’s decision-making process such that he/she starts to make “right” choices (from a moral perspective) as opposed to “wrong” choices. Exactly the same reasoning would apply to the choices made by a deterministic machine. bjolly wrote: It is a criticism of both the choice itself and the quality of decision making on the part of the decision maker. It is generally assumed that you cannot hold someone responsible for that which is not in their control, so to label them as a 'bad' person for making a 'poor' decision assumes that they could have chosen otherwise. But logically they COULD have chosen otherwise, had they so wished to choose otherwise. The important point is that they did not wish (want) to choose otherwise, and it is their want that determines their choice. We can then reason with them and make them understand that what they wanted was morally wrong, and try to persuade them to want something morally right on future occasions. This is what we might do with the non-conscious deterministic machine, and its also what we would do with a conscious human. Labeling someone as a “bad” person for making a “poor” decision is simply an acknowledgement of the fact that their particular decision-making processes do not accord with what we would deem acceptable (based on our moral values) – hence their decision-making process is “bad”. bjolly wrote: When we punish someone for making a bad choice we are doing much more than giving them negative reinforcement for their own good. When we punish someone we are doing so in frustration that they made the 'wrong' choice and claiming that they deserve the punishment for their poor behavior. How can someone deserve punishment for an action which was out of their control? This is the aspect of morality that I am claiming requires a liberal notion of freewill. Are we in fact doing more than giving negative reinforcement? Why do you think this? Why do we take any action at all, except with a view to bringing about a certain effect/consequence? One logical consequence of the threat of punishment for doing the wrong thing is that people will be influenced to do the right thing. One logical consequence of locking up people who do the wrong thing is that it prevents such people from continuing to do the wrong thing (at the expense of other members of society). One logical consequence of not punishing people for doing the wrong thing is that they (and others) will not be influenced to do the right thing. If someone does the wrong thing then they “deserve” punishment only insofar as it accords with our objective to achieve these consequences (influencing future behaviour), but not out of some mistaken concept of “just deserts”. bjolly wrote: If one's wants are determined, then it is unfair to criticize the quality of their decision. It is not “unfair” at all, so long as one remembers that the ultimate objective of any such criticism is NOT to simply exact retribution or revenge or inflict suffering (which would indeed be unfair), but rather to bring about a change in behaviour. If you do something wrong, I criticise you not simply because I want you to feel bad (that you did something wrong), but more importantly because I want you to understand that what you did was wrong and hopefully that you will recognise this and change your behaviour and not do the same wrong thing again. If I succeed in changing your behaviour through my criticism then my criticism has had the consequence we desire; whereas if all I succeed in doing is making you suffer (without changing your behaviour) then who has benefited? Thus, even if one’s wants are determined there is still a justified reason for criticising such determined wants, because such criticism acts to influence those wants. In this way, all moral responsibility can be reconciled with determinism. Put another way: IF the only purpose of punishment is to exact retribution, to make the guilty person suffer (and no other reason), then such a thing would indeed be unfair if the world was deterministic. There are two possible ways to resolve this. EITHER the assumption that the world is deterministic is false, OR the assumption that punishment is only for the purpose of retribution and inflicting suffering (and nothing else) is false. Unfortunately, the assumption that the world is not deterministic solves nothing – even if the world is not deterministic, what possible constructive purpose is served by punishing someone solely for the reason of retribution and inflicting suffering (and no other reason)? Edited by reincarnated on 10/29/09 - 09:06 AM
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Posted 10/29/09 - 09:51 AM:	#65
parameter wrote: Why is free will in relation to ethics necessarily not causal? Is this simply an assertion, or can you show this to be the case? Why is anything which is not conscious necessarily causal? Is this simply an assertion, or can you show this to be the case? I explained the first in depth earlier. The second is an assertion based on observation. I thinks it's a very safe one, but I'd love to hear an alternative possibility. parameter wrote: Agreed, NOT simply because the rock is controlled by deterministic forces, but rather because the rock has nothing (that we know of) that we can equate with a “want” or a “wish” or a “desire” – and if an entity does not have “wants” then it cannot possibly act according to such wants – and THIS is why we do not hold such entities to be morally responsible for their actions. Again taking my example of a deterministic non-conscious machine which nevertheless “wants” to bring about a certain course of action (maybe it wants to terminate a human life), we may be able to reason with that machine on the basis that its “want” is deemed bad or wrong from a (human) moral perspective. In so reasoning with the machine, we may then be able to influence its wants and its actions so that it DOES then choose (both non-consciously and deterministically) to act according to our moral values. Isn’t that just what we do also with conscious humans? No, we do much more, as I explained in my earlier posts. parameter wrote: In a sense, the person who makes a bad choice IS indeed “wrong” for making that (bad) choice – the deterministic process that the person used to arrive at the choice is (from our perspective) a “bad” process because it arrived at a bad choice. Thus we would wish to influence or change that person’s decision-making process such that he/she starts to make “right” choices (from a moral perspective) as opposed to “wrong” choices. Exactly the same reasoning would apply to the choices made by a deterministic machine. We don't use that type of reasoning with humans, as I described in my earlier posts. parameter wrote: But logically they COULD have chosen otherwise, had they so wished to choose otherwise. The important point is that they did not wish (want) to choose otherwise, and it is their want that determines their choice. We can then reason with them and make them understand that what they wanted was morally wrong, and try to persuade them to want something morally right on future occasions. This is what we might do with the non-conscious deterministic machine, and its also what we would do with a conscious human. Labeling someone as a “bad” person for making a “poor” decision is simply an acknowledgement of the fact that their particular decision-making processes do not accord with what we would deem acceptable (based on our moral values) – hence their decision-making process is “bad”. You seem to be skipping passed the points I've already made. Simplifying determinism down to the point of wants isn't any intrinsically different. Again, you could not have chosen otherwise because your wishes were determined. You may be determined to choose otherwise in the future, but you could not have chosen otherwise according to your model. Read the response I had to this in the last post. Again, this is a great approach to morality, but it's not what we currently do. Look back to earlier posts for my points on deserving etc. parameter wrote: It is not “unfair” at all, so long as one remembers that the ultimate objective of any such criticism is NOT to simply exact retribution or revenge or inflict suffering (which would indeed be unfair), but rather to bring about a change in behaviour. If you do something wrong, I criticise you not simply because I want you to feel bad (that you did something wrong), but more importantly because I want you to understand that what you did was wrong and hopefully that you will recognise this and change your behaviour and not do the same wrong thing again. If I succeed in changing your behaviour through my criticism then my criticism has had the consequence we desire; whereas if all I succeed in doing is making you suffer (without changing your behaviour) then who has benefited? Thus, even if one’s wants are determined there is still a justified reason for criticising such determined wants, because such criticism acts to influence those wants. In this way, all moral responsibility can be reconciled with determinism. Put another way: IF the only purpose of punishment is to exact retribution, to make the guilty person suffer (and no other reason), then such a thing would indeed be unfair if the world was deterministic. There are two possible ways to resolve this. EITHER the assumption that the world is deterministic is false, OR the assumption that punishment is only for the purpose of retribution and inflicting suffering (and nothing else) is false. Unfortunately, the assumption that the world is not deterministic solves nothing – even if the world is not deterministic, what possible constructive purpose is served by punishing someone solely for the reason of retribution and inflicting suffering (and no other reason)? I agree with your approach. Unfortunately, I don't think society does. As you've pointed out, much of how we deal with morality today can be explained in deterministic terms involving reinforcement, but some of it can't and most of the actions which you are pointing out as being compatible with determinism, actually come about through the logic of liberal freewill and its resulting responsibilities. We try minors differently than we do adults, because we claim that a child doesn't yet 'know better'. This assertion undeniably assumes that an adult does, and that an adult should have acted differently -as if they had a choice. The death penalty is not only argued through the logic of 'an eye for an eye', assuming that they deserved such a consequence, but it holds no greater purpose than life in prison, besides the argument that it is a greater deterrent (but I think that life in prison is a great enough deterrent.) When an attorney is defending someone for murder, the first thing they often try to do is prove that the defendant was a victim of some type of causation. They will claim that he/she is crazy or mentally unstable etc. We have first and second degree murder, which deals with the level of intent involved in the decision to kill. This is derived from the idea that one who has deliberated and premeditated a murder is worse than one who has not, because they were more conscious of their decision and not just caught up in the emotion of the moment. It assumes that since being caught up in the emotion of the moment leaves one less in control of their actions than one who has had the time to think through how they are going to kill. It presumes control. Also, it's worth noting that our system of punishment doesn't work. People who go to jail come out worse most of the time etc. Why is this? Is it because what we do under the veil of productivity is truly something more primitive -like revenge? How is it productive to put a criminal in a system that creates a sense of self-hate and degradation, when those are the things that caused him/her to make the decisions that got them in there in the first place? There's much more going on than just trying to help change the person.

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Posted 10/30/09 - 05:37 AM:	#66
Hi bjolly Maybe I should just change my name to parameter? bjolly wrote: And it's fine to have that opinion. I'm not claiming one myself or refuting yours, but it still doesn't fix the fact that what you are labeling as compatiblism is begging the question of what 'freedom' is according to the ongoing argument between freewill and determinism. I state quite clearly what freedom is according to compatibilism – it is the freedom to do what I want to do. Why is this problematic? Why is it begging the question? bjolly wrote: What you are really saying is that you are determined to do what you want to do because your desires are just as causally determined as anything else in this world. Correct. I have never denied this. And your point is? bjolly wrote: And believing in that is fine, but it does contradict certain aspects of morality It contradicts certain misconceptions of morality, because those misconceptions are based on an incoherent notion of metaphysical libertarian free will. The resolution to the contradiction is therefore to reject the misconceptions, and to accept a coherent view of morality which is consistent with compatibilist free will. bjolly wrote: Any feeling of guilt or remorse for a past decision where you thought , 'I was wrong for making that choice, I should have made another one", would be completely nonsensical. Not at all. Even if the world is deterministic, I can regret a past decision, and if a similar situation occurs again in future I can make a different decision, I am not necessarily forced (by determinism or anything else) to make the same decision the second time around. bjolly wrote: 'I could have chosen a different action to the one I did choose, if I had wanted to choose differently'......but you couldn't have wanted to choose differently. Logically, I could have wanted to choose differently, if the antecedent states of the world had been different. Looked at the other way, why on earth would I have wanted to choose differently to the way I did want to choose if the antecedent conditions were exactly the same? The very notion is absurdly illogical. There is no logical necessity about the way the world is, it is logically contingent. If the past had been different, then I could have chosen differently. Given the past is what it is, and given that I want what I want, why would I want to choose differently? As pointed out already, the very notion that I would want to do what I do not want to do is illogical. Why would I want it? Can you give a reason? If you cannot give a reason, why do you find it so hard to accept? bjolly wrote: Under determinism you may be able to make choices, but the choice you do make is determined. To say you are 'free to do what you want', while maintaining that your wants are deterministic, really implies a strange definition of freedom. That's saying you are free to do what you have to do. Hence the 'smoke and mirrors' trick argument. It may seem strange to you, maybe because you are assuming a different definition of freedom. It doesn’t sound strange to me, because it’s the only kind of freedom that actually works. I am not trying to pretend that my freedom is any different to what it actually is – its predetermined, yes, but it works and it means that I can do what I want to do (and you cannot give me a logical reason why I should want to do other that what I want to do). There is no smoke and mirrors there – I’m being frank and honest about what freedom is and how it works. On the contrary, the smoke and mirrors is around the metaphysical libertarian version of freedom, which is naturalistically incoherent and requires something magical to work (but nobody will admit that it needs magic). bjolly wrote: You can spend all of the time you want calling it absurd, and you may be right, but that doesn't change the fact that this is the notion morality that we have today. I think it is important to acknowledge this, at the very least, since feelings of guilt, regret remorse, anxiety etc. all come from liberal notions of freewill. Please don’t assume that we all subscribe to the same naïve version of morality that you propose here, I certainly do not. (and please do not be offended by the use of the word naive - I do not mean it in a derogatory sense, rather in the sense of something which is intuitively simplistic). And you are mistaken - feelings of guilt, regret, remorse, anxiety etc still all apply even under compatibilistic free will and determinism. bjolly wrote: I called it a 'smoke and mirrors' trick because it redefined freewill. Redefining something which was previously incoherent, into a new form which is coherent, is not “smoke and mirrors”, so long as one is upfront and honest about the redefinition. Your accusation is misplaced. bjolly wrote: Your position is completely logical, but your claim that you just made two opposing things 'compatible' only worked because you redefined one of them, however absurd the original definition was -you redefined it. That's like saying, 'I just made Theism compatible with atheism', and then redefining Theism and then backing your actions with an argument of its absurdity. I’m not sure what you are trying to prove here. I can define free will as I wish, I don’t see why I have to accept an absurd and incoherent definition which is imposed on me by someone else. bjolly wrote: It seems you were quick to categorize me. I haven't made any claims for or against any position on freewill or determinism. I was making a simple point that most current concepts of morality do. I thought I was pretty clear about that. I apologise if I mistakenly assumed you were taking a particular stance, but your posts certainly looked like you were criticizing certain viewpoints. You say you haven’t made any claims for or against any position, and yet you accuse compatibilists of using smoke and mirrors? That certainly seems like a claim to me. bjolly wrote: The second is an assertion based on observation. I thinks it's a very safe one, but I'd love to hear an alternative possibility. Certainly. What is the cause of nuclear radioactive decay? All the evidence points to the radioactive decay of nucleii being strictly probabilistic (there is simply a certain probability that the nucleus will decay within a certain period of time), but so far nobody has identified any “cause” for this decay. At the quantum level, all processes seem to be of this nature – at a microscopic level it seems the world is ruled simply by probability, not by strict cause and effect. bjolly wrote: We don't use that type of reasoning with humans, as I described in my earlier posts. What do you mean by “we”? I certainly use that type of reasoning with humans, because it’s the only reasoning which makes coherent sense, so please don’t assume that you speak for everyone when you say “we don’t use that type of reasoning”. bjolly wrote: Again, this is a great approach to morality, but it's not what we currently do. Look back to earlier posts for my points on deserving etc. Again, please do not use “we” in this context. You have objected to being placed in a box, similarly I object to the implication that everyone agrees with your view of morality. bjolly wrote: I agree with your approach. Unfortunately, I don't think society does. As you've pointed out, much of how we deal with morality today can be explained in deterministic terms involving reinforcement, but some of it can't and most of the actions which you are pointing out as being compatible with determinism, actually come about through the logic of liberal freewill and its resulting responsibilities. Exactly what cannot be explained in deterministic terms? Can you give an example? bjolly wrote: We try minors differently than we do adults, because we claim that a child doesn't yet 'know better'. This assertion undeniably assumes that an adult does, and that an adult should have acted differently -as if they had a choice. This is completely compatible with determinism. We cannot hold an individual responsible for its actions unless and until it has developed to the point where it understands the difference between right and wrong (and thus controls its actions accordingly). This is why we treat minors differently, because we make allowance for the fact that they are still developing and they may not yet have fully developed the correct sense of right and wrong. It also explains why we treat mentally deficient people differently. All completely compatible with a deterministic explanation of behavior. bjolly wrote: The death penalty is not only argued through the logic of 'an eye for an eye', assuming that they deserved such a consequence, but it holds no greater purpose than life in prison, besides the argument that it is a greater deterrent (but I think that life in prison is a great enough deterrent.) When an attorney is defending someone for murder, the first thing they often try to do is prove that the defendant was a victim of some type of causation. They will claim that he/she is crazy or mentally unstable etc. We have first and second degree murder, which deals with the level of intent involved in the decision to kill. This is derived from the idea that one who has deliberated and premeditated a murder is worse than one who has not, because they were more conscious of their decision and not just caught up in the emotion of the moment. It assumes that since being caught up in the emotion of the moment leaves one less in control of their actions than one who has had the time to think through how they are going to kill. It presumes control. How is any of this incompatible with a deterministic explanation? Can you be specific in explaining just how you think it is incompatible with determinism? I don’t see any incompatibility here. bjolly wrote: Also, it's worth noting that our system of punishment doesn't work. People who go to jail come out worse most of the time etc. Why is this? Is it because what we do under the veil of productivity is truly something more primitive -like revenge? How is it productive to put a criminal in a system that creates a sense of self-hate and degradation, when those are the things that caused him/her to make the decisions that got them in there in the first place? I have never claimed that the justice system is perfect or always works. But that is not evidence of incompatibility with determinism. I am sure that if you could come up with a better and practical way of rehabilitating criminals (rather than just locking them up with other criminals), then everybody would want to hear about it. bjolly wrote: There's much more going on than just trying to help change the person. I agree - we are also trying to keep that person locked up so they cannot commit similar crimes (ie to protect society), and we are also trying to send a message to other would-be criminals. What other purpose do you think incarceration serves? What else is it that you think is "going on"? Are you trying to suggest that we put people into "a system that creates a sense of self-hate and degradation" simply out of a desire to make them suffer? If not, why do you think we do this? Again, you have made a lot of interesting points here, but how is any of it evidence that what we do (in terms of justice, the law, punishment etc) is in any way incompatible with a deterministic view of the world? Edited by reincarnated on 10/30/09 - 05:51 AM
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

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Posted 10/30/09 - 01:10 PM:	#67
.... My half hour reply to reincarnated got erased due to some pop up that arised from this site. -_-; That took forever to do. Can someone fix this problem? But much of reincarnated's arguments surrounds the idea that if I can't prove that machine's can't in principle produce consciousness then I can not have justification over the fact that they can. This is a false idea. Same with time traveling and every other theory. Successful theories only arise from proving that something is possible, not about proving methods impossible. You can not justify scientific facts that we can in the future meet with empirical methods by using Occam's Razor. If you can not provide an example, theory, model, of how computers or machines can produce consciousness, it is illogical to believe that they possibly can in the future just as much as physcists today believe that we should not be optimistic about time traveling to the past unless we first form a successful theory that allows time traveling to be plausible. (I find Michio Kaku to be too optimistic) Brian Greene also provided the fact that most physcists would still resist time traveling even if it is possible in principle because of ridiculously unlikely obstacles, and being unlikely is a more important element is science. "I dont think there are flying saucers. So my antagonist said, 'Is it impossible for there to be flying saucers, can you prove that it is impossible?' And I said no, 'No I can not prove that it is impossible. It's just very unlikely.' That they say is very unscientific, if you can't prove it impossible how can you say it is unlikely. For that is the way it is scientific. To say it is more likely or less likely and not to be proving all the time all the possibilities." Richard Feynman (1964 Caltech Lectures) I provided reasons why chess machines can not be used as an example for an analogy, but I am running out of time so unfortunately I can not repeat what I have said in my deleted response. Edited by Dragohunter on 10/30/09 - 01:33 PM
"Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological criminal." - Albert Einstein

reincarnated
the moving finger writes

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Posted 10/30/09 - 08:03 PM:	#68
Dragohunter wrote: My half hour reply to reincarnated got erased due to some pop up that arised from this site. -_-; That took forever to do. Can someone fix this problem? Hi Dragohunter When compiling long posts I find it better to copy and paste into MS Word, construct my post, and then copy paste back into PF. That way you are less likely to lose your hard work. Dragohunter wrote: But much of reincarnated's arguments surrounds the idea that if I can't prove that machine's can't in principle produce consciousness then I can not have justification over the fact that they can. This is a false idea. I’m an optimist. I am simply taking the position that something should be considered possible unless someone can give me a good reason why it should not be possible. Some others on this thread seem to be pessimists, arguing the opposite view – that something should be considered impossible until it can be demonstrated. Its simply a different point of view – its logically incorrect to say that one or other viewpoint is “false”. Dragohunter wrote: If you can not provide an example, theory, model, of how computers or machines can produce consciousness, it is illogical to believe that they possibly can in the future just as much as physcists today believe that we should not be optimistic about time traveling to the past unless we first form a successful theory that allows time traveling to be plausible. But I HAVE provided a theory/model of how machines can produce consciousness (see post #21 and all of the subsequent discussion on the thread “Consciousness” in the Metaphysics section). I welcome constructive criticism which might show that my theory/model is incorrect, or that it contains anything invalid or untrue? Dragohunter wrote: "I dont think there are flying saucers. So my antagonist said, 'Is it impossible for there to be flying saucers, can you prove that it is impossible?' And I said no, 'No I can not prove that it is impossible. It's just very unlikely.' That they say is very unscientific, if you can't prove it impossible how can you say it is unlikely. For that is the way it is scientific. To say it is more likely or less likely and not to be proving all the time all the possibilities." Richard Feynman (1964 Caltech Lectures) Far be it from me to find fault with a quotation from Richard Feynman, but it does NOT follow from the fact that we cannot prove something is impossible that we cannot say it is unlikely. Faulty logic. I can accept that you believe flying saucers are unlikely, and at the same time that we agree they are not impossible. There is simply no contradiction at all between “not impossible” and “unlikely”. Dragohunter wrote: I provided reasons why chess machines can not be used as an example for an analogy, but I am running out of time so unfortunately I can not repeat what I have said in my deleted response. As an analogy for what? I have never tried to use chess machines as an analogy for consciousness. I’m very happy to continue our discussion when you have more time to explain what you mean here.
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Dragohunter
illusion is persistent

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Posted 10/31/09 - 04:41 PM:	#69
reincarnated wrote: Hi Dragohunter When compiling long posts I find it better to copy and paste into MS Word, construct my post, and then copy paste back into PF. That way you are less likely to lose your hard work. Thank you I’ll try that =) I’m an optimist. I am simply taking the position that something should be considered possible unless someone can give me a good reason why it should not be possible. Some others on this thread seem to be pessimists, arguing the opposite view – that something should be considered impossible until it can be demonstrated. I don’t see how being an optimist or pessimist is relevant to philosophy or cognitive science. It is about what is likely and unlikely to be possible, not what we hope to be possible. If we were for an example, discussing the security measures and importance of global warming, we can not use our pessimistic or optimistic ideals to cloud our judgment. (which often happens in that particular subject) I find this to be much like this case. Optimism and pessimism should not be an element in our discussion in a scientific point of view. I am quite optimistic about scientific advancements actually; it’s just that I happen to consider this topic as an inconsistency. But I HAVE provided a theory/model of how machines can produce consciousness (see post #21 and all of the subsequent discussion on the thread “Consciousness” in the Metaphysics section). I welcome constructive criticism which might show that my theory/model is incorrect, or that it contains anything invalid or untrue? I’ll look into that. Far be it from me to find fault with a quotation from Richard Feynman, but it does NOT follow from the fact that we cannot prove something is impossible that we cannot say it is unlikely. Faulty logic. That was not my assertion. I was saying (or Richard Feynman) what is scientifically applicable is not about proving and disproving all the possibilities but seeing what is most likely and unlikely. I can accept that you believe flying saucers are unlikely, and at the same time that we agree they are not impossible. There is simply no contradiction at all between “not impossible” and “unlikely”. … well yes but that’s just repeating the quote. Flying saucers are not proven impossible and that is not a contradiction for flying saucers being unlikely. I don’t see your point. reincarnated wrote: Unfortunately I believe the misunderstanding is on your side. I disagree with your comment that Aristotle’s usage of “water, fire, air, earth” refers to exactly the same things that we understand today as “water, fire, air, earth” – simply because for Aristotle these words referred to the basic elements from which he believed everything else was created (whereas we no longer believe this). “Fire” for example is no longer considered an element (as Aristotle believed), but rather as a process. The meaning of (ideas associated with) the word “fire” thus was obviously very different for Aristotle, and he therefore used that word in ways which we would not use it today. His ideas (that he associated with fire) we believe are incorrect, but the incorrectness of his ideas does not in any way "invalidate" the meaning he intended when he used the word “fire”. Our ideas today are very different, hence our meanings are different. As ideas change, so too does the usage of words in language, and thus meanings also change (because meaning derives from usage). Just because ideas are “wrong” does not imply that meanings are also “wrong” – Aristotle’s meaning of the word “fire” is simply determined by his ideas and therefore his usage of the word, irrespective of whether his ideas are correct or not. I don’t see how I can agree with you. The usage of the word is how the words are represented, not the meaning. I won’t debate on the subject on the philosophy of language so I’ll just give a few examples. If I desire water as a 5 year old child, I desire water or a substance I come to know from experience quenches my thirst. I also know how it feels and how it looks and how it tastes. As I grow up and learn chemistry, my understanding of water drastically changes. I also have a complete different understanding of water as I learn about its chemical composition and how it affects the properties that I see with my own eyes, how it associates with chemical reactions with other elements, how they can causally be broken down into molecules and so on. But even though my understanding of water as a bunch of atoms bonded together is very different from my understanding as a 5 year old child, to say “I desire water” or “I like water” is still representing the same word and object in either case. The same principle relates with the words like “lion”, “thought”, “duck” and “gravity”. The ideas and meanings associated with them drastically changed as time passed but our usage of the words still remained the same. When Descartes referred to a squirrel not as a conscious being but more like a machine, the word “squirrel” he used is still the same word directed when we refer to squirrels today. If this was not the case, we would have to adopt a new “language” everytime meanings associated with words change. If drastic discoveries were made about cells and robots every few weeks, does that mean the words referring to those object change every time the ideas change? Certainly not. We were not discussing “perception”, we were discussing “recognition”. Using the word “recognition’ when referring to the process that computers use to identify objects does not necessarily reflect any particular “ideas” that these people have about the way that computers recognise (two people may refer to “computer recognition” but may also have very different ideas about how computers go about the process of recognition). None of this makes any difference to the fact that meaning derives from usage. And why do you think that a machine cannot also describe its relation to the world in the form of an “intentional aboutness”? And why do you think that semantics necessarily cannot arise from the execution of processing units? I will explain why semantics cannot arise from the execution of processing units using modern philosophy of the mind. I first lead on that semantics requires intentionality, in turn intentionality requires consciousness so anything that does not have consciousness does not have intentionality (yes even when you are unconscious) Intentionality (in a general description) the distinguishing property of mental phenomena of being necessarily directed upon an object, whether real or imaginary. All intentional phenomena have aspectual shapes in which the neuronal structures of the brain produces mental states that can causally influence thought. When we are unconscious, such aspectual shapes do not exist. The only mental states that do exist when we are unconscious are neurobiological structures capable of causing conscious states and capable of causing behavior appropriate to those mental states. This sort of motivation in a situation where consciousness doesn’t occur could not be an intentional content and therefore has no psychological reality. If we as comparably ridiculously advanced human minds don’t have intentional aboutness when we’re unconscious, nor can machines can without consciousness. There is more? Such as? Ontologically irreducible qualitative data of the human mind. I will give an explanation if you request. Why should we NOT believe? Your argument is again based on a false premise. What does similarity in genetic information necessarily have to do with it? Currently the only two types of entities able to play chess (that we know of) are humans and machines (indeed I am willing to bet that there are MORE humans with some form of ethics than there are who can play chess) – and yet there is ZERO similarity in genetic information between humans and machines. And yet based on your simplistic assumption (that a similarity in genetic information is necessary in order to develop similar abilities) we should conclude that machines would never be able to play chess? This is where I meant that you used the chess machine analogy, and this is why chess machines can’t be used as an example of having similarities to the human mind: The most important mathematical element of chess is the development of algorithms which can play chess. Beyond this, it doesn’t include any products of the human mind because: 1. playing chess is sharply defined both in allowed operations (the moves) and in the ultimate goal (checkmate) and no other computations are necessary; 2. it is neither so simple as to be trivial nor too difficult for satisfactory solutions; 3. chess machines do not do any "thinking" for skillful play as they don’t have any conscious thoughts 4. the discrete structure of chess fits well into the digital nature of modern computers so it doesn’t display anything relatively abnormally advanced This is all based on chess machines built NOW so concluding that chess machines can display abilities humans can, it doesn’t mean they copy similar effects of the human mind. And I only used the genetic information as an analogy to compare two similar species with one having abilities that the other intellectually can not produce to show how similar something has to be to the human mind to actually produce the same effects. I did not mean to say genetic information was relevant to the discussion. I don’t necessarily disagree regarding complexity – but where is it said that a machine can never be as complex as the human brain? If your argument is simply based on complexity then you have not provided any reason to believe that machines will never, in principle, be able to develop ethics. You claim your argument still stands – but what exactly is your argument? Is it that “only something similar to the human mind can develop ethics”? But this is NOT an argument – its simply an assertion or a premise. I have asked you to justify your assertion, and your response is along the lines “only humans have so far developed ethics” – which I have shown does not (by itself) justify the assertion “only humans can in principle develop ethics”. (sigh) I hope you are reading my posts seriously or it may be that I’m making a huge mistake that you are assuming obvious. I explained that the level of complexity that allows the development of ethics is part of the identification of the human mind, not that it is side detail or effect that the human mind contains. If I were to say the only molecule we know that has the exact solubility of 0.0026 g/100 mL or formula CO is carbon monoxide, I would be saying that is one of the facts about the molecule that identifies it. I can’t say that there may be in the future molecules with formula CO just because only such molecules have been observed in the past had formula CO, but the formula CO is part of the identification of carbon monoxide. This may have been a bad example because the laws of chemistry are not going to change as scientific advancements, but I’m saying there are such properties and effects of the human mind that can only exist with the human mind because that is what identifies it.
"Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological criminal." - Albert Einstein

reincarnated
the moving finger writes

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Posted 11/04/09 - 12:48 AM:	#70
Dragohunter wrote: I don’t see how being an optimist or pessimist is relevant to philosophy or cognitive science. It is about what is likely and unlikely to be possible, not what we hope to be possible. Noting that one’s views or beliefs are optimistic or a pessimistic is simply an observation regarding one’s beliefs, and beliefs are fundamental to the practising of both philosophy and science. You made the judgment that such a viewpoint is “false”, which is of course ridiculous. You talk about “hope” – I never mentioned the word “hope”. I am talking about beliefs. I believe something is possible unless and until someone can give me good reasons why it should not be possible. Some others (I’m not sure if you are one of them?) seem to believe that things are impossible unless and until someone can demonstrate in practice that they are possible. So far, I have not seen anyone provide a good reason why conscious machines should be considered impossible. reincarnated wrote: Far be it from me to find fault with a quotation from Richard Feynman, but it does NOT follow from the fact that we cannot prove something is impossible that we cannot say it is unlikely. Faulty logic. Dragohunter wrote: That was not my assertion. I was saying (or Richard Feynman) what is scientifically applicable is not about proving and disproving all the possibilities but seeing what is most likely and unlikely. Read the quote again. It says “if you can't prove it impossible how can you say it is unlikely.” reincarnated wrote: I can accept that you believe flying saucers are unlikely, and at the same time that we agree they are not impossible. There is simply no contradiction at all between “not impossible” and “unlikely”. Dragohunter wrote: … well yes but that’s just repeating the quote. No, it’s not, the quote says just the OPPOSITE. The quote says (basically) you cannot say they are unlikely IF you cannot prove them impossible. I am saying you CAN say they are unlikely even if you cannot prove they are impossible. In other words, I am saying that flying saucers can be both possible (ie not proven impossible) and unlikely at the same time, whereas your alleged Feynman quote says that flying saucers CANNOT be both possible (ie not proven impossible) and unlikely at the same time (which is false). Dragohunter wrote: The usage of the word is how the words are represented, not the meaning. But meaning derives from usage. Dragohunter wrote: I won’t debate on the subject on the philosophy of language so I’ll just give a few examples. If I desire water as a 5 year old child, I desire water or a substance I come to know from experience quenches my thirst. I also know how it feels and how it looks and how it tastes. As I grow up and learn chemistry, my understanding of water drastically changes. I also have a complete different understanding of water as I learn about its chemical composition and how it affects the properties that I see with my own eyes, how it associates with chemical reactions with other elements, how they can causally be broken down into molecules and so on. But even though my understanding of water as a bunch of atoms bonded together is very different from my understanding as a 5 year old child, to say “I desire water” or “I like water” is still representing the same word and object in either case. The same principle relates with the words like “lion”, “thought”, “duck” and “gravity”. The ideas and meanings associated with them drastically changed as time passed but our usage of the words still remained the same. I think you are confusing “meaning” with “referent” here. The referent of a word is the thing to which that word refers. In the case of “water”, you (believe that you) use the word “water” to refer to the same thing whether you are 5 years old or an adult. But though the referent apparently stays the same, the meaning of the word “water” changes for you as grow up. When you are a child “water” simply means something wet, colourless, tasteless which quenches your thirst and sometimes falls from the sky. As you grow up, you learn that there is much more to the meaning of the word water (not the referent, the meaning) than this simple characterization, and your usage of the word changes accordingly. You come to understand that water is defined as H2O, but that there is also heavy water (D2O), and you may distinguish different kinds of water (salt water, fresh water, distilled water, mineral water, as well as heavy water), all of which are still “water” and yet which differ from one another in important ways – in this way the meaning of the word “water” evolves for you and changes as you acquire different ideas and concepts about the usage of the word. And that’s my whole point. Aristotle’s usage of the word “fire” was NOT identical with our usage of the same word, because for Aristotle fire was also an element (whereas for us it is not), so he would have used the word in ways that we would not use it today. Hence it follows that the meaning of the word was different for Aristotle. Dragohunter wrote: I will explain why semantics cannot arise from the execution of processing units using modern philosophy of the mind. I first lead on that semantics requires intentionality, in turn intentionality requires consciousness so anything that does not have consciousness does not have intentionality (yes even when you are unconscious) Intentionality (in a general description) the distinguishing property of mental phenomena of being necessarily directed upon an object, whether real or imaginary. All intentional phenomena have aspectual shapes in which the neuronal structures of the brain produces mental states that can causally influence thought. When we are unconscious, such aspectual shapes do not exist. The only mental states that do exist when we are unconscious are neurobiological structures capable of causing conscious states and capable of causing behavior appropriate to those mental states. This sort of motivation in a situation where consciousness doesn’t occur could not be an intentional content and therefore has no psychological reality. If we as comparably ridiculously advanced human minds don’t have intentional aboutness when we’re unconscious, nor can machines can without consciousness. And what does this show? Even if I accept your argument (and I am not saying that I do), all you have shown (in fact you have assumed it in your definitions) is that semantics entails intentionality which in turn entails consciousness. You have NOT shown that machines cannot possess semantics and intentionality (and therefore also consciousness), and you certainly have not shown why semantics cannot arise from the execution of processing units. Dragohunter wrote: Ontologically irreducible qualitative data of the human mind. I will give an explanation if you request. Please do, and while you’re at it please also explain why such “ontologically irreducible qualitative data” cannot exist also within a machine. Dragohunter wrote: This is where I meant that you used the chess machine analogy, and this is why chess machines can’t be used as an example of having similarities to the human mind: I am not using chess machines as an analogy to consciousness or the human mind. I am simply making the observation that humans play chess, and that certain machines play chess. As far as we know, these are the only two entities in the universe with the ability to play chess. And yet there is zero similarity in genetic makeup between the two (which similarity in genetic makeup is, according to your simplistic argument , necessary). Thus your argument (that a similarity in genetic makeup is necessary in order for two entities to have similar abilities) is fallacious. Dragohunter wrote: I hope you are reading my posts seriously or it may be that I’m making a huge mistake that you are assuming obvious. I explained that the level of complexity that allows the development of ethics is part of the identification of the human mind, not that it is side detail or effect that the human mind contains. I am indeed reading your posts very closely. What is this complexity that you refer to? Ethics is simply the seeking of answers to questions about morality, and morality is simply the distinction between right and wrong, or good and bad. What is complex about this? From an analytical perspective, ethics is remarkably straightforward – and we all know that machines are very good at analytical applications. Perhaps you think that there is something more to ethics than this, if so could you please explain what “more” you think there is to ethics other than seeking the answers to questions about morality? Edited by reincarnated on 11/04/09 - 12:54 AM
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

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