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Ethics of consciousness
Is consciousness the only thing that can cause the possibility of ethics?

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Ethics of consciousness

bjolly
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Posted 10/19/09 - 11:47 PM:	#51
note: This last post was in response to *reincarnated .*

Dragohunter
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Posted 10/20/09 - 06:03 PM:	#52
parameter wrote: bjolly wrote: Without consciousness there could be no freewill. How does this follow? *Freewill, as it relates to ethics, is the ability to make choices not bound by causal determinism. In order to freely will a decision, one must have some level of conscious intent. If there were no conscious intent, then it would be decided by the forces of causality. Unconscious objects, such as a rock, can not have freewill, and have a destiny which is by default determined. Would you disagree with this assertion? [b] [/quote] I would also like to add as not matter how much free will is accepted as an illusion in theory, it is always be realized in practice. Its not like you can tell a person who's asking what your "decision" will be, "Oh I am sorry, I am a determinist who doesn't have the free will to make decisions. I'll just wait and see what happens." Daniel Denett's book Freedom Evolves explains how Free will is compatible in a deterministic universe using game theory explanations. Edited by Dragohunter on 10/24/09 - 10:52 AM
"Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological criminal." - Albert Einstein

bjolly
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Posted 10/20/09 - 06:36 PM:	#53
I have spent a lot of time looking into arguments for compatiblism, and have yet to hear anything more than a much more complex understanding of determinism. Most compatiblist arguments emphasize that yes, we are the result of determinism, but we do choose what we desire to. The problem is that the desire that they refer to is just a result of causality according to their model. It's a smoke and mirrors trick, and it only works if you redefine freewill as doing what you desire, as opposed to doing what you desire without the restraint of determinism. The former is just a description of how the illusion of freewill works in the deterministic model. In order to have moral responsibility, in the sense that you could have chosen a better action than you did, you must have the freedom to make more than one possible decision. If matter is necessarily causal, and we are 100% matter, and we use a definition of freedom that requires the transcendence of causality, then there is by definition a contradiction. Edited by bjolly on 10/21/09 - 10:56 PM

Dragohunter
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Posted 10/21/09 - 10:54 AM:	#54
The view that, although in the strict physical sense our actions are pre-determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved. Free will, seen this way, is about freedom to make decisions without duress, as opposed to an impossible and unnecessary freedom from causality itself. To clarify this distinction, consider the term 'evitability' as the opposite of 'inevitability', defining it as the ability of an agent to anticipate likely consequences and act to avoid undesirable ones. Evitability is entirely compatible with, and actually requires, human action being "deterministic". If you want to know more about this, you should read about the Prisoner's Dilemma which explains how conscious and with "free will" agents who cooperate will be more successful than agents "without free will" who do not cooperate. Cooperation wouldn't seem to naturally arise since agents are tempted to 'defect' and restore a Nash equilibrium, which is often not the best possible solution for all involved. As so, you can conclude that free will may have been exercised as an adaption at a social social environment throughout the developments of the brain.
"Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological criminal." - Albert Einstein

bjolly
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Posted 10/21/09 - 01:49 PM:	#55
parameter wrote: The view that, although in the strict physical sense our actions are pre-determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved. Free will, seen this way, is about freedom to make decisions without duress, as opposed to an impossible and unnecessary freedom from causality itself. To clarify this distinction, consider the term 'evitability' as the opposite of 'inevitability', defining it as the ability of an agent to anticipate likely consequences and act to avoid undesirable ones. Evitability is entirely compatible with, and actually requires, human action being "deterministic". You're missing the point. You have also just done exactly what I described in my last post. You redefined freewill to mean the ability to make choices. Computers and robots have 'the ability of an agent to anticipate likely consequences and act to avoid undesirable ones' as long as they are programed to do so. Would you say that they have freewill? But that wasn't even my main point, which was that morality requires a much more liberal description of freewill than you've described. You didn't respond to the part where I said, "In order to have moral responsibility, in the sense that you could have chosen a better action than you did, you must have the freedom to make more than one possible decision." I did not mean just the ability to make choices, I meant the ability to make more than one choice. In your model, your "freewill" is restricted by your determined impulses based on your past experiences. This means that you couldn't look back and say, 'i should have made another decision' because your decision was an inevitability based on your deterministic experiences and your deterministic processing power. While your model may be right, it contradicts the form of freewill that morality requires. Morality requires that you are responsible for your actions, and you cannot be responsible for your actions if they are ultimately deterministic. Our justice system does much more than just provide positive and negative reinforcement. It labels people and actions as "bad" or "good". How can you call a person bad, for making decisions which they are not responsible for? This undeniably assumes that the person could have and should have made another choice, which goes against your assertions. What you are describing as "free will agents" are just higher forms of intelligence which have developed a more complex understanding, and thus have acquired better decision making skills. But more choices does not mean freer choices.

Dragohunter
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Posted 10/24/09 - 10:51 AM:	#56
bjolly wrote: You're missing the point. You have also just done exactly what I described in my last post. You redefined freewill to mean the ability to make choices. Computers and robots have 'the ability of an agent to anticipate likely consequences and act to avoid undesirable ones' as long as they are programed to do so. Would you say that they have freewill? But that wasn't even my main point, which was that morality requires a much more liberal description of freewill than you've described. You didn't respond to the part where I said, "In order to have moral responsibility, in the sense that you could have chosen a better action than you did, you must have the freedom to make more than one possible decision." I did not mean just the ability to make choices, I meant the ability to make more than one choice. In your model, your "freewill" is restricted by your determined impulses based on your past experiences. This means that you couldn't look back and say, 'i should have made another decision' because your decision was an inevitability based on your deterministic experiences and your deterministic processing power. While your model may be right, it contradicts the form of freewill that morality requires. Morality requires that you are responsible for your actions, and you cannot be responsible for your actions if they are ultimately deterministic. Our justice system does much more than just provide positive and negative reinforcement. It labels people and actions as "bad" or "good". How can you call a person bad, for making decisions which they are not responsible for? This undeniably assumes that the person could have and should have made another choice, which goes against your assertions. What you are describing as "free will agents" are just higher forms of intelligence which have developed a more complex understanding, and thus have acquired better decision making skills. But more choices does not mean freer choices. I agree with the what you say except I don't think free will is based only on moral choices. If I go to a restaurant and order something to my liking, I am using my own freewill. Even if I pick a usual order, I have the will to make a free "choice" of something else while although a machine may be designed to have many possible outcomes or choices, they don't have the "freedom" to do so. Your model isn't successful of explaining free will in the strict sense.
"Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological criminal." - Albert Einstein

bjolly
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Posted 10/25/09 - 08:04 PM:	#57
Dragonhunter, You completely misunderstood my post. I would go back and read it again. First off, I did not say that freedom is based on moral choices, I said that aspects of morality require freedom. Those mean two completely different things. Second, I did not propose a model for freewill. You proposed compatiblism, and I explained that the 'free' aspect of compatiblism that you described isn't the kind of freedom that morality requires. I'd rather not explain that again, so if you'd like to understand why I made that claim, feel free to read through my earlier posts in the conversation.

reincarnated
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Posted 10/28/09 - 09:10 PM:	#58
Dragohunter wrote: I agree with your defintion of language but I think you're basing it on a misunderstanding. I can refer to water as a color less odor less liquid and not H20 (supposedly I was ignorant of chemistry) and another person may also refer to the word water as both my description but concentrating on its chemical composition and how it relates at the molecular level. The meaning of a word does not go beyond its usage but it the usage of the word can still be mistaken to the object its refering to. Aristotle's usage of world water, fire, air, and earth is still referring to water, fire, air, and earth that we refer to today but his understanding to the words it was referring was mistaken because his conception of it was wrong. Unfortunately I believe the misunderstanding is on your side. I disagree with your comment that Aristotle’s usage of “water, fire, air, earth” refers to exactly the same things that we understand today as “water, fire, air, earth” – simply because for Aristotle these words referred to the basic elements from which he believed everything else was created (whereas we no longer believe this). “Fire” for example is no longer considered an element (as Aristotle believed), but rather as a process. The meaning of (ideas associated with) the word “fire” thus was obviously very different for Aristotle, and he therefore used that word in ways which we would not use it today. His ideas (that he associated with fire) we believe are incorrect, but the incorrectness of his ideas does not in any way "invalidate" the meaning he intended when he used the word “fire”. Our ideas today are very different, hence our meanings are different. As ideas change, so too does the usage of words in language, and thus meanings also change (because meaning derives from usage). Just because ideas are “wrong” does not imply that meanings are also “wrong” – Aristotle’s meaning of the word “fire” is simply determined by his ideas and therefore his usage of the word, irrespective of whether his ideas are correct or not. Dragohunter wrote: Likewise the word perception in philosophy is the process of attaining awareness or understanding of sensory information. Just because people use the word to refer to computers and machines does not mean their ideas are right. We were not discussing “perception”, we were discussing “recognition”. Using the word “recognition’ when referring to the process that computers use to identify objects does not necessarily reflect any particular “ideas” that these people have about the way that computers recognise (two people may refer to “computer recognition” but may also have very different ideas about how computers go about the process of recognition). None of this makes any difference to the fact that meaning derives from usage. reincarnated wrote: Sorry, but you still have not explained what you mean by "meaning". Could you please explain? Until we understand and agree exactly what you mean by "meaning" I am not sure it makes much sense to continue discussing "meaning"? Dragohunter wrote: The intentional "aboutness" the mind describes in relation to the world. And why do you think that a machine cannot also describe its relation to the world in the form of an “intentional aboutness”? Dragohunter wrote: I would have to go into the case of intentionality and explaining it is irrelevant to this duscussion. It seems to be very relevant to what you mean by “meaning”. Dragohunter wrote: I'm not trying to say that computer programs lack something else, but programs are instructions for processing units to execute; I never knew them to be anything else. And why do you think that semantics necessarily cannot arise from the execution of processing units? Dragohunter wrote: there is more to the human mind that distinguishes it from being causually reduced to computational functionalism like machines. There is more? Such as? Dragohunter wrote: The point is that a computer that can perfectly immitate the functions of a human brain still lack properties that are ontological irreducible. I agree that a machine could imitate an entity which possesses consciousness but at the same time not actually possess consciousness This is not the point. The point is that neither you nor Searle has provided an acceptable justification for the belief that machines cannot, in principle, possess consciousness. Dragohunter wrote: I have no argument to prove that there aren't invisible pink unicorns roaming around the world. I simply find it implausible and unlikely by my understanding, so my opinion is useless because it lacks justification? I am not asking for proof – only for justification for your beliefs. My justification for disbelieving in invisible pink unicorns is Occam’s razor. My justification for disbelieving in some “magic consciousness-causing mind stuff” which is undetectable and only present in some organic brains is also Occam’s razor. My justification for believing in physicalism and for believing that consciousness is a property which emerges as a simple consequence of a particular (physical) process is also Occam’s razor. Dragohunter wrote: You have agreed that value implies a perspective and this discussion is based on the disagreement that robots can't have a perspective, understanding, or meaning. Thus it hinges on exactly what you mean when you refer to things like “understanding” and “meaning” - but it seems you believe that further discussion on what you mean by “meaning” is irrelevant, so where do we go from here? Dragohunter wrote: If gorillas, whose genetic information only differs from humans 2% are not able to function to develop ethics, why should we imagine that developing computers to be able to form their own ethics (whose complexity is far behind an earthworm's brain)? Why should we NOT believe? Your argument is again based on a false premise. What does similarity in genetic information necessarily have to do with it? Currently the only two types of entities able to play chess (that we know of) are humans and machines (indeed I am willing to bet that there are MORE humans with some form of ethics than there are who can play chess) – and yet there is ZERO similarity in genetic information between humans and machines. And yet based on your simplistic assumption (that a similarity in genetic information is necessary in order to develop similar abilities) we should conclude that machines would never be able to play chess? Dragohunter wrote: I'm just implying its unlikely to produce anything that can produce ethics unless we create something similar or complex as the human mind. I don’t necessarily disagree regarding complexity – but where is it said that a machine can never be as complex as the human brain? If your argument is simply based on complexity then you have not provided any reason to believe that machines will never, in principle, be able to develop ethics. Dragohunter wrote: My argument is still valid because only something similar to the human mind can develop ethics because only properties shown to be in the human mind can produce ethics, like hydrogen having 1 proton. You claim your argument still stands – but what exactly is your argument? Is it that “only something similar to the human mind can develop ethics”? But this is NOT an argument – its simply an assertion or a premise. I have asked you to justify your assertion, and your response is along the lines “only humans have so far developed ethics” – which I have shown does not (by itself) justify the assertion “only humans can in principle develop ethics”. bjolly wrote: In order to freely will a decision, one must have some level of conscious intent. If there were no conscious intent, then it would be decided by the forces of causality. Unconscious objects, such as a rock, can not have freewill, and have a destiny which is by default determined. Would you disagree with this assertion? Why does “conscious intent” imply lack of causality? Observing that non-conscious objects follow deterministic laws does not lead to the safe conclusion that conscious objects therefore follow non-deterministic laws. bjolly wrote: Would you agree that when one calls another "morally responsible" for an action, that the assumption is that they could have chosen otherwise (via freewill)? Morality is simply the distinction of good behaviour from bad, or right from wrong. If one wants to act, and does so act, according to such moral values (ie if one wants to do, and does, the good or right thing as opposed to the bad or wrong thing) then we say that one is acting morally (or with moral responsibility). But where is any of this incompatible with determinism? IF I want to do the right thing, and I then DO do the right thing, THEN it follows that I am acting with moral responsibility – all completely deterministic. Of course I must be free (unconstrained) such that I can in fact do what I perceive to be the right thing (in other words, I am not forced against my will (against what I want) to do the wrong thing), but this is the only "freedom" that is required – the compatibilist freedom simply to be able to do what one wants to do – all completely compatible with determinism.
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

bjolly
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Posted 10/28/09 - 11:01 PM:	#59
parameter wrote: Why does “conscious intent” imply lack of causality? Observing that non-conscious objects follow deterministic laws does not lead to the safe conclusion that conscious objects therefore follow non-deterministic laws. I did not make the conclusion that 'conscious objects therefore follow non-deterministic laws.' Here's my full quote with you're preceding question in context: parameter wrote: bjolly wrote: Without consciousness there could be no freewill. reincarnated wrote:How does this follow? bjolly wrote: Freewill, as it relates to ethics, is the ability to make choices not bound by causal determinism. In order to freely will a decision, one must have some level of conscious intent. If there were no conscious intent, then it would be decided by the forces of causality. Unconscious objects, such as a rock, can not have freewill, and have a destiny which is by default determined. Would you disagree with this assertion? I was discussing why consciousness is necessary for freewill. The most important sentence in showing the context of the point I was making was the first one, which you didn't include in your quote. I did not say that 'conscious intent' implies lack of causality. I said that freewill in relation to ethics is necessarily not causal, and anything which is not conscious is necessarily causal, therefore, anything which is not conscious is not free. In other words, instead of 'conscious intent implies causality', it's 'no consciousness necessarily implies causality'. I was stating that consciousness is a necessary requirement for (not sufficient for) a free choice, not that conscious intent implies lack of causality. Freewill, according to you, is the ability to act on your desires. If you are not conscious, then you could not have desires (unless you have an extremely loose definition of desire or an extremely strict definition of consciousness.) Therefore, without consciousness you could not have freewill. My point was that we don't hold deterministic things such as rocks to moral standards. Would you agree that it would seem out of place to say 'that rock was immoral!' when it falls on your head? When we speak of moral responsibility we are doing much more than just designating the agent which caused something, we are claiming that it should have made a different choice (not just that the choice was bad). We don't do this with rocks falling on our heads because we know that it had no other choice. parameter wrote: Morality is simply the distinction of good behaviour from bad, or right from wrong. If one wants to act, and does so act, according to such moral values (ie if one wants to do, and does, the good or right thing as opposed to the bad or wrong thing) then we say that one is acting morally (or with moral responsibility). But where is any of this incompatible with determinism? IF I want to do the right thing, and I then DO do the right thing, THEN it follows that I am acting with moral responsibility – all completely deterministic. Of course I must be free (unconstrained) such that I can in fact do what I perceive to be the right thing (in other words, I am not forced against my will (against what I want) to do the wrong thing), but this is the only "freedom" that is required – the compatibilist freedom simply to be able to do what one wants to do – all completely compatible with determinism. I totally agree, and when we define morality like you just have as good things or bad things, then you are correct that freewill is unnecessary. Unfortunately, people commonly associate much more with morality. Instead of simply saying, 'that choice was bad', people often say, 'that was a bad choice', implying not just that the choice was wrong, but that the person is 'wrong' for making that choice. It is a criticism of both the choice itself and* the quality of decision making on the part of the decision maker. It is generally assumed that you cannot hold someone responsible for that which is not in their control, so to label them as a 'bad' person for making a 'poor' decision assumes that they could have chosen otherwise. Of course, you could say that we simply define agents as immoral when they make a certain amount of immoral decisions, and that freewill is not necessary for that, but I think it's undeniable that we do much more than that. When we punish someone for making a bad choice we are doing much more than giving them negative reinforcement for their own good. When we punish someone we are doing so in frustration that they made the 'wrong' choice and claiming that they deserve the punishment for their poor behavior. How can someone deserve punishment for an action which was out of their control? This is the aspect of morality that I am claiming requires a liberal notion of freewill. If one's wants are determined, then it is unfair to criticize the quality of their decision. Any concept of deserving, such as an eye for an eye, assumes that the choice was undetermined. You wouldn't refute this would you?

bjolly
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Posted 10/28/09 - 11:03 PM:	#60
that was to reincarnated.

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