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Does Ought Always Imply Can?
It depends on the use or function of "ought"

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Does Ought Always Imply Can?

aletheist
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Posted 09/01/09 - 07:59 PM: Subject: Does Ought Always Imply Can?	#1
As noted in a recent paper by Wayne Martin, the premise that "ought implies can" (OIC) is almost a truism in moral philosophy--almost, because although it is something that is often taken for granted, it is by no means self-evidently true or historically uncontroversial. As a result, it cannot simply be assumed; it must be defended by those who wish to invoke it in arguments. A couple of simple and obvious counterexamples spring immediately to mind: 1. I find myself in a genuine moral dilemma, where two different obligations are in total conflict. It is not possible to satisfy both of them; I must choose one or the other (or neither). Does this mean that one (or both) of them is not really a moral obligation? 2. I am working on a certain project that must be finished by a specific date. I procrastinate until the day before the deadline, at which point it is no longer possible for me to complete the assignment on time. Does this relieve me of my moral obligation to do so? Both of these are what Martin calls "duty-restricting" (or "Whew!") applications of OIC: I cannot X, therefore it is not the case that I ought to X. There are also "capacity-expanding" (or "Wow!") applications of OIC: I ought to X, therefore I must be able to X. The former tend to be more common, but the latter are (according to Martin) more consistent with the actual invocation of OIC by Kant, with whom it is most closely associated. The applicability of OIC seems to depend heavily upon the use or function of the specific "ought" claims under consideration. Martin reviews arguments that establish OIC in the contexts of deliberation (by reductio), "all things considered" obligations (when ought presupposes can, rather than entailing it), and formal deontic logic (where ought only implies logical possibility). All three show OIC to be a synthetic inference, rather than an analytic principle, and noticeably weaken its scope. Martin is primarily interested in what he calls "infinite moral consciousness", which is organized around "infinite ideals" that may impose obligations or duties that are impossible for us to fulfill. A paradigmatic example is the traditional Christian doctrine that no human is capable of obeying the explicit command of Jesus to "Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48). Martin suggests that the use or function of this kind of "ought" claim is evidently not one to which OIC applies; the intention behind it is not to prompt us to behave in a certain way--rather, it is to teach us that we do not, in fact, have the ability (within ourselves) to do so. I look forward to your comments.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Mako
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Posted 09/01/09 - 09:21 PM:	#2
aletheist wrote: A couple of simple and obvious counterexamples spring immediately to mind: 1. I find myself in a genuine moral dilemma, where two different obligations are in total conflict. It is not possible to satisfy both of them; I must choose one or the other (or neither). Does this mean that one (or both) of them is not really a moral obligation? 1):The short answer is that only one of them is an obligation if the agent can only satisfy one of them. Dilemmas are what I refer to as 'boundary situations.' That is, I view morality as a 'bounded-domain' wherein one typically acts 'inside' the boundary, within the domain, where more or less simple deontological rules usually apply (e.g. 'don't lie, don't steal). In boundary situations however, we are called upon to act 'as if 'one is an adjudicator. At that moment where one must face a moral dilemma, the agent is, according to his/her own judgment, provisionally the sole moral authority; extreme cases may even involve life and death decisions. One does not in my view have a duty to satisfy both obligations in cases where it is impossible to do so. 'Ought still implies can.' Moral obligations should never overwhelm the agent. Morality is and must remain, in the end, practical. Duties should therefore be performable/achievable. Furthermore, boundary/dilemma situations may require 'consequentialist' considerations (as opposed to deontological ones)/That is, under typical, non-dilemma conditions, deontological rules (duties) come into play in order to achieve the reciprocal, symmetrical outcomes which define moral relationships. With dilemmas however, consequentialist considerations may be necessary (e.g.Should one rescue the lifeboat with 10 people or with 2 if one can only rescue one of them?). In boundary (dilemma) situations, the moral agent must in my view, make decisions which protects/preserves ''moral agency.' This is why, using Kant's famous 'murder-at-the-door' example, I would favour lying to the muderer if I thought that would save a life. The assailant here is not at this time behaving as a moral agent. And using contractualist language, one has no prior contractual obligation to someone whose stated purpose is to act 'outside of and contrary to' the moral contract (by threatening murder) in the first place. aletheist wrote: 2. I am working on a certain project that must be finished by a specific date. I procrastinate until the day before the deadline, at which point it is no longer possible for me to complete the assignment on time. Does this relieve me of my moral obligation to do so? 2):For me, all duties are ceteris paribus(provisional/conditional). That is, all things being equal ( barring extenuating circumstances serious enough as to void the obligation), one has a duty to follow through with the specific obligation to which one has agreed. Perhaps this is where an Aristotelian take on it might come in. That is, one is wise (and moral) to cultivate the virtue of 'diligence' so that one avoids procrastination. Kant would have argued that such virtues which lead to self-perfection are 'imperfect duties' and that one has an obligation, though a less immediate one, to cultivate such virtues. For me it comes down to what is 'reasonable' and one's specific duty here is involves a 'time' parameter. It is reasonable then and indeed morally obligatory in my view, to take the time factor into consideration and to take all reasonable measures (such as beginning the project early) in order to fulfill the obligation. EDIT: Think of #2 from another perspective. Due to the prior agreement to 'complete the project' by a certain time, party A has a 'right' to expect that party 'B' will complete the project on time. The fact that 'B' is a procrastinator does not bear on the conditions of the agreement whether it be a formal or informal one. From A's perspective, B can be held morally responsible/culpable for not completing the project. Mako Edited by Mako on 09/02/09 - 05:44 AM
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Postmodern Beatnik
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Posted 09/02/09 - 06:58 AM:	#3
I temporarily refer you to the brief comments I made on this thread (copied below). I'll say more when I've read the paper. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: "Ought" is thought to imply "can," because it hardly seems to make sense to say that you ought (i.e. are obligated) to do something if it is not, in fact, possible for you do so. Such an obligation would, at the very least, be meaningless at the practical level. We need to be careful how widely we apply the principle, however, as illustrated by the following example. Assume that you ought to keep all of your promises and that you have made a promise to Joe that you will pay him $1,000 dollars on June 16, 2009. If you then promise Beth that you will not pay Joe $1,000 dollars on June 16, 2009, you will no longer be able to keep all of your promises. This on its own, however, does not mean you ought not keep all your promises. It might just mean that you ought not have promised Beth to begin with, due to the moral conundrum in which it would land you. You could have put yourself in a position to be able to keep all of your promises, but no longer have the opportunity to do so. This raises the question of moral luck. Suppose that instead of making promises to Joe and Beth, you promise Tommy that you will go to his baseball game and Sally that you will go to her dance recital. Then the game (or the recital) gets rescheduled such that both events -- which are located 100 miles apart and not being broadcast in any way -- are now to occur at the same time. Now what? You could have put yourself in a position to be able to keep all of your promises (by promising only Tommy, only Sally, or neither), but you no longer have the opportunity to do so. Yet we can stipulate that there was no way you could have known the game (or recital) would be rescheduled. What to make of all this is an open question: some people argue that since the impossibility of keeping all your promises is not of your own making, you cannot be held to at least one of your promises; others argue that such moral misfortunes are relevantly similar to the cases that do not involve moral luck and that you are, therefore, equally responsible for both of your promises. Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 09/02/09 - 06:13 PM. Reason: added referenced comments -- just in case.
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Cuthbert
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Posted 09/02/09 - 08:22 AM:	#4
I procrastinate until the day before the deadline, at which point it is no longer possible for me to complete the assignment on time. Does this relieve me of my moral obligation to do so? Perhaps it does. But it doesn't relieve you of the moral blame for having failed to do the assignment, when you were able. What's the meaning of someone's having an obligation they can't fulfill? But the point of blaming ourselves for things we can do nothing about is to recognise that we were (if we were) responsible for the mess we've made. Perhaps in the hope we can do better next time. 1. I find myself in a genuine moral dilemma, where two different obligations are in total conflict. It is not possible to satisfy both of them; I must choose one or the other (or neither). Does this mean that one (or both) of them is not really a moral obligation? Perhaps the case is that I ought to X, if I can X; and I ought to Y, if I can Y. So I ought to both X and Y, if I can both X and Y. But, as a matter of circumstance, if I X, then I cannot Y, and vice versa. And so it's not the case that I ought to both X and Y. So I ought to do only one of them. Whichever one I choose, I get the blame for not having done the other, even though, not being able to do it, I wasn't obliged to do it (as above). For my inability to do it was itself the result of my moral choice. I think OIC just points up the fact that we've got a dilemma. It doesn't help us solve any dilemma, but it seems that it can be consistent with the existence of dilemmas.

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Posted 09/02/09 - 08:45 AM:	#5
aletheist wrote: A couple of simple and obvious counterexamples spring immediately to mind: 1. I find myself in a genuine moral dilemma, where two different obligations are in total conflict. It is not possible to satisfy both of them; I must choose one or the other (or neither). Does this mean that one (or both) of them is not really a moral obligation? 2. I am working on a certain project that must be finished by a specific date. I procrastinate until the day before the deadline, at which point it is no longer possible for me to complete the assignment on time. Does this relieve me of my moral obligation to do so? 1. Perhaps you could throw out some examples of this to see if they actually are such dilemmas. 2. The temporal aspect here is what causes the confusion. You didn't do something even when you could have, but once you no longer can do it, you are not relieved from an obligation to have done something in the past, or an obligation that doesn't exist in the present.
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 09/02/09 - 10:23 AM:	#6
aletheist wrote: 1. I find myself in a genuine moral dilemma, where two different obligations are in total conflict. It is not possible to satisfy both of them; I must choose one or the other (or neither). Does this mean that one (or both) of them is not really a moral obligation? I wonder if there's another option: obligations don't aggregate. The argument seems to be (1) It's obligatory that A. (2) It's obligatory that B. (3) If it's obligatory that A, and it's obligatory that B, then it's obligatory that A & B. (4) It's not possible that A & B. (5) Therefore, there's a case in which it's not possible, but it is obligatory. But maybe (3) isn't true. The analogous principle in alethic modalities isn't: it may be possible that P, and possible that not-P, but it doesn't follow that it's possible that P & not-P.

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Posted 09/02/09 - 02:30 PM:	#7
Mako wrote: Dilemmas are what I refer to as 'boundary situations.' That is, I view morality as a 'bounded-domain' wherein one typically acts 'inside' the boundary, within the domain, where more or less simple deontological rules usually apply (e.g. 'don't lie, don't steal). In boundary situations however, we are called upon to act 'as if 'one is an adjudicator. At that moment where one must face a moral dilemma, the agent is, according to his/her own judgment, provisionally the sole moral authority; extreme cases may even involve life and death decisions. One does not in my view have a duty to satisfy both obligations in cases where it is impossible to do so. 'Ought still implies can.' *Moral obligations should never overwhelm the agent. Morality is and must remain, in the end, practical.* Duties should therefore be performable/achievable. Furthermore, boundary/dilemma situations may require 'consequentialist' considerations (as opposed to deontological ones)/That is, under typical, non-dilemma conditions, deontological rules (duties) come into play in order to achieve the reciprocal, symmetrical outcomes which define moral relationships. With dilemmas however, consequentialist considerations may be necessary (e.g.Should one rescue the lifeboat with 10 people or with 2 if one can only rescue one of them?). In boundary (dilemma) situations, the moral agent must in my view, make decisions which protects/preserves 'moral agency.' This is why, using Kant's famous 'murder(er)-at-the-door' example, I would favour lying to the mu(r)derer if I thought that would save a life. The assailant here is not at this time behaving as a moral agent. And using contractualist language, one has no prior contractual obligation** to someone whose stated purpose is to act 'outside of and contrary to' the moral contract (by threatening murder) in the first place. I need to think more about this approach before I respond further.
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aletheist
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Posted 09/02/09 - 06:14 PM:	#8
Mako wrote: 1):The short answer is that only one of them is an obligation if the agent can only satisfy one of them. Do I understand you correctly that the agent is then free to choose which one is an obligation, and which one is dispensable? Mako wrote: 2):For me, all duties are ceteris paribus(provisional/conditional). That is, all things being equal ( barring extenuating circumstances serious enough as to void the obligation), one has a duty to follow through with the specific obligation to which one has agreed. Are there moral obligations that do not require our agreement; i.e., that apply to us whether we accept them or not? What about absolute moral obligations that do not admit any extenuating circumstances?
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 09/02/09 - 06:25 PM:	#9
Cuthbert wrote: Perhaps it does. But it doesn't relieve you of the moral blame for having failed to do the assignment, when you were able. So, if that were the case, would it be right to say that "ought implies can" only if the "ought" is used to assign blame, rather than obligation? Cuthbert wrote: For my inability to do it was itself the result of my moral choice. This seems like a key aspect of my second counterexample. We presumably have an obligation not to take deliberate steps to create circumstances that will make it impossible for us to fulfill our other obligations. However, this does not apply to the scenario proposed by Postmodern Beatnik, where the inability to fulfill multiple obligations is not the result of my moral choice.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 09/02/09 - 06:33 PM:	#10
keda wrote: 1. Perhaps you could throw out some examples of this to see if they actually are such dilemmas. Martin cites the case of Antigone, who felt a moral duty to bury her fallen brother; but this was against the law, because he had been declared a traitor. Postmodern Beatnik suggested a situation where you promise to attend two events, one of which ends up being rescheduled to occur at the same time as the other one, but in a different place.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

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