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Do we have to 'know' that we know?

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Do we have to 'know' that we know?

treysuttle
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Posted 06/18/09 - 09:12 AM: Subject: Do we have to 'know' that we know?	#1
Do we have to know that we know, in order to have knowledge? (Referred to in the literature as the 'KK thesis'). According to some accounts (externalist accounts of knowledge, naturalized epistemology), we do not. That is, a belief can be justified without either being able to show that one is justified and without even being aware that one is justified. Granted, these positions sometimes may not consider propositional knowledge to be this sort of knowledge (propositional knowledge being knowledge >that< p, as opposed to knowledge by acquaintance and knowing 'how'). But what about propositional knowledge - do we have to 'know' that we know? -- or to put it another way: Can I know that p, without knowing that I know that p? One reason for thinking that we do have to KK manifests when we consider the nature of justification. Justification is a necessary component of propositional knowledge. In terms of inferential knowledge, it would seem that we have to know that we know. If our justification for p is based on q, then it also seems that we must further know that q entails p. In terms of noninferential knowledge, it would seem that we have to know that the, say sensory state, is just the sort of contributor that would justify the belief. For example, if my claim that: 'This is red', counts as knowledge, then it must be justified. I might further say that my justification is based on my being in a particular phenomenal state. But (as Sellars points out in attacking the myth of the given), one also must know that being in such a state conditions the correct use of the statement, 'This is red', as opposed to say, being in the same phenomenal state and asserting, 'This is green'. Further, it would seem that to be justified in a statement based on observation, one should also at least have some reason for believing that one is not hallucinating, not dreaming, and so forth (-- not that we should be certain, but at least have some reason). Consider also basic notions of belief -- If I believe p, don't I also believe that I believe p? Otherwise, I believe p, but don't know whether I believe p, or, I believe p but do not believe that I believe p? Could I have justification, but be oblivious to whether my justification is good justification for my belief? Unlike merely stating a belief, asserting knowledge seems to come with it a kind of self-reflective understanding that one is asserting and why (the reasons grounding) such asserting. If we don't know why asserting should count as knowledge (what reasons we have for believing our justification - why our reasons are good reasons for asserting), then are we really justified? It seems to me the answer is 'no'.

Philo1965
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Posted 06/18/09 - 08:48 PM:	#2
Suppose the JTB analysis is correct. According to KK, then, in order for me to know that p, I have to know that I have satisfied JTB. In other words, I have to know that I am justified in believing that p, and I have to know that p is true. Two questions: (1) Why wouldn't the fact that I am justified in believing that p, and that p is true, be enough for me to know that p? (2) How would I know that I am justified in believing that p, and that p is true?

unenlightened
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Posted 06/18/09 - 09:08 PM:	#3
I know that proposition; we were introduced at a party last week. But perhaps it not the proposition that I usually know, but something that can be represented by a proposition. When I know stuff, I like to think it is not juat a bunch of words that I know. for instance, I might know, to borrow your example, that "Ceci est rouge." Yet, if I didn't know some French, I would not know that those letters represent that which I know. It is even possible that I do not have the exact word for the colour that I know this to be - somewhere between crimson and maroon. I know that I know, yet I cannot say what I know, and even if I can, the saying is not what I know.
...most of our actions are the result of the past, or according to a future ideal. That's not action, that is just conformity. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

Philo1965
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Posted 06/18/09 - 10:17 PM:	#4
unenlightened wrote: But perhaps it not the proposition that I usually know, but something that can be represented by a proposition. When I know stuff, I like to think it is not juat a bunch of words that I know. A proposition is what is expressed by a declarative sentence. "Snow is white" and "Der Schnee ist weiß" are two different sentences that express the same proposition.

treysuttle
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Posted 06/19/09 - 04:18 AM:	#5
Phil1965: "Why wouldn't the fact that I am justified in believing that p, and that p is true, be enough for me to know that p" Well, you might be...according to what you are willing to count as justification. For example, if just being in a particular mental state is sufficient for justification, then it seems you surely could be, i.e. the fact that I am in the state of experiencing a red object is sufficient justification for the statement, 'This object is red', to be knowledge. Externalists and reliablists seem to accept something like this, right. We very well may not know that our belief is the product of a reliable belief-forming process....but as long as it is, we are justified in our belief. Consider a famous scenario -- clairvoyance: Norman is a reliable clairvoyant. But he has no reason to believe that he is (when he gets 'feeling' that are the product of his power, his feelings always express true beliefs, but when his feelings are not the product of the power, they are sometimes true and sometimes false). Norman gets the feeling that the president is currently in Chicago. His feeling is (and only is) the product of his power (and therefore expresses a true belief), but he has no further reason to believe that his feeling is the product of his power, as opposed to a feeling not produced by the power. Does Norman have knowledge? If merely 'being justified' is enough, then we must say yes. His belief was produced by a process that always produces true beliefs (you can't get much stronger justification than that, I presume). Do we really want to call Norman's 'feeling' that the president is in Chicago a case of knowledge? Doesn't it seem that something is lacking in Norman's case? What seems to be lacking is that, even though Norman is justified in his belief, he doesn't know that he is justified in his belief. Without this second-order knowledge about his justification, his being justified is really in no better state than his not being justified. Not all reasons count as good reasons for believing that a belief is true. It seems that in order to have good reasons, one must know something about what distinguishes a good reason from a not so good reason (in this case, mere feelings from clairvoyance) -- and must know (be further justified in believing) that one's reasons in the particular situation are good as opposed to not so good (it's not enough just to know that you are a clairvoyant...you also have to know when a particular belief is the product of the power and when it is not). Phil1965: "How would I know that I am justified in believing that p, and that p is true?" When you know that your justification is the right sort of justification to justify you in believing that p is true. Here I don't think there is a cut and dry 'criteria' for 'right sort of justification'. Generally, the sort of justification that if your justification is highly probable, then the truth of p is highly probable. But (as the Norman case elucidates), it is not enough just to have highly probable justification (or even justification such that the truth of p is absolutely certain) -- one must know something about that justification, i.e. that it is highly probable or certain.

unenlightened
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Posted 06/19/09 - 09:13 AM:	#6
Philo1965 wrote: A proposition is what is expressed by a declarative sentence. "Snow is white" and "Der Schnee ist weiß" are two different sentences that express the same proposition. However the whiteness of the snow is expressed by the snow in the first place, and only reflected by the proposition.
...most of our actions are the result of the past, or according to a future ideal. That's not action, that is just conformity. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

nousPLOTINU
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Posted 06/20/09 - 07:29 AM:

To show knowledge you would have to justify the organization of it. People loosly use the term know when they gloass over the organizational aspects of knowledge. All knowledge has an infrastructural organization otherwise it would be impossible to sense the presence of the knowledge-bearing objects from life (the facts from the case understudy).

In the case of Norman, for him to have knowledge he has to be able to show it is indeed the case throughout his organized feelings and thoughts. Norman would have an organizationA for his real thingie and another organizationB for his occasional thingie. To claim his information is valid he must know whenA and notB ( or) whenB and notA.

Feelings, sensations and sentiments are the worst cases of knowledge.because of the high level of inference needed to admit true information.

It is not that I think I know, it is that I know when I think.

treysuttle
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Posted 06/20/09 - 08:37 AM:	#8
I agree with everything that you say, generally. However, let me break down what is at issue, to have a clear grasp of the problems involved. Knowledge is at least justified true belief. So, let's take p as an instance of knowledge. So we might say s (a subject) JTBp (s has a justified true belief, that p). If having to know....that you know...is necessary to know p, then we end up with as a condition for knowing p: s must have a JTB (JTBp). s must have a justified true belief (condition for knowing), that she has a justified true belief, that p. But she has to know that she knows, so then she has to know that she knows that she knows that p. This results in an infinite regress...such that we never know anything. There are several possible solutions to this problem. One is that there are some beliefs that are justified that do not require further justification (this rejects the KK thesis, incidentally). The problem is, for any belief that does not require justification, all such beliefs would seem to be on a par. The result is that picking some belief not further justified would seem to be ad hoc....any non-further justified belief would seem to be just as good as another. Further, if one shows (provides justification for) why one belief should be 'self-justified' and another not...then, 'q is self-justifying', is not self-justifying after all, and one can inquire about whatever reason someone offered supporting its presumed self-justification. Sextus Empiricus, the famous skeptic, referred to this position generally as 'dogmatism'. As we've noted, if the process goes on infinitely, then we are never justified in a belief (an implication of the KK thesis). If it circles around (coherentism), i.e. p justifies q, q justifies n, n justifies p. This is circular reasoning, also known as 'begging the question'. Begging the question is certainly not a good contender for knowledge (although it may illuminate something about the nature of justification). Also, further problematic, in a round about way it assumes what is to be justified, and is therefore a disguised form of dogmatism. One solution to these problems (there may be others that you can think of) is to reject the KK thesis. But not because there is something inherently mistaken about asking, 'how do you know, that you know'. This is perfectly acceptable sometimes. The reason is by noticing that when one asks, 'How do you know, that you know'..one is asking a different question from 'How do you know'. Given that knowledge requires at least justified true belief, one can answer the second question without (or without even being able to) answer the first question. The first question is essentially a meta-question concerning the second. Conflating the two (which is very common, incidentally) has become known as epistemic 'level confusions'. To ask 'how do you know that you know' is to shift to a meta-level concerning our original question. (I know that: p) I know that: (I know that: p) If you require that persons be able to answer meta-level questions concerning their knowledge claims, notice that you either have to concede that we never have knowledge (those infinite regresses) or you give an account of why we reach some meta-level in which further justification is no longer required (remember, this rejects the KK thesis) -- I submit that either your account will be ad hoc, or just as applicable to the original claim to knowledge as to any of the meta-levels (which will be NOT very applicable..because our original question concerns (know that: p), -- not, (know that)(know that p). Of course, advocating meta-level justification for subordinate claims also leaves us in the predicament that very few people actually know anything, as very few people are equipped to give even a 1st level meta-justification for why they know something...much less further on up the 'chain' of meta-levels. Edited by treysuttle on 06/20/09 - 08:43 AM

unenlightened
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Posted 06/20/09 - 09:13 AM:	#9
Is it possible that the justification of a belief might be something other than knowledge? One might have recourse occasionally to immediate experience. Surely, the idea behind this analysis is at some point to escape from one's own head and say something about the world. Its like Banno's hands; how does he know he has two hands? Its the two hands that give it away. Is a better justification even conceivable?
...most of our actions are the result of the past, or according to a future ideal. That's not action, that is just conformity. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

lexusdominus
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0 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 06/20/09 - 09:16 AM:	#10
Everyone seems to love complicating simple issues on this forum its funny. There is already a word for knowledge. Its called faith. I know, that I am right. Some people know that I am wrong.

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