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dissolution of the issue on solipsism
A short argument listed as a set of propositions.

dissolution of the issue on solipsism

marmot
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Posted 07/01/09 - 11:12 PM: Subject: dissolution of the issue on solipsism	#1
I was arguing with a friend who is a philosophy major, (and I am not, I am a physics/math major) about how scepticism, solipsism, etc can be dissolved to nonsense using wittgensteinian dissolution. I posted this argument, tell me if it is sound: 1) Senses might be deceiving us (You say) Lets suppose its not "might", and that it is actually true: 1) Senses deceive us. 2)If the senses deceive us, the objects we perceive are deceiving us. 3) Language as a means of communication is created in a public context. People point at objects and situations and regurgitate sounds and make facial expressions. (This is a proposition I take as self evident) 4)These objects people point at are deceiving us/ hallucinations. 5)If the language game arises in this public context, then it arises from an hallucinatory context. 6)If Language arises from this accumulation of halluccinations, then it is imbued with deception. 7) The proposition "senses are deceiving us" is formulated with deceived concepts so it unintelligible. Does this make sense?

jtoma
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Posted 07/02/09 - 12:11 AM:	#2
I'll regurgitate so you can see what I understand: 1) Sensory perceptions are deceitful. 2) Objects are known insofar as deceit speaks truth. 3) Language communicates and is communicated by sensory perception, which is deceitful. 4) Language communicates deceit. 5) (1) is unintelligible due to deceit in the language used to express it. If (1) were unintelligible, how would I have regurgitated it along with the rest of your argument? Edited by jtoma on 07/02/09 - 03:54 PM

ughaibu
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Posted 07/15/09 - 03:48 AM:	#3
If somebody argues that they might not be real, there doesn't seem to be much point in taking their arguments seriously. Can the non-existent argue?

the.yangist
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Posted 07/18/09 - 03:01 AM:	#4
marmot wrote: I was arguing with a friend who is a philosophy major, (and I am not, I am a physics/math major) about how scepticism, solipsism, etc can be dissolved to nonsense using wittgensteinian dissolution. I posted this argument, tell me if it is sound: It's not sound unless you give a strong reading to the first premise. "Senses deceive us," in most ordinary interpretations, just means that there are some inaccuracies to our perceptions, that only some of our senses deceive us. I only need to cite some audible or optical illusions (my favorite being the effect on the eyeballs upon focusing on a color in front of a white backdrop, and then quickly removing it to leave residual appearance of a different color). Really, to get it across, you need to put it more strongly, "All of our senses are wholly deceived," or something of the sort. 1) Senses might be deceiving us (You say) Lets suppose its not "might", and that it is actually true: You're invoking something called "conditional proof," if the formality of your argument is of interest to you. [Good] philosophers excel at exactly this type of argumentation to produce most of the conditional statements they make. However, since your aim is to prove a contradiction, you'll invariably arrive at an "indirect proof," and therein demonstrate that a variant of skepticism is wrong (i.e. you will refute your first premise, something your first respondent doesn't seem to understand), and thereby show that not all senses are deceitful. 1) Senses deceive us. 2)If the senses deceive us, the objects we perceive are deceiving us. 3) Language as a means of communication is created in a public context. People point at objects and situations and regurgitate sounds and make facial expressions. (This is a proposition I take as self evident) 4)These objects people point at are deceiving us/ hallucinations. 5)If the language game arises in this public context, then it arises from an hallucinatory context. 6)If Language arises from this accumulation of halluccinations, then it is imbued with deception. 7) The proposition "senses are deceiving us" is formulated with deceived concepts so it unintelligible. Does this make sense? For extra note, you've really only extended a recycled version of the "skeptic's paradox," which, along with the nihilist's paradox, basically undermines its own principle. You've simply put it in a novel way. Kudos for making this dull topic more interesting. Generally, the paradox is put this way: "Nothing is certain/knowable/assertable as true." "Therefore, 'Nothing is certain/knowable/assertable as true,' is certain/knowable/assertable as true." That renders the first statement both true and false, and that is a contradiction. I don't see how this is a talk about solipsism, though. Also, there's nothing uniquely Wittgensteinian about what you've argued. "Dissolution" is just RAA. Otherwise, cool post!
"If it were not for the laughter, the Way would not be what it is." -- Laozi

180 Proof
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Posted 07/18/09 - 09:43 AM:	#5
If I am all that exists -- entailing that there are no not-I reference-points, Then I lack orientation; But I am oriented (e.g. temporal-asymmetry), Thus there must be not-I reference-points; Therefore, I cannot be all that exists. QED Subtract all perceptions, thoughts & memories from (any) consciousness. That's "solipsism".
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

jtoma
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Posted 07/21/09 - 10:29 AM:	#6
Sorry, I was merely asking if the question I asked was the right one to illuminate the contradiction between 1) and 5) to our math/phys boy, who probably knows what an indirect proof is What I don't understand is how you think marmot's contradiction was achieved. What contradiction did you find that made you not want to assume what? Even though it seems like you think that if something has been proved not to be the case, then it was done by contradiction (?), it doesn't seem like you have explicated the contradiction. What you did explain about the skeptical paradox (whatever that is) is that it does undermine it's own rule: you assume something (say P), which if true, would entail its own contradiction (-P). So p -> p&-p = -(-pvp). Thus, if you can assume something that leads to its own contradiction, then (roughly) the law of excluded middle does not apply to whatever set contains that thing. So, the main thing that follows from 'nothing is certain' is that something may be certain. Taking 'nothing' to range (at least) over propositions of which 'nothing is certain' is one, then that proposition is not certain, which is to say that some things may be certain. (if it is not certain that nothing is certain, then it is possible that something is certain). proof- Even if thats all you think of solipsism, its still something to reckon with. (I am all that exists -> there are no not-I reference pts. -> I am not oriented) & (I am oriented -> there are not-I reference pts -> I am not all that exists). This argument looks like yours, and also like a conjunction of contrapositives, doesn't it? Does force of the argument rest on the contradiction between being oriented and not oriented? Anyway, If you were all that existed, then you could be incorrect in believing that you are oriented due to misapprehension of I reference pts as not-I reference pts. Likewise, if you were not all that existed, then you could still be incorrect in believing that you are not oriented due to a misapprehension of not-I reference pts as I reference pts.

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