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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

probeman
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Posted 02/01/04 - 12:32 PM:	#1
Welcome to a discussion of Daniel Dennett's "Consciousness Explained", Chapter 1 (Prelude: How are hallucinations possible?). In an effort to avoid argumentative discussion over vague generalities, I have suggested that we start a new thread that will, each week (more or less), consider a chapter from Dennett's book and discuss the pros and cons of the issues raised by his attempt at a scientific explanation of consciousness. However, as Dennett himself has pointed out, the book is in many places only a preliminary sketch of a fully explanatory scientific theory of consciousness, whose primary purpose is to develop new ideas for thinking about old problems in order to make progress on this very difficult question that has plagued both philosophy and science for many years. It is suggested that the participants in the discussion should make every attempt to read the material under discussion before joining the discussion and try to frame the questions or issues in context of the author's actual words in the chapter under consideration. This is an attempt to bring some structure to the discussion in order to more closely focus on specific problems with this scientific explanation of consciousness. For example, the author discusses whether it is valuable or even desirable to try and "explain" consciousness in Chapter 2, therefore discussion of these types of questions should ideally wait until those ideas are being discussed in the week dedicated to the issues in that chapter. Whenever possible the author's actual words should be cited (so we're all on the same page- so to speak) and of course it will sometimes be necessary to include ideas and data from other scientists and philosophers working on these issues, but here also, the text or data source should be cited whenever possible to add weight and context to the discussion. Also, since Dennett's book is some 13 years old, we might expect that new data and further considerations (by the author and others) have deemed necessary some modifications of certain specific aspects of the work since that time. However, in a cursory review of the field it would appear that, overall, the ideas in the book have continued to stand up extremely well in light of new data and studies since the original publication. But any new information that bears on the ideas under discussion would of course be most welcome. One additional note on "isms": I've seen that philosophers like to use a lot of "isms". For example "materialism". I prefer to avoid arguments about "isms" as much as possible because I think they detract from a discussion of more specific problems. But based on some previous interactions, I think it would be helpful to warn the participants that when Dennett mentions "materialism", it is in contrast to "dualism". It therefore might be better to think of Dennett's "materialism" simply as detectable properties or processes. Furthermore, since it is Dennett's central thesis that all aspects of the mind are ultimately produced from material processes, he would, I think, include as "material" properties, more intangible items such as our perceptions and even our "ideas" of those perceptions, since they are, in many cases quite detectable. Finally, keep in mind that the first chapter (Prelude) is merely a warm-up exercise for understanding Dennett's later ideas for a scientific explanation of consciousness by attempting to provide a mechanistic or algorithmic explanation of one very small aspect of the mind- hallucinations and the character of dream narratives. I've asked Faustus to provide a summary of the first chapter's salient points to get the discussion going and he has said he would oblige.
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Faustus
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Posted 02/01/04 - 01:32 PM:	#2
Chapter one of Consciousness Explained is obviously just a prelude of things to come, but Dennett does set the stage by introducing ideas that will develop as the book progresses. Here are some that struck me as important. The first emerges in the example of the psychoanalytic party game, and in a sense is the heart of the book. Here an entire narrative (a dream) is generated not by a single person or group with full authorial intent, but by a nearly mindless process with no conscious direction. We’re lead to consider this game from a traditional starting point: Descartes’ muse that, in fact, we could be living a dream manipulated by a malicious demon. Of course, when we have a normal dream, we are both the dreamer and the demon—participant, and (somehow) author alike. How could this happen? “The more or less standard answer of the Freudian has been the extravagant hypothesis of an internal dream playwright composing therapeutic dream-plays for the benefit of the ego and cunningly sneaking them past an internal censor by disguising their true meaning.” (p. 14—all my quotations are from the first edition hardcover; sorry, I know virtually everyone out there participating has the trade paperback.) This Freudian playwright is a proposed “homunculi”: an intelligent agent of the larger mind, charged with a task to perform. Positing a specific bit of mental engineering and an interior entity poised to instantiate it is permissible in a theory, but “whenever homunculi are rung in to help, they had better be relatively stupid functionaries”.(14) This is because unless they are truly stupid, we really have postponed explanation by moving our target inside the homunculi. No, authorship of a normal dream must be explained in a way that does away with the author, or we have no explanation. The psychoanalytic party game is one way to do it. The game is of a series of Dennettian thought experiments in which near-mindless algorithms suffice to produce the appearance of conscious design where there is none. The role of the audience is easily one performed by a machine that merely looks at the last letter of each question. The questioner—now there’s an “un-exorcised” homunculi. But the questioner and audience roles are parallel to actual models of perception as involving “generate and test” cycles, in which something like homunculi are employed. These mental subsystems are there to “assuage epistemic hunger----to satisfy ‘curiosity’ in all its forms. If the ‘victim’ is passive or incurious about topic x, if the victim doesn’t seek answers to any questions about topic x, then no material about topic x needs to be prepared.”(16) Here the term “victim” refers to the questioner, who in the party game is the butt of the whole joke. This passage also contains hints of ideas that will be developed later. “Material about topic X” sounds like one of his circulating “multiple drafts”. And this notion of perception only needed to “assuage epistemic hunger” is used later to dispense with qualia and “filling in”. That the book begins with Descartes is of course important, given his influence on how discussions of consciousness are often framed in Western intellectual history. The Cartesian way of talking, and the habits of thought engendered that way of talking, is the primary thing Dennett wishes to change.

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Posted 02/01/04 - 02:27 PM:	#3
On page 462, Dennett informs us that by the end of the day (or book) he is a behaviorist: "But you are, really, a sort of bahaviorist, aren't you?" This question has been asked before, and I am happy to endorse the answer that Wittgenstein [1953] gave to it: " 'Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction?' -- If I do speak of a fiction, then it is a grammatical fiction." Several philosophers have seen that what I am doing as a kind of redoing of Wittgenstein's attack on the "mental objects" of conscious experience. Indeed it is.
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

jk236
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Posted 02/01/04 - 03:08 PM:	#4
TecnoTut wrote: On page 462, Dennett informs us that by the end of the day (or book) he is a behaviorist: I wouldn't conclude from this that Dennett is of the simplistic variety of behaviorists. Dennett relies on the results of neuroscience, cognitive science, and even evolutionary biology for his theory of consciousness, not exactly something you'd find a typical behaviorist to do.
"The philosophical lesson I learned from my biology teacher is this: when not much is known about a topic, don't take terribly seriously someone else's heartfelt conviction about what problems are scientifically tractable. Learn the science, do the science, and see what happens." Patricia Smith Churchland "Now I know what it must have felt like to be a cop at Woodstock." Daniel Dennett on the Towards a Science of Consciousness Conference

probeman
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Posted 02/01/04 - 06:31 PM:	#5
TecnoTut wrote: On page 462, Dennett informs us that by the end of the day (or book) he is a behaviorist: First real post and someone is already jumping to page 462. Sigh! It's like trying to herd cats.
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probeman
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Posted 02/01/04 - 06:59 PM:	#6
Faustus wrote: ...That the book begins with Descartes is of course important, given his influence on how discussions of consciousness are often framed in Western intellectual history. The Cartesian way of talking, and the habits of thought engendered that way of talking, is the primary thing Dennett wishes to change. Faustus, Thanks for the very concise summary. It's one sign of science at work when complex processes can start to be broken down into simpler processes (or mechanisms). My particular satisfaction with Dennett's ideas are that they have apparently broken the grip of the Cartesian theater inhabited by a homunculi. A not always happy situation in science, is that untested theories tend to continue to be utilized, often simply for lack of a better idea. One thought that came to mind while I was reading about how the contents of dream narratives not only tend to be composed of the particular obsessions of the dreamer, but also that they tend to be rather "volatile". The "my grandmother [but] has become the Pope" type of shift which might be explained by an "active but insufficiently skeptical" confirmation system, page 14-15. The thought that came into my mind while reading this section is that I myself have experienced another related experience. That is, real sensory data becoming incorporated into my dream narrative during the transition from sleep to waking. For example, someone calling my name, I have found on occasion, to be someone in my dream calling me, but a different person, and as I wake it switches to the real person. Or the sound of someone hammering at a construction site outside has been incorporated into my dream as someone banging on my door, but upon waking the sound switches to an outdoor sound. I distinctly remember the moment of "perceptual vertigo" I experienced with these shifts in perception when, for example I *"knew"* in my dream someone was banging on my door, to when I awoke and *"knew"* that it was only someone hammering outside my window. I'm sure you have all experienced this interesting dreaming at one time and it is nicely explained by the hypothesis-test cycle of the perceptual system.
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probeman
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Posted 02/01/04 - 07:01 PM:	#7
jk236 wrote: I wouldn't conclude from this that Dennett is of the simplistic variety of behaviorists. Dennett relies on the results of neuroscience, cognitive science, and even evolutionary biology for his theory of consciousness, not exactly something you'd find a typical behaviorist to do. Yes, I guess one might say he is a philosopher of mental behavior.
Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.

Belem

Posted 02/02/04 - 08:29 AM:	#8
The introduction does not help very much to distinguish his own proposal about consciouness from the one that scientists have already provided. I think I will enjoy more the following chapters. Dennett: We have seen how attention to the engineering requirements of a mental phenomenon can raise new and more readily answerable, questions, such as: What models of hallucinations can avoid combinational explotion? How might the content of experience be elaborated by (relatively) stupid, uncomprehending processes? What sort of links between processes or systems could explain the results of their interactions? Dennett uses the case of hallucinations to compare it with something that from my point of view is much more complicated than that. I think that the engineering of hallucinations is not a good example to understand the engineering of consciousness, unless he provides a very good theory not to explain identifiable physical processes that cause identifiable mental states but the act of being aware that it matters what we know and think. Belem

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Posted 02/02/04 - 09:34 AM:	#9
Belem wrote: Dennett uses the case of hallucinations to compare it with something that from my point of view is much more complicated than that. I think that the engineering of hallucinations is not a good example to understand the engineering of consciousness, unless he provides a very good theory not to explain identifiable physical processes that cause identifiable mental states but the act of being aware that it matters what we know and think. Belem I think he'd be inclined to agree. It's just a taste of things to come. The pattern of explanation given in the prelude is what you'll find repeated later on. And yeah, things don't really start getting interesting until later. . . .

probeman
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Posted 02/02/04 - 10:02 AM:	#10
Belem wrote: The introduction does not help very much to distinguish his own proposal about consciouness from the one that scientists have already provided. I think I will enjoy more the following chapters. Dennett uses the case of hallucinations to compare it with something that from my point of view is much more complicated than that. I think that the engineering of hallucinations is not a good example to understand the engineering of consciousness, unless he provides a very good theory not to explain identifiable physical processes that cause identifiable mental states but the act of being aware that it matters what we know and think. Belem Yes, it is just a taste of things to come and a warm up exercise. As he even states (bottom of page 15), this explanation of hallucinations is not very satisfactory, because although it might explain the "illusionist/playwright" that plays Cartesian pranks on the mind (and replace it with a mechanistic solution), it still leaves unexplained the "question-poser" or "audience" of the hallucination (or dream). The point being that today, every cognitive scientist is comfortable with Dennett's "mechanistic" or "algorithmic" type of explanations, but not everyone else is familiar with the ideas, or more and especially, agrees with him. Dennett wants to proceed slowly and systematically to make sure that everyone can follow the argument. I'm itching to get to the next chapter which has some real meat to it- but I too want to proceed slowly and systematically. There must be some (maybe Freudian inclined) philosophers that can find some faults in this first chapter?
Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.

Belem

Posted 02/02/04 - 12:12 PM:	#11
The point being that today, every cognitive scientist is comfortable with Dennett's "mechanistic" or "algorithmic" type of explanations, but not everyone else is familiar with the ideas, or more and especially, agrees with him. Probeman, You seem to imply (twice now) that Scientists could enrich their approach to the study of how the mind works with Dennett's theories of consciousness. I think that Scientists have nothing to learn from Dennett because Dennett's proposal is based completely on the achievements of Science in many areas. He is basically using the discoveries in psychology, cognitive science and neurology to dismantle the philosophical conception of consciousness. He wants to prove that consciousness can be reduced to mere physical processes and back up his arguments with scientific evidence. At the end, if consciousness can be reducible, then it would have to be Science the only reliable figure to claim that it is so and Science -at this moment- can only speak about correlations. Belem

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Posted 02/02/04 - 12:43 PM:	#12
Belem wrote: You seem to imply (twice now) that Scientists could enrich their approach to the study of how the mind works with Dennett's theories of consciousness. I think that Scientists have nothing to learn from Dennett because Dennett's proposal is based completely on the achievements of Science in many areas. He is basically using the discoveries in psychology, cognitive science and neurology to dismantle the philosophical conception of consciousness. He wants to prove that consciousness can be reduced to mere physical processes and back up his arguments with scientific evidence. At the end, if consciousness can be reducible, then it would have to be Science the only reliable figure to claim that it is so and Science -at this moment- can only speak about correlations. Belem This subject is really more appropriate for the discussion of the second chapter, where these questions and related concerns are specifically addressed- but since the philosophers in this forum do not seem to be exactly breaking down the walls on this thread, I will respond. I would disagree. Cognitive scientists that I have talked to seem very appreciative of many philosophers and their efforts in this area, Dennett's efforts in particular. However, many of Dennett's hypotheses cannot be considered scientific in the strictest sense since sufficient empirical data is lacking in more than a few cases, as he himself is quick to point out. But his philosophical ideas can point to new directions and areas that cognitive scientists can then investigate. I would say that Philosophy, informed by science, can make a tremendous contribution to the study of consciousness. Of course, you are correct that philosophy, based solely on intuition or belief, vague generalities and never tested empirically, may not have much to add to the discussion. The situation is somewhat analogous to the Social Sciences, where now some sociologists and anthropologists can see biology and evolutionary psychology encroaching on their "territory". But even there, many researchers from both perspectives (cultural and physical) have found very fruitful collaboration and are gaining greater understanding, just as Dennett has. But I am more interested in your specific issues with the idea that hallucinations might be explained as a kind of perception based data "starvation" of a confirmation/disconfirmation system continually asking questions and getting somewhat arbitrary responses in return. What is your impression of these ideas?
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Posted 02/02/04 - 01:07 PM:	#13
Belem wrote, “I think that Scientists have nothing to learn from Dennett because Dennett's proposal is based completely on the achievements of Science in many areas.” This book really straddles both disciplines. It’s an education on the science for fellow philosophers who prefer the safety of an armchair and depend too often on their intuitions. It’s also an education in philosophy for scientists in the field who might not even realize how unexamined philosophical intuitions shape their work. But his theory doesn’t just take science done by others and frame it to make a purely philosophical point. In coming chapters, he’ll actually challenge the interpretations scientists have claimed for their own work, and in the concluding appendix, his theory makes some predictions—one of which has already been confirmed. . . . .

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Posted 02/02/04 - 02:09 PM:	#14
Good discussion. I'll read the chapter and get more involved in the discussion but just preliminarily: Quote byTecnoTut On page 462, Dennett informs us that by the end of the day (or book) he is a behaviorist: The examples sighted by TecnoTut do not seem to make Dennett a behaviorist. He simply, in keeping with Wittgenstein, concentrates on those elements of behavior that can be meaningfully discussed and debated about. Wittgenstein, to my naive understanding, attacks the concept of "mental objects" on the biases that one cannot meaningfully speak of such things. This does not mean they do not exist. But again I have not read the book yet. I'm just eager to participate in a disscustion and this does not seem to be a topic of the first chapter

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Posted 02/02/04 - 02:33 PM:	#15
Avery Burke wrote: The examples sighted by TecnoTut do not seem to make Dennett a behaviorist. He simply, in keeping with Wittgenstein, concentrates on those elements of behavior that can be meaningfully discussed and debated about. Wittgenstein, to my naive understanding, attacks the concept of "mental objects" on the biases that one cannot meaningfully speak of such things. This does not mean they do not exist. But again I have not read the book yet. I'm just eager to participate in a disscustion and this does not seem to be a topic of the first chapter If Dennett himself admits that he is a behaviorist, then I do not know how you can deny that he is a behaviorist. Wittgenstein, too, was a behaviorist. In Dennett's 'intentional stance', 'beliefs', 'intentions', and 'qualia' are all merely grammatical fictions a la Wittgenstein. The only thing that really exists is behavior. All other things, such as beliefs and intentions, are just useful fictitious models used in predicting and explaining behavior. John Searle said that scientists and philosophers have always used the latest technology and science as a model or metaphor for the mind. Dennett is no different. When telephone switchboards were first invented, philosophers and scientists analogized the mind to the swithboards. Sherrington, the great British neuroscientist, thought that the mind worked like a telegraph system. Freud often compared the mind to hydraulic and electro-magnetic systems. Leibniz compared it to a mill, and the ancient Greeks thought the brain functions and mental processes like a catapult. The current fashionable trend of analogizing the mind to computers and functional properties, which Dennett is so fond of, will slowly fade when newer technology and cognitive theories arrive.
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:04 PM:	#16
TecnoTut wrote: If Dennett himself admits that he is a behaviorist, then I do not know how you can deny that he is a behaviorist. Um, except that he has gone on record denying that he is a behaviorist. In fact, the first paper I was ever assigned to read by him was an atttack on behaviorism. But I suppose we can get into that when the appropriate chapter comes up for reading. He denies the charge, but it's a common one, so something is going on. . . .

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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:10 PM:	#17
Faustus wrote: Um, except that he has gone on record denying that he is a behaviorist. In fact, the first paper I was ever assigned to read by him was an atttack on behaviorism. And he admits to being a behaviorist as I have quoted. Behaviorists, such as Dennett, are known for attacking other types of behaviorisms. But I suppose we can get into that when the appropriate chapter comes up for reading. He denies the charge, but it's a common one, so something is going on. . . . If Dennett says intentions and beliefs are just useful fictitious models to explain or predict behavior, then he's a behaviorist. The 'intentional stance', according to Dennett, is a fictitious stance.
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:24 PM:	#18
Behaviorism is a more specific doctrine than what you have attributed to Dennett, but that will come out when we get to that chapter. As I said, it's a common charge, one leveled at him even from a former grad student, but flatly denied by the man himself.

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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:39 PM:	#19
Avery Burke wrote: But again I have not read the book yet. I'm just eager to participate in a disscustion and this does not seem to be a topic of the first chapter Please do read the first chapter at least. We look forward to your discussion.
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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:57 PM:	#20
TecnoTut wrote: And he admits to being a behaviorist as I have quoted. Behaviorists, such as Dennett, are known for attacking other types of behaviorisms. TecnoTut, please let's not get into debating "isms". In my opening post I specifically pleaded to everyone to try and avoid this type of debate. I really don't see the value in it. Please re-read my opening post if you wouldn't mind for the "ground rules". They are not onerous I think. TecnoTut wrote: If Dennett says intentions and beliefs are just useful fictitious models to explain or predict behavior, then he's a behaviorist. The 'intentional stance', according to Dennett, is a fictitious stance. This is jumping ahead of the first chapter, but ok, "isms" aside- what is wrong with trying to understand consciousness by describing mental processes without invoking the 'intentional stance'? In other words, what value of explanation does invoking the 'intentional stance' get you? Besides that you might find it deeply and intuitively satisfying to invoke, I mean? The whole point of Dennett's thesis is that however these mental processes actually may work, they might not be easily intuitive to us. As he states on page 17: "Many of the problems encountered by other theories are the result of getting off on the wrong foot, trying to guess the answers to the Big Questions too early. The novel background assumptions of my theory play a large role in what follows, permitting us to postpone many of the traditional philosophical puzzles over which theorists stumble, until after we have outlined an empirically based theory..." Patience. Until then, is there anything in the first chapter that you disagree with specifically?
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Posted 02/02/04 - 04:03 PM:	#21
Faustus wrote: Behaviorism is a more specific doctrine than what you have attributed to Dennett, but that will come out when we get to that chapter. As I said, it's a common charge, one leveled at him even from a former grad student, but flatly denied by the man himself. Understand this, behaviroism is not a doctrine, it is a set of doctrines. There are many types of behaviroism, and Dennett's is one of many. Your counter claim, that Dennett denies being a behaviroist, is no different than Marx's "I am not a Marxist." At most it shows that he is a person who makes prior inconsistent statements, viz. that he is and is not a behaviorist. Personal admissions, however, are not important. What matters is that he says that the "intentional stance" is a fictitious stance.
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

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Posted 02/02/04 - 04:45 PM:	#22
TecnoTut wrote: What matters is that he says that the "intentional stance" is a fictitious stance. So tell us specifically and exactly why this matters to a scientific understanding of consciousness.
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Posted 02/02/04 - 05:05 PM:	#23
Belem wrote: He wants to prove that consciousness can be reduced to mere physical processes and back up his arguments with scientific evidence. At the end, if consciousness can be reducible, then it would have to be Science the only reliable figure to claim that it is so and Science -at this moment- can only speak about correlations. Belem And what exactly is so bad about physical processes? I happen to like a number of physical processes very much- maybe a little too much, but let's not go there just now. This again is really a chapter two issue but I'll say that science and philosophy should work together on this subject. Science to test and measure and philosophy to predict and suggest areas of investigation and of course to keep things honest. But seriously, do you have a specific problems with his ideas in chapter one? Do you find the idea that hallucinations or even the contents of dreams could be explained with a mechanistic model, implausible in some way?
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Posted 02/02/04 - 06:51 PM:	#24
probeman wrote: So tell us specifically and exactly why this matters to a scientific understanding of consciousness. Whether or not Dennett's 'intentional stance' matters to the "scientific understanding of consciousness" is an immaterial issue. The issue, rather, is whether Dennett is a behaviorist or not, which in turn depends on whether he believes beliefs and intentions are real.
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

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Posted 02/02/04 - 10:38 PM:	#25
TecnoTut wrote: Whether or not Dennett's 'intentional stance' matters to the "scientific understanding of consciousness" is an immaterial issue. The issue, rather, is whether Dennett is a behaviorist or not, which in turn depends on whether he believes beliefs and intentions are real. Dennett's belief's are not the issue at all. His explanations of mental processes are the issue. What EXACTLY and SPECIFICALLY do you disagree with in the idea that hallucinations or even the contents of dreams might be explained with a mechanistic model such as he describes? Did you even read the first chapter?
Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.

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