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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

Avery Burke
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Posted 02/04/04 - 01:43 AM:	#81
Okay here's my disclaimer. I just read the first chapter. I've never read the book so I don't have any perceived opinions about it. I have just combed through the replies and picked out quotes to respond to. I will first post my in a single field (their rather long) and then give some thoughts on the chapter at issue. -Avery

Avery Burke
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Posted 02/04/04 - 01:48 AM:	#82
Responses: Ouote by TecnoTut Understand this, behaviorism is not a doctrine, it is a set of doctrines. There are many types of behaviorism, and Dennett's is one of many. If behaviorism is such a broad category what explanatory power do we get from discussing weather an instance of this category can apply to Dennett's stance? Besides refuting his augment on the basis of his (supposed) alliance to a school of thought is a variation of the fallacy Ad Hominem. So, be a true philosopher and look at the augment part for part then cast judgment; even if the argument is wrong there may be some very valuable parts of the argument. Don't be dogmatic. Quote by TecnoTut Dennett's beliefs are at issue because they are his explanations. This is a more precise account of the fallacy Ad Hominem. I know you've taken some philosophy (probably much more than I) and are reasonable; so act that way. Quote by TecnoTut There's nothing wrong with saying brain activities cause mental states such as beliefs and desires. There is something wrong, however, in writing off mental states merely as useful fictitious models that pick out patterns of behavior. The latter position is Dennett's and it's a mix of eliminativism and behaviorism. Actually its a mix of positivism and some elements of behaviorism. But why is this wrong? Even if both of those approaches have been over turned that doesn't discount the argument at hand. On the point of speaking of mental states as useful fiction: I can very easily make the claim that wile mental states exist we cannot verify their character or lean anything useful from them; so, since we can never know about such states, when we speak of them we understand that our characterizations of such states are fiction to help us with our overall theory (like imaginary numbers to number theory). I am not saying that I hold this belief; I am simply asserting that one can be made. This account does not seem to discount mental states; it simply says that our characterization of such states are fictions. This, I think, is what Wittgenstein (and therefore Dennett since he aligns himself with Wittgenstein) was getting at. This theory does not discount mental states only our ability to explain them and gain knowledge from an examination of them. Ouote by jk236 You can believe that the mind is produced by the brain and yet still believe in intentionality as a real feature of the mind. What about the framework under discussion says otherwise? Quote by TecnoTut I merely report what Dennet has said. If he said mental properties are fictitious, then he said it, not I. Clearly not. I think Dennett is saying that our representations of mental properties are useful fiction. Either way you still haven't said why this is bad (except that is sounds like behaviorism). Quote by Unisonus I don't think Dennet explains consciousness at all. He may explain the process by which it's engendered, or maybe even the process that consciousness entails- but he ignores the unique phenomenal aspect. You make a brod presupposition about the existence of "the unique phenomenal aspect" of consciousness. What is this aspect? Why must they exist? Quote by Unisonus It is true that consciousness entails various functions, and that these functions can be acted out by patterns in the brain- or writhin the circuits of machinery. But if we follow these patterns, the interactions of atoms and molecules on the most microscopic level- or zoom out and look at the entire process- we still do not get the unique "quality of consciousness." Well, kind of. If you mean that looking to at the neuron and chemical level of brain activity can't describe things like concept recognition, concept relation, and the like your absolutely right. There seems to me to be little more than physical explanations that can be reveal by looking at those types of brain activities. Hofstadter prepossess a very compelling model of conscious activity on the level of emergent patters in the overall binary data of neuron activity in Godel, Escher, Bach. Its good stuff check it out. Quote by Unisonus Dennett is hoping to get away with the analogy by making the product of the process conceptual (e.g. the story) rather than just material. The problem is that if concepts (i.e. ideas like stories) are figments of conscousness, Dennett doesn't explain anything when he, once again, only demonstrates that physical activities influence consciousness and its functions. With the mentioned analogy Dennett seems to achieve his goal of removing an agent that generates the story. That is all he is trying to do; and he does it. There is no one author to this story. The entirety of the story need not preexist inside someone's head. He set out to sketch a simple scheme by which a simple version of brain activities might generate a hallucinatory event without having to have the entity event composed by some part of the mind; and so he does.

Avery Burke
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Posted 02/04/04 - 02:06 AM:	#83
The first chapter is sort of slow going. Dennett prepossess the possibility of a goal driven (or expectation driven) basic component of a stimulus organizing system of the brain. Presumably, as Dennett goes to pains to mention, the preliminary system he sketches is to simple to really explain anything in the way of perceived experience. But there's good historical evidence that supports the idea of simple expectation driven devices in our biology. All organism have goal driven behavior which is, in most cases, very simply coded into the genome. A simple change, for instance, in genetic coding can cause microbes to eat nonbeneficial chemicals instead of their food. I have long wondered how this historical inheritance plays out in human behavior (besides the obvious bodily cravings and their psychological reproductions). Certainly it does not effect anything more that habit. But having it play a part in perception and stimulus organization is very interesting.

Death Monkey
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Posted 02/04/04 - 02:17 AM:	#84
Unisonus, Do you agree that those are actually properties of the process that is your perception of that object? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Normally, results are not properties of the processes that engender them. Cars are not properties of the conveyer belts. Cookies are not properties of the baker. The letters on the screen are not properties of your computer's processor. Mental images are not properties of brain processes...I think. I'm sure you can take that approach, with some sort of animism. You can argue that consciousness is a component of all matter and when you have some together...abracadabra! But I find that hard to swallow. To claim that mental images are actual things, which are created by the brain, rather than processes of the brain, in the same sense that cookies are things which are created by a baker, is what I find hard to swallow. If the mental image is not a process, but rather a thing which the brain has created, then where is it? What is it made of? In any event, I am not claiming that consciousness is a component of all matter. I am saying that consciousness is a physical process. It is something which matter does, under the right conditions. TecnoTut, How are the properties different? For example, let's say you are looking at something blue. I would say that the property of blueness that the image in your mind has, is actually a property of the physical process of perception occurring in your brain. Why is this contradictory? ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is contradictory because my brain process is not blue. What do you mean when you say it is not blue? Do you mean that when you open up somebody's brain, and look at it working, it doesn't look blue? If so, you are comparing apples and oranges. Like I said before, the physical properties of objects you are looking at are not equivalent to the properties of the image in your mind. If the image in your mind is blue, then that is a statement about the process of perception occurring in your brain, not about the object you are looking at. You can usually infer something about the object you are looking at, but they are not the same thing. When you say that the process in your brain does not look blue, you are just saying that its properties are not the same as those of the object you are looking at, which is irrelevant. There is no contradiction here, unless you assume some sort of Cartesian dualism, where the image in your mind is believed to have some sort of existence independent of what your brain is doing. You may believe this is the case, but can you really claim that the alternative I have suggested is not possible? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You're right. It is dualistic, viz. property dualism. But if you don't a-priori assume dualism, where is the contradiction? What possible logical justification can there be for claiming that dualism must be true? Colors, intuitively, are properties of objects. One of the many things modern science has tought us is not to allow our intuitive preconceptions to get in the way of understanding how things really work. The spectral characteristics of an object are properties of the object. The color we see in our mind is a property of the process of visually perceiving certain wavelengths of light. In other words, counter-intuitive as it may be, colors are not properties of objects, they are properties of visual perception. When I see a blue object, the blueness is in the object, not me. Obviously not. If this were the case, the object would not look blue under one kind of light, and red under another. The color you see is obviously not simply a property of the object you are looking at. It is a property of the interaction between you and the light reflecting off of the object. It is a property of visual perception. I of course have an experience of seeing blue. And that experience is a phenomenal event -- not a physical event. In what way is it not a physical event? What are its non-physical characteristics? But the key thing to do is here is to distinguish the experience of perceiving from the thing that is perceived -- the experience of seeing blue from the blue seen. Close. The key is to distinguish between the experience of seeing blue, and the physical properties that cause certain objects to look blue. Take another qualia: pain. In the case of pain, it's even harder to draw that distinction; when you are in pain, are you perceiving something -- something we can call pain? If we do say that (and some philosophers think this is right), then we can again distinguish the experience of perceiving pain from the pain perceived. We can then say the pain perceived is physical but worry that the experience of perceiving it is not. Or we could recognize that pain is an experience, not a thing. The experience of feeling pain is a process, not a thing "out there" which we perceive. DM
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geoff23
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Posted 02/04/04 - 04:00 AM:	#85
DM If the mental image is not a process, but rather a thing which the brain has created, then where is it? What is it made of? If it is a non-physical property then it isn't anywhere and it isn't made of anything. If it had attributes like physical location or if it was "made of something" then it wouldn't be a non-physical property. Geoff.
The poets did not win; the philosophers surrendered. (Umberto Eco)

Death Monkey
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Posted 02/04/04 - 04:05 AM:	#86
Geoff, If the mental image is not a process, but rather a thing which the brain has created, then where is it? What is it made of? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ If it is a non-physical property then it isn't anywhere and it isn't made of anything. If it had attributes like physical location or if it was "made of something" then it wouldn't be a non-physical property. A non-physical property of what? First we were talking about properties of the mental image, and now you are saying that the mental image is a non-physical property of something else? Which is it. Are mental images things, processes, or properties of other things and/or processes? And what is a non-physical property anyway? Is it a property of something non-physical? If so, what is this non-physical thing or process that you think mental images are properties of? DM
Pseudoscience makes Baby Jesus cry.

geoff23
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Posted 02/04/04 - 05:04 AM:	#87
DM, I'm not sure how far I know exactly what Tecno will reply but I'll give it a stab. Death Monkey wrote: Geoff, A non-physical property of what? First we were talking about properties of the mental image, and now you are saying that the mental image is a non-physical property of something else? TT already posted : Contra substantive dualism, property dualism holds that mental states cannot exist seperately from the physical processes that cause them -- and that mental properties are mental attributes of brains, not minds. So according to this they are mental attributes of brains. They do not exist seperately from the physical processes but they are not identical to the physical processes. They are non-physical properties, hence "property dualism". Which is it. Are mental images things, processes, or properties of other things and/or processes? Well they aren't "physical processes". So I suppose they must be non-physical properties of brains, or brain processes. And what is a non-physical property anyway? Is it a property of something non-physical? No, it is a non-physical property of something physical. If so, what is this non-physical thing or process that you think mental images are properties of? Well, that a whole other question. I think you are basically asking "If these mental experiences we are discussing are not identical with the physical brain, then what the hll are they?*" If this is what you are asking then we have to expand our view to the whole history of that debate. Having concluded that Dennetts view is irretrievably problematic, there is no easy alternative we can just adopt to replace it, but that is no reason to retain the Dennett solution if we have decided it can't be right. I think a person who is genuinely seeking an answer that makes sense may have to spend quite a lot of time reading about the history of the attempts that have been made to provide that answer before coming to his own conclusion. All we really establish by demonstrating the flaws in Dennetts argument is that metaphysics can't be ignored if we are trying to find answers to these questions. Expecting an alternative answer-on-a-plate is to misunderstand the nature of philosophy. Philosophy doesn't work like science. Geoff
The poets did not win; the philosophers surrendered. (Umberto Eco)

geoff23
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Posted 02/04/04 - 05:18 AM:	#88
DM, Perhaps there is an easier answer. Chalmers is a mysterian. Probably my own neutral monism ought best be described as another form of mysterianism. As such, Chalmers position would be that we simply do not know why physical things can have non-physical properties, they just do, and my position would be that we do not know why a Universe only made of one thing manifests to us in such a way as it looks like there are two, it just does. What is so bad about being faced with a mystery? My favourite Penrose quote comes to mind : Q : Do you think you'll see a final "theory of everything" in your lifetime? Penrose : Oh I do hope not! What on earth would we do then? Geoff
The poets did not win; the philosophers surrendered. (Umberto Eco)

Death Monkey
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Posted 02/04/04 - 06:58 AM:	#89
Geoff, I'm not sure how far I know exactly what Tecno will reply but I'll give it a stab. Quote: Originally Posted by Death Monkey Geoff, A non-physical property of what? First we were talking about properties of the mental image, and now you are saying that the mental image is a non-physical property of something else? -------------------------- TT already posted : Quote: Contra substantive dualism, property dualism holds that mental states cannot exist seperately from the physical processes that cause them -- and that mental properties are mental attributes of brains, not minds. -------------------------- So according to this they are mental attributes of brains. They do not exist seperately from the physical processes but they are not identical to the physical processes. They are non-physical properties, hence "property dualism". The point I was making is that mental properties are properties of the brain (specifically of brain processes), and not properties of the objects being viewed. The question of whether they are physical or non-physical, and even of whether such a distinction is meaningful, is another issue. Remember that I was addressing TecnoTut's claim that experiences cannot be brain processes because they have different properties. Claiming that the properties of experiences (being mental properties) are properties of brain processes, hardly supports this claim. Which is it. Are mental images things, processes, or properties of other things and/or processes? Well they aren't "physical processes". So I suppose they must be non-physical properties of brains, or brain processes. I guess this is a question of semantics. You can say the image is a set of properties of the visual experience, and I can say that the image is the visual experience, which has various properties. I think we are both really saying the same thing, namely that the characteristics which we are referring to when we say "mental image" (things like color, shape, contrast, brightness, etc...) are properties of the visual experience. This is very different from saying that those properties are, in fact, properties of the object we are looking at. Redness is not a property of an apple. Reflecting certain wavelengths of light is a property of an apple. Redness is a property of the sensory process of seeing an apple. Would you agree? If so, what is this non-physical thing or process that you think mental images are properties of? ----------------------------------------- Well, that a whole other question. I think you are basically asking "If these mental experiences we are discussing are not identical with the physical brain, then what the hll are they?" Not at all. If you agree that what we think of as "mental properties" are properties of brain processes, then I have no problem. What I want to know is, what does it mean to claim that a property of a physical process is non-physical? What definition of "physical" are you using when you say this? I don't see how it could possibly be the scientific one. Perhaps there is an easier answer. Chalmers is a mysterian. Probably my own neutral monism ought best be described as another form of mysterianism. As such, Chalmers position would be that we simply do not know why physical things can have non-physical properties, they just do, and my position would be that we do not know why a Universe only made of one thing manifests to us in such a way as it looks like there are two, it just does. What is so bad about being faced with a mystery? There is absolutely nothing wrong with saying "I don't know". There is a problem with saying "It is unknowable", and giving up. Anyway, like I said before, in what sense are they non-physical? What does that term mean*? In science, the term is used to refer to some abstract idea that cannot exist in the real world. What do you mean by it? My favourite Penrose quote comes to mind : Q : Do you think you'll see a final "theory of everything" in your lifetime? Penrose : Oh I do hope not! What on earth would we do then? I don't believe that we will ever know everything. I do not see any reason to think that the nature of consciousness is unknowable, though. Why pessamistic attitude? DM
Pseudoscience makes Baby Jesus cry.

other-wise
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Posted 02/04/04 - 07:31 AM:	#90
Originally posted by probeman: Do you see what Faustus is saying about the idea of "they are non-physical properties presented in our experiences” as implicitly assuming the Cartesian Theater? And (bolding mine) “I see the problem but you're still not making sense. I'm saying that the physical property of blueness, so many nanometers of electromagnetic radiation, produces a neurological state in the brain that we happen to call "blue" every time we perceive it and it's based on the response of our red, green and blue color receptors. We could call it "kirut" and it would still be a perception of that same wavelength of light. Yes, the physical wavelength of blue light is NOT in our brains, just a representation of it as neurons and chemicals. ”. A yellow sign with a black squiggly line on it is not a winding road; a winding road is what the squiggly line represents to me. A sign no one can read represents nothing; information that is coded must be decoded. So to whom or what are the neurons and chemicals representing? Aren’t you also implicitly assuming the Cartesian Theater?

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