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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"
probeman
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Posted 02/03/04 - 10:56 AM:
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#51
TecnoTut wrote:
The first question is different from the second one. The first asks whether physical or neuronal properties cause mental properties. It's not a controversial question and most people say "yes." The second more controversial question does not ask whether physical states cause mental states, it asks, rather, whether physical states are mental states.

If mental states are not representative of physical states of the brain (and there is much empirical evidence that they are), what are mental states representative of?
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TecnoTut
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Posted 02/03/04 - 11:25 AM:
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#52
probeman wrote:

If mental states are not representative of physical states of the brain (and there is much empirical evidence that they are), what are mental states representative of?


I do not know how you are using the word "representative" but I take it that some mental states represent physical objects (not brain states). The taste of sweetness, a mental form of qualia, "represents" the sugar in my coffee. Other mental states, such as beliefs, do not represent things, but rather, are about things.

Maybe you are asking me, simply, what are mental properties. The obvious answer is that they are non-physical properties presented in our experiences.
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probeman
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Posted 02/03/04 - 11:43 AM:
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#53
TecnoTut wrote:
I do not know how you are using the word "representative" but I take it that some mental states represent physical objects (not brain states). The taste of sweetness, a mental form of qualia, "represents" the sugar in my coffee. Other mental states, such as beliefs, do not represent things, but rather, are about things.

Maybe you are asking me, simply, what are mental properties. The obvious answer is that they are non-physical properties presented in our experiences.

But in the first chapter dennett points out how one might explain mental states such as hallucinations or dreams (that do not represent physical objects) as being explained by perceptual processes operating under certain conditions. Could then these, " non-physical properties presented in our experiences", be explained by physical states of the perceptual system?
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TecnoTut
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Posted 02/03/04 - 11:52 AM:
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#54
probeman wrote:

But in the first chapter dennett points out how one might explain mental states such as hallucinations or dreams (that do not represent physical objects) as being explained by perceptual processes operating under certain conditions. Could then these, " non-physical properties presented in our experiences", be explained by physical states of the perceptual system?


If "explain by" be means physical processes cause dreams and hallucinations, then he is merely say something trivial and non-controversial. But if he means physical processes are the hallucinations and dreams, then he is wrong because mental properties are different from physical properties. The property of appearing as a flying dragon in consciousness is different from the property of neurons releasing electrochemical charges.
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest

Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s

Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)
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Posted 02/03/04 - 12:07 PM:
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TecnoTut,

If "explain by" be means physical processes cause dreams and hallucinations, then he is merely say something trivial and non-controversial. But if he means physical processes are the hallucinations and dreams, then he is wrong because mental properties are different from physical properties. The property of appearing as a flying dragon in consciousness is different from the property of neurons releasing electrochemical charges.


This line of reasoning seems all mixed up to me. The experience of imagining a flying dragon is a physical process. The properties of that imaginary dragon are properties of that process, just as the properties of the image in your mind of a real object you are looking at, are really properties of the physical process of perceiving the object. Your mind has no direct access to the actual physical properties of the object you are looking at. Those must be inferred from the properties of the perceptive process.

So where, exactly, is the problem? Do you also deny that the properties of the image in your mind of something you are looking at, are actually properties of the physical process of perception that is occurring in your brain? If so, on what grounds?


DM
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Posted 02/03/04 - 12:13 PM:
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Isn't it possible that consciousness could be created through an algorithmic process in a remotely analogous way to the dupe in the party game who creates a dream without an actual "author"?

Dennett is hoping to get away with the analogy by making the product of the process conceptual (e.g. the story) rather than just material. The problem is that if concepts (i.e. ideas like stories) are figments of conscousness, Dennett doesn't explain anything when he, once again, only demonstrates that physical activities influence consciousness and its functions.

Notice that there is no way in which the story could exist unless it takes shape within the minds of its listeners. In that sense the dupe only creates a physical representation of the story within the brains of the listeners- in which case we're back where we started.
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Posted 02/03/04 - 12:23 PM:
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DM;

Do you also deny that the properties of the image in your mind of something you are looking at, are actually properties of the physical process of perception that is occurring in your brain?
Sorry to bud in, but the question makes no sense. Stated otherwise:

Do you deny that the properties of conscious activities exist as [e.g. are] properties of physical non-conscious activities?

Huh?
"...take care that your style and diction run musically, pleasantly, and plainly, with clear, proper, and well-placed words, setting forth your purpose to the best of your power, and putting your ideas intelligibly, without confusion or obscurity."

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TecnoTut
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Posted 02/03/04 - 12:29 PM:
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DM wrote:

This line of reasoning seems all mixed up to me. The experience of imagining a flying dragon is a physical process. The properties of that imaginary dragon are properties of that process, just as the properties of the image in your mind of a real object you are looking at, are really properties of the physical process of perceiving the object.


No, the experience is a mental event caused by physical processes and events. I do not see physical processes, I see flying dragons.


DM wrote:

Your mind has no direct access to the actual physical properties of the object you are looking at. Those must be inferred from the properties of the perceptive process.


That's an argument for the existence of mental properties, not against them: I am not perceiving physical object because I am then perceiving the mental representation of the physical object.

DM wrote:

So where, exactly, is the problem? Do you also deny that the properties of the image in your mind of something you are looking at, are actually properties of the physical process of perception that is occurring in your brain? If so, on what grounds?


On the grounds that they have different properties. A trianagle is different from a square because they have different properties; a wave with a short frequency is different from a wave with a long frequency because they have different properties; a snowflake is different from another snowflake because they have different properties.
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest

Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s

Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)
probeman
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Posted 02/03/04 - 12:33 PM:
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Unisonus wrote:
Notice that there is no way in which the story could exist unless it takes shape within the minds of its listeners. In that sense the dupe only creates a physical representation of the story within the brains of the listeners- in which case we're back where we started.

If I understand you- I don't agree. The party game listeners aren't acting as conscious agents. They are providing essentially mechanistic (random but not contradictory) responses based on the last letter of the question asked. And Dennett does admit that there is still the issue of the question-poser and that is the subject of his following thesis to be discussed. (p. 15)
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Posted 02/03/04 - 12:47 PM:
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Unisonus,

Do you also deny that the properties of the image in your mind of something you are looking at, are actually properties of the physical process of perception that is occurring in your brain?
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Sorry to bud in, but the question makes no sense.


It doesn't? It seems to make perfect sense to me. Consider the image in your mind of whatever you are currently looking at. That image has properties, right? Do you agree that those are actually properties of the process that is your perception of that object?

Stated otherwise:

Do you deny that the properties of conscious activities exist as [e.g. are] properties of physical non-conscious activities?


That does not bear any resemblance to my question at all.


TecnoTut,

This line of reasoning seems all mixed up to me. The experience of imagining a flying dragon is a physical process. The properties of that imaginary dragon are properties of that process, just as the properties of the image in your mind of a real object you are looking at, are really properties of the physical process of perceiving the object.
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No, the experience is a mental event caused by physical processes and events. I do not see physical processes, I see flying dragons.


You don't see your experiences either. Seeing is an experience. Anyway, you may very well be correct that mental events are not physical processes, but the point of my post was to try to get you to explain why you think this must be the case. As I pointed out, just saying that the properties of the image in your mind are not the same as properties of some brain process does not cut it. How do you know they are not? What, other than intuition, do you have to back this up?

Your mind has no direct access to the actual physical properties of the object you are looking at. Those must be inferred from the properties of the perceptive process.
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That's an argument for the existence of mental properties, not against them: I am not perceiving physical object because I am then perceiving the mental representation of the physical object.


Who said I was arguing against the existence of mental properties? What I am saying is that since our mental processes are brain processes, those mental properties are properties of a physical process.

So where, exactly, is the problem? Do you also deny that the properties of the image in your mind of something you are looking at, are actually properties of the physical process of perception that is occurring in your brain? If so, on what grounds?
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On the grounds that they have different properties. A trianagle is different from a square because they have different properties; a wave with a short frequency is different from a wave with a long frequency because they have different properties; a snowflake is different from another snowflake because they have different properties.


How are the properties different? For example, let's say you are looking at something blue. I would say that the property of blueness that the image in your mind has, is actually a property of the physical process of perception occurring in your brain. Why is this contradictory? There is no contradiction here, unless you assume some sort of Cartesian dualism, where the image in your mind is believed to have some sort of existence independent of what your brain is doing. You may believe this is the case, but can you really claim that the alternative I have suggested is not possible?


DM
Pseudoscience makes Baby Jesus cry.
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