Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained": Philosophy Forums

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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

jk236
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Posted 02/02/04 - 11:09 PM:	#31
TecnoTut wrote: Exactly. Thank you. Was I not clear? It was clear to me but I'm a philosopher and probeman is a scientist.
"The philosophical lesson I learned from my biology teacher is this: when not much is known about a topic, don't take terribly seriously someone else's heartfelt conviction about what problems are scientifically tractable. Learn the science, do the science, and see what happens." Patricia Smith Churchland "Now I know what it must have felt like to be a cop at Woodstock." Daniel Dennett on the Towards a Science of Consciousness Conference

probeman
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Posted 02/02/04 - 11:24 PM:	#32
TecnoTut wrote: There's nothing wrong with saying brain activities cause mental states such as beliefs and desires. There is something wrong, however, in writing off mental states merely as useful fictitious models that pick out patterns of behavior. The latter position is Dennett's and it's a mix of eliminativism and behaviorism. So you've "ismed" his theory to death have you? You are really something. He's not "writing off mental states merely as useful fictitious models that pick out patterns of behavior". He's explaining how these things we call mental states might be explained by more simple processes. That's how science works. It's done it for cosmology, the human body and the evolution of life. Why should mind be any different- because you *want* it to be different and protected from science? Is it that you want to believe in this so called "mind stuff"? What do you think is the actual difference between the purple and yellow cows in your mind?
Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.

TecnoTut
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Posted 02/02/04 - 11:33 PM:	#33
probeman wrote: So you've "ismed" his theory to death have you? You are really something. What does that mean? I cannot use nouns to describe ideas or viewpoints? Silly me to use noun words with "ism" as a suffix. probeman wrote: He's not "writing off mental states merely as useful fictitious models that pick out patterns of behavior". He's explaining how these things we call mental states might be explained by more simple processes. That's how science works. According to him, to explain how "mental states might be explained by more simple processes" requires viewing anythig mental to be fictitous. probeman wrote: It's done it for cosmology, the human body and the evolution of life. Actually, human bodies and galaxies have emergent properties too that cannot be conceptually reduced to their simpler constituents. probeman wrote: Why should mind be any different- because you want it to be different and protected from science? Huh? probaeman wrote: Is it that you want to believe in this so called "mind stuff"? Yes, mental properties exist. I have beliefs and desires. probeman wrote: What do you think is the actual difference between the purple and yellow cows in your mind? One is purple the other is yellow. PS -- at least you're not reading Derrida.
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

Belem

Posted 02/03/04 - 04:45 AM:	#34
probeman, This subject is really more appropriate for the discussion of the second chapter, where these questions and related concerns are specifically addressed- Yes, there isn't much to discuss in chapter one. but since the philosophers in this forum do not seem to be exactly breaking down the walls on this thread, I will respond. I am not a philosopher. The situation is somewhat analogous to the Social Sciences, where now some sociologists and anthropologists can see biology and evolutionary psychology encroaching on their "territory". But even there, many researchers from both perspectives (cultural and physical) have found very fruitful collaboration and are gaining greater understanding, just as Dennett has. My point is that Dennett is not only reassuring what Science has already found but making claims about the nonexistence of consciousness and qualia (which Science does not make). I think that Science has many things to learn from the immaterialist philosophers who can provide valid arguments about what Science still lacks regarding the study of the mind. But I am more interested in your specific issues with the idea that hallucinations might be explained as a kind of perception based data "starvation" of a confirmation/disconfirmation system continually asking questions and getting somewhat arbitrary responses in return. What is your impression of these ideas? I think that it is possible to explain how the mechanism of hallucinations take place in the brain, just like dreams we can easily recognise them as tricks of the brain. We wake up and experience a reality that confirms us that they are illusions. However, my contention is that our experience of awareness is not remotely similar to the engineering of hallucinations, maybe I should wait and corroborate whether or not Dennett is suggesting such. Until then, this is my only opinion about this chapter. Belem

Belem

Posted 02/03/04 - 04:53 AM:	#35
probeman wrote: And what exactly is so bad about physical processes? I happen to like a number of physical processes very much- maybe a little too much, but let's not go there just now. There is absolutely nothing wrong with physical processes. In fact I am eager to read a full description of how the experience of red, love, fear, etc. take place. I would be happy to hear the scientific arguments of how subjective experiences are really objective. This again is really a chapter two issue but I'll say that science and philosophy should work together on this subject. Science to test and measure and philosophy to predict and suggest areas of investigation and of course to keep things honest. Yes, they should work together. Immaterialist philosophers should provide ways of enquiry about consciousness and Science should test them. Science recognises its limitations, unfortunately materialists do not recognise Science limitations and this is when problems arise and make impossible the interactions between philosophers and scientists. Belem

Faustus
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Posted 02/03/04 - 06:11 AM:	#36
I’m going to start working on a summary launch for chapter two—chapter one doesn’t really have much going on, and it seems as if most are eager to get to the good stuff now. Probeman: Dennett does argue that some properties of mental states are useful fictions, but if I am remembering correctly, the “intentional stance” actually plays a minor roll in Consciousness Explained. If you want to find out more about the intentional stance, then try the book by that title. Of course, Technotut exaggerates the “fiction” part at the expense of the “useful” in order to maintain the commonly held but false assertion that Dennett denies we have beliefs and other mental states. But that won’t be clear until we actually reach the passages where Dennett specifically addresses these issues. Hopefully, once we embark on chapter two, the fact that the ball gets rolling in that chapter will encourage participants to focus rather than jump ahead—isn’t that the whole point of a chapter by chapter book discussion?

TecnoTut
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Posted 02/03/04 - 08:46 AM:	#37
Faustus wrote: Probeman: Dennett does argue that some properties of mental states are useful fictions, but if I am remembering correctly, the “intentional stance” actually plays a minor roll in Consciousness Explained. If you want to find out more about the intentional stance, then try the book by that title. Consciousness Explained merely combines Dennett's prior writings, which includes his ideas on the intentional stance, to argue against the Cartesian Theatre. From there he advocates a "multiple drafts" model of consciousness and present a model of processes underlying verbal report, and argues that there is nothing else (e.g. mental properties) to explain. Faustus wrote: Of course, Technotut exaggerates the “fiction” part at the expense of the “useful” . I merely report what Dennet has said. If he said mental properties are fictitious, then he said it, not I. Nor do I deny the utility of beleifs. I just deny Dennett's claim that they do not exist. Faustus wrote: in order to maintain the commonly held but false assertion that Dennett denies we have beliefs and other mental states. My assertion is not false. Your assertion that my assertion is false is false. In chapter four, Dennett compares the reality of mental states to the fictitious Sherlock Holmes.
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

probeman
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Posted 02/03/04 - 09:25 AM:	#38
TecnoTut wrote: I merely report what Dennet has said. If he said mental properties are fictitious, then he said it, not I. Nor do I deny the utility of beleifs. I just deny Dennett's claim that they do not exist. Dennett's claim is that these mental processes are fictional in the way that we commonly think of them as being obvious. To use a poor analogy: Before Galileo, it was considered "obvious" that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. Dennett is merely saying that these mental states are not exisitng in the mind in the way that they are normally thought of in a Cartesian sense. He would say that there is not place a place in the brain that is devoted to being "intentional". To do so would put a Homuculi back in the brain with resulting infinite regress. A better example that Dennett uses is that there used to be a strong intuitive belief that all substances had a property called "caloric" or heat that would flow from hotter objects to cooler objects. This substance seemed completely real and existing in fact to many scientists and philosophers until it was demonstrated slowly over many years through the science of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, that heat was an entirely different physical entity that it was not a substance at all and in fact was merely simple molecular vibrations. It may seem that our mental states actually exist in the sense that you are thinking of them but it could also be that our intuitions about these things are not correct. That is all Dennett is saying. Let's start discussing Chapter two since it appears clear that while the mechanistic explanation of hallucinations and dreams is suitable for those low level mental states, it is not satisfactory for an explanation of waking consciousness. And everyone seems eager to get onto the next section where we can discuss whether a scientific explanation of the mind is desirable, why dualism can never offer an explanation, and what Dennett proposes to offer in the way of a scientific explanation. Faustus please proceed if you would be so kind. TecnoTut: I don't want to get off subject so feel free to PM me with what emergent properties of human bodies and galaxies do you find unexplainable by simpler processes? At the present time, although much is still not known, besides the subject of present discussion, I was not aware of any properties that weren't at least being worked on with great success in science.
Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.

probeman
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Posted 02/03/04 - 09:34 AM:	#39
Faustus wrote: Of course, Technotut exaggerates the “fiction” part at the expense of the “useful” in order to maintain the commonly held but false assertion that Dennett denies we have beliefs and other mental states. But that won’t be clear until we actually reach the passages where Dennett specifically addresses these issues. What I find really unfair about TecnoTut's claim that Dennett says mental states do not exist, is saying this coupled with his assertion earlier that Dennett is just a Behaviorist. when in fact in chapter two Dennett clearly states (p. 40) "2. No feigning anesthesia. It has been said of behaviorists that they feign anesthesia- they pretend they don't have to experiences we know darn well they share with us. If I wish to deny the existence of some controversial feature of consciousness, the burden falls on me to show that it is somehow illusory." Regardless of whether one calls him a behaviorist or not, at least he's admitting up front that he won't deny the apparent reality that we seem to have real mental states. That seems reasonable enough, doesn't it? Let's proceed then.
Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.

Unisonus
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Posted 02/03/04 - 09:42 AM:	#40
I don't think Dennet explains consciousness at all. He may explain the process by which it's engendered, or maybe even the process that consciousness entails- but he ignores the unique phenomenal aspect. It is true that consciousness entails various functions, and that these functions can be acted out by patterns in the brain- or writhin the circuits of machinery. But if we follow these patterns, the interactions of atoms and molecules on the most microscopic level- or zoom out and look at the entire process- we still do not get the unique "quality of consciousness." I have a materialist bent myself, but I wasn't satisfied by Dennet's book. It was entertaining, but not conclusive. I couldn't escape the feeling that Dennett was simply avoiding the central issue- which is obvious to anyone who aint a zombie.
"...take care that your style and diction run musically, pleasantly, and plainly, with clear, proper, and well-placed words, setting forth your purpose to the best of your power, and putting your ideas intelligibly, without confusion or obscurity." - Miguel de Cervantes

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