Please note: because you're not logged in, you may be viewing older cached versions of pages which are served up to reduce server load.
Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"
PrintPage: First 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Last
 Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" | |
|
Avery Burke
Graduate Usergroup: Members Joined: Jan 20, 2004 Total Topics: 5 Total Posts: 233 |
 #191
Quote by TecnoTut .Quine’s indeterminacy of meaning translation is irrelevant here. And if it were, all it amounts to is indeterminacy as to which mental state is occurring, not the non-existence of mental states The first sentence is plainly wrong. We only assume mental states in others based on context. We only assume certain mental states in other based on language. If we wish to say "brain activity X corresponds to mental state Y" then the only thing we have to go on is a verbal cue. So if we want to say that "this neuron activity correspond to pain" the subject has to say "ouch" (or some verbal cure; or maybe wince) when we stimulate that particular activity. However, if words do not have translatable meanings (nor to gesticulator cures like a wince) then we cannot make this claim. In fact we cannot claim that "an experience" as I understand the meaning of the term has even taken place. This is an example of how metaphysics and science can help each other out. The fact that context based clues do equal internal states is also empirically and scientifically valid. So mentioning Quine keeps the science on a strait path. There have been replies of recent that claim that metaphysics and science medal in each other's affiants. This claim is utterly ridiculous. Quote by TecnoTut On the basis that neuroscientists tell s stimuli sends a message to our nervous system which produces sensations to us. In other words, on the basis of neuroscience. No. Neuroscience [U]only says that there is a causal relationship between stimuli and electrochemical activity in the brain. Observation tells us that there is some correlation between a reported sensation in an individual and the stated electrochemical activity in the brain. But corollary relationships are not necessarily causal. I repeat on what bases do you assert that there exists a causal relationship between electrochemical activity in the brain and the (subjectively inferred) inner state or sensation? This seems like a blatant logical and scientific fallacy. Quote by TecnoTut What does the meaning of the word “ouch” have to do with neuroscience? It’s the linguists and lexicographers job to discover the meaning of the word “ouch,” not the neuroscientist’s The word has nothing to do with neuroscience. The word has to do with inferring the experience of pain in others. Or relating "an experience" to neuroscience. Neuroscience can only tell us about electrochemical activity in the brain unless we turn to linguistic cues to see how those activities relate to an individuals internal state. I find it hard to believe you could miss this connection. You could perform experiments on someone's brain all day and if they said nothing you would learn nothing about how there "experience" was being effected. For someone that holds your views about the difference between electrochemical activity in the brain and "an experience" you must recognize the importance of language to you the scheme you are laying out. Quote by TecnoTut I’m a property dualist. How’s that for an answer? What is experience? It’s a point of view. I don't care what you call yourself or what others call you, I believe I made that clear, I only care about what you actually have to say. Not "experience"; "an experience". Besides that answer really doesn't make any sense to me in the context of our discussion. I think we need a contextual definition. |
|
Avery Burke
Graduate Usergroup: Members Joined: Jan 20, 2004 Total Topics: 5 Total Posts: 233 |
#192
Sorry. My second reply got messed up. there's not supposed to be any underlining. -Avery |
|
Avery Burke
Graduate Usergroup: Members Joined: Jan 20, 2004 Total Topics: 5 Total Posts: 233 |
#193
By the way. I think TecnoTut may have some problem with the idea of emergent behavior. Am I correct? Do you think that emergent behavior doesn't exist? |
|
Avery Burke
Graduate Usergroup: Members Joined: Jan 20, 2004 Total Topics: 5 Total Posts: 233 |
#194
I hope that last one didn't sound patronizing. I mean it as an honest question. I think that would clear up a lot of the discussion, especially the thing about robots made of robots. |
|
probeman
Uncertain but reliable  Usergroup: Members Joined: Dec 12, 2003 Location: US Total Topics: 16 Total Posts: 1832 |
#195
other-wise wrote: probeman, a quick question to help me clarify your stance: Do you make a distinction between “experience” as in knowledge gained from overtly interacting with the world over [x] amount of time (e.g., “I’ve learned from experience not to pet barking dogs ”) and “experience” as in covertly interacting with the world in the present moment (as in say, floating in an sensory deprivation tank, just “experiencing” what it was like, i.e., “experience” as in just being aware)? I'm not trying to be difficult but I don't think that trying to define that word is going to help. The word "experience" has broad usage- the way Technotut and I have been using it is in intuitive sense of meaning, the way we seem to "experience" things like pain. I agree with Dennett that relying on what seems to be going on in our minds is not going to get us anywhere. Although we need to investigate these "feelings" that we so strongly and intuitively, just so that we can try to explain them. This is chapters 3 and 4- heterphenomenology. But it's an easy concept: we just uncritically and neutrally accept what the subject is telling us, including all the other non-verbal data as well. (normal science) I should find a better quote, but here: ...but then we adopt a special move, which distinguishes heterophenomenology from the normal interpersonal stance: the subjects’ beliefs (etc.) are all bracketed for neutrality. Why? Because of two failures of overlap, which we may label false positive and false negative. False positive: Some beliefs that subjects have about their own conscious states are provably false, and hence what needs explanation in these cases is the etiology of the false belief. For instance, most people–naive people–think their visual fields are roughly uniform in visual detail or grain all the way out to the periphery. Even sophisticated cognitive scientists can be startled when they discover just how poor their capacity is to identify a peripherally located object (such as a playing card held at arm’s length). It certainly seems as if our visual consciousness is detailed all the way out all the time, but easy experiments show that it isn’t. (Our color vision also seems to extend all the way out, but similar experiments show that it doesn’t.) So the question posed by the heterophenomenologist is: Why do people think their visual fields are detailed all the way out? not this question: How come, since people’s visual fields are detailed all the way out, they can’t identify things parafoveally? False negative: Some psychological things that happen in people (to put it crudely but neutrally) are unsuspected by those people. People not only volunteer no information on these topics; when provoked to search, they find no information on these topics. But a forced choice guess, for instance, reveals that nevertheless, there is something psychological going on. This shows, for instance, that they are being influenced by the meaning of the masked word even though they are, as they put it, entirely unaware of any such word. (One might put this by saying that there is a lot of unconscious mental activity–but this is tendentious; to some, it might be held to beg the vexed question of whether people are briefly conscious of these evanescent and elusive topics, but just hugely and almost instantaneously forgetful of them.) Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse. |
|
TecnoTut
Tenured Poster  Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Jul 09, 2002 Location: Florida Total Topics: 213 Total Posts: 4725 |
#196
probeman wrote: So you're saying that Pain is a property of, what? Pain? Wow, heavy! You know exactly what pain is. In fact because you’ve known it all of your life, you know how to avoid it and inflict it. Avery Burke wrote: We only assume certain mental states in other based on language. My white Persian cat never speaks to me. Does that mean she has no mental states? How about a person sleeping or in a coma? Do you think they dream? Avery Burke wrote: So if we want to say that "this neuron activity correspond to pain" the subject has to say "ouch" Do you think masochists feels pain? What if they say “I love this” when we’re pounding a hammer on their heads? Avery Burke wrote: Neuroscience [U]only says that there is a causal relationship between stimuli and electrochemical activity in the brain. Don’t stop there. They also say the neuro-electrochemical activity makes us conscious. Avery Burke wrote: I don't care what you call yourself or what others call you, I believe I made that clear, Then don’t ask me what I think I am. Remember, I responded to your question. Avery Burke wrote: I only care about what you actually have to say. Not "experience"; "an experience". Besides that answer really doesn't make any sense to me in the context of our discussion. I think we need a contextual definition. You don’t know what a point of view is? You do not know what it is like to have an experience? Do you know what pain is? Do you think chairs feel pain or have a point of view? How about beliefs? Do you believe you have beliefs? I won't utter falsehoods, but I've no objection to uttering meaningless statements - A.J. Ayer, when saying grace. The apparent negation of a pseudo [meaningless] statement must also be a pseudo-statement - from Carnap's Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna) |
|
Avery Burke
Graduate Usergroup: Members Joined: Jan 20, 2004 Total Topics: 5 Total Posts: 233 |
#197
Quote by TecnoTut My white Persian cat never speaks to me. Does that mean she has no mental states? How about a person sleeping or in a coma? Do you think they dream? It does not mean she has no mental states it means you have no logical bases for assuming she has anything but behavior. Particularly if you wanted to assert that she had mental states that where smiler to yours I think she would have to tell you "I feel pain" but even then you really would know would you? Not to say that mental states don't exist. Of course they might not in something like a cat. We don't know because a cat can't speak to us. But a sleeping person can wake up and tell us what was going on in them wile they where sleeping. Quote by TecnoTut Do you think masochists feels pain? What if they say “I love this” when we're pounding a hammer on their heads? I think this is a good illustration of the problem's that come when we try to relate our sensations to others supposed sensation. This is a small piece of what I have been saying. Quote by TecnoTut You don't know what a point of view is? You do not know what it is like to have an experience? Do you know what pain is? Do you think chairs feel pain or have a point of view? How about beliefs? Do you believe you have beliefs? A point of view is an opinion or a vantage point. What does that have to do with "an experience" of pain? I don't know if a chair feel pain but I doubt it. I don't know what a belief is nor to i know what it is to believe I have a belief. But all this avoids my main question to you: on what bases do you assert that there exists a causal relationship between electrochemical activity in the brain and the (subjectively inferred) inner state or sensation? |
|
other-wise
Quirky Usergroup: Members Joined: Dec 23, 2003 Total Topics: 0 Total Posts: 130 |
#198
Originally posted by other-wise: Do you make a distinction between “experience” as in knowledge gained from overtly interacting with the world over [x] amount of time (e.g., “I’ve learned from experience not to pet barking dogs ”) and “experience” as in covertly interacting with the world in the present moment (as in say, floating in an sensory deprivation tank, just “experiencing” what it was like, i.e., “experience” as in just being aware)? Response by probeman: I'm not trying to be difficult but I don't think that trying to define that word is going to help. The word "experience" has broad usage- the way Technotut and I have been using it is in intuitive sense of meaning, the way we seem to "experience" things like pain. The reason I ask is that it sometimes seems as if you (and Dennett) are suggesting that... using the robot analogy... thousands of little semi-independent cognitive robots are gaining “experiential knowledge of the world” and they’re all semi-cooperatively competing with each other for momentary dominance, and that this dynamic, but perpetual turnover of “momentary dominance” is what we mistake for being “aware”, i.e., conscious. In other words (referring to my previous quote above) there is, bottom line, no such thing as the latter form of “experience”, only the former. (Again, not trying to shove words into your mouth, just trying to catch your drift) |
|
TecnoTut
Tenured Poster Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Jul 09, 2002 Location: Florida Total Topics: 213 Total Posts: 4725 |
#199
Avery Burke wrote: It does not mean she has no mental states it means you have no logical bases for assuming she has anything but behavior. Particularly if you wanted to assert that she had mental states that where smiler to yours Why not? I have mental states, so why shouldn't she? Avery Burke wrote: I think she would have to tell you "I feel pain" but even then you really would know would you? There you go again with verbal reports. Do you think deaf-mutes feel no pain? Have no feelings or beliefs? Avery Burke wrote: Not to say that mental states don't exist. Do you belief beliefs don't exist? Or would you not know how to answer this question? Avery Burke wrote: Of course they might not in something like a cat. We don't know because a cat can't speak to us. But a sleeping person can wake up and tell us what was going on in them wile they where sleeping. So all the animal cruelty organizations are out on a holiday because we really do not know if animals are capable of suffering and feeling pain? I wonder why my white Persian kitty meows when she's hungry. Avery Burke wrote: I think this is a good illustration of the problem's that come when we try to relate our sensations to others supposed sensation. This is a small piece of what I have been saying. Is that a "yes," "no,' or "I don't know" to my question? Avery Burke wrote: A point of view is an opinion or a vantage point. What does that have to do with "an experience" of pain? I don't know if a chair feel pain but I doubt it. Good, me too. Avery Burke wrote: I don't know what a belief is nor to i know what it is to believe I have a belief. You don't know what a belief is? Do you believe you do not know what a belief is or are you just saying that? I won't utter falsehoods, but I've no objection to uttering meaningless statements - A.J. Ayer, when saying grace. The apparent negation of a pseudo [meaningless] statement must also be a pseudo-statement - from Carnap's Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna) |
|
probeman
Uncertain but reliable Usergroup: Members Joined: Dec 12, 2003 Location: US Total Topics: 16 Total Posts: 1832 |
#200
other-wise wrote: The reason I ask is that it sometimes seems as if you (and Dennett) are suggesting that... using the robot analogy... thousands of little semi-independent cognitive robots are gaining “experiential knowledge of the world” and they’re all semi-cooperatively competing with each other for momentary dominance, and that this dynamic, but perpetual turnover of “momentary dominance” is what we mistake for being “aware”, i.e., conscious. In other words (referring to my previous quote above) there is, bottom line, no such thing as the latter form of “experience”, only the former. (Again, not trying to shove words into your mouth, just trying to catch your drift) Have you been reading the book? Because I think you would pretty much answer the question yourself if you'd gotten to chapter 3 or 4. Yes, basically Dennett is saying that our intuitions about how we experience the world (optical illusions, hallucinations, etc), and most importantly for your question, even our own thoughts (cartesian theater, dualism, experience), does not accurately represent the way that our brains actually work at the physical level. There is a short paper of his called Who's On First that deals directly with explaining how he is going to investigate scientifically something that seems so intuitively resistant to investigation. Just read the first two and half pages and I think it will impress you. http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/JCSarticle.pdf Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse. |
Page: First 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Last
Sorry, you don't have permission to post. Log in, or register if you haven't yet.