Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained": Philosophy Forums

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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

Belem

Posted 02/02/04 - 12:12 PM:	#11
The point being that today, every cognitive scientist is comfortable with Dennett's "mechanistic" or "algorithmic" type of explanations, but not everyone else is familiar with the ideas, or more and especially, agrees with him. Probeman, You seem to imply (twice now) that Scientists could enrich their approach to the study of how the mind works with Dennett's theories of consciousness. I think that Scientists have nothing to learn from Dennett because Dennett's proposal is based completely on the achievements of Science in many areas. He is basically using the discoveries in psychology, cognitive science and neurology to dismantle the philosophical conception of consciousness. He wants to prove that consciousness can be reduced to mere physical processes and back up his arguments with scientific evidence. At the end, if consciousness can be reducible, then it would have to be Science the only reliable figure to claim that it is so and Science -at this moment- can only speak about correlations. Belem

probeman
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Posted 02/02/04 - 12:43 PM:	#12
Belem wrote: You seem to imply (twice now) that Scientists could enrich their approach to the study of how the mind works with Dennett's theories of consciousness. I think that Scientists have nothing to learn from Dennett because Dennett's proposal is based completely on the achievements of Science in many areas. He is basically using the discoveries in psychology, cognitive science and neurology to dismantle the philosophical conception of consciousness. He wants to prove that consciousness can be reduced to mere physical processes and back up his arguments with scientific evidence. At the end, if consciousness can be reducible, then it would have to be Science the only reliable figure to claim that it is so and Science -at this moment- can only speak about correlations. Belem This subject is really more appropriate for the discussion of the second chapter, where these questions and related concerns are specifically addressed- but since the philosophers in this forum do not seem to be exactly breaking down the walls on this thread, I will respond. I would disagree. Cognitive scientists that I have talked to seem very appreciative of many philosophers and their efforts in this area, Dennett's efforts in particular. However, many of Dennett's hypotheses cannot be considered scientific in the strictest sense since sufficient empirical data is lacking in more than a few cases, as he himself is quick to point out. But his philosophical ideas can point to new directions and areas that cognitive scientists can then investigate. I would say that Philosophy, informed by science, can make a tremendous contribution to the study of consciousness. Of course, you are correct that philosophy, based solely on intuition or belief, vague generalities and never tested empirically, may not have much to add to the discussion. The situation is somewhat analogous to the Social Sciences, where now some sociologists and anthropologists can see biology and evolutionary psychology encroaching on their "territory". But even there, many researchers from both perspectives (cultural and physical) have found very fruitful collaboration and are gaining greater understanding, just as Dennett has. But I am more interested in your specific issues with the idea that hallucinations might be explained as a kind of perception based data "starvation" of a confirmation/disconfirmation system continually asking questions and getting somewhat arbitrary responses in return. What is your impression of these ideas?
Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.

Faustus
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Posted 02/02/04 - 01:07 PM:	#13
Belem wrote, “I think that Scientists have nothing to learn from Dennett because Dennett's proposal is based completely on the achievements of Science in many areas.” This book really straddles both disciplines. It’s an education on the science for fellow philosophers who prefer the safety of an armchair and depend too often on their intuitions. It’s also an education in philosophy for scientists in the field who might not even realize how unexamined philosophical intuitions shape their work. But his theory doesn’t just take science done by others and frame it to make a purely philosophical point. In coming chapters, he’ll actually challenge the interpretations scientists have claimed for their own work, and in the concluding appendix, his theory makes some predictions—one of which has already been confirmed. . . . .

Avery Burke
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Posted 02/02/04 - 02:09 PM:	#14
Good discussion. I'll read the chapter and get more involved in the discussion but just preliminarily: Quote byTecnoTut On page 462, Dennett informs us that by the end of the day (or book) he is a behaviorist: The examples sighted by TecnoTut do not seem to make Dennett a behaviorist. He simply, in keeping with Wittgenstein, concentrates on those elements of behavior that can be meaningfully discussed and debated about. Wittgenstein, to my naive understanding, attacks the concept of "mental objects" on the biases that one cannot meaningfully speak of such things. This does not mean they do not exist. But again I have not read the book yet. I'm just eager to participate in a disscustion and this does not seem to be a topic of the first chapter

TecnoTut
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Posted 02/02/04 - 02:33 PM:	#15
Avery Burke wrote: The examples sighted by TecnoTut do not seem to make Dennett a behaviorist. He simply, in keeping with Wittgenstein, concentrates on those elements of behavior that can be meaningfully discussed and debated about. Wittgenstein, to my naive understanding, attacks the concept of "mental objects" on the biases that one cannot meaningfully speak of such things. This does not mean they do not exist. But again I have not read the book yet. I'm just eager to participate in a disscustion and this does not seem to be a topic of the first chapter If Dennett himself admits that he is a behaviorist, then I do not know how you can deny that he is a behaviorist. Wittgenstein, too, was a behaviorist. In Dennett's 'intentional stance', 'beliefs', 'intentions', and 'qualia' are all merely grammatical fictions a la Wittgenstein. The only thing that really exists is behavior. All other things, such as beliefs and intentions, are just useful fictitious models used in predicting and explaining behavior. John Searle said that scientists and philosophers have always used the latest technology and science as a model or metaphor for the mind. Dennett is no different. When telephone switchboards were first invented, philosophers and scientists analogized the mind to the swithboards. Sherrington, the great British neuroscientist, thought that the mind worked like a telegraph system. Freud often compared the mind to hydraulic and electro-magnetic systems. Leibniz compared it to a mill, and the ancient Greeks thought the brain functions and mental processes like a catapult. The current fashionable trend of analogizing the mind to computers and functional properties, which Dennett is so fond of, will slowly fade when newer technology and cognitive theories arrive.
I won't utter falsehoods, but I've no objection to uttering meaningless statements - A.J. Ayer, when saying grace. The apparent negation of a pseudo [meaningless] statement must also be a pseudo-statement - from Carnap's Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

Faustus
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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:04 PM:	#16
TecnoTut wrote: If Dennett himself admits that he is a behaviorist, then I do not know how you can deny that he is a behaviorist. Um, except that he has gone on record denying that he is a behaviorist. In fact, the first paper I was ever assigned to read by him was an atttack on behaviorism. But I suppose we can get into that when the appropriate chapter comes up for reading. He denies the charge, but it's a common one, so something is going on. . . .

TecnoTut
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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:10 PM:	#17
Faustus wrote: Um, except that he has gone on record denying that he is a behaviorist. In fact, the first paper I was ever assigned to read by him was an atttack on behaviorism. And he admits to being a behaviorist as I have quoted. Behaviorists, such as Dennett, are known for attacking other types of behaviorisms. But I suppose we can get into that when the appropriate chapter comes up for reading. He denies the charge, but it's a common one, so something is going on. . . . If Dennett says intentions and beliefs are just useful fictitious models to explain or predict behavior, then he's a behaviorist. The 'intentional stance', according to Dennett, is a fictitious stance.
I won't utter falsehoods, but I've no objection to uttering meaningless statements - A.J. Ayer, when saying grace. The apparent negation of a pseudo [meaningless] statement must also be a pseudo-statement - from Carnap's Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

Faustus
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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:24 PM:	#18
Behaviorism is a more specific doctrine than what you have attributed to Dennett, but that will come out when we get to that chapter. As I said, it's a common charge, one leveled at him even from a former grad student, but flatly denied by the man himself.

probeman
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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:39 PM:	#19
Avery Burke wrote: But again I have not read the book yet. I'm just eager to participate in a disscustion and this does not seem to be a topic of the first chapter Please do read the first chapter at least. We look forward to your discussion.
Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.

probeman
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Posted 02/02/04 - 03:57 PM:	#20
TecnoTut wrote: And he admits to being a behaviorist as I have quoted. Behaviorists, such as Dennett, are known for attacking other types of behaviorisms. TecnoTut, please let's not get into debating "isms". In my opening post I specifically pleaded to everyone to try and avoid this type of debate. I really don't see the value in it. Please re-read my opening post if you wouldn't mind for the "ground rules". They are not onerous I think. TecnoTut wrote: If Dennett says intentions and beliefs are just useful fictitious models to explain or predict behavior, then he's a behaviorist. The 'intentional stance', according to Dennett, is a fictitious stance. This is jumping ahead of the first chapter, but ok, "isms" aside- what is wrong with trying to understand consciousness by describing mental processes without invoking the 'intentional stance'? In other words, what value of explanation does invoking the 'intentional stance' get you? Besides that you might find it deeply and intuitively satisfying to invoke, I mean? The whole point of Dennett's thesis is that however these mental processes actually may work, they might not be easily intuitive to us. As he states on page 17: "Many of the problems encountered by other theories are the result of getting off on the wrong foot, trying to guess the answers to the Big Questions too early. The novel background assumptions of my theory play a large role in what follows, permitting us to postpone many of the traditional philosophical puzzles over which theorists stumble, until after we have outlined an empirically based theory..." Patience. Until then, is there anything in the first chapter that you disagree with specifically?
Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.

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