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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"

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Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained"
geoff23
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Posted 02/04/04 - 08:23 AM:
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#91
DM


The point I was making is that mental properties are properties of the brain (specifically of brain processes), and not properties of the objects being viewed.


OK, I am sorry for interupting your debate. I will let Tecno defend his own position.


Redness is a property of the sensory process of seeing an apple. Would you agree?


Well, it certainly isn't a property of the apple. I am kind-of defending somebody-elses position here, so I'm not sure I should continue this line.


Not at all. If you agree that what we think of as "mental properties" are properties of brain processes, then I have no problem. What I want to know is, what does it mean to claim that a property of a physical process is non-physical? What definition of "physical" are you using when you say this? I don't see how it could possibly be the scientific one.


This isn't science. It's metaphysics. So scientific definitions aren't particularly useful, unless your intention is to go round and round a circular argument. We have already agreed that science must assume physicalism in order to operate, so using scientific definitions in a debate about metaphysics is rather self-defeating. Metaphysics does not have to make this assumption.

What does it mean to claim that mental properties are not physical properties? It means that these properties are non-physical. It means that they are something fundamental to existence but they are not physical. It means that non-physical properties can exist, hence it is called property dualism. Obviously such definitions are not particularly useful to a scientific materialist, but that does not make them invalid or incomprehensible to a philosopher like Chalmers, or even a layman. Again - this isn't science - it is metaphysics.


Anyway, like I said before, in what sense are they non-physical? What does that term mean? In science, the term is used to refer to some abstract idea that cannot exist in the real world. What do you mean by it?


Well, I repeat once more that this is not science you are discussing and this is not a science forum. It is a philosophy forum and you are discussing metaphysics. Yes, according to a scientific materialist only physical things exist. We all know that. What do I mean by it? I mean that non-physical things can exist, and that "subjective experiences"/qualia/whatever-you-wanna-call-them-but-you-know-what-they-are are these non-physical things. It really is a bit of a non-question, since nobody actually has any trouble telling the difference between a physical and a non-physical thing. Our language is set up so as to make the distinction very easy. It is only difficult to reconcile it with the language of physics and materialism, and since I am not a materialist it does not seem to me to be all that much of a problem, although I recognise why it seems like a problem to you.


I do not see any reason to think that the nature of consciousness is unknowable, though. Why pessamistic attitude?


I do not see this as pessimism. I am just trying to be as honest and accurate as I can.

smiling face

Geoff.

The poets did not win; the philosophers surrendered. (Umberto Eco)
TecnoTut
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Posted 02/04/04 - 08:24 AM:
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#92
ethereal wrote:

To what extent is neutral monism distinct from property dualism?


Property dualism holds that there are two properties in the world: physical and mental properties. Neutral monism either holds that there is only one property in the world and it is neither physical nor mental; rather, it’s some mysterious tertium quid.

Avery Burke wrote:

If behaviorism is such a broad category what explanatory power do we get from discussing weather an instance of this category can apply to Dennett's stance? Besides refuting his augment on the basis of his (supposed) alliance to a school of thought is a variation of the fallacy Ad Hominem. So, be a true philosopher and look at the augment part for part then cast judgment; even if the argument is wrong there may be some very valuable parts of the argument. Don't be dogmatic.

This is a more precise account of the fallacy Ad Hominem. I know you've taken some philosophy (probably much more than I) and are reasonable; so act that way.

Actually its a mix of positivism and some elements of behaviorism. But why is this wrong? Even if both of those approaches have been over turned that doesn't discount the argument at hand.
On the point of speaking of mental states as useful fiction: I can very easily make the claim that wile mental states exist we cannot verify their character or lean anything useful from them; so, since we can never know about such states, when we speak of them we understand that our characterizations of such states are fiction to help us with our overall theory (like imaginary numbers to number theory). I am not saying that I hold this belief; I am simply asserting that one can be made. This account does not seem to discount mental states; it simply says that our characterization of such states are fictions. This, I think, is what Wittgenstein (and therefore Dennett since he aligns himself with Wittgenstein) was getting at. This theory does not discount mental states only our ability to explain them and gain knowledge from an examination of them.


Discounting behaviorism is not dogmatic. There are established arguments against behaviorism. The main problem with most forms of behaviorism is that they identify behavior with mental states; ergo an actor pretending to be sad really is sad – talk of mental states is really talk of behavior, not mental states. Dennett’s behaviorism does not identify behavior with mental states; Dennett makes a distinction between mental states and behavior. However, Dennett holds mental states to be fictitious useful models in predicting behavior. Bottom line, he does not believe mental states really exist, but he does believe behavior really exists. Hence he’s a behaviorist.

Death Monkey wrote:

the physical properties of objects you are looking at are not equivalent to the properties of the image in your mind.


I agree. That’s why they are distinct things.

Death Monkey wrote:

But if you don't a-priori assume dualism, where is the contradiction? What possible logical justification can there be for claiming that dualism must be true?


But you are a dualist in some sense. You have just made a distinction between mental properties and physical properties. This is property dualism.

Death Monkey wrote:

The color we see in our mind is a property of the process of visually perceiving certain wavelengths of light. In other words, counter-intuitive as it may be, colors are not properties of objects, they are properties of visual perception


What I mean by colors is the mind-independent wavelength, not the mind-dependent, phenomenal property perceived. Mind-independent wavlengths are floating around outside my body on or off of objects.

Death Monkey wrote:

In what way is it not a physical event? What are its non-physical characteristics


In the way that mental properties have different properties from physical properties – images in the mind are distinct from the physical processes. As you just said above “the physical properties of objects you are looking at are not equivalent to the properties of the image in your mind.”

Death Monkey wrote:

Close. The key is to distinguish between the experience of seeing blue, and the physical properties that cause certain objects to look blue.


No, when I see a blue boat, my phenomenal experience of seeing a blue boat is about the real physical boat out there, and not about my brain properties causing the mental experience.

death monkey wrote:

Or we could recognize that pain is an experience, not a thing. The experience of feeling pain is a process, not a thing "out there" which we perceive.


Again, you are confusing property dualism with substantive dualism. Property dualism denies mental things or substances, but not the mental properties of things. By the way, saying “we could recognize that pain is an experience, not a thing. The experience of feeling pain is a process, not a thing "out there" which we perceive.” Does not disprove substantive dualism let a lone property dualism theories of pain.

death monkey wrote:

TecnoTut's claim that experiences cannot be brain processes because they have different properties. Claiming that the properties of experiences (being mental properties) are properties of brain processes, hardly supports this claim.


They are different properties because of Leibniz’s Laws. Your constant reiteration that that they are the same thing does not amount to an argument.

He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest

Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s

Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)
Faustus
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Posted 02/04/04 - 09:53 AM:
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#93
TecnoTut wrote:
What mistake? How is Dennett any different from a behaviorist that denies the existence of mental states insofar as they are merely fictitious tools used to predict and explain behavior?


I should not have brought that up, as I'm coyly awaiting the actual appearance of your originally quoted passaged before I explain why you have misinterpreted it. I'm trying to focus on one chapter at a time.

Is anyone even reading this book other that probeman and myself? Fess up!
Faustus
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Posted 02/04/04 - 10:05 AM:
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#94
TecnoTut wrote:
Calling dualism "dead" and the Cartesian Theatre "shallow" is not philosophy. You need arguments, not negative characterizations. The fact of the matter is that most professional philosophers today are "property dualists", a.k.a., non-reductive materialists. Property dualism is simply the compromise between substantive dualism as one extreme and eliminativism as another extreme. Contra substantive dualism, property dualism holds that mental states cannot exist separately from the physical processes that cause them -- and that mental properties are mental attributes of brains, not minds. Furthermore, there can be no mental change without a physical change, but there can be a physical change without a mental change; thus, the same mental state may be instantiated by different physical states but different mental states cannot be instantiated by the same physical states -- this allows for multiple realization and token physicalism (but not type physicalism). Unlike reductive materialism and eliminativism, however, property dualism holds that mental properties do in fact exist and are distinct from the physical properties that cause them because of Leibniz's Laws.


Perhaps you are reading only my posts and not the book itself.

1. Dennett openly says that dualism is so fundamentally non-scientific that he's just going to drop it out of the range of possibilities without argument. Since we are supposed to be focusing on chapter two, which is all about the rules he has chosen to play by, do you think dualism should be kept as a live possibility? Note that I'm not talking about the supposedly popular "property dualism"--I'm talking about life after death dualism.

2. Your description of property dualism matches Dennett's program exactly only until we reach this sentence: "Unlike reductive materialism and eliminativism, however, property dualism holds that mental properties do in fact exist and are distinct from the physical properties that cause them because of Leibniz's Laws."

Here the property dualist jumps behind the idea that there is mental stuff, only it isn't being called stuff, but rather a "property". And Dennett openly says in this second chapter that the idea that there is mental stuff of some kind or other is the very thing he's going to attempt to explain.

Basically, the rest of the book is an attempt to wean us away from the kinds of intuitions that would incline someone to be a property dualist in the first place. So to insist over and over again the magisterial "obviousness" that the world comes packaged in two types of properties is just to beg the question. THAT is the issue at stake in the book. And the point of this discussion group is to examine Dennett's alternative to this view one chapter at a time to see in detail how it works.
Avery Burke
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Posted 02/04/04 - 10:10 AM:
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#95
Quote by TecnoTut
Discounting behaviorism is not dogmatic. There are established arguments against behaviorism. The main problem with most forms of behaviorism is that they identify behavior with mental states

Discounting Dennett because you label him a behaviorist is dogmatic.There may well be established arguments against Skinner's form of behaviorism; most notably The Case Against Skinner by Chomsky. But this does not, to me, seem to discount your characterization of Dennett's supposed behaviorism. Pleas explain how this could be.

Many people have mistaken Wittgenstein's positivists view of human behavior for some form of Behaviorism because of its claim about the uncertainty of internal states (as I have said). This uncertainty is the same we find in Quantum Physics: we understand that we can never be certain of the locality and properties of Quantum particles (the qualities may only be explainable in matrix mechanics) this means we know our models of these particles are only useful fiction; not that the particles do not exist.
probeman
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Posted 02/04/04 - 10:11 AM:
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Avery Burke wrote:
Actually its a mix of positivism and some elements of behaviorism. But why is this wrong? Even if both of those approaches have been over turned that doesn't discount the argument at hand.
On the point of speaking of mental states as useful fiction: I can very easily make the claim that wile mental states exist we cannot verify their character or lean anything useful from them; so, since we can never know about such states, when we speak of them we understand that our characterizations of such states are fiction to help us with our overall theory (like imaginary numbers to number theory). I am not saying that I hold this belief; I am simply asserting that one can be made. This account does not seem to discount mental states; it simply says that our characterization of such states are fictions. This, I think, is what Wittgenstein (and therefore Dennett since he aligns himself with Wittgenstein) was getting at. This theory does not discount mental states only our ability to explain them and gain knowledge from an examination of them.

Now we're getting somewhere! smiling face

Actually I don't want to jump the gun too much, but this basically correct, with a slight modification that Dennett introduces later in his idea of "heterophenomenology"- whew! that's a mouthful.

What I (he) means, is that if these mental states are indeed only apparent useful fictions, they still need to be explained by his theory (not eliminated as Tecnotut claims). Because they are real enough to EACH OF US. But as Wittgenstein and Dennett would agree- the introspective first person plural examination of these mental states is fraught with danger and mistakes. Because these mental states seem so OBVIOUS and REAL and INTUITIVE. Besides- you can't question MY internal mental states! wink

However, Dennett suggests that use the third person perspective (as does science in general), and we treat these "mental states" as would an anthropologist examining any culture's (possibly) mythological beliefs- we non-judgementally take the subjects word for their description of these "customs or religious beliefs" (internal mental states) and we catagorize and examine this data set.

What the natives say about their "mental states" is real enough to them, even if it is not a scientifically realistic explanation of "how their world was created". But if we are going to "explain" how their "mythology" was developed and passed on- like the anthropologist, we need to carefully examine the beliefs they hold.

I don't want to say much more at this point- just give you a taste of were he's going with examinations of internal mental states.

Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.
probeman
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Posted 02/04/04 - 10:15 AM:
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#97
Avery Burke wrote:
The first chapter is sort of slow going.
Dennett prepossess the possibility of a goal driven (or expectation driven) basic component of a stimulus organizing system of the brain. Presumably, as Dennett goes to pains to mention, the preliminary system he sketches is to simple to really explain anything in the way of perceived experience. But there's good historical evidence that supports the idea of simple expectation driven devices in our biology. All organism have goal driven behavior which is, in most cases, very simply coded into the genome. A simple change, for instance, in genetic coding can cause microbes to eat nonbeneficial chemicals instead of their food.
I have long wondered how this historical inheritance plays out in human behavior (besides the obvious bodily cravings and their psychological reproductions). Certainly it does not effect anything more that habit. But having it play a part in perception and stimulus organization is very interesting.

Avery, Dennett is very much cognizant of therole that explanations from evolutionary psychology take in our mental development and will use some of that data in his later explanations. The second chapter gets much more interesting!

Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.
probeman
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Posted 02/04/04 - 10:20 AM:
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#98
geoff23 wrote:
DM
If it is a non-physical property then it isn't anywhere and it isn't made of anything. If it had attributes like physical location or if it was "made of something" then it wouldn't be a non-physical property.
Geoff.

And as Dennett points out- this belief completely insulates oneself from a scientific examination of the mind.

Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.
probeman
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Posted 02/04/04 - 10:28 AM:
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#99
other-wise wrote:
A yellow sign with a black squiggly line on it is not a winding road; a winding road is what the squiggly line represents to me. A sign no one can read represents nothing; information that is coded must be decoded. So to whom or what are the neurons and chemicals representing? Aren’t you also implicitly assuming the Cartesian Theater?

It's not different for any animal (conscious or unconscious). It does't have to be a metal sign- that's just a human notation for warning, just like dead bodies might be a warning to an animal that something is dangerous about this vicinity. The animal uses it's senses to detect that there is a "winding road" or say obstruction out there, and it's brain (probably unconsciously) uses that information to avoid the obstruction.

A robot can do that much and we assume they don't have a cartesian theater. But keep trying to keep us honest- the Cartesian theater is the intuitive approach and it's difficult to drop it even in this discussion.

Certainty is not a gift to humanity- it is a curse.
geoff23
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Posted 02/04/04 - 10:29 AM:
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#100
probeman wrote:
And as Dennett points out- this belief completely insulates oneself from a scientific examination of the mind.


Well, I don't agree. I think it may limit the ability of science to meddle in metaphysics, but then I think that science had no business meddling in metaphysics in the first place (and I don't think science does this - maybe some people do so in the name of a defence of science). It does not prevent the scientific study of the contents of consciousness - for example the links between human nature and evolution, or the correspondencies between human learning and machine learning. I think the objection is a bit of a mirage - it does not 'insulate oneself from scientific investigation' - rather it clarifies what sort of investigation can truly said be to scientific, and what sort can't.

The poets did not win; the philosophers surrendered. (Umberto Eco)
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