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Discrete Contexts for Discourse
Can philosophy of language draw a line between fields of discourse?
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rigelrover
Professor  Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Aug 05, 2009 Total Topics: 24 Total Posts: 776 |
 #1
Subject: Discrete Contexts for Discourse Thanks again for taking the time for my questions. I light of Wittgenstein's general philosophy of language, minimally; or more to the point: your own - should fields or contexts for discourse be exclusively differentiated? Are there strict lines of demarcation, for instance, between scientific and religious discourse or between either of these and mathematical discourse? Or can they overlap; either discretely or continuously; arbitrarily or only in particular ways? Along these lines, is it metaphysically possible that a universally proper mode of discourse may exist? Or should this be ruled out in light of a rational argument? For instance, should one argue against strict empiricism as a mode for producing the only meaningful language structures? Ultimately I am wondering if you would consider bridging contextual discourse among different epistemologies is a constructive endeavor; do we gain more, less, or nothing in doing so? Your response is appreciated, RR I am more interested in questions than answers; dialog than dictation. If we can reasonably believe that there is not just a breach, but a fundamentally unclosable gap between the individual mind and the ultimate nature of the reality; the primordial thing in itself, then true mystery does exist. |
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John Searle
Honored Guest Usergroup: Guest Speakers Joined: Oct 13, 2009 Total Topics: 0 Total Posts: 8 |
#2
Wittgenstein sometimes talks as if he thought that language games could be mutually exclusive, as if one kind of language game did not overlap with other kinds of language games. But I think there is a serious difficulty in that almost all forms of language involve some kind of representation. This is brought out in the theory of speech acts by the fact that different types of speech acts can all have the same propositional content. Similarly with language games. There can be a religious language game where the speaker prays that his broken leg will be healed. There can be a medical language game where we talk about the best procedure for healing the same broken leg, and there can be a scientific language game where we discuss the exact scientific nature of his broken leg. There can be a family language game where talk about the role of his broken leg in family life. And so on. There do not seem to be mutually exclusive or sharp dividing lines between different kinds of language game. Having said that, however, I want to add that I think the positivist idea that some sorts of discourse could be automatically excluded on the grounds that because they were not empirically meaningful, they were not meaningful at all, is a mistake. We cannot say in advance what sorts of forms of linguistic communication are going to succeed and what forms are going to fail, though we can point out in certain cases why such and such an effort failed, and why such and such an effort succeeded. |
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rigelrover
Professor Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Aug 05, 2009 Total Topics: 24 Total Posts: 776 |
#3
Is Occam's maxim a good way of measuring the success or failure of language games? Sometimes I get the impression from linguists that a language game that is self-consistent, and closed perhaps, is untouchable; i.e. we can not say anything about its validity to claims to knowledge and truth. It is as if there is no correct maxim for obtaining an optimized language game, because there is no optimum (i.e. it is relative only to the particular mode or game being played); or perhaps there is no way for determining what is optimum. That is to say that the role of the proposition 'there is a broken leg' is how it matters to those talking about it. If a scientific explanation matters, then it is useful, and works in their language game. If it does not matter, then it is not useful, and does not work in their language game. It seems to me that there is a way to measure the success or failure of a particular game, however; namely if the game leads itself into paradox, the parameters/propositions/semantics must be reconsidered, etc. This seems like the role of philosophy these days. I see that strict empiricism fails on account of paradoxes inherent in assumptions regarding temporal causality, etc. There are still the paradoxes of infinity and of beginning and end to be sorted out. Given what appears to be philosophy's role in this, it still seems that what we have is a funnel or filter into empiricism. I am not comfortable with this. When you say that 'we cannot know in advance' what communication will succeed or fail, what exactly are the criteria for success or failure of a language? If there are criteria, it seems that there is an optimum that is reach-able (if ultimately un-graspable). If the criteria have to do with communicating the precise nature of a thing (to oneself or publicly) then we are perhaps doomed to forgo the theoretical optimum. If this is the case, what can be said (by a philosopher) to show that progress can be made in philosophy? Thanks again for your time. I hope that my questions and reasoning follow from your response adequately. RR Edited by rigelrover on Nov 2, 2009 - 4:19 AM. Reason: spelling I am more interested in questions than answers; dialog than dictation. If we can reasonably believe that there is not just a breach, but a fundamentally unclosable gap between the individual mind and the ultimate nature of the reality; the primordial thing in itself, then true mystery does exist. |
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rigelrover
Professor Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Aug 05, 2009 Total Topics: 24 Total Posts: 776 |
#4
I wish that Prof. Searle would have stayed around to answer this. Does anyone else have any insight? Thanks, RR I am more interested in questions than answers; dialog than dictation. If we can reasonably believe that there is not just a breach, but a fundamentally unclosable gap between the individual mind and the ultimate nature of the reality; the primordial thing in itself, then true mystery does exist. |
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Timothy
Russell wannabe  Usergroup: Moderators Joined: Dec 18, 2004 Location: Grad School Total Topics: 93 Total Posts: 2360 |
#5
What the heck, here I go rigelrover wrote: Is Occam's maxim a good way of measuring the success or failure of language games? Sometimes I get the impression from linguists that a language game that is self-consistent, and closed perhaps, is untouchable; i.e. we can not say anything about its validity to claims to knowledge and truth. It is as if there is no correct maxim for obtaining an optimized language game, because there is no optimum (i.e. it is relative only to the particular mode or game being played); or perhaps there is no way for determining what is optimum. That is to say that the role of the proposition 'there is a broken leg' is how it matters to those talking about it. If a scientific explanation matters, then it is useful, and works in their language game. If it does not matter, then it is not useful, and does not work in their language game. I don't think Occam's razor counts as a yardstick against which to measure language games. The reason is that languages games don't share a common purpose. Occam may work in the context where your goal is to explain something veridically; but not all discourse aims at truth or explanation or usefulness. An important realization of Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations was that meaningful discourse is not limited to epistemic, truth-sensitive contexts (superseding positivistic empiricism), and these are the contexts where, I think, Occam properly applies. rigelrover wrote: When you say that 'we cannot know in advance' what communication will succeed or fail, what exactly are the criteria for success or failure of a language? If there are criteria, it seems that there is an optimum that is reach-able (if ultimately un-graspable). I don't think Searle would maintain that there's some fix set of criteria, as some kind of a priori rules, that determine what language is successful or doomed to failure, even when a specific common goal is assumed. There's an essential anti-reductionistic attitude, and some contemporary empiricist (like Quine) hold communication and meaningful speech acts as an irreducible given - it's there, like our life, as Wittgenstein once put it (if I remember correctly) T. |
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