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Derrida / Of Grammatology

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Derrida / Of Grammatology
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Posted 05/05/08 - 03:31 AM:
Subject: Derrida / Of Grammatology
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There is a question at the end. Derrida writes in Of Grammatology that


The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign (so grossly misnamed, and not only for the reasons Saussure himself recognizes) must forbid a radical distinction between the linguistic and the graphic sign. No doubt this thesis concerns only the necessity of relationships between specific signifiers and signifieds within an allegedly natural relationship between the voice and sense in general, between the order of phonic signifiers and the content of the signifieds (“the only natural bond, the only true bond, the bond of sound” ). Only these relationships between specific signifiers and signifieds would be regulated by arbitrariness. Within the “natural” relationship between phonic signifiers and their signifieds in general, the relationship between each determined signifier and its determined signified would be “arbitrary”.

Now from the moment that one considers the totality of determined signs, spoken, and a fortiori written, as unmotivated institutions, one must exclude any relationship of natural subordination, any natural hierarchy among signifiers or orders of signifiers. If “writing” signifies inscription and especially the durable institution of a sign (and that is the only irreducible kernel of the concept of writing), writing in general covers the entire field of linguistic signs. In that field a certain sort of instituted signifiers may then appear, “graphic” in the narrow and derivative sense of the word, ordered by a certain relationship with other instituted — hence “written,” even if they are “phonic” — signifiers. The very idea of institution — hence of the arbitrariness of the sign — is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and outside of its horizon. Quite simply, that is, outside of the horizon itself, outside the world as space of inscription, as the opening to the emission and to the spatial distribution of signs, to the regulated play of their differences, even if they are “phonic.”


The basic structure of his argument seems to be that:

(1) if a sign, as construed by Saussure, is arbitrary, then a radical distinction between graphic and phonetic signs must be forbidden. The radical distinction is then a distinction regarding the function of the sign, not a distinction based upon their constitutive difference (e.g. that phonemes are spoken, graphemes are written marks, etc.). Saussure wishes to restrict arbitrariness to the "necessary" relationships between naturally occurring relationships of voice/signified. This is a chronological relationship (presumable, speech came first) over flowing into a logical one. Derrida contests the logical relationship between the signifier/signified, saying that if signs are arbitrary, then this "natural" relationship (speech/sign) is as arbitrary as the written sign (e.g., all signs for a word, whether spoken or written, must fall under the thesis of "arbitrariness").

(2) if all signs are arbitrary, then a relationship (of logical subordination) on the basis of arbitrariness cannot be made. If "writing" signifies inscription and durability (the convention and institution of the use of the sign), the concept of writing can be used to describe all possible linguistic signs, whether they be spoken or written. Because the spoken word is also a sign, and the sign is established by convention, but the written sign is also established by convention, and each are arbitrary, then the idea of institution and arbitrariness is unthinkable outside the possibility of writing, if writing designations the distribution of signs (how they are instituted, how they form, how they are used) and the regulated play of differences (how they acquire meaning in relationship to each other by comprising a network of relationships).

I'm better at prose than logic (having a soft, literary mind), but I would interpret it as something like this: if some property "x" applies to "a" and "b" equally, and both "a" and "b" are related through "x" as their fundamental property, then a subordination in terms of "x" of "a" and/or "b" cannot be permitted for "a" or "b", because "a" and "b" include "x" equally. So, if this is the case, then "a" and "b" in terms of "x" are interchangeable, and if "b" has additional properties "p," but nonetheless is always "x" and all additional properties are differences in use, then we can say that b=a for all "x", and as such, both b and a can be subsumed beneath a concept which permits no distinction in terms of "x" of "a" and "b," "n," and that "n" can be said to be the fundamental source of differences between "a" and "b" as well as their similarities (differance).

Now, my question. If I interpret this correctly, Derrida is saying that “writing” in the “narrow sense” is constitutive of the general system of speech and writing because this notion encompasses all fundamental aspects of the sign in general; that the concept of (graphic) writing is implied within the possibility of speech and thus speech contains the trace of writing, writing the trace of speech, and so both reduce to a fundamental thesis. So what to make of this statement:

The very idea of institution — hence of the arbitrariness of the sign — is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and outside of its horizon. Quite simply, that is, outside of the horizon itself, outside the world as space of inscription, as the opening to the emission and to the spatial distribution of signs, to the regulated play of their differences, even if they are “phonic.”


Is Derrida implying that the world contains a spatial distribution of signs in a literal sense? Or is he saying that the graphic and phonetic signs both contain analogous spatial and differential relationships?

Derrida then continues:

… only the signs called natural, those that Hegel and Saussure call “symbols,” escape semiology as grammatology. But they fall a fortiori outside the field of linguistics as the region of general semiology. The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign thus indirectly but irrevocably contests Saussure's declared proposition when he chases writing to the outer darkness of language. This thesis successfully accounts for a conventional relationship between the phoneme and the grapheme (in phonetic writing, between the phoneme, signifier-signified, and the grapheme, pure signifier), but by the same token it forbids that the latter be an “image” of the former. Now it was indispensable to the exclusion of writing as “external system,” that it come to impose an “image,” a “representation,” or a “figuration,” an exterior reflection of the reality of language.


The general argument is clear enough. Derrida is claiming that if phonetic writing is to be a conventionally established sign or representation of the spoken language, it cannot (per the argument Saussure makes against the written language as an insufficient representation of speech) be an image of the former; but Saussure has used the notion of the image or representative function of phonetic writing generally to condemn its inferior status to speech. So Saussure uses the notion of “image” contradictorily.

I cannot, however, make out how the notion of “symbol” factors into the argument. Why does a symbol escape semiology? I am not familiar enough with either Hegel or Saussure to account for their theses on symbols. It seems as though the symbol itself is constitutive of semiology also, because the symbol indicates something. Is it because the symbol is overflowing with meaning? It would appear as though Derrida wants to institute the symbol as a general form of his writing. Some interpretation and help would be useful.

I am using the 1976 edition, translated by Gayatri Spivak, published by the Johns Hopkins University Press. An excerpt from Of Grammatology, chapter 2, in which the above excerpts appear, can be found Edited by quickly on 05/05/08 - 04:41 AM

"Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: 'here are our monsters',
without immediately turning the monsters into pets." -Jacques Derrida
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Posted 05/05/08 - 04:21 AM:
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Basically my question is a big "why?" to the following:

...in the synchronic structure and systematic principle of alphabetic writing — and phonetic writing in general — no relationship of “natural” representation, none of resemblance or participation, no “symbolic” relationship...no “iconographic” relationship...[can] be implied.


What is the importance of the symbol? Why cannot graphic writing function symbolically? How is symbol differentiated from image?


Edited by quickly on 05/05/08 - 04:53 AM

"Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: 'here are our monsters',
without immediately turning the monsters into pets." -Jacques Derrida
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Posted 05/05/08 - 05:05 AM:
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I'm better at prose than logic, but I would interpret it as something like this: if some property "x" applies to "a" and "b" equally, and both "a" and "b" are related through "x" as their fundamental property,


What is a "fundamental property"?

then a subordination in terms of "x" of "a" and/or "b" cannot be permitted for "a" or "b", because "a" and "b" include "x" equally.


What is the meaning of "subordination" in this context?

So, if this is the case, then "a" and "b" in terms of "x" are interchangeable,


That is just another way of saying that they both share the same property.

and if "b" has additional properties "p," but nonetheless is always "x" and all additional properties are differences in use, then we can say that b=a,


If b has properties in addition to X that are not shared by a, then you can't say they're identical. Leibniz' law (the indiscernibility of identicals) tells us that if x and y are identical, then they share all properties in common. The contrapositive is that if x and y don't share all properties in common, then x and y are not identical.

and as such, both b and a can be subsumed beneath a concept which permits no distinction in terms of "x,"


I don't know what this means.

"n," and that "n" can be said to be the fundamental source of differences between "a" and "b" as well as their similarities.


What is n? It doesn't appear earlier in the post.

BTW, you don't need to put quotes around your logical symbols like that. Also, you should not use "x" as a symbol for properties, unless it is a second order variable, in which case it should be upper case. Letters like "x," "v," "z," "y" are used for first order variables. Use "F," "G," "P," "H" for properties. If you want to write "a has the property F," write "Fa."
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Posted 05/05/08 - 05:53 AM:
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Two problems: I’m not familiar with formal logics; I’m not sure I understand Derrida’s argument. I’m trying to understand it, so hopefully I’m presenting it somewhat accurately.


7: What is a "fundamental property"?

Saussure’s thesis is that all signs are related through their being arbitrary. There is no logical reason why a particular sign is related to a particular concept. As such, the only way in which signs attain meaning is by their difference from all other signs. A sign means only insofar as it isn’t another sign. The number of signs is equivalent to the number of possible concepts. This is the irreducible property of all signs, hence signification. So if speech and writing are both acts of signification, then they are related to each other as acts of signification by being composed of a network of arbitrary signs.


What is the meaning of "subordination" in this context?

The first part of the chapter I quoted from dealt with Saussure’s attempt to “banish” writing from a realm of “pure signification.” Hence, he subordinates writing to speech as an impure, parasitic, form of signification. This is Derrida’s primary target of attack. The claim then is that if all signification is arbitrary and means because it is constituted within a system of differences, then all acts of signification are irreducibly acts in which an arbitrary sign is used to communicate. You can’t say: both are arbitrary, but one is more so if both are the same.


That is just another way of saying that they both share the same property.

Yes, but it’s a critical step in deconstructive arguments. If both “writing” and “speech” are the same in terms of the proposition (of arbitrariness), then if we’re talking about the proposition, I can say “writing” whenever you say “speech,” because the difference between them (graphic/phonetic) isn’t a part of the argument anymore. It is a property which is irrelevant to the act of signification in terms of the thesis of arbitrariness.

If b has properties in addition to X that are not shared by a, then you can't say they're identical. Leibniz' law (the indiscernibility of identicals) tells us that if x and y are identical, then they share all properties in common. The contrapositive is that if x and y don't share all properties in common, then x and y are not identical.

This is where I’m getting confused in the argument. I think Derrida wants to limit the discussion to the “sign” in general in terms of the thesis of arbitrariness or “institution.” Basically, I see him saying that properties of speech which are irreducible properties of “speech,” e.g., the act of speaking, are inconsequential when the discussion is about the nature of the sign in general, or as a theoretical construct of signifier/signified.


I don't know what this means.

Essentially, I see Derrida saying that if, in terms of this property of arbitrariness, and given the theoretical nature of the sign (signifier/signified to Saussure), both writing and speech share the same basic structure, then differentiating writing from speech on the basis of arbitrariness can’t occur. This is what he says:

Of Grammatology, C2, S3: “[the thesis of arbitrariness] forbids that the latter [writing] be an image of the former [speech].”

“how [can] he [Saussure] at the same time say of writing that it is an “image” or “figuration” of language and define language and writing elsewhere as “two distinct systems of signs[?]”

“Saussure thus accumulates contradictory arguments to bring about a satisfactory decision: the exclusion of writing.”


Saussure tries to say that writing and speech aren’t and are at the same time bound by a relationship determined by “image.” But by the rules of the sign, he can’t do that. Derrida then argues that he can create a concept which is more originary than the notion of “language” as "writing" or "speech" to account for both, because it is, in a sense, “merely the common property,” that is, arbitrariness and difference; or "that which permits signification," namely, "differance."

7: What is n? It doesn't appear earlier in the post.

The new concept. “Writing” or “grammatology” to Derrida. The “concept which is merely the property,” in reference to the above.

BTW, you don't need to put quotes around your logical symbols like that. Also, you should not use "x" as a symbol for properties, unless it is a second order variable, in which case it should be upper case. Letters like "x," "v," "z," "y" are used for first order variables. Use "F," "G," "P," "H" for properties. If you want to write "a has the property F," write "Fa."

Thanks. Hopefully that will come to me sometime after I take a logic course. smiling face Which is next on my semester schedule…


Edited by quickly on 05/05/08 - 10:25 AM

"Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: 'here are our monsters',
without immediately turning the monsters into pets." -Jacques Derrida
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Posted 05/06/08 - 03:03 AM:
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So, the above argument, which I’m trying to comprehend fully, is the precondition to Derrida’s concept of the trace and the displacement of the origin of the theoretical concept of the sign. It is an important step, and I feel I’m not understanding some part of it. This is what follows, after some discussion of how Marxism and structuralism are both "unscientific," and how Saussuer presents a unique opprotunity, because of the popularity of structualism, of providing “an assured means of broaching the deconstruction” of Western metaphysics (or Derridean mouth-flapping), he continues:

Now we must think that writing is at the same time more exterior to speech, not being its “image” or its “symbol,” and more interior to speech, which is already in itself a writing. Even before it is linked to incision, engraving, drawing, or the letter, to a signifier referring in general to a signifier signified by it, the concept of the graphic [unit of a possible graphic system] implies the framework of the instituted trace, as the possibility common to all systems of signification.


Essentially, the argument runs: if graphic writing is both speech’s other, since it isn’t an image or representation of it (since Saussure defines it written scripts as separate semiotic systems), but also “more interior to speech,” because speech itself is a “kind of writing,” or, that both are irreducible semiotic systems constituted by differences and “arbitrary” institutions (conventional points of reference), then both speech and writing are constituted by an “instituted trace,” where the instituted trace is defined as that place where “the relationship with the other is marked, articulates its possibility in the entire field of the entity, which metaphysics has defined as the being-present starting from the occulted moment of the trace.”

Spivak, in her introduction, describes the trace as follows: “the sign, phonic as well as graphic, is a structure of differance” – or archi-writing, etc – “[which] suggests that what opens the possibility of thought is not merely the question of being, but also the never-annulled difference from the ‘completely other.’ Such is the strange ‘being’ of the sign: half of it always ‘not there’ and the other half always ‘not that.’ The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other which is forever absent.” As such, the “structure of the sign [is] a trace-structure,” where the trace is “the mark of the absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experience,” where thought and experience implies the possibility of a linguistic reality, or of any sensory experience being represented by language.

Now, Derrida seems to argue that the concept of phonetic or graphic script (including hieroglyphics, ideograms, symbols, signs, etc.) implies a structure wherein the one always implies the other (as an other) because it retains the possibility of always always having been originary in the other (or of having another origin, theoretically, in which signification could arise) – in this case, writing. If the sign is a trace structure, wherein both signifier and signified are bound only by their difference, then all acts of signification are constituted equally by differance. Or, their theoretical origins are interchangeable. So if we retain this thesis or arbitrariness, then all acts of signification are equally always other-than-structures (trace structures), and as such, the theoretical origin of writing/speech is interchangeable, and a new terms, which is merely the possibility of either (archi-writing, for instance), can be substituted to describe the sign/writing/speech.

So, the instituted trace. Derrida describes the it in the same way he describes Saussure’s “unmotivatedness,” or “arbitrariness,” and seems to imply that the trace-structure of the sign is a controlled effect of social, historical, conditions – or, that the structure of the sign, as a trace-structure, is in the same way as any sign, a convention. As such, the institution of a sign by convention always implies the movement from the “other” as a symbol into the “other” and the “other” as signifier/signified, or as a sign. The instituted trace then being the convention of a trace of the object.

Am I interpreting this correctly?

If I am, it presents a rather interesting view of language in general. It’s interesting that Derrida uses structuralism’s semiotics instead of, for example, Frege’s sense/reference, but obviously given that he’s attacking structuralism, it makes sense. He actually shows an affinity for Pierce throughout. However, Derrida continually implies, and sometimes directly states, that deconstruction, and this one in particular, is a scientific theory, particularly because it denies access to metaphysical realities. So, I was thinking: do the concepts of iterability, differance, etc., which Derrida has outlined, wherein meaning is controlled by convention, repetition, and difference, provide for a more scientific conception of reality once the notion of essences or "direct access" has been denied the sign? That is, Derrida's view of language allows it a flexibility, but an instituted rigidity, which is always adaptable because no word need to necessarily designate any thing, and no concept any thing either. Can one build a theory of language from the notion of possibility?


Edited by quickly on 05/06/08 - 05:38 AM

"Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: 'here are our monsters',
without immediately turning the monsters into pets." -Jacques Derrida
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