 Defense of Substance Dualism | |
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Hanover
The Highest Rank Possible  Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Nov 30, 2008 Location: Atlanta Total Topics: 25 Total Posts: 3387 |
 #1
Subject: Defense of Substance Dualism The substance dualist holds that mental events occur in the non-physical realm and all else occurs in the physical realm. My body is in the physical world, but my thoughts are not. This view is in current disfavor and is generally thought to be a religious view. It is generally accepted, however, that mental events and everyday physical events are different types of events. In an effort to avoid substance dualism, but to acknowledge the distinction between mental and non-mental events, a position referred to a "property dualism" has emerged. This position holds that mental thoughts are physical events, but that they are not reducible to physical descriptions (non-reductive physicalism). It also holds that mental events rely upon everyday physical events like brain activity, but that mental events are someting "over and above" that brain activity (supervience). In fact, most property dualists do not even require that the same mental event be consistently attached to the same brain activity (anamolous monism). All that they require is that some brain activity occur for there to be a mental state (token identity). My argument is that there is no distinction between substance dualism and property dualism. To describe a physical property that (1) is irreducible to all other known physical properties, (2) is not predictably related to any particular known physical event (even upon exact replication of prior physical causes), and (3) is "over and above" mundane physical events in some indescribable way, is to describe a physical property that is so distinct from all other observable physical matter that it is incorrect to refer to it as physical matter. This exercise of dividing the world into mundane matter (that which is readily observable) and mental matter (that which occurs only in conscious people's brains) is an exercise indistinct from what Descartes did when he described mental and physical events in what he took to be a world of two substances. |
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Yahadreas
YHDRS  Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Mar 02, 2006 Location: Pattaya, Thailand Total Topics: 118 Total Posts: 4585
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#2
I believe the view of substance dualism is that there are two foundational substances: mind and matter. Property dualism, however, is the view that there is one foundational substance: matter; and that mind is a product of matter. Simply put, substance dualism allows for separate mental events. Property dualism does not allow this separation; matter must precede mind. |
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Hanover
The Highest Rank Possible Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Nov 30, 2008 Location: Atlanta Total Topics: 25 Total Posts: 3387 |
#3
Yahadreas wrote: Simply put, substance dualism allows for separate mental events. Property dualism does not allow this separation; matter must precede mind. The property dualist (PD) asserts that the world is composed of matter (M), and M has two properties (a) mental events and (b) all other physical events. He admits that (a) is not reducible into (b) and acknowledges that (a) doesn't even predictably follow the same laws of physics as (b). It is my position that the property dualist is espousing substance dualism in just other terms. The PD asserts that M = (a) + (b), but, in truth, this is purely a tautology. It therefore does not say anything at all about M. M is not a substance that comprises two things. M is a definition. I say this because (b) is defined as being everything that (a) is not. Since (b) = NOT (a), then (a) + (B) = the universe. So, M = everything. What the property dualist is therefore saying is: the universe is comprised of two things: matter and mental events. That is exactly what the substance dualist says. For the PD to say that the universe is composed of matter and there are two properties of matter (a) and (b) is indistinct from the SD saying that the universe is composed of (a) and (b). Why not take it another level and say the Real Universe is comprised of universe stuff (u) and non-universe stuff (n). Therefore, we live in a monistic Real Universe with properties of (u) and (n)? Have we really said anything by doing this? |
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Yahadreas
YHDRS Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Mar 02, 2006 Location: Pattaya, Thailand Total Topics: 118 Total Posts: 4585
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#4
The substance dualist allows for mind without matter. The property dualist requires matter for mind. Imagine a car with a dent in the bonnet. The dent is a property of the car. It requires the car. But the dent can't be reduced to the car. It is its own thing. |
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Hanover
The Highest Rank Possible Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Nov 30, 2008 Location: Atlanta Total Topics: 25 Total Posts: 3387 |
#5
Yahadreas wrote: The substance dualist allows for mind without matter. The property dualist requires matter for mind. Imagine a car with a dent in the bonnet. The dent is a property of the car. It requires the car. But the dent can't be reduced to the car. It is its own thing. I do think an appropriate analogy will be needed to convince me because it's my belief that there isn't anything truly like the relationship between mind and matter as described by the property dualist. That is, the PD's mind/matter relationship is unique and unlike anything else in the world, thus lending support to my theory that the PD is describing something of a different type as opposed to a different property. Your analogy to the dent in the bonnett (which to an American is something a baby wears) is: Matter is to Mental States as a Car is to a Dent. Using that analogy, fill in the blank: Matter is to Physical Bodies as a Car is to a ______. If the word "dent" fills in this blank as well, I suspect something is missing from the analogy, which is that the dent is fully explained by a description of the car, but a mental state is not fully explained by a description of matter, thus the problem with the irreducibility of mental states. By the way, I say "hood," which I suppose is something Little Red Riding Hood wears. |
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180 Proof
kynic  Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Apr 27, 2003 Location: desert of the real ... Total Topics: 131 Total Posts: 7316 |
#6
Hanover wrote: The substance dualist holds that mental events occur in the non-physical realm and all else occurs in the physical realm. My body is in the physical world, but my thoughts are not. This view is in current disfavor and is generally thought to be a religious view. My argument is ... an exercise indistinct from what Descartes did when he described mental and physical events in what he took to be a world of two substances. Define substance. Explain how separate substances "interact" (e.g. mental-to-physical). |
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Yahadreas
YHDRS Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Mar 02, 2006 Location: Pattaya, Thailand Total Topics: 118 Total Posts: 4585
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#7
Hanover wrote: Matter is to Mental States as a Car is to a Dent. Using that analogy, fill in the blank: Matter is to Physical Bodies as a Car is to a ______. If the word "dent" fills in this blank as well, I suspect something is missing from the analogy, which is that the dent is fully explained by a description of the car I don't understand your second comparison. Physical bodies are matter. The dent isn't the car. The car is a substance. A physical substance. The dent is not a substance. It is a property of the car. It is a property of the physical substance. The brain is a substance. A physical substance. The mind is not a substance. It is a property of the brain. It is a property of the physical substance. |
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Hanover
The Highest Rank Possible Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Nov 30, 2008 Location: Atlanta Total Topics: 25 Total Posts: 3387 |
#8
180 Proof wrote: [Define substance. From the Oxford American Dictionary:" Substance: Matter with more or less uniform properties." So, if mental events do not have uniform properties with all other events, then I think it's appropriate to refer to them as different types of substances. Explain how separate substances "interact" (e.g. mental-to-physical). I can't resolve the mind/body interaction problem. The property dualists don't offer any better explanation. They simply say that mental events are caused by physical events in unpredictable ways and they can't identify which physical events will result in particular mental events. When you ask me why I have a certain thought, the PD simply says that it somehow had its origin in material interaction, but it is not reducible to physical events, whatever that means. I think both sides (the substance dualist vs. the physical dualist) just throw their arms up and say, "it just happens." |
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Hanover
The Highest Rank Possible Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Nov 30, 2008 Location: Atlanta Total Topics: 25 Total Posts: 3387 |
#9
Yahadreas wrote: I don't understand your second comparison. Physical bodies are matter. The dent isn't the car. The car is a substance. A physical substance. The dent is not a substance. It is a property of the car. It is a property of the physical substance. The brain is a substance. A physical substance. The mind is not a substance. It is a property of the brain. It is a property of the physical substance. Isn't the dent reducible to and fully explainable by reference to material events? If you agree with that, then you're a reductionist, right? |
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Yahadreas
YHDRS Usergroup: Sponsors Joined: Mar 02, 2006 Location: Pattaya, Thailand Total Topics: 118 Total Posts: 4585
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#10
Hanover wrote: Isn't the dent reducible to and fully explainable by reference to material events? If you agree with that, then you're a reductionist, right? And it could be that we will eventually be able to explain the mind by reference to material events, it just being the case that we haven't discovered how yet. Just as once we were unable to explain lightning and so attributed it to the wrath of Zeus. Edited by Yahadreas on 05/20/09 - 9:21 AM |
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