Debate 18: Truth is prior to language.
Debate 18: Truth is prior to language.

Debate 18: Truth is prior to language.
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Posted Oct 21, 2012 - 3:15 AM:
Subject: Debate 18: Truth is prior to language.
Subject:

Creative and Banno have agreed to debate on the above topic, with Creative taking the affirmative.



Rules:

1. Creative will write the opening argument.
2. Participants are given up to a week between posts.
3. Each post must be at least 200 words, with a maximum of 700 words.
4. There will be 5 rounds each, but this may be extended by agreement.
5. Please no other members can post in this thread except Creative and Banno.

Edited by unenlightened on Oct 21, 2012 - 5:33 AM
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Posted Oct 21, 2012 - 12:52 PM:

I'd like to thank Paul, the PF staff, and all the sponsors/members for this site's creation, moderation, and continued existence. I'd also like to thank unenlightened for facilitating this debate, and Banno for suggesting it.



The approach here is critical. It is necessary to begin by bringing the very idea of conceptual framework and it's subsequent effects/affects to the forefront of this discussion/debate. How one comes to terms with things and the meaning attributed to those terms(the conceptual framework) exemplifies one's own thought/belief on the matter at hand. Language is a very powerful tool. Thus, it is critical to note how "truth" is being put to use here, and how that conception delimits(or not) our subsequent inference, assuming our adherence to it. Most importantly, if we are to cultivate an understanding of what truth is and the role that it plays in thought/belief and language, then we ought take careful note of whether or not the conception in question can take that into account.

If we hold that truth is a property of true statements, and given that true statements cannot be prior to language, then it only seems to follow that truth cannot be prior to language. At first blush, that argument seems sound. I mean, truth is a property of true statements, and statements do require language. However, it simply does not follow that truth cannot be prior to language unless we also depend upon a covert and rather dubious presupposition. Namely, that truth is nothing but a property of true statements. If we adhere to such a scheme, then we are either forced to conclude that true thought/belief cannot exist prior to language or we are forced to explain how true thought/belief can exist without truth. I suspect that the difficulty inherent to the latter will result in maintaining the former. The problems with maintaining that position become obvious when we turn our attention elsewhere and then look back towards the conceptual schema for an explanation thereof.

Current knowledge clearly warrants concluding that, in one form or another, humans existed in the world prior to developing common language. Given that much, if we hold that truth is not prior to language, and that humans existed prior to language, then we are forced to conclude that prelinguistic humans could not have possessed true thought/belief about the world and/or themselves.

Whence come the idea of tools, which entail language, if not from true thought/belief formation? I mean, by what means do we expect to intelligibly explain how it is even possible to invent and use tools, including but not limited to language itself, without the inventor first thinking and/or believing that the materials existed and could be put to use for this or that purpose? How is it even possible to invent a tool, without first thinking/believing that those things are/were there to be named and/or to be put to use for this or that purpose?

All that being said, I anticipate a slightly different approach from Banno. I suspect that I will be expected to argue for what thought/belief consists in/of prior to language. I am prepared to do just that. I can only hope that I will not be expected to give such an account without putting language to use. I further hope that my account will not be conflated with that which is being taken into account. I'll argue that language is not necessary for true thought/belief formation, I'll give examples, and simultaneously drive a wedge between the conversation/debate and that which is being taking into account. This will draw and maintain a distinction between our understanding of truth, which requires language, and the instantiation and/or autonomous use of truth as correspondence that comes as a consequence of our being born naive realists. The latter happens prior to language even though our ability to understand that that is the case does not.
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Posted Oct 22, 2012 - 1:10 PM:

Thanks yet again to all. I look forward to this opportunity to explore with a partner who’s critical skill I admire what has for me been a topic to which I have returned several times.

Creative presents my basic case very neatly, and I will accept it, apart from a small quibble: I’m not keen on using the word properties, preferring to leave it out of the discussion in the hope of also leaving out the considerable baggage it carries.

The argument might then be presented:

Statements cannot be prior to language
It is certain statements that are true
Hence true statements cannot be prior to language

A valid argument. So sensibly, if the argument is to be rejected, one of its premises must be rejected. Creative’s choice is the second; that it is only statements that can be true.

Now the strategy outlined here is, it seems to me, quite strong. If Creative can indeed show that there are other, non-linguistic things, that are true, if the premise of the argument presented above is indeed false, it will follow that truth is prior to language.

If I have understood aright, the candidate being presented for a something that is not linguistic is a true thought/belief. While I agree that thoughts/beliefs are the sort of thing that can be true, I do not agree that thoughts/beliefs are not linguistic.

I want to draw attention to an aspect of thoughts/beliefs. I guess what I am doing here is asking if Creative acknowledges this aspect, and hence if it can be taken for granted. It’s a commonplace, I think, but perhaps it will help us in our explorations. What I have in mind is the observation that beliefs and thoughts are directed. A belief is always a belief that....; a thought always a thought that....; I believe that the kettle is hot; I have the thought (I think) that the kettle is hot. Moreover, if the thought/belief is true, then it is true in virtue of its object being true. My belief that the kettle is hot will be true only if it is true that the kettle is hot. Though/belief has at its core a statement.

I do not what to be misunderstood as advocating the obvious view that since thoughts/beliefs have, as their objects, statements, and as statements are linguistic, that it follows that thoughts/beliefs must themselves be linguistic. But I do want to call into the argument a discussion of the sorts of things that thoughts/beliefs are - if they are things at all.

So , what sort of thing is a thought/belief? Can we shorten this to just belief, at least for the sake of this discussion?
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Posted Oct 24, 2012 - 10:07 PM:

In question is whether or not truth is prior to language. I'm asserting that there is such a thing as pre-linguistic thought/belief, and it can be true. It follows that truth is prior to language or true thought/belief exists without truth. The latter is absurd. Banno, however, has cleverly countered this by method of subsuming thought/belief into language and subsequently claiming that thought/belief has at it's core, a statement; that all thought/belief is linguistic. This denies the distinction between thought/belief and language. That is quite the interesting move, to say the least. The stark difference between our views is now clearly at the forefront of this discussion.

Banno's revised argument rests upon the supposition that all thought/belief has at it's core, a statement. The ground for that was: If we hold that all thought/belief is thought/belief that, and we see that what follows that is always in the form of a statement, then we can conclude that thought/belief always has as it's object a statement. Moreover, if the thought/belief is true, then it is true in virtue of its object being true. That last bit seems rather odd. Are we to conclude that having a statement as it's object in language is equal to having a statement at it's core(as it's elemental constitution)? Surely not! I'd like to direct our attention to a more simple but equally adequate explanation of what's going on when we discuss thought/belief, and more importantly what it tells us about thought/belief itself.

We use language to talk about thought/belief. In doing so, we use statements as a means for setting it out. However, it does not necessarily follow from that that all thought/belief has at it's core a statement. It only follows that all thought/belief, when set out with language, takes the form of a statement. That is nothing more than following the rules of language. It says nothing about what thought/belief consists in/of. That is what is at stake here. Ockham's razor applies.

I put it to you that at their core thought/belief are indistinguishable: All thought/belief share the same elemental constitution. It is comprised of sensory perception, spatiotemporal distinction, and correlation. Those are sufficient for thought/belief. None of that requires language in order to happen. That severs thought/belief from language. Understanding that much allows us to keep in mind that there is a significant difference between how we talk about thought/belief and what it takes to form it.
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Posted Oct 30, 2012 - 1:03 AM:

Well, again, Creative’s argument is very strong. So strong that I must in the main agree with it.

I’m going to go off on a bit of a tangent, but perhaps it will help.

It would seem that the notion of a conceptual framework is important in your account, since you raised it in your first post, second paragraph. I pretty much accept Davidson’s criticism of conceptual framework, and of a tripartite system of thing, conceptual frame and language. Talk about the kettle on my stove is talk about that kettle, not talk about the-kettle-as-it-sits-in-a-conceptual-scheme. Same goes for talk about beliefs and thoughts.

I am also content to ascribe beliefs and thoughts to beasts that do not talk.

You’ve said a bit about what thoughts/beliefs are not, but it remains unclear as to what they are. I must disagree with your suggestion that they are indistinguishable. One might think that all beliefs are thoughts; but then one might act on un-thought beliefs; one beliefs that turning the gas on will heat the kettle, but one need not think it - for certain values of thought and belief. Beliefs are demonstrated by action as well as thought - a thoughtless racist act may betray one’s beliefs, even if one thinks one is not racist.

All this to say that there are a wide range of notions covered by thoughts and beliefs; if you are going to claim that they are identical, best be a bit specific. After all, given that you are telling us is that there are other things besides sentences that can be true; it would be appreciated if you could tell us as clearly as possible what those things are.

I admit to spending some time scratching my head over this one. My reply here is poor. But under the terms of the debate I am obliged to post, and so I post.

Edit: Am I allowed to edit? I just wanted to add, by way of clarification, that I am in no doubt that Creative is wrong.

Edited by Banno on Oct 30, 2012 - 11:11 PM
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Posted Oct 31, 2012 - 10:43 AM:

Thought/belief - at their core - are indistinguishable. It consists of sensory perception, spatiotemporal distinction, and correlation. These are extant within all thought/belief. None are immune. One example to the contrary would negate this claim. However, that is impossible because offering an example requires the use of language. Language requires the attribution of meaning. That is, language entirely consists in/of correlations between symbols and objects. So, let us acknowledge that much and return to the main thrust of my argument. Truth autonomously emerges within all thought/belief formation via the necessary presupposition thereof(as correspondence to fact/reality) that, in part(particularly prior to becoming aware of our own fallibility), causes us to be born as naive realists.

Everyday events as they take place bear witness to(are evidence that support) the notion that correlation is a completely autonomous process. Correlation requires sensory perception and spatiotemporal distinction, and it necessarily presupposes the existence of it's own content. That last bit instantiates the presupposition of truth(as correspondence to fact/reality) within all thought/belief. The presupposition of truth within thought/belief is automonously instantiated. Language acquisition itself shows this rather nicely. When learning that that is called "a tree", the student must first think/believe that that exists prior to his/her correlating the object of perception to this or that vocalization. Correlation happens in a myriad of other ways as well. For instance...

After repetition, young children will often begin to correlate their own crying with their subsequently being picked up and held, and afterwards will sometimes cry with the newly developed expectation thereof. The same holds regarding certain behaviors/sounds having consistent consequences; being rewarded by obtaining this or that item after "ba ba", etc. This holds equally well for some beasties without written/spoken language capable of holding expectations. For instance...

My cats have correlated the sound of the sliding lanai doors to their being able to go outside(they re-cognize the sound). They will come running upon hearing it expecting me to let them out, and will adamantly show their own displeasure if that does not occur. The same behavioral expectation is clearly on display when the bag of catfood rustles or the icecube trays crackle and pop while being emptied of their contents(the one loves icecubes - an odd cat he is). The cats think/believe that they can go outside or that they are about to get fed when they hear these sounds - they have come to expect it through repetitive correlation(re-cognition) and the subsequent confirmation thereof. Their behavior clearly shows that that is the case. Here the skeptic may call "stimulus-response mechanism". Not unless that includes a clear expectation stemming from pre-existing thought/belief that is put on display for all to see. If it does then it is of no consequence to the argument being made. If not, then it is insufficient in it's explanatory power.

What is in question here is whether or not truth is prior to language, and this leads us to what sorts of things can be true/false; a.k.a. - the 'truth bearing' approach. I put it to you that that approach is dogmatic in that it holds that only certain sentences/statements can be true/false and bases this upon the rules of language alone. I strongly assert otherwise. As my argument goes, and the facts bear witness to: Pre-linguistic behavior(s) can be a bearer of truth because it can clearly be a case of true/false thought/belief about fact/reality as it occurs that is being put on display. Again, it takes language(conceptual framework) in order to set these things out in an intelligible and coherent fashion. However, and this is the important part - language is not necessary in order for these events to take place.

This is the distinction between what it takes to talk about thought/belief, and thus truth, and what thought/belief consists in/of.
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Posted Nov 2, 2012 - 2:51 PM:

Here’s the dilemma. On the one hand we have the observation that it is statements that are true, and the conclusion that being true requires language. On the other, the observation that creatures without language have true beliefs, and the conclusion that language is not necessary for truth.

Creative has now set out the notion of language that underpins beliefs begin both true and yet somehow outside of language: language entirely consists in/of correlations between symbols and objects. This view is not uncommon, but it is at best misleading, and at worst wrong. It was something like this view that Wittgenstein most famously criticized in the first few pages of Philosophical Investigations, a critique from which it has never quite recovered.

No need to go over the historical arguments against that view of language here; they are easily found. It will I think be far more instructive to see how it lends support to the view that language is not necessary for truth. Indeed, doing so will present us with a rather nice example of why the notion that language entirely consists in/of correlations between symbols and objects is so misleading.

Here’s the view that has been found wanting: language consists entirely in correlations between symbols and objects. So the kettle on my stove correlates to “the kettle on my stove”; and it is through such correlations that language functions. Every symbol, if it is to have a meaning, has a correlate: some thing to which it corresponds. Moreover, a piece of language will be true precisely and only if that correlation holds. The theory of language brings with it a theory of truth.

If it is true that thee kettle is hot, then it must be true that there is a kettle. If it is true that the fish believes it is about to be fed, then it must be true that there is a belief. Moreover, the belief is reified into a some-thing-in-the-head; that to which “I believe I am going to get fed” correlates in a fish that does not speak English; and it is this some-thing-in-the-head that is both not expressed in words, and yet true. It is this some-thing-in-the-head that is the meaning of “the fish believes it will get fed”.

But the theory can go further. This thing-in-the-head is not alone, but accompanied by a large number of other things-in-the-head. These are various beliefs, thoughts, or whatever that come together to form the conceptual framework of the opening post.

So we end up with a trinity, consisting in the real stuff of the world, a conceptual framework that divvies that stuff up, and finally a language that expresses that conceptual framework. Given this model, it is a simple step to claim that being true can happen at the level of the conceptual framework, and does not need language.

But when called to account, the trinity is found wanting. I asked, in my first post, what sort of thing a belief might be. The answer;
pre-linguistic behavior(s) can be a bearer of truth because it can clearly be a case of true/false thought/belief about fact/reality as it occurs that is being put on display.

Belief is behavior; behavior is the final, real truth-bearer. Here the muddle created by this false view of language turns on itself; my scratching my bum - an observable, forthright behavior - is neither true nor false. It just is. Creative is mistaken.

One advantage of taking the negative side in a debate is that one does not have to prove one’s case; it is enough that one show the error of the affirmative. I have here done so.
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Posted Nov 2, 2012 - 6:27 PM:

I am being reminded somewhat of a starving animal happening upon a tasty morsel, quickly gobbling it all up without ever knowing what was being eaten. Rhetorical effect aside...

My interlocutor has just grossly misrepresented my position, subsequently attacking a strawman and then claiming an empty victory against quite the imaginary opponent. Suffice it for me to say here that a conceptual framework requires language. Prelinguistic thought/belief do not constitute being a conceptual framework.

There is no dilemma here. If true belief is prior to language, then so too is truth. That suffices. There is no chasm between 'the two sides' other than my interlocutor's position being based upon a false presupposition that has already been exposed:That being that only true statements are capable of being true. My entire position cannot be understood without something bordering on thesis, thus the preemptive mention of conceptual framework. That will not happen here, nor need it. Due to the rules of this particular debate, I'd rather not waste time nor available text pointing out where Banno has went astray in his interpretation. Rather, let's return to what is immediately relevant.

What is in question is whether or not truth is prior to language. The criteria for proving my case was set out by myself, and subsequently approved within Banno's initial post with the caveat of his/her taking note to mention the brute strength of the argument. That criteria has been more than satisfied. I have shown that true belief exists prior to language. It only follows that truth is prior to language. Yet, curiously enough, there has been no concession. There has been initial agreement subsequently followed by a weak attempt to subsume thought/belief into language. That was followed by more agreement and then the misattribution of meaning to my own expressions being followed by an attack on that strawman. An unfortunate set of circumstances, indeed.

Suffice it for me to say that there need not be a one to one correspondence between symbol and thing in order for language to solely consist in/of correlations between symbols and things. If that were the case, then every letter of the alphabet would have a corresponding physical object(all terms would be nouns); never mind the terms which tie nouns together, denote singularity/plurality, modify existing phrases, etc. So, I am more than a little disappointed that one would wrongfully attribute such naive and inadequate meaning to my words, for it certainly does not follow from them.

The burden, as far as I'm concerned, still lie on my interlocutors shoulders. Either explain away that which has already all but conceded to; or else concede that true belief formation happens prior language acquisition. If true belief happens prior to language then it does not require language. It only follows that truth is prior to language or true belief exists without truth.

Take your pick.

Edited by creative on Nov 2, 2012 - 7:00 PM
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Posted Nov 3, 2012 - 2:01 PM:

The good old straw man. I might draw attention to this:

I wrote:
I do not what to be misunderstood as advocating the obvious view that since thoughts/beliefs have, as their objects, statements, and as statements are linguistic, that it follows that thoughts/beliefs must themselves be linguistic.


And yet that is exactly what you did.

But never mind; there are other things to talk about. Apparently I have misunderstood you, and we can’t let that pass.

You say that there are beliefs* that are prior to language. How am I to understand this? If all you are claiming is that there are unstated beliefs, then as I have said, I agree. There are innumerable truths that we each take for granted, and yet never explicate. But if that is what you mean, I don’t see it as philosophically interesting.

So here is your concession: If all you mean by “truth is prior to language” is that there are unstated truths, I concede the point. Forgive me for believing you had made some other, interesting, claim.

But I do not believe this is your claim. I believe you are making the much more interesting claim that belief is an example of a thing that is true and yet prior to language. On that basis, I pursued you for an explanation of the sort of thing you believe a belief is. You said they were pre-linguistic behaviors. I pointed out that behaviors are neither true nor false, and so that will not do.

So here we stand. The valid argument is:

Statements cannot be prior to language
It is certain statements that are true
Hence true statements cannot be prior to language

And the question: if you deny the second premise, what sort of things can be true or false besides statements? Behaviors will not do, yet that is what your prelinguistic beliefs reduce to, on your own account.



*I am going to drop your thoughts/beliefs; I haven’t been able to make much sense of it, and you say they are the same anyway.


Edited by Banno on Nov 3, 2012 - 2:10 PM. Reason: mush --> much; but perhaps I should have left it….
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Posted Nov 4, 2012 - 12:30 AM:

Evidently we have misunderstood one another at least in part. I have mistakenly assumed that you were in agreement with my first two posts, based upon your saying so. I assumed that that was true. However, it has become rather clear to me that you have not understood what was being claimed and/or the far-reaching logical consequences thereof. So, due to the need to backtrack a bit, this debate will require increasing the number of posts. During the set up, we both agreed that that may be necessary. So, given the current situation, the centrality of truth, our mutual respect, and the shared interest, hopefully this request will be granted without issue. I suggest increasing the number of posts to eight rather than five. Hopefully that will do. I will be more disciplined in paving the way, guiding the discussion, and providing a clearer explanation of what is being claimed and the consequences thereof. Banno, in turn, must agree to meet me on my own terms and ask for clarity when necessary prior to moving on. This has become necessary. I'm really not interested in anything less.

Quid pro quo.

I'll begin by directly addressing Banno's argument. It is valid, without doubt. However, validity is a measure of correct logical inference(coherence). Coherence is insufficient for truth. An argument can be both valid/coherent and false. Most importantly, logic presupposes truth - not true statements. We're also not asking whether or not true statements are prior to language. You're arguing that truth is not prior to language, and have taken a truth-bearing approach that relies upon the false supposition that only statements can be true. I reject that because it denies the existence of true thought/belief prior to language. Everyday events bear witness to quite the contrary. Upon reflection, this will become clear. Examples can follow.

For clarity...

Contrary to what Banno has just claimed, if one re-reads the thread, it will become clear that it has not been claimed that thought/belief is prelinguistic behavior. Rather, a careful reader will note that I have repeatedly set out what thought/belief consists in/of and behavior was not included. More on the role of behavior in a bit. In the meantime, I have also not said that thought/belief were "the same". I claimed that - at their core - all thought/belief are indistinguishable. The bolded part is pivotal. Fact/reality clearly shows us that true thought/belief formation happens prior to language. Critical thinking skills and language offers us the ability to set out an adequate criterion for what thought/belief formation takes; to define thought/belief, not on an arbitrary whim, but according to becoming aware of what all spoken/written thought/belief requires for it's existence, subsequently removing that which requires language and see if what is left is adequate for thought/belief formation. All thought/belief requires and all prelinguistic thought/belief consists in/of sensory perception, spatiotemporal distinction, and the autonomous correlation between objects of perception and/or one's own state of mind. One exception to the contrary negates the claim. That is the strongest justification possible. Now, these are of a remarkably different nature than what has been said. They have gone without due attention, and I stand beside them.

Back to behavior...

The claim about prelinguistic behavior was that it is truth-bearing. That claim is supported by certain everyday events involving behaviors that clearly put true thought/belief on display for us all to see. If these behaviors show the existence of true thought/belief, and yet still do not constitute being truth-bearing, then the criterion for truth-bearing is utterly inadequate.

Allow me to finish by saying that my position is quite nuanced, and as such it requires initially setting some(perhaps deeply embedded) presupposition aside in order to grasp it in it's totality. It is supported by everyday fact, as it occurs, and a bit of common sense ground. Everyday events will serve as the aforementioned examples and offer adequate observational evidence to verify my claims, falsify the second premiss of Banno's argument, show the inherent inadequacy of the truth-bearing approach, adequately explain how/why "is true" becomes/is redundant, in addition to showing that all predication is correlation but not all correlation is predication.

I'm happy to answer any questions prior to moving onto the examples. If need be here is an equally valid but sound argument. The soundness will be proven via proving that the primary premiss is true. What more can we ask?

True thought/belief formation is prior to language
True thought/belief requires truth
Truth is prior to language
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