MrPootys wrote:
dclements- I dont know about that opening statement. Refering to himself as a sophist, whos does not really have a stance in objective morality(which he is arguing for). His opening post doesnt really outline a general stance, but more or less attacks a single random stance that he himself proposes.--That consequences determine right and wrong. The problem is, I dont think that there is much for Floyd to attack in his next post, because dclements didnt really make much of an argument.

Paul wrote:
It would be interesting if virtue ethics got more play here. MacIntyre's notion of virtue as striving to live the good life of the specific society has always struck me as a clever way of making subjectivity objective.

loveofsophia wrote:


I second the motion of virtue ethics. It pushes things more toward complexity and less toward simplicity but good philosophy tends toward gathering together all the empirical pieces and organizing arguments and perspectives (past and present) off of them, MacIntyre certainly aims in that direction.

Morality is a word with complexities and necessary historical conceptions informing the definition. Subjectivity considered outside objectivity is as silly as objectivity considered outside subjectivity. The relation between the two is were morality lies, not one or the other.

Liked the debate. Thanks guys.

Machiveli wrote:
I think floyd won by default rather than by actively making his case. Interestingly dclements briefly hit upon what looks like a strong line of argument but didnt pursue it.

One could follow a pseudo-Kantian line and argue that either morality is absolute or it does not exist.

The trick is never to argue that objective morality exists but rather that unless a moral code is universal it cannot have any imperative force and hence cannot be a moral code in any meaningfull sense.

A particular culture may have a particular set of beliefs and of course our believer in subjective morality can descibe them but if he admits that what is right in one culture is wrong in another on what basis does the subjectivist call these codes moral at all? They may have psycological force but without imperitive force (which requires universality) what distinguishes a morality from a mere ritual, neurosis or civil law?

To make the distinction between moralities and mere cultural characteristics the subjectivist must argue that things do not just seem right or wrong in a particular culture but actualy ARE right or wrong in a particular culture.

Even if they pull off this amazing feet (perhaps using Paul's virtue ethics idea) the universalist can argue that they have only done so by rediscoving universal morality.

KipBond wrote:
Floyd did a good job in implictly defining morality as those actions which someone prefers (comparing them to "taste" -- after all, how can God say that chocoloate ice cream objectively tastes better than vanilla?). There was no counter to this, unfortunately.

dclements wrote:
In the end Floyd was merely arguing why his morality was 'good' and my morality was 'evil'.

nosos wrote:
Moral preferences and taste preferences are two different kinds of preference, directed at two different objects, in two very different spheres. The fact that there’s no mysterious metaphysical distinction between the two doesn’t make them the same, any more than anger and elation both being emotions makes them the same.