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Debate 8 Discussion: Whether a priori knowledge is possible

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Debate 8 Discussion: Whether a priori knowledge is possible

Paul
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Posted 07/31/05 - 06:47 PM: Subject: Debate 8 Discussion: Whether a priori knowledge is possible	#1
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Analytic
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Posted 08/04/05 - 07:23 AM:	#2
Since Reformed Nihilist has not so far given much argument to defend his position, I'll comment on some of JHBowden's points. Although I agree with his attitude toward a priori knowledge, I think the case is not a simple one to defend. First, the argument that the a priori cannot be shown to be inconsistent because the proof would presuppose what it tries to disprove will not move the antagonist. He can simply evade the attack by claiming that though his proof indeed uses some logic, it is not a priori (because nothing is). Somebody may try to show that there is no such thing as experience-independent knowledge, admitting at the same time that the proof itself is also based on experience-dependent notions. So, RN's strategy (hopefully to be fleshed out later in the debate) to show that no a priori knowledge is possible is not contradictory in itself. The refutation of Mill by JHBowden is not very convincing either as it only amounts to saying that twice five is necessarily ten. But it needs to be shown, in order for this argument to work, that a prioricity and necessity are strongly related notions. The fact that a piece of knowledge is not based on experience (is not justified on drawing on evidence from sensory input) need not mean that it is necessary. As long as this relation is not shown, the argument hangs in the air. But even if the relation between a priori and necessity is established, the problem is that the anti-a-priorist can always question any particular statement's necessity. Finally, I don't understand the example of the paragraph on 'intuitive induction'. That example is one where the piece of knowledge (that no object is red and blue on all of its surface) is obtained, essentially, through sensory input. If the a priori is that which needs no sensory justification, then the example is ill-chosen because it does involve sensory perception. And again, the example seems to shift the debate toward discussing 'necessity' but the original topic is 'a priori'.

Paul
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Posted 08/04/05 - 09:02 AM:	#3
JHBowden says "one could attempt to show how a sharp a priori/a posteriori distinction is misguided. W.V. Quine's effort remains the most influential attempt to do so." I haven't read a whole lot of Quine so I may be missing somewhere that he's argued this. His more famous argument though, so far as I know, is against the analytic/synthetic distinction in Two Dogmas of Empiricism. I don't recall him attacking the a priori/a posteriori distinction there (though it's been a couple years since I last read it). It's my impression that Quine wants to reject the analytic a priori, and leave us with the synthetic a priori (I recall him expressing a preference for the synthetic somewhere). Hopefully someone can clarify Quine's position in this for me. Edited by Paul on 08/04/05 - 09:07 AM

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Posted 08/04/05 - 11:06 AM:	#4
Well, from his post it seems Reformed Nihilist is trying to reorganize the battlefield: whereas JHBowden clearly wants to concentrate on the content of mathematical statements, claiming that that content is experience-independent, RN is concentrating on the genesis and the physiological basis of mathematical behaviour. But I'm not sure if his arguments do indeed what he wants them to do. First, the fact that mathematical notions have been developed gradually in history does not mean that they have been developed inductively from sensory data. It's very well possible that they are 'second-order' notions needed to organize higher-level mental operations in an effective way without themselves having any empirical content or depending on such. If so, then although they are 'parasitic' on the empirically contentful notions which they organize, they are a priori in the sense JHBowden specified. Second, the fact that mathematical behaviour is located in the brain is a red herring because this particular fact has nothing to do with the question whether mathematical concepts are a priori or not. Edited by Analytic on 08/04/05 - 11:10 AM

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Posted 08/04/05 - 12:21 PM:	#5
Paul wrote: His more famous argument though, so far as I know, is against the analytic/synthetic distinction in Two Dogmas of Empiricism. I don't recall him attacking the a priori/a posteriori distinction there (though it's been a couple years since I last read it). It's my impression that Quine wants to reject the analytic a priori, and leave us with the synthetic a priori (I recall him expressing a preference for the synthetic somewhere). Quine does indeed reject the whole of a priori. To him even mathematics and logic are a posteriori, and hence he accepts only a posteriori synthetic statements. I think he does argue against a priority in Two Dogmas, but I do not remembe it by heart. Nonetheless, rarely philosophers accept Kant's synthetic a priori, and Quine was no exception. ~M~
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Prince_James
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Posted 08/19/05 - 11:28 PM:	#6
A question: Should this debate slow or end, or should the participants acquisce to this, might it be possible for me to join in on the side that a priori knowledge is false? I believe I have some insights which are not being presented and which could ultimately enrich the debate, hence my desire to volunteer.

Jonesy
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Posted 08/27/05 - 10:21 PM:	#7
What does it mean when I know for a fact, if God exists, God knows more than me, has better judgement, a better idea of justice, and is more powerful than me? Would this be considered a priori or a posteriori?
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shrubbery
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Posted 08/27/05 - 10:57 PM:	#8
That would be a posteriori, Jonesy. You only know that God would have to be this or that way by learning that concept of God. That you require the experience of learning the concept means that it can't be a priori (prior to experience). One might consider it analytic, however.

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Posted 08/28/05 - 12:11 AM:	#9
That would be a posteriori, but for more complex reasons than the one shrubbery gave, although that's a good start. The name "God" is used to describe a being with certain properties. Sometimes, it is used to describe a being that doesn't necessarily have those properties (having better judgment, for example) by definition, for example it might just be the creator of the universe. In this case, you would have to determine a posteriori that, given that what you call "God" exists, it has these properties which it doesn't have by definition. If you have an apple with a worm inside, then that isn't necessary by definition. Something can be an apple but have no worm inside. But if you want to know if your apple has a worm inside, if it has that additional property, you are looking for a posteriori knowledge. On the other hand, if God is defined as something that has precisely the properties you've given, then it would be a priori that he has all those qualities, since it is true by definition (it is analytic too, but the main thing is that it is not dependent on experience), but you'd be cheating because if you posit a collection of properties, there's no reason a priori why the collection of properties refers, i.e. it is unrealistic to say that the existence of God is a given. There is a caveat to be made. Since mathematical objects and fictional objects can be treated independently of this world, their existence is possible given just a consistent collection of properties, i.e. a description or definition. This is because the mathematical things we study or the fictional characters we make up are whatever we want to study or make up, and they don't really affect this world. God would have been someone who created this world, and interacts with this physical world, and we know that there is less in the physical world than we can think of, so just defining God wouldn't work to give him existence. It couldn't be known a priori.
"The only reason we die... is because we accept it as an inevitability." -- Stewie "To enslave nuance to dogma is folly." -- Lord Hillyer

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Posted 08/28/05 - 08:22 AM:	#10
"What does it mean when I know for a fact, if God exists, God knows more than me, has better judgement, a better idea of justice, and is more powerful than me? Would this be considered a priori or a posteriori?" It depends on the god and how one claims to know it. If someone was like, "ooh! I directly experienced a god in a religious experience! Yay!" then it would be proper to call the so-called knowledge of the god a posteriori. However, if someone tries to argue that we know a single god necessarily exists in all possible worlds, we'd have an argument on our hands that if successful would constitute a priori knowledge.
"It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it." -- Joseph Joubert (1754-1824) "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!" -- Isaiah 5:20 "What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out, which is the exact opposite." -- Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)

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