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Debate 8: Whether a priori knowledge is possible

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Debate 8: Whether a priori knowledge is possible

Paul
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Posted 07/31/05 - 06:45 PM: Subject: Debate 8: Whether a priori knowledge is possible	#1
The topic of this debate is whether a priori knowledge is possible. Some philosophers, so-called radical empiricists, say that all knowledge is a posteriori (derived from experience). Others argue that some knowledge is fully independent from experience (a priori). Kant threw another twist into the debate by making a distinction between analytic a priori and synthetic a priori. Later the picture was further muddled as Quine attacked this distinction while Kripke proposed analytic a posteriori knowledge. Here JHBowden will be making the case for the possibility of a priori knowledge, while Reformed Nihilist makes the case against it. Debate Rules Number of rounds: 6 Post Length: No more than 2,500 words (for the sake of the readers). No less than 300 words. The opening post to start the debate must be at least 500 words. No quote tags. You may discuss this debate in the discussion subforum thread. Edited by Paul on 08/06/05 - 08:37 AM

JHBowden
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Posted 07/31/05 - 06:52 PM:	#2
In this debate I am defending the possibility of a priori knowledge. I first commit to the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, providing several intuitive examples designed to create a feel for the inquiry's motivation. To ensure we're never bogged down in irrelevant matters, I craft a minimal conception of the a priori, unloading a few items commonly associated with but not essential to the idea. Viewing the terrain, several introductory remarks follow concerning common distinctions employed in discussions involving Reason. I conclude this opening post by identifying several targets in my line of sight. Establishing the very idea of a priori knowledge and defending the view that humans have such knowledge are my objectives. After all, if there is no such thing as a priori knowledge, there is no point demonstrating humans have attained it. Of the several ways of treating a priori knowledge, I will develop an intuitionist, traditionalist view during the debate. 1. The a priori/a posteriori distinction We base much of our knowledge empirically. One might perceive a roll of toilet paper, read about the last Sox game in the paper, or remember hanging out with friends last weekend. We call this kind of warrant (and knowledge) a posteriori. As Kant remarked in the first critique, even though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. Imagine a scientist working in a laboratory observing paramecia. He counts five in one half of his view, looks to the other half and counts seven, and then counts again and counts thirteen. We may say the scientist made an error counting, a paramecium reproduced, or that one swam away during the initial counting. We never say, however, that the scientist "proved" that 5+7=13. We simply do not justify our mathematical, logical, and ethical norms empirically. We call knowledge of this type a priori, meaning that its justification condition does not depend on evidence from sensory experience. Since we have actual a priori knowledge ( "2+2=4", modus ponens, etc.), it follows from the actuality of a priori knowledge that a priori knowledge is possible. 2. A note on justification We commonly assume a belief has epistemic justification iff it is more likely to be true than its denial. While how much more likely is a subject of debate, philosophers almost unanimously agree that justification does not require certainty. One does not need infallible beliefs, an absence of psychological doubt, or logical entailment to have a justified belief. I note these considerations apply to a priori knowledge. 3. A minimal conception of the a priori Since I sketched the features included in a priori knowledge, let us examine features that do not necessarily apply to a priori knowledge to prohibit Ignoratio Elenchi from entering our neighborhood. A minimal conception of the a priori does not require irrevisable beliefs, self-evident beliefs, or innate concepts. A belief is epistemically irrevisable iff it would not be epistemically rational to give up that belief under any circumstances, including circumstances where the world is radically different. A minimal conception of the a priori does not require this; a priori warrant may change, for instance, as a purely theoretical system is expanded. A belief is self-evident iff it is justified but does not derive its justification from anything other than itself. A priori knowledge in itself does not need this. An individual may reject foundationalism in favor of coherentism with respect to justification, arguing a priori beliefs are justified through each other. Some foundationalists may not appeal to the self-evidence of basic a priori beliefs, but perhaps to a kind of intellectual intuition or a state of understanding. Hence, an attack on a priori knowledge focused exclusively on self-evidence will lack generality. Perhaps it is the case that all beliefs that are justified a priori must include innate concepts, but in the absence of argument, there is no reason to suppose why this must be so. We are concerned with the conditions of the a priori justification of beliefs, not their causal origins. 4. Preliminary distinctions Two other basic distinctions are important when thinking about a priori knowledge -- the metaphysical distinction between necessity and contingency, and the semantic distinction between analytic and synthetic truth. Why are these relevant to this debate? One can ram through different conclusions from arguments about how these distinctions bear on the a priori/a posteriori distinction. Traditionally understood, a proposition is necessarily true iff it is not possibly false; in the language of Leibniz, necessarily true propositions are true in all possible worlds. Contingently true propositions are true in some possible worlds but not in others; put another way, contingently true propositions are true propositions that are possibly false. Analytically true propositions are true by virtue of the meanings of the constituent terms or concepts, the thrust of the idea being analytically true propositions cannot be denied without self-contradiction. Synthetic truths, such as "Jason Bowden is a scientific genius," do not entail self-contradiction upon denial. 5. Looking Forward on D My defense of a priori knowledge will dispose of the conceptions of the a priori found in psychologism, pragmatism, linguisticism, Wittgensteinworshipism, and holism. I'll also attack the view that accepts a traditional conception of the a priori, but defends a stance of skepticism about whether any human can attain such knowledge.
"It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it." -- Joseph Joubert (1754-1824) "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!" -- Isaiah 5:20 "What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out, which is the exact opposite." -- Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)

Reformed Nihilist
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Posted 08/03/05 - 09:24 AM:	#3
As there seems to be no takers, I will try my hand. Please excuse my non-scholarly style. The question at hand is "Is a priori knowledge possible?". I think it is first important to address the issue of possibility. In the strictest sense, that which is possible is that which is not self-contradictory. So using this sense of the word, in order to prove my point I would have to show that the notion of a priori knowledge self-contradictory. But I think that we may also say anything that if something is not reasonably possible it would be considered not possible by a reasonable person. I assume my interlocutor is a reasonable person, so let it suffice to say I must show that a priori knowledge is not reasonably possible, rather than logically self-contradictory. Next we must explore the daunting, but important question "what is knowledge?". Now here I think I shall take a different tack than offered by many. We can try to create a model based on individual subjective knowledge, or we can create a model based on the essential nature of human knowledge. To create a model of the prior would be both futile and meaningless. The only subjective knowledge I can speak of is my own, and I cannot say if it is similar in any way to any knowledge possessed by anyone else. When we wish to create a rational model for physical events, we choose to describe things in terms of what is essential to physical things (the laws of physics). In order to create a coherent and rational theory about knowledge, surely I must also base this theory on evidence I can show. We must also be clear on what a priori means. By a priori, we mean knowledge we possess completely independent of experience. Mathematics is one of the most common examples of a priori knowledge. We know 2+2=4 without needing 2, +, = or 4 to refer to any experience. Lastly, I think as well it is important to make a distinction between what is subjectively reasonable and what is objectively reasonable. What is subjectively reasonable is what "makes sense to me". What is objectively reasonable is what meets the accepted standards of reasonableness set forth by society (in this case science). According to these standards, the most reasonable model of the mind is that it is a function of the brain. Knowledge is a description of a function of the mind, therefore knowledge is something that can be objectively modeled as a subfunction of brain activity. As such, it is open to physical, psychological, and evolutionary analysis.. What I intend to show is that when considered from an scientific model, even though our understanding of the human mind and it's subfunction knowledge is imperfect, it is only reasonable to conclude that a priori knowledge is objectively unevidenced. What will be evident that a priori knowledge is in fact an attempt to plug the holes of our imperfect understanding of our own knowledge with what some call intuition, but I call self-affirming speculation.
Nobody ever became a famous philosopher by being a champion of ecumenical hybridism Daniel Dennett Freedom Evolves

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Posted 08/03/05 - 08:15 PM:	#4
It is my pleasure that Reformed Nihilist stepped up to the plate on such short notice. While one could have trolled the egosphere for Rand cultists to debate me (they ridiculously deny the a priori in their affirmation of "Reason"), my preference is to discuss philosophy without the recalcitrant, confused fanaticism. Reformed Nihilist presented a few ideas; some are more formidable than others. One was a suggestion to show that the a priori was self-contradictory. Also mentioned was a distinction between types of reasonability. Most importantly, the post sketched how knowledge should be open to physical, psychological, and evolutionary analysis. 1. On demonstrating the a priori is self-contradictory I advance that trying to show the a priori is self-contradictory is a doomed strategy. Success here defeats itself; one would be using a priori knowledge about contradiction to somehow show a priori knowledge is self-contradictory. However, one could attempt to show how a sharp a priori/a posteriori distinction is misguided. W.V. Quine's effort remains the most influential attempt to do so. 2. Explaining away the a priori Reformed Nihilist introduced a distinction above between "subjective" and "objective" reasonability. If I understand correctly, subjectively known beliefs cannot be shown to be similar to those held by other knowers. Knowledge justified objectively, in contrast, can demonstrably and publically be shown. Can the truths of mathematics and logic be shown empirically? John Stuart Mill answered in the affirmative. Mill adopted the view that the truths of logic and mathematics are not necessary or certain. Supposedly such truths were inductive generalizations based on an extremely large number of instances. My counting example above confutes this. If I count two pairs of five objects, I necessarily have ten; this belief is not something subject to empirical falsification. If we reject Mill, does that mean logic and mathematics are all in the head? Theodore Lipps wrote in 1880 that "logic is either a physics of thinking or it is nothing." So we might interpret modus ponens like this: "given two propositions p and q, everyone is so constituted that if he believes that p is true, and that p implies q, he cannot help upon reflection of these two propositions to believe that q is true." However, an unreasonable individual would be all it takes in this circumstance to show the theory is false. But one could always settle for a radical conventionalism that says what we accept as proof always involves an individual decision to accept or reject it at each step. 3. Forms of Life Reformed Nihilist presented the idea that our knowledge is something open to physical, psychological, and evolutionary interpretation. In many respects, this notion is similar to one advanced by Wittgenstein. With the radical conventionalist, Wittgenstein claimed that mathematical truth and necessity arise in us; human nature and forms of life explain mathematical truth and necessity. In the Remarks, Wittgenstein put forth that general agreement about what is called counting, inferring, calculating is needed for counting, inferring, and calculating to be what they are at all. Wittgenstein also believed that we have no clear conception of what the opposite of such activities would be. With no clear concept of how it is to be otherwise, why should there be a concept at all? Was Wittgenstein trying to have it both ways, attacking the Platonism of Frege and early Russell while affirming some practices are unintelligible to us? Wittgenstein believed it is possible for a person to be rational but at the same time not playing our "game." For instance, upon being ordered to "Add 2", someone may proceed like 2, 4, 6, ... 998, 1000, 1004, 1008...., feeling it natural to "Add 2" this way. As we expand the implications of behaving like in Wittgenstein's perverse examples consistently, the understanding of the possibilities diminishes. The lesson is that if our world had been different, our forms of life would have been different. Wittgenstein emphasized our natural reactions and practices are facts of natural history -- physical, physiological, and psychological. While we don't know how it is to be like the individuals in Wittgenstein's examples, Wittgenstein wanted to hammer home the contingency of our efforts to calculate, infer, et cetera. While I reject this view, I'll stop here to ensure I argue against Reformed Nihilist's view and not some man of straw. 4. Intuitive Induction Plato speculated that to acquire knowledge of necessary truth we should turn away from this world and toward the eternal and the immutable. To avoid excessive controversy, we can also look at a view Aristotle advanced, arguing one way of obtaining this kind of knowledge was to consider particular things of this world. As Duns Scotus put it, the perception of particular things is only the "occasion" of acquiring the knowledge; even if the senses are deceived, the intellect would be not. For instance, one might first look around at blue things and red things. Then begins a process of abstraction -- we come to understand what it means for a thing to be red or blue. Then we intuitively apprehend relations holding between properties, perhaps the fact that red excludes blue. Once we have acquired this intuitive knowledge, ipso facto, we know the truth of reason expressed by, "Necessarily, everything is such that if it is red then it is not blue." Why deny such a truth is known? While some call this self-affirming speculation, I'm content at the moment to call it intuitive induction, following W.E. Johnson. Though Aristotle called the process "induction," he was getting at something very different than enumerative induction. No doubt my ideas about these topics would greatly benefit from a study of Husserl, but for the time being, this will have to suffice. Edited by JHBowden on 08/03/05 - 08:30 PM
"It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it." -- Joseph Joubert (1754-1824) "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!" -- Isaiah 5:20 "What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out, which is the exact opposite." -- Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)

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Posted 08/04/05 - 09:44 AM:	#5
Let me clarify my position on a priori knowledge as self-contradictory. I do not assert that it is logically self-contradictory, so I think we can dispose with those particular lines of inquiry. I do however assert that using any acceptable notions of reasonable, one cannot reasonably say that a priori knowledge is possible I am glad to see JH Bowden has not stooped to stretch the definition of possibility beyond its context. Certainly we can agree that if pink unicorns are not reasonably possible, then neither is a priori knowledge. To address what I think is the heart of our disagreement on this matter: JH Bowden believes that the non-empirical nature of mathematics proves that mathematics is not developed inductively. I am sorry to say that it doesn't follow. I certainly do not claim analytic systems like mathematics aren't mostly consistent. That would be contrary to all evidence, and thus unreasonable. If we look at primitive examples of counting, we can see that humanity developed these basic concepts, as the environment demanded them to. This is not surprising, as it is a consistently reasonable explanation for most other phenomena that has occurred in the biological world. It is called evolution. Now I think we first need to establish that calculating, mathematical behavior is in fact something that can be accounted for in a neurophysiological model. In order to do this we need only look to the angular gyrus, and specifically Broadman's Area 39. It is well documented that damage to this area of the brain causes a condition known as acalculia. Acalculia is simply the inability to perform mathematical calculations. Considering this evidence, I think it is safe to say that mathematical behavior does in fact have a reasonable neurophysiological explanation. Next, we should consider the development of mathematics socially. Did the development of the ability to perform basic mathematical behaviors occur independent of environmental pressures? Let us look at the Dammara Tribe of Africa, when first discovered by western society in the 19th century, they were able to understand the equivalence of two sticks of tobacco to one sheep. Interestingly, they could not formulate the equivalence of four sticks of tobacco to two sheep. There is also evidence that wolves can perform basic enumeration in order to determine the sizes of opposing packs, and thus their potential threat, while many other species cannot. This evidences that environmental pressures drive even the simplest mathematical behaviors. It seems that all the evidence available to us points to the fact that mathematical behavior is in fact a mechanism developed in response to environmental and social pressures. Environmental and social pressures are surely examples of experience, so I cannot see how we can reasonably accept JH Bowden's claim that knowledge can be developed prior to experience. Now, having established clearly that mathematical behavior is in fact a product of experience, the question remains "Is it possible to have any knowledge that is not the product of experience?". I can find no behavioral expression of knowledge that can be evidenced to be the product of anything other than experience. In fact, I have a question for JH Bowden: What is the source of (alleged) a priori knowledge if it is not experience?
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Posted 08/06/05 - 11:00 AM:	#6
This reply makes a few distinctions in the world of Scientism, examines the relationship between necessity and behavior, elaborates upon the fundamental distinctions of the debate, and ends in a few criticisms of a constructivist interpretation of the a priori. 1. Revolutionary and Reformist Naturalism Much of the debate has shifted towards a view emphasizing naturalism. The objective, as I understand it, is to show how a scientific conception of the entire epistemological enterprise excludes anything spooky like colors, properties, meanings, and so forth. I advance that epistemology has something to say when it comes to the study of cognition. Contrary viewpoints diverge to different degrees. For instance, some would maintain that the traditional problems of epistemology should be resolved a posteriori within the web of empirical belief. Stronger positions include the ideas that epistemological problems should be resolved by the natural sciences of cognition, or even that the traditional problems of epistemology are illegitimate and misconceived. If this is indeed the desired strategy, I definitely have more to say in a future reply. 2. Necessity and Behavior Some have argued that the notions of analyticity, necessity, a priori, and synonymy form a "circle of intensional terms" whose utility remains in doubt until we obtain some clear and independent criterion for their application. In light of this, it is sometimes recommended that our beliefs collectively, without the a priori/a posteriori distinction, should face the tribunal of experience. As one can predict, I'm not sympathetic. What does Faygo Root Beer have to do with the Peano axioms, I wonder? One argument goes as follows. All of the items in the circle of intensional terms can be explicated only with reference to necessity. We'd often like to say if a given term applies to a thing in a language, a certain other term in the language necessarily applies to that thing. However, the argument goes, there is no reliable way of telling, judging from observation of another's behavior, whether if a given term applies to a thing it necessarily applies to another. Moreover, it is not possible, by reference to linguistic behavior, to say what it is for a language to be such that, given two terms, if a term applies to a thing in that language it necessarily applies to another. The problem, as Chisholm and probably a few others have noticed, is that the argument does not imply the desired conclusion, that is, the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, and the distinction between a priori and the a posteriori, are untenable. Such an argument requires at least an additional premiss to make the argument valid, i.e. a philosophical generalization concerning what conditions must obtain if the distinctions are to be tenable. I'm at a loss to understand how such a generalization could be defended to salvage the argument. 3. Distinctions, again. If one accepts there is necessary a posteriori knowledge or contingent a priori knowledge, one ipso facto accepts the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. While I'm skeptical of Kripke's argument about this, if one accepts it, one accepts the possibility of a priori knowledge. While our knowledge begins with experience, it doesn't follow that it arises out of experience. Knowing that red excludes blue is something justified simply by being aware of and comparing both properies. It isn't like one collects all of the red things and all of the blue things in our universe and compares them, as if we could find a region of space simultaneously only blue and only red. This is an example of synthetic a priori knowledge. The a posteriori/a priori distinction again is an epistemological distinction concerning the justification condition of knowledge. The necessity/contingency distinction is metaphysical, and the analytic/synthetic distinction is semantic. That some individual can't see because of brain damage, for instance, has no bearing on whether the visual beliefs of others can be justified a posteriori. The same applies with thinking. I've argued that mathematical claims are necessary and are known a priori. They aren't contingent and their justification has no epistemological dependence upon experience. For instance, I would not pay you, the venerable reader, $50 with two $20 dollar bills on the ground that I discovered that 20+20=50 while counting blueberries. This is a preanalytic fact from our lives. If one disagrees with me, I'd like do business sometime. Empirical-minded philosophers of the early 20th century handled this by claiming the truths of Reason were simply freely made stipulations we make. Ayer noted that 2x5=10 because we never allow it to be anything else. C.I.Lewis remarked that whatever was a priori was necessary, not because it compelled the mind's acceptance, but precisely because it did not! If experience were other than it is, Lewis argued, a definition and its classification might be inconvenient, fantastic, or useless, but it could not be false. 4. Against Conventionalism: A few observations Why do I disagree with individuals like Lewis, Wittgenstein, about philosophical ideas many now feel are obsolescent? One, our nature may explain why we accept a set of axioms compared to another consistent set, but our nature cannot make a set of inconsistent axioms true. We can't pooh-pooh consistency. Secondly, there is the problem of finitism. Human practice, actual and potential, only goes so far. However, we have many justified mathematical beliefs that involve the idea of infinity. Lastly, our explanation of the world around us often involves a priori beliefs. Take a Turing machine that has its input set to '111' so it never stops, and run it for two weeks. The explanation why the machine does not stop involves the mathematical fact that the machine with that program never halts on the input, together with empirical facts (e.g. the program is instantiated, etc.). Edited by JHBowden on 08/06/05 - 12:04 PM
"It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it." -- Joseph Joubert (1754-1824) "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!" -- Isaiah 5:20 "What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out, which is the exact opposite." -- Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)

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Posted 08/08/05 - 01:34 PM:	#7
I am finding it difficult to respond, as there has been little attempt from my interlocutor to refute my claims. Neither has there been a concise explanation of what a priori knowledge is, or why we should believe (against all evidence to the contrary) that is exists. I hope that we will be given these, and also possibly an example of a priori knowledge that unlike "2+2=4" is not so easily explained by empirical means. As a foundation for my argument, I am certainly taking a moderate naturalist-like approach, although I hope that my arguments will be taken on their own merit rather than addressed as if Quine were making them. Certainly there is nothing "spooky" about colors, properties and the like. We have some very acceptable psychological explanations for such things. How should we determine whether a priori knowledge exists? I can only see two directions to turn: Evidence and intuition. Now surely intuition is unacceptable for two reasons. First, it begs the question: "I know without evidence that I have knowledge that cannot be evidenced". Secondly, in the realm of the social world in which we live, if we are to be convinced of the existence of something, we must be shown that it exists. Intuition, as I understand, it is a purely subjective phenomenon and thus cannot show us anything. So if intuition is unacceptable, we are left with evidence. I am unaware of any evidence of the existence of a priori knowledge. Is there value in epistemology? Certainly. We ask what we mean by knowledge and decide if the notion entails any unpleasant inconsistencies. We must realize the limits of epistemology though. It is still a modeling of observables about the category of knowledge. When it leads us to conclude that what is empirically evidenced and observable is incomplete, it looses its value. How can we have reason without a priori knowledge? This is the question that seems to be at the center of the debate. The problem is that this frames the issue falsely. Reason doesn't spring from knowledge. Knowledge was two sources: experience and reason. Reason is the product of a system of chemical reactions within the brain. Experience is the variables outside the brain that cause changes to the system. With our current understanding of the neurological basis of thought, I don't see the value in a notion like a priori knowledge. When Man's mind was nothing but a shadow called a soul, believing that reason and intuition were immutable and necessary properties of the mind was the best model available. This is no longer the case. Just as Aristotle's four elements was the best explanation available at one time but is no longer true, we must accept that a priori has no explanatory value that has not been exceeded by divergent logics, cognitive science, psychology or evolution. As a postscript, I certainly wouldn't exchange my $50 bill for two $20 bills, but I do recomend trying this exchange with an afluent 5 year old if your ethics will allow it. I suspect he will accept the deal. Edited by Reformed Nihilist on 08/08/05 - 01:42 PM
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Posted 08/08/05 - 07:10 PM:	#8
We are discussing the possibility of a priori knowledge, the kind of knowledge of which the justification condition does not epistemically depend on evidence from sensory experience. Since I've established the difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge and defused any efforts to muddle the distinction, the objective of this reply is to examine Reformed Nihilist's proposed distinction between "subjective" and "objective" knowledge. When we examine the idea of evidence, we find it is unintelligible without a knowing subject. Reformed Nihilist could stick with the importance of evidence and claim the perspective of the knowing subject matters with regard to justification, but this would undercut his arguments about public "evidence" and things being "shown." Or -- Reformed Nihilist could stick to the arguments about how beliefs like modus ponens and 2+2=4 are actually a result of causal processes, biting the bullet and putting forth a theory of justication that specifies in non-epistemic terms when a belief is justified. 1. Deduction and Science. "Mathematics is the language with which God has written the universe." -- Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) Justified mathematical beliefs, such as "there are infinitely many primes," "the square root of two is irrational," "the set of real numbers does not have the same cardinality as the set of natural numbers," and so forth do not depend on sensory input. They are justified a priori. I cannot count or calculate for an infinite amount of time and justify the claims empirically. Should we consider our mathematical beliefs useful fictions we can't help but to believe given our biological heritage that evolved over millions of years? If so, the state-of-affairs would be like a man standing on a tree branch while attempting to saw it off. Our scientific worldview requires the objectivity of deductive procedures. Science has a distinguished epistemic status, yes, but it does not have a privileged epistemic status. 2. Mental Access Arguing against a priori knowledge by asserting the fallibility or non-existence of introspection is a faulty strategy. I first note that I have a soul, though we usually use the modern language and call it a mind or a consciousness. Now, it must be the case that if one knows a proposition, then the proposition is true. However, this shouldn't be confused with the idea that if one knows that something is true, then one's belief of it must be true, in the sense that one's believing it entails or guarantees its truth (i.e. only beliefs that cannot be false constitute knowledge). The first notion is correct; the second is not. We're fallible, yes, but we still have justified beliefs. Others would like to go farther and deny we have any access to the states of our own minds, souls, or whatever one would prefer to call them at all. Often a private language argument is invoked to support this claim. We have access to the contents of acts such as beliefs, desires, emotions, and perceptions. In Meinong's terminology, such attitudes are "self-presenting" and constitute their own evidence; the acts in question present themselves directly to the selves whose acts they are. Who would object to such a view? Armstrong once thought up a brain technician who has a perfect understanding of the correlation between states of a person's brain and experiences. The idea is that one can determine the states of one's mind from the brain patterns alone. However, one asks how the technician knows that seeming to see something green is correlated with a specific brain state. If the technician knows the correlation between the experience and the brain state, either the technician or another person has been situated to correlate his experiences with his brain states. If the technician has a "perfect understanding," it appears he has privileged access after all. Secondly, look at the problem of non-comparative description. Some think if we have nothing public to compare our experiences with, then statements about experiences are either empty and/or do not express knowledge. The thesis supposes the idea that all judgments are comparative which has absurd consequences for predicative belief. If I believe that 'x is P', then the theory suggests we necessarily compare it to a second thing and assert 'x' resembles the second thing. However, we don't derive that 'x resembles y' unless we can believe noncomparatively that 'y is P'. 3. The Constitution of Evidence Various forms of intuition, along with imagination and thought, render evidence possible. Our experience is not a wild phantasmagoria. The manifold of sensation is articulated with unities and pluralities. Objects cannot be given in sense or imagination alone, but through sensible intuition, allowing a consciousness to be directed toward an object. Intuitive induction, called eidetic intuition by some, allows us to grasp species like green or square. (There is no such thing as a perfect square in the world.) Moreover, we need at least memory, imagination, and thought to generate a hypothesis that we can draw inferences from. It appears evidence, while humble at a first look, seems to involve a lot. If one wants to refer to an objective state of sensible objects, one needs to refer to categorical forms using formal words like "the," "a," "some," "many," "few," "two," "is," "no," "that," "and," "or," et cetera. One only understands these forms through categorial intuition, which forms the basis for much of our a priori knowledge. If one believes in evidence, one needs the very ideas that justify a priori knowledge. 4. Externalism and Scientism Well, maybe one wants to argue that "objective knowledge" is an external matter. There is a difference between genetically explaining beliefs from a descriptivist standpoint and justifying them. An explanation for why we talk about why red is not blue may not necessarily be a justification in a particular instance. If one wanted to wiggle out by arguing for truth-conduciveness of belief-forming processes, I think one simply has the wrong idea. By-passing the subject's perspective is unwise; we can't confuse truth for what we take to be truth-indicative. Some would argue that the sciences of cognition can explain action without positing beliefs, desires, and so forth. Since beliefs and such are not smoothly reducible to neurophysiological states, it is recommended we should jettision the "folk psychology." I would argue such a position self-destructs since it cannot have an intelligible account of assertion. Edited by JHBowden on 08/09/05 - 12:13 PM. Reason: slight grammar change
"It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it." -- Joseph Joubert (1754-1824) "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!" -- Isaiah 5:20 "What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out, which is the exact opposite." -- Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)

Reformed Nihilist
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Posted 08/13/05 - 04:01 PM:	#9
Well, it seems as if we are getting somewhere. JHBowden asserts the primacy of the subject in knowledge, and stresses the alleged intuitive and subjective nature of justification. Let's start there. On Justification. What exactly does it mean for a belief to be justified? It has been rightly noted by JHBowden that it needn't mean logical necessity or indubitable psychological certainty. Must we rely upon coherence to other pieces of knowledge? This of course leads to a foundationist regression. Some would end this regress by arbitrarily asserting a starting point; equivocating meaning (a communicative social tool) with a priori justification, or confusing analytic truths with a priori knowledge. We can see why neither of these notions of justification are satisfactory. Consider the claim 7+5=13. We can agree that this is a claim that is unjustified, but cannot be falsified directly via experience. If I claim that it is in fact rationally necessarily true, how would a reasonable man respond? They would say that it is not. That appeal to a reasonable man is how we define justification. On Reason and its source. How does it happen that we develop a sense of reason? Is it not innate? Piaget creates a model of developmental psychology that answers that question satisfactorally. Basic reflexes, which could not be construed as knowledge, develop through interaction with ones environment into 'constucted schemes'. These eventually develop into symbols and complex abstractions. These complex abstactions and their relationships are what we call reason. On the problem of universals. What are these abstractions that Piaget speaks of? They are universalizations of specific experiences that are organized in a certain fashion. Are they knowledge? No, but knowledge can be derived from them. Experience is organized using these models, and determinations are made regarding the truths of matters, and when these determinations are coherent with our observations and other coherent models, we call this knowledge. On perspective. If there is a truth that is in fact self-evident, the it would be the truth of subjective experience. Any individual can claim rightly "I experience" with certainty. The problem comes with making a distinction between what is experienced and what is known. How do we do this? We test our experience against others. Does that mean that no belief can be considered knowledge without testing it against others? That would be an over-simplification. As long as our modeling of abstractions are socially verified, we have no reason to doubt the verification of the correct (coherent within its own rules) application of these models. Without this social verification, 'subjective knowledge' is nothing but belief. In order to rightly call something knowledge, we must appeal to the agreement of others. On transcendental and psychological reduction. The method by which we model the workings of the mind is central to the question at hand. If we consider the transcendental route, the rationale for choosing this method is that the alternative (psychological reduction) is incomplete or imperfect. Transcendental reduction claims to be 'pure', assuming that the subjects understanding of his own experiences and intentional states are known purely and perfectly. This is just patently false. Experiments by Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith show quite the opposite. A subject will often alter their private opinion on a matter to a more benificail position without awareness or intent to do so. Edited by Reformed Nihilist on 08/14/05 - 03:42 PM
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JHBowden
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Posted 08/15/05 - 03:50 PM:	#10
My final reply before my concluding remarks will examine how agreement and genetic explanation bear on the idea of a priori knowledge. 1. Agreement Everyone agrees human beings are fallible and crosschecking with others is almost always worthwhile. But just because we are fallible doesn't mean we can't justify our beliefs. If we know a proposition, it is true. But this doesn't mean that beliefs entail or guarantee their own truth. Agreement between individuals is not knowledge. It clearly isn't sufficient for knowledge. One, individuals may agree on something that may not be true. For instance, someone may erroneously believe that the Cubs have a better record than the White Sox this year. Moreover, individuals may have baseless opinions about something that may end up being true, perhaps that the Twins will defeat the White Sox tonight. Nor is agreement necessary for knowledge. I may independently discover through research that Sol is 25,000-28,000 light years from the center of the Milky Way without expressing an agreement with anyone. Knowledge excludes not only ignorance, but error and opinion. Mathematical truth has a priori justification since mere agreement that a result or theorem is valid isn't sufficient for knowledge. Radical conventionalism has problems in mathematics when we look at consistency, infinitude, and scientific explanation, as mentioned above. Moreover, the laws of logic don't pretend to be vague and approximate, but instead are precise and absolutely valid. If they were empirical generalizations from experience like the Piaget quote suggests, this would not be the case. Secondly, if we built a robot whose thoughts succeeded each other in according to logical laws, its design and function would not be the foundation for those laws; succession is not validity. In addition, the inclusion relation "if all A are B, and all B are C, then all A are C" makes no reference to empirical facts and cannot be described as a posteriori. 2. GE Genetic explanations still remain at the epicenter of this discussion. It was initially stated that known beliefs require public evidence, that is, something that can be shown to another. I disambiguated this statement into three possibilities -- 1) we can have evidence within a web of belief, 2) justification doesn't matter and knowledge is really a matter of the truth-conduciveness of belief-forming processes, 3) scientism's thesis that we should convert to science and science only since folk psychology about notions like beliefs and desires are fictions. The position presented to me has been unstable. A priori knowledge was supposed to be impossible because it can't be evidentially "shown," that is, the justification appears to be internal. Evidence, however, requires a first person perspective, so I don't see what the problem is unless one is arguing for some sort of externalism or scientism. Lastly, wow did we develop a sense of Reason? Why do I phenomenologically experience colors, even if they can be correlated to a physical process? Why does the Earth have one moon instead of two or none? How did the permittivity of free space come to be 8.854187817 x 10^-12 C^2 N^-1 m^-2 ? One can demand genetic explanations for many things. But just because one doesn't have a genetic explanation for why the earth has one moon doesn't imply that a person doesn't know that earth has one moon. Explanatory Rationalism, the idea that everything can be explained, is a bogus doctrine; we shouldn't give the idea of explanation more scope or importance than is warranted. 3. Common Ground? (or at least philosophical proximity?) The appeal to the reasonable man above reminds me of how Hilary Putnam once defended the a priori. Rationality-based apriorism is the view that a proposition can be known a priori by humans iff that proposition has the blessing of human rationality in the sense that it would be irrational to deny it under any circumstances. My view is somewhat more conservative than this, but not as conservative as those who argue for necessity-based apriorism like Swinburne. Edited by JHBowden on 08/15/05 - 07:26 PM
"It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it." -- Joseph Joubert (1754-1824) "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!" -- Isaiah 5:20 "What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out, which is the exact opposite." -- Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)

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