Debate 8: Whether a priori knowledge is possible: Philosophy Forums

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Debate 8: Whether a priori knowledge is possible

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Debate 8: Whether a priori knowledge is possible

Reformed Nihilist
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Posted 08/16/05 - 08:29 AM:	#11
I think before I summarize, it is important to deal away with some common problems that arise in debate over epistemic matters. Conflation of knowledge and truth. It may or may not be apparent in a given debate what truth is. There are certainly many theories available which can address that question. On questions of knowledge, truth is often an element (as in Justified True Belief), but is not necessarily. Because of this it is important not to make assertions about what is true, or what is held to be true (belief), and assume that this speaks conclusively about knowledge. Even accepting JTB as a common ground, statements like "He believed he knew X, but X was not true" is in no way an indictment of knowledge, just a trivial explication that untrue beliefs are not considered knowledge *Intuitively obvious* assertions that are factually incorrect. I am certain that those who proposed a round earth dealt with this one, and I certainly sympathize with their opponents. Without evidence showing the alternative to be the case, I would certainly believe the flat-earthers. I mean just look at the ground. It's flat, right? As we know, this doesn't cut it. We have clear evidence that A) Humans develop their cognitive abilities, and that both environmental factors and genetics play a part in this development, that B) many systems of logic are possible and desirable, and as problems become more complex, standard bivalence falls aside to multivalent, quantum, or fuzzy logics. Over-simplification of human reasoning. The multiple levels of abstraction, and the complexity of models we create as humans often cause us to try to treat the abstractions as concrete phenomena. If I treat multiplication as foundational in mathematics, I am ignoring the fact that all multiplication can be reduced to multiple addition. Addition can be reduced to counting (discriminating "an" and "some"). Now I don't care to take this step-by-step process and apply it to a proof of Fermat's theorem, but clearly all mathematics can be reduced in this fashion. Why do we develop these multiple leveled, complex abstract models, when there is no apparent empirical referent to the models in question? Simply to test for incoherencies, in the given model. We are testing our hypothesis about quantity against itself. Now, I would add that mathematics (as a subject) isn't limited to quantity, but also to space and change. This means that all mathematics can be reduced to measurement and counting. These are explained by Piaget's theories. When one attempts an absolute claim about human reasoning, it is important that one considers the implications of the strictest reductions. Equivocations with objective/object and subjective/subject.** It is a tautology to state that the topic of knowledge requires a subject. There must be a knowing individual somewhere in existence in order to have the concept knowledge. In the same way, there must be a rock somewhere in order to have a concept of geology. We certainly do not ask a rock what "rockness" is like when we study geology. We gather information that can be publicly verifiable and analyse it using methods that have proven effective and are publicly sanctioned. This is how one can speak of objectivity. Objects are things and subjects are those who experience things. Objective facts are things held to be true that are confirmed publicly, or confirmable by publicly accepted means, while subjective beliefs are things held to be true, but that have not or cannot be confirmed publicly. I do not wish to remove the subject from this debate, merely the subjectivity. Edited by Reformed Nihilist on 08/16/05 - 08:41 AM
Nobody ever became a famous philosopher by being a champion of ecumenical hybridism Daniel Dennett Freedom Evolves

JHBowden
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Posted 08/23/05 - 12:07 PM:	#12
This has been a fun, engaging debate. I thank everyone who has taken the time to follow along. I also thank Reformed Nihilist for entering the debate in such a hasty manner. Overall I believe the discussion has been very productive, especially for those reading who may be unfamiliar with the topic. I defended a Platonist view that mathematical and logical objects, through categorial intuition and categorial abstraction, can by known purely without reference to sensible objects. I also put forth that various propositions, like 'red excludes blue', can be known a priori through eidetic intuition. Reformed Nihilist mentioned how truths of reason are open to physical, psychological, and evolutionary analysis. I took this, despite some protest, to be that mathematical and logical truth or necessity are explained by human nature and forms of life. I understand the spirit of the argument -- some philosophers feel warm and secure in the spatial-temporal realm and feel uncomfortable dealing with strange, spooky notions like colors, numbers, meanings and so forth that are notoriously difficult to reduce physically. I also emphasized the irrelevance of explanatory rationalism to this debate; if I can't explain why I now perceive a yellow patch, this doesn't mean I'm not now perceiving a yellow patch. I made certain I took my opponent's queen off the board, Quine's interpretation of the a priori, before going after the rooks, knights, and so forth. I emphasized we need Reason and at least some intuition to even to have a physical view of the world at all. Reformed Nihilist, if I understood correctly, tried to advance subjectivity, while real, had little importance to knowledge because our mental states cannot be shown. I retaliated by flanking any private language argument with an argument for our private access to our minds. The debate neared its end as I disambiguated how "evidence" was being understood. I succinctly revealed the problems for each untangled view. Though I did not suffer a direct hit, I recognize I was most weak during my introduction of various kinds of intuition. I found it to be a bit skeletal and believe I could have put a lot more muscle on it. On the other hand, I think my offense was very good, especially when I went straight after conventionalism in places like #6.4. How can one explain mathematics involving notions like infinity when human beings and human practice are finite? How can we pooh-pooh consistency and still explain the a priori? How can we explain the operation things like Turing machines without considerations known a priori? I couldn't find an answer for any of these questions in the theories of Piaget. Again, thanks to Reformed Nihilist for jumping into the ring, Paul for having the debate, and of course, our venerable audience. Edited by Paul on 08/23/05 - 12:18 PM
"It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it." -- Joseph Joubert (1754-1824) "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!" -- Isaiah 5:20 "What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out, which is the exact opposite." -- Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)

Reformed Nihilist
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Posted 08/23/05 - 12:19 PM:	#13
In this debate, we have discussed a vast range of concepts. The central focus has been on the nature of justification, the value of naturalist epistemology vs. intuition, and the value of evidence from the first person. I want to start by re-asking the question. Is a priori knowledge possible? Let’s be methodical about the answers provided. What is knowledge? Knowledge is justified true belief. Belief is a given, so I think we can leave it alone for the moment and work on separating truth from justification. Truth is ontology while justification is epistemology. Truth refers to what is the case, while justification refers to what we would consider good reason to believe it. If we once use truth as a justification, then we have reduced JTB to TB. This is unacceptable. There are very good reasons for the inclusion of justification into the mix. So in order to call something knowledge, we must hold it to be true, as well as having good reason to hold it true. What is justification? Let me repeat: In order to call something knowledge, we must hold it to be true, as well as having good reason to hold it true. What is the distinction? I have offered the alternative of public scrutiny of the model, evidence and/or consistency between them. This means that both the specific evidence may be scrutinized (there are two apples on the tree), and the model may be scrutinized (2-1=1), or the coherence between the two (there are two apples on the tree and I take one, so there is one left). If there is general agreement regarding these things, we can fairly say we are justified in believing it. But for a moment, let’s say one does accept my explanation. Are there problems? Problems with subjective justification of a priori knowledge. The way we justify a posteriori may not be agreed upon, but we do agree that we access empirical data (by definition) to do so. By definition, the notion of a priori knowledge cannot access empirical data for justification. So we are left with a belief that is ‘justified’ by the feeling that it must be true. This is called belief. If I feel that something is true, I believe it. I could believe that 1+1=2 or I could believe that Martians are going to invade earth. Either way, until I am justified in believing so, how may I call this knowledge? Self-evidence? This just means I really believe it a lot. True by definition? This means that it is consistent within the system I believe is justified a posteriori. Whatever the explanation of justification, if we are left with nothing but shadows to discriminate knowledge from belief, the explanation is unsatisfactory. Necessary conditions for thought are not knowledge. I think that the deduction that claims to have derived what we call a priori knowledge has actually derived the necessary conditions of thought. In order to have anything, we must have conditions for such a thing. To have a house, we have conditions (walls, roof, people are mean to live there), to have movement we have conditions (a starting point, distinctions in time and position). It is these distinctions that define the concepts, and without them we could have no meaning. Thought has conditions as well, and some philosophers have incorrectly categorized these conditions as knowledge. It is clear that they are not. In conclusion. Without a workable distinction between strongly held a priori belief and justified a priori belief, we must reject the notion. Self-evidence and intuition are not acceptable, as they are just fancy ways of saying strongly held beliefs. There are reasonable a posteriori naturalist explanations for what are often ascribed as a priori knowledge. Considering all of this, it is unreasonable to hold onto the superstition of a priori knowledge. As we have developed our methods for understanding the world and ourselves, what has repeatedly become evident throughout history, is that a feeling that something must be true is not sufficient to claim that it is in fact known. A reasonable man could not conclude otherwise.
Nobody ever became a famous philosopher by being a champion of ecumenical hybridism Daniel Dennett Freedom Evolves

Paul
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Posted 08/23/05 - 12:23 PM:	#14
Debate #8 is now concluded. Everyone should feel free to place their comments in the discussion thread. Thanks to JHBowden and Reformed Nihilist for their participation. If either of them would like an @philosophyforums.com e-mail forwarding address as was offered for completion of the debate, PM me your desired email and the preexisting email to forward that to. Edited by Paul on 08/23/05 - 12:30 PM

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