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Debate 4: Is determinism compatibile with freedom?

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Debate 4: Is determinism compatibile with freedom?

Paul
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/20/04 - 11:10 AM:	#1
Rules of this debate Minimum words per turn: 300 Maximum words per turn: 1500 Rounds: 6 Time alloted for each response: 2 days No quoting of posts is allowed in this debate (paraphrase only). The topic of this debate is the question of if determinism is compatible with freedom. The philosophical dictionary at http://philosophypages.com/dy/ defines the two key terms this way: determinism Belief that, since each momentary state of the world entails all of its future states, it must be possible (in principle) to offer a causal explanation for everything that happens. When applied to human behavior, determinism is sometimes supposed to be incompatible with the freedom required for moral responsibility. The most extreme variety of determinism in this context is fatalism. freedom {Lat. libertas Ger. Freiheit}} The human capacity to act (or not to act) as we choose or prefer, without any external compulsion or restraint. Freedom in this sense is usually regarded as a presupposition of moral responsibility: the actions for which I may be praised or blamed, rewarded or punished, are just those which I perform freely. The further question of whether choice—the volition or will to act—is itself free or subject to ordinary causality raises the issue of determinism in human conduct. But most modern philosophers have held that (internal) determination of the will by desire or impulse does not diminish the relevant sense of moral responsibility. Some philosophers, called compatibilists, believe that freedom can exist within a deterministic universe. (These philosophers need not be determinists themselves -- they only need to believe that if determinism is true then free will remains true.) Others, incompatibilists, believe that if determinisim is true that eliminates the possibility of freedom. Note that this debate is not about whether determinism is actually true. To approach this question we have to first take it as a given that determinism is true, and work from there to determine what the consequences of this would be for personal freedom. In this debate, EntropicOrder will argue for the compatibility of determinism with freedom. phenyl_engine_rods will argue that they cannot be reconciled. In order to establish the problem in the minds of the readers which the other side needs to resolve, phenyl_engine_rods will go first. The two opening posts will be submitted to Interlocutor via PM and posted nearly simultaneously here in this thread by him (phenyl's first, then Entropic's a few moments later). After this phenyl_engine_rods will have up to 2 days to respond to EntropicOrder's opening post. After this 2 days for Entropic to respond, and so on until all 6 rounds have been completed. Note that the open discussion thread for non-participants will not begin until after the debate and voting have concluded. Once that has taken place, there will be a link to the discussion thread edited into this space.

phenyl_engine_rods
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2 of 2 people found this post helpful Posted 07/23/04 - 09:28 PM:	#2
If I grab your hand, force your fingers into a fist, and ram this configuration into someone's face, you are not responsible for punching him/her. If you are hypnotized so that whenever you hear a bell, you punch someone in the face, you are not responsible for that punch, either. If a mad scientist messes with your genes so that whenever you see the colour red, you feel an overwhelming desire to punch someone in the face, it won't be your fault if you ever give into this redness-induced urge. If you act because you are compelled to do so by causes outside yourself, you do not act freely. This is why determinism is incompatible with freedom. My opponent will, most likely, argue that if you act according to your most earnest desires, then no matter the cause of those desires, you must be acting freely and you must be accountable for your actions. This may seem intuitive on first glance, but as I will show, it is simply wrong. Let's suppose the victim (call her Anne) of the mad scientist mentioned above is put in a room with a very friendly, charming, harmless man, Bob, who happens to be wearing a red shirt. Thanks to the mad scientist's meddling with her genes, Anne feels an overwhelming desire to punch Bob in the face, and if she is not restrained, she will definitely do so. Anne clearly wants to punch Bob in the face, and she punches him because she wants to do so. Yet we would not hold Anne responsible for punching Bob--rather, this is the mad scientist's fault. One response compatibilists often make to this sort of example is that Anne may want to punch Bob, but she doesn't want to want to punch him. That is, although Anne feels an irresistible urge to punch Bob, if she were to reflect on whether it would be better if she didn't have these urges, she would surely conclude that she'd be better off without being compelled to punch Bob. It is argued, then, that this is how we can tell when someone is being compelled by some external force and when someone is acting freely: if one does what one wants to do, but not what one wants to want to do, then one is not acting freely. If Carl is addicted to tobacco, but wants to quit smoking, then he does not act freely; but if Dana is addicted to heroin and absolutely loves it, the compatibilist may argue that she does act freely. But our "metadesires"--what we want to want--are just as susceptible as our desires to the mad scientist's treatment. Suppose Anne's genes have been altered not only to give her the urge to punch Bob, but also so that whenever she reflects on whether it would be better to have such urges or not, she can only come to the conclusion that this is the most natural and beneficial way things could possibly be. (This is certainly no more far-fetched than the genetic alteration originally hypothesised. History is full of otherwise rational people unable to make what seem to us obvious rational conclusions: for example, that people of African descent are indeed people, or that Copernicus was calling 'em like he saw 'em, not speaking for the Devil.) In such a case, the compatibilist of the last paragraph would have to claim that Anne acts freely; but she is obviously no more free than she was when we supposed the mad scientist's intrusions were more limited. Now, for our final example, suppose Anne's genes are exactly as in the previous example: she feels an overwhelming, irresistible desire to punch someone whenever she sees the colour red, and necessarily sees this as the best way, the right way to feel on seeing the colour red. But let's do away with the mad scientist--let's suppose Anne came by her genes the same way we all do, whether you choose to credit that gift to God or to natural selection, or whatever else strikes your fancy. Does this make Anne more free? How could it? Anne is still a slave to her genes, still not in control of her actions. Think back to our very first example, where I forcibly take your hand, make it into a fist, and ram it into your neighbour's face. In deciding whether you were free in that action, would it make a difference if your fist were forced into your neighbour's face by a blind force--a gust of wind, say--instead of a manipulative other person? Not in the slightest. Either way, you have no choice but to throw that punch. And that is precisely the issue: if, as in these examples, an agent is not faced with the real possibility of more than one action, the agent cannot be called free. There can be no freedom without choice, and there can be no real choice if one's actions are predetermined, because what this means is that one has only one possible action--and that's not a choice. Edited by Paul on 07/29/05 - 12:35 AM

EntropicOrder
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1 of 2 people found this post helpful Posted 07/23/04 - 09:30 PM:	#3
I wish to defend compatibilist determinism; a universe that is completely driven by causal relations and that simultaneously allows us to express freedom as we intuitively feel we do. I will do so with an ontological argument, and by evaluating the concepts of will, self, choice, possibility, freedom, coercion, influence, time, and responsibility. Here is the crux of my argument: determinism states that the entire universe is 100% cause and effect. If there is said to be a will, then that will must take up some percentage of the whole. Let’s say the will takes up 2% of the universe for easy of understanding. While the will is not free of cause and effect, and while it may not be free from the influences of the universe that is external to itself, is it 2% free from non-will forces. To whatever extent we designate the will (or self) to be a separate entity in the universe; the will (or self) is free to that exact same extent. ____________________________________ Determinism makes us think that somehow our decisions are coerced by some force, as if we were a puppet being pulled along by invisible strings. However, many of those forces are internal, which means they create the will. In other words, some of the cause and effect that determines one's decisions actually makes up one's will. However, when we think of coercion, we think of something else pushing us along. What is forcing you to act as you do? The determinist answers "cause and effect". But, where is that cause and effect? It is inside the will. The will cannot meaningfully be coerced by itself. "I coerced myself" should be understood as "I chose" in this context. Even conventional understanding of free will would allow that when a person is not restrained by something external that he is still "restrained" by his own will. ____________________________________ Determinism also declares that a person could not have acted otherwise than he/she did. Considering free will as “ability to choose freely”, then the question is whether or not a decision that can only possibly yeild one outcome is really a free choice. Choose - To select from a number of possible alternatives Possible - Capable of happening, existing, or being true without contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances (dictionary.com) Notice it doesn’t say actual laws, it says proven laws. Proof is only needed for a law to be believed, not to be actual. In other words, possibility doesn’t have to be actually possible, only conceivably possible. Determinism says there is only one actual possibility, but that does not disable humans from conceiving of various possibilities. Therefore there is choice. But, is that choice free? We can see strict cause and effect as a form of compulsion or restraint. However, what’s important is whether or not that compulsion is internal or external, according to the definition Paul has given us ("The human capacity to act (or not to act) as we choose or prefer, without any external compulsion or restraint.") As I’ve already stated, some cause and effect must be internal to the will. Otherwise, we could not even meaningfully say "there is a will." This means our choice is, at worst, an internal compulsion. Therefore, there is free choice. Now influence in space-time must be carefully examined to understand its role in this compatibilist universe. We can discuss this idea if my challenger wishes. Finally, I just want to extend peace to you, phenyl_engine_rods, and acknowledgement that though I may oppose your position, I do not oppose you. Notes: 1. Exactly where the will begins and ends or if there is a clear distinction is irrelevant to my argument. I only require that a will exists somewhere to some degree. 2. While I agree that the percentage of the will is insignificant compared to the whole universe, if we were to look at the percentage of the will compared to only the parts of the universe that it comes in to contact with, this percentage would be much higher. Besides, any percentage of freedom, no matter how small, is still freedom. Edited by Paul on 07/29/05 - 12:35 AM
My game sites: http://www.entropicorder.net, http://www.plushquest.com My giant stuffed animal store: http://www.mybigplush.com "But the wise man neither rejects life nor fears death. For living does not offend him, nor does he believe not living to be any evil." - Epicurus

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2 of 2 people found this post helpful Posted 07/25/04 - 03:17 PM:	#4
There are several aspects of EntropicOrder's opening post which I find curious. Some of these are merely confusing ways of expressing familiar ideas; but some, I shall argue, reveal the writer's own confusion. Let me now go through my opponent's arguments and discuss their curiosities. EntropicOrder begins with a minor curiosity: the universe is divided in some unspecified way, so that determinism is said to mean that the universe is 100% cause and effect, and so that we assume the will takes up 2% of the universe. Exactly what it would mean for the will to constitute 2% of the will is not clear--does this mean 2% of the matter in the universe has will? that 2% of the energy in the universe is spent on choices? that 2% of the chain of causes and effects are in some way governed by the will?--but this is not of tremendous importance. The idea here is that we assume the will has some place in the (hypothetically deterministic) universe, that the will, while it is itself determined by the rest of the universe, has some role in determining what shall occur. In short, the universe is a great chain of causes and effects, and the will is one of those causes. Next is a more confusing curiosity. We are told, it seems, that although we assume the will, along with everything else, is subject to the laws of cause and effect which completely determine every occurrence, 2% of the will is free from the rest of the universe. Most likely, the idea here is simply that 2% of the universe is the will, and not that any of that 2% is actually independent of the rest of the universe, since this would contradict our assumption of determinism. The idea, I take it, is simply this: Wherever there is will, there is freedom. This simple principle is the one I argued against in my opening post. The example of Anne, the victim of a mad scientist's genetic manipulations, is a clear case of will without freedom. The key to that example is that, as well as being a cause, the will is also an effect in the great chain of causes and effects making up the universe. Now EntropicOrder begins working a (more or less) new thread into his argument. Determinism, he says, makes us think that our decisions are coerced by some assortment of forces. But, of course, some of these forces are internal--for example, one of the forces that makes Anne decide to punch Bob in the face is her will to do so. Surely, EntropicOrder argues, one cannot be coerced by internal forces, by one's own will! But this misses the incompatibilist point. The incompatibilist does not argue that Anne's decision to punch Bob is coerced because she decides based on her will, but because her will itself is determined by external forces (namely, the mad scientist). Again, if determinism is true, the will is an effect as well as a cause. (NB: I wish to make it clear that when I say EntropicOrder misses the incompatibilist's point, I do not mean to charge him with failing to understand my opening arguments. Our initial posts were written in ignorance of each other.) From this first statement of my opponent's main confusion, we move on to a rephrasing, replete with its own menagerie of curiosities. EntropicOrder astutely characterizes the problem as the question of whether there can be free choice when there is only one possible outcome; but this insight is marred by the inappropriate definition of possibility Entropic provides. My opponent reports that dictionary.com defines possibility in terms of proven laws, not actual laws. That is, an outcome is possible so long as it does not conflict with proven laws, facts, etc. My initial reaction is to point out that, whatever the general usage of the word may be, it is inappropriate in this context to define possibility in subjective terms: what is possible for one person at one time must be possible for any other person at any other time, and likewise with impossibilities; but this definition makes possibility dependent on what has been proven, which varies over time and from person to person. But a moment's reflection reveals that in fact, since this definition ought to be strictly weaker than one in terms of actual laws. (That is, the former definition admits as possible any outcome which the latter definition admits, as well as some others. This is because proven laws must also be actual laws, so if an outcome conflicts with no actual laws, it must not conflict with any proven laws.) And so if there is only one possible outcome by dictionary.com's definition, there cannot be more than one possible outcome by a more philosophically appropriate definition. But this is not the conclusion my opponent draws. Instead, EntropicOrder says, rather curiously, that this means "possibility doesn’t have to be actually possible, only conceivably possible." I confess I have no clue what this could mean. Does this mean that anything conceivable is possible? Fine, but then what is actual possibility? It seems to me contradictory to say about anything that it doesn't have to be actually itself--"ice cream doesn't have to be actually ice cream" is not at all comprehensible to me, and neither is EntropicOrder's statement about possibility. From this, my opponent concludes that since we can conceive of many possibilities, there is choice regardless of what is actually possible. This seems to me wrong, but so long as we still leave open the question of whether such a choice is free, it is only a minor curiosity. On the question of whether these choices can be free, EntropicOrder reaches his conclusion via the same major confusion we met earlier in his post, namely, that so long as the immediate cause of one's actions is one's will, that action is free. We are told that this means that though one's actions are indeed compelled, they are compelled by internal forces, which does not amount to coercion. This is mistaken because when those internal forces are themselves subject to external forces, the agent is open to coercion after all. I would point again to the example of Anne, the mad scientist, and poor Bob; and remind my opponent that the will is an effect as well as a cause.

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1 of 2 people found this post helpful Posted 07/27/04 - 12:44 PM:	#5
The Role of the Will in the Universe First of all, I want to clarify what phenyl calls my first “curiosity” by rephrasing a claim I made. My only initial implication of designating the will as 2% is to say that if the will exists, it takes up some portion of matter and energy in the universe. Since all matter and energy are bound by the law of cause and effect in a deterministic universe, it could also be said that the will takes up some portion of the cause and effect that occurs in the universe. This is true for any object or process. A rock, cloud, or love, all take up some designated percentage of cause and effect. While nothing is truly separate by the fact that everything is deterministically interrelated, they are separate by our designations. I believe we can agree on this point. While it is true that the will itself is a cause of other effects, that was not the point of my recognition of the role of the will. Rather, I wish to show that to some extent the will causes itself and to that extent it is free. Consider the situation where there is a cause and effect process occurring within the will. Now consider that the exclusive result of this process is some change in the will, such as part of decision making. Since this process is completely internal to the will, this is an example of the will being free. That process, representing the will, is free from outside force. Therefore it is free. I believe phenyl would state that a flaw in my argument is this: the forces that caused that process prior to it are outside forces, and therefore that process was not free. However, we must remember that the will is separated by a designated context. To consider cause and effect relationships indefinitely prior to an event is to overstep the context in which the will is designated to exist as a separate entity. For instance, let’s say that part of my will is a desire to have sex. Without a relevant context, one could say, “The only reason you desire sex is because evolution produced sexual desire as a means to ensure sexual reproduction.” In doing this one would be denying that I want to have sex and asserting that evolution wants me to have sex. This in effect robs me of a piece of my will. If one were to apply this process to all the different pieces that can be said to compose the will it would completely remove the existence of the will. As I’ve already stated, if the will is said to exist at all, we must allow desire to belong to a will, not to the causes of that will. The fact that evolution caused me to have a desire does not change the fact that I do have that desire. Therefore, we must consider cause and effect relationships in a relevant temporal context. (This is the space-time clarification I alluded to earlier.) The Relationship Between Moral Responsibility and Freedom Now a main thread in phenyl’s arguments is that if and only if there is freedom there is moral responsibility, such that if it can be shown that there is no responsibility, then there is no freedom. While I agree that they are strongly related in most cases, I don’t think they always are. Let’s look at an example. Assume I am about to teleport somewhere. My body is successfully cloned but the process fails to destroy the original me. My clone kills someone and later dies. The family of the victim declares that I am morally responsible, but I declare my clone is (even though my clone is me). The point of my example is not to assign moral responsibility, but rather to reveal its ambiguity, especially when challenging the common notion of self and individuality. In the example about the evil scientist and Anne, phenyl has created ambiguity in Anne’s identity. For that reason, I will agree that the scientist is morally responsible for her assault, but contend that Anne was free to punch the person. In order to clarify this ambiguity, we should consider two states of Anne, 1 and 2, representing before and after the scientist’s intervention. True, it was against Anne1’s will to have her will changed. However, though it might have been against Anne1’s will to punch Bob, it was not because Anne1 no longer exists. Anne2 punched the guy, and it was not against Anne2’s will to do so, and therefore she was free to punch the guy. Declaring what Anne’s will was throughout the ordeal ignores the fact that there are two different wills in question. Anne (as Anne2, the only Anne currently existing) freely punched Bob just people freely act in other ways. Therefore, this is not a “clear example of will without freedom”. How We Are Bound By Forces and How We Aren't I think this example reveals the fact that we intuitively define a continuous will as not having unnatural intervention. This brings me to the rest of phenyl’s argument. He states that the incompatibilist’s point is this: if we are exclusively bound by cause and effect, then we are also bound by the forces that have influenced us, and this denies us any freedom that we might have had. However, I disagree with this. Remember, though I have conceded that no object or process is ever objectively separate in a deterministic universe, they are still pragmatically separate. As I’ve stated, a person is designated to be separate from the universe by the very usage of the word, and this designation is useful. Yes, we are exclusively bound by cause and effect according to determinism. Yes, this makes us objectively bound by the forces prior to us. However, pragmatically, we are not bound by those forces because we have designated ourselves to be separate from them. So I will agree that freedom does not exist objectively, but rather pragmatically. However, I think in this same context I would have to say that persons don’t exist objectively either (as in Nihilism), but rather pragmatically. So, though we might consider unnatural intervention, such as scientist’s tinkering, to coerce the will, we usually don’t consider natural involvement, such as prior forces like evolution, to take away freedom. Possibility in a Deterministic Universe Phenyl also states that the context of this argument requires us to evaluate possibility only in the actual sense rather than in the conceivable sense. Once again I think this points us toward the distinction between objective and pragmatic. We both agree that in a deterministic universe there is only one actual, objective possibility. However, choices do not occur as an objective phenomenon. They occur subjectively and pragmatically. I agree that my statement, “possibility doesn’t have to be actually possible, only conceivably possible” doesn’t make sense when it is removed from its intended context. What I meant was that in order to choose, or “select from a number of possible alternatives”, the alternatives do not need to be actually, objectively possible. A choice is made between several conceived possibilities. Whether or not those alternatives are actually possible is irrelevant for it to be a choice. Consider this: for a given coin flip, is it possible for it to land on heads? While the objective answer (unconcerned with human affairs) might be “it is only possible for it to land on whatever it lands on”, that doesn’t really give us knowledge. For instance, one could give that same answer to the question, “Is it possible for a coin to land on its hand?” Even though we know a coin doesn’t have a hand making it impossible to land on one, the deterministic answer doesn’t tell us that. The answer that produces knowledge is, “A coin cannot possibly land on hands, it can only possibly land on heads or tails (or maybe its side)”, even if that is “only” true in a pragmatic sense. It is in this same sense that we are able to choose from different possibilities. Conclusion The main point phenyl and I seem to disagree on is whether we should consider causes of one’s will within a relevant context or indefinitely when looking for freedom. My belief on the matter is that objectively there is no freedom because the process must be applied indefinitely. However, pragmatically, things must be considered within a useful, relevant context. Determinism doesn't exclude freedom from existing any more than it excludes a will from existing.
My game sites: http://www.entropicorder.net, http://www.plushquest.com My giant stuffed animal store: http://www.mybigplush.com "But the wise man neither rejects life nor fears death. For living does not offend him, nor does he believe not living to be any evil." - Epicurus

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1 of 2 people found this post helpful Posted 07/27/04 - 09:44 PM:	#6
Existence of the Will vs. Freedom of the Will To begin, I want to thank EntropicOrder for clarifying some of his points--particularly, on what is meant by the will constituting a percentage of the universe, and on what makes conceivability more relevant to our discussion than actual possibility. But I still find what I consider to be some misconceptions in my opponent's arguments: most importantly, the distinction between the will and freedom. For example, Entropic claims that processes whereby the will causes changes in itself are examples of the will acting freely, since the forces in question are internal to the will. This I see only as evidence that the will exists and acts, not that it exists or acts freely. For what causes the will to act as it acts? All the will does can be traced to the influence of external forces. Entropic attempts to dismiss such arguments by saying that we must not consider cause and effect relationships "indefinitely prior to an event" for fear of losing context. But surely we needn't go so far back to find an external force! Wherever we may designate the will to begin and end, we will always find an immediate cause for the state of the will: and this will be an external force. Nor is this outstepping the bounds of context, for I do not suggest that we trace the will's causal history back to the origins of the universe, but only that we look at the immediate causes of its nature. That the will acts on itself does not make it any more free than the fact that the will acts at all. In another instance, the confusion goes the other way: EntropicOrder suggests that when one says the only reason you desire sex right now (and don't pretend you don't want some), one denies that you desire sex at all, and says that instead someone else desires sex through you. This is not at all the case. Going back again to the case of Anne and the mad scientist, I do not claim that it is the mad scientist rather than Anne who desires to punch Bob--it is certainly Anne who desires it--but that since the mad scientist is entirely responsible for Anne's desire, Anne does not desire freely, nor does she act freely when she does punch Bob. In light of these confusions (as I take them to be), I would ask my opponent if he sees any distinction between the will's existence and the will's freedom. That is, can he provide what he would consider an example of will without freedom? I would argue against the suitability of the examples already described of the unwilling addict and the person whose hand is forcibly made into a fist and rammed into another's face: these are certainly examples of the absence of freedom, but they are not examples of willful behaviour. Of course, it is no crime to identify freedom of the will with existence of the will, but in this debate, to assume such an identity without arguing for it would beg the question. Freedom and Responsibility Of more fundamental importance than this confusion, however, is our difference on the notion of freedom in question. Based on the definitions quoted in Paul's post at the start of this debate, I have been implicitly defining freedom in terms of moral responsibility. EntropicOrder seems to have a different notion of freedom in mind, however, in light of his arguments against the equation of freedom and moral responsibility (which he words too strongly for the position to be tenable, but the point is moot). I am not certain what sort of freedom he has in mind, and so I invite my opponent to elucidate further his notion of freedom. In the meantime, however, I cannot but continue to argue as before. There is no reason why we should not establish what we can about this moral notion of freedom as well as any results we may obtain about Entropic's notion. And so I must address EntropicOrder's comments on moral responsibility. Anne, he claims, acts freely when she punches Bob because she has become a different person--or rather, what seems equivalent to me, her will has been replaced by a new will. My opponent accuses me of "challenging the common notion of self and individuality" by seeing Anne aas the same person before and after the mad scientist's intervention. A couple of responses to this charge come to mind.: First of all, contrary to my opponent's interpretation of the example, I have not stipulated that Anne should have had a different will before the mad scientist's intervention--he could very well have done his tinkering before there was an Anne to talk about, and grown her in a test tube. There is thus no necessary interruption in the continuity of Anne's will, nor are there two Annes, Anne1 and Anne2, to compare; there is no ambiguity in Anne's identity. (If I were insisting that the intervention should come later in life, it would be hard for me to suggest, as I did, that the mad scientist could be replaced in this process by some blind force like evolution.) Second, I would argue that some of Entropic's comments on this issue smack of the confusion discussed in the previous section. EntropicOrder says that Anne2 acts freely simply because "it was not against [her] will to do so." Comments such as this suggest that my opponent does not distinguish existence of the will from freedom of the will. Conceivability, Choice, and the Appearance of Choice I find my opponent's comments on "pragmatic" or "conceivable" possibility troubling. It seems that the question of whether we have free will has nothing to do with any deeper inquiry we might make: if we appear to have choice, we have choice; if we say we are free from the forces acting on us, we are free from them; if we seem to have free will, we have free will. EntropicOrder claims that choices are not objective, but rather subjective and pragmatic. Does this mean that whether or not one chooses depends on who perceives the choice? Surely this is not what my opponent means. I assume that the point he is trying to make is that when we make a choice, we can only base it on what is apparent to us. This seems to me obviously correct, but irrelevant. The question at hand is not what we base our choices on, but rather whether our choices are free: that is, whether we are faced with true choices, or whether we are simply acting out the script written for us by the past. I still contend that it is inappropriate to consider what is conceivable as what is possible, unless we are merely disputing whether there is the appearance of choice. And that seems to be all my opponent leaves us to discuss. It seems we do not dispute whether we are actually free, since Entropic says that "objectively there is no freedom." In this case, I do not believe we have anything left to debate. I will not contend that we do not seem to have free choices; obviously we do. I certainly invite my opponent to argue that freedom and apparent freedom are one and the same; but as with existence of and freedom of the will, to simply assume this identity without some justifying argument would beg the question--not to mention being very unintuitive, and a position many compatibilists would shun. Generally, compatibilists do at least take seriously the question of determinism's consequences for freedom; my opponent seems not to, based on the concluding sections of his post.

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Posted 07/28/04 - 11:24 AM:	#7
I tried not to give my notion of freedom because I wanted to stay consistent with Paul’s definition. However, it is important now because of my distinction between objective and subjective freedom. First, I need to make it clear that I arrived at compatibilism because I actually believe determinism is true. In response to that belief, I considered what my experience of freedom truly is. One might arrive at a different conclusion if one sees determinism as merely theoretical rather than actual. What is Freedom? Freedom is an intuitive concept. A man who has been trapped under a rock escapes and declares, “I’m free!” A country who has overthrown a dictator shouts, “We’re free!” A man in American is free to find his wife as opposed to a man in the Middle East where his wife is found for him. Does being bound to cause and effect change what any of these people mean by freedom? Absolutely not. None of these people would say, “Woe is me. Alas, I’m a prisoner to my own body.” I suppose if some of them are hard determinists they might feel that way, but I don’t see any reason that determinism challenges the idea of freedom as it is normally applied, even if it challenges freedom from cause and effect. The original notion of freedom is not objective. In those examples, it is a subjective understanding of being in control of one’s own life and body. Though one can see other humans as being free as well, one doesn’t truly understand what it means for them to be free, because in order to do that one would have to be inside their minds. The only mind one is inside is one’s own, where freedom is properly understood. Objective freedom arrives in response to determinism or at least materialism. Upon considering it, we could say, “No, determinism does not allow for objective freedom.” However, I think it is important to realize I say this in exactly the same way that I say, “No, a ‘person’ does not objectively exist.” I say this because, according to Nihilism, the only things that exist as entities are the monads (theoretically smallest pieces). A person, as a conglomerate, only exists because we as humans, from our subjective point of view, understand a person to be separate, not because one objectively is. Along with separate objects, separate events don’t exist objectively either, such as a human action. In this same sense love, thoughts, experience, etc. don’t exist objectively because they never were meant to designate something objective. I argue that the ordinary notion of freedom was never meant to designate something objective either. I think a good synonym for freedom is simply “unbound.” We normally view freedom (in a non-deterministic universe) as not bound by another’s will or some imminent, external object or process. The problem arises when people think that freedom means being unbound by anything. I believe this concept when followed to its own conclusions leads to absurdity. This type of freedom means a person is not bound by his own body, circumstance, his own reasons, his own desires, scientific laws, order, or even possibility. Or maybe we could say his desires are not bound by anything, such as availability, culture, need, etc. The absurdity is that while we think of freedom as being in control, this type of completely unbound freedom looks exactly like randomness, which is no control at all. A correct understanding of freedom is not that we are entirely unbound, but that we are unbound by a certain class of things, the law of cause and effect not being one of them. Will and Freedom The reason I support “wherever there is will there is freedom” is because of this properly understood concept of freedom. The will only exists insofar as it results in an action, even if that action is only a thought. My argument is that if an action is said to result from a will, then it was not the result of “another’s will or some imminent, external object or process” (and vice versa), which is freedom as I have defined it. I do not think there is any case of the will without freedom. I believe they are simultaneous concepts. Phenyl is correct in seeing my strong relationship between will and freedom, especially when I identify Anne2 as having freedom in my last post. If it were the case that the scientist intervened before she even had a will, then there is no interruption of identity. In that hypothetical, I see no need to make the distinction and maintain that whatever Anne does as a result of conscious choice once she develops a will is an exercise of her freedom, despite the causes prior to her will and whether or not she is eventually held morally responsible for her actions. She is free by the notion of freedom I have provided in this post. Imminent vs. Indefinite Causes of One’s Action I want to show how I distinguish between imminent and indefinite causes. Let’s say that Doug had an abusive childhood. 20 years later, he hits his own child. Now at first glance we can say that his abusive childhood caused his abusiveness. However, I think this is misleading. It is important to note that the abusive childhood caused a memory of abuse in Doug, and that the memory caused Doug’s abusiveness. As an imminent, relevant issue, childhood caused the abuse only insofar as childhood existed internal to Doug, as a memory. Because we look at it in this context we can prevent Doug from hitting his child again by removing or pacifying the memory of his abusive childhood (with therapy, for example). By looking at it in this pragmatic context, we are mobilized to action, to change the future from what it might have been had we not intervened. If we ignore the pragmatic, imminent context from this situation, we are more inclined to give up, saying that since childhood caused Doug to be abusive, it can only continue to do so because we can’t go back and change the past. Doing so in effect does remove freedom, but by choice rather than by coercion. To see causes in a relevant temporal context is to grab hold of the freedom we do have to change the future from what it might have been. Calling Doug’s abusive childhood that happened 20 years ago an “immediate” cause of his will (as it currently exists) does indeed overstep the relevant context of the situation. (If you are reading me correctly, then you know that I would say that children indeed have much less free will considering their development as a much more imminent cause.) Appearance of Freedom I do argue that the appearance of freedom is the ordinary sense of the word freedom. Objective freedom, as in a thing being completely unbound by anything, is indeed a different type of freedom than unqualified freedom. I will now show why subjective freedom (i.e. appearance of freedom) is “regular” freedom. I have already mentioned several examples of people being free earlier in this post. Let’s look at how they are subjective. The man “trapped” under the rock might have wanted to be there, in which case the situation might have been the result of the man’s will. If someone else removed the rock, they could be removing his freedom to be under a rock, rather than giving him freedom to not be under a rock. It all depends on what his will is, what he wants, which is entirely subjective. This can be applied to the desires of the dictated people as well as the married man. (I know a Muslim living in America who is happy with having his wife chosen for him. He is not being forced.) Keep in mind that it does not matter if the different options were actually possible. For instance, if the man saw the boulder falling and started to run out of the way, then he chose the course of action of avoiding the rock. Just because he couldn’t make it and was crushed anyway, doesn’t mean that he didn’t choose to avoid being crushed. He was not free to not be crushed, but he was free to choose to avoid being crushed if, as far as he knew, he might be able to outrun it. This is a case of choosing a conceivable possibility that was not actually possible. The Middle Eastern man is free to choose to pick his wife, but may or may not be free to actually pick his wife. Finally, I want to note that I do fairly consistently hold people accountable for their freedom even when many deterministic factors become obvious. This is in contrast to how things are often handled in a court of law.
My game sites: http://www.entropicorder.net, http://www.plushquest.com My giant stuffed animal store: http://www.mybigplush.com "But the wise man neither rejects life nor fears death. For living does not offend him, nor does he believe not living to be any evil." - Epicurus

phenyl_engine_rods
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/28/04 - 07:56 PM:	#8
I find more and more that I agree with in my opponent's posts--but I find myself, again, puzzled. Freedom as Subjective My opponent argues that freedom is a subjective, intuitive notion through some oddly chosen examples. We hear of a man who says "I'm free" and means "I'm free from that rock"; and we hear of a country whose people say "We're free" and mean "We're free from that dictator." It seems we are to learn from this that freedom is a subjective concept, whereas in fact we have only been shown that there are many different contexts in which one can be free. We can discuss whether one is free from a specific constraint, and we can discuss whether one is free from all constraint. I do not see, however, that answer to either of these questions is at all subjective. Either the man is free from the rock's restraint or he is not: it does not depend on the observer. Nor do the other cases: the country is free from the dictator's rule or it is not; and either one is free from external forces in making choices or one is not. The fact that in different contexts we mean different things by the statement "I am free" does not imply that the concept at hand is subjective. Entropic claims that, since freedom is subjective, the only freedom one can understand is one's own; this consequence seems very unintuitive to me, and itself makes an argument against the idea that freedom is subjective. EntropicOrder says that "unbound" is a good synonym for "free," and I agree with him. He points out, rightly, that the sense of freedom at the heart of our debate has to do with our choices being unbound by external forces, but must not be mistaken for the requirement that we be independent of all outside influence. Clearly, the fact that I cannot jump to the moon is no infringement on my freedom. So let us now examine what external forces we must be unbound by in order to be free. Immediate Cause My opponent and I agree that we are only concerned with immediate, external forces; but we have different ideas of what should be the criteria for immediacy. Entropic argues that only causes temporally proximate to a choice should be considered relevant to the question of its freedom. That is, if something happens a long time before the choice in question, it cannot be relevant to the freedom of that choice. Now, is this a plausible criterion? To see why it is not, let's look at an example. Suppose, unbeknownst to you, I implant a device in your arm which will mechanically force it to punch the person nearest you, not right away, but after it has detected you sneezing a thousand times. Suppose you rarely get colds, and have no allergies, so that it takes a great many years before you sneeze this many times; after all this time has passed, the device in your arm forcibly causes you to punch someone in the face. It is clear that despite the great passage of time, my implanting of this device in your arm is still relevant to your freedom to punch the victim of your assault. This is why it is inappropriate to say that to be free is to be unbound by temporally immediate external forces. Rather, I maintain that we must examine the forces causally immediate and external to the will. Consider again the case of Anne, Bob, and the mad scientist. We have a causal chain something like this: Anne punches Bob, who is wearing a red shirt, because Anne wants to punch Bob, because Anne's genes make her want to punch someone whenever she sees the colour red, because a mad scientist altered her genes a long time ago, because he wanted to, and so on. This chain will end with something like, "because there was such-and-such a distribution of matter and energy at the origin of the universe," or, "because God created such-and-such on Wednesday." In determining Anne's freedom to punch Bob, we don't need to examine the last clauses of this chain, because they are not causally immediate to Anne's will. Since we are only examining why Anne's will is as it is, we need only trace the causal chain back to the first clause concerning a process external to Anne's will--in this case, the mad scientist's meddling. It doesn't matter how long ago this process occurred: it only matters that it is the first external process we find when we trace the causal history of Anne's choice. Likewise, God's creation of the universe would still be irrelevant if He did it yesterday. Appearances and Pragmatics Now that my opponent has explicitly identified freedom with the appearance of freedom, let me offer another example for consideration. Suppose you really want to punch me in the face; and suppose the person next to you grabs your hand, makes it into a fist, and rams it into my nose; you rejoice. Are you responsible for punching me in the face? I don't see how you could be any more responsible for this punch than you would be if your neighbour had picked up a brick instead of your arm. Yet this case exactly parallels Entropic description of a man happy to be trapped under a rock. Neither is a case of freedom in the sense relevant to moral responsibility; neither is a case of objective freedom. I say this means that neither is a case of freedom. I will not contend that we do not seem to have freedom, nor will I claim that we should not act as though we have freedom. It is plain that we do and we should. I have explained why I am unconvinced by my opponent's arguments that the relevant sense of freedom is a subjective one. I am left to wonder how EntropicOrder can believe there are any incompatibilists, when he suggests this debate should be about whether we seem to have freedom and whether we should act as though we do. If we take the question of whether determinism is compatible with freedom seriously, we must be concerned with more than pragmatics and the appearance of freedom. It is one thing to argue that, on reflection, we find that people can be objectively free despite their actions and their will being completely determined by the external world, but it is quite another to claim that there is no need to think about whether we could be free in a deterministic universe.

EntropicOrder
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Posted 07/29/04 - 01:17 AM:	#9
Clarification of Subjective Freedom My examples of freedom were meant to illustrate the conceived ability for a person to control his own body with his own will, as opposed to it being controlled by an outside force (like a rock or a dictator). However, one cannot know what a person wills unless one is that person. For instance, maybe the guy under the rock is powerful enough to lift the rock off of himself or can at least conceive of himself trying to lift the rock, but instead of doing these things he chooses inaction which means he willing allows himself to be crushed (which, in a sense, is choosing to be crushed, although not directly.) While being free from a rock or a dictator does not depend on an observer in the objective sense, it does depend on an observer in the ordinary subjective sense of freedom. It depends on whether or not the observer chooses to allow or cause these. (Below I talk more about free will regarding inaction.) Entropic’s Temporal Immediacy Phenyl argues that evaluating freedom might necessitate abandoning the temporally immediate context. However, I do not feel his example demonstrates that and so I still maintain that a temporally immediate context is appropriate. In the example given about the device that makes me punch someone after 1000 sneezes, I agree that I was not free to punch the person. However, I don’t find the implanting of the device years ago to be needed to the diagnose non-freedom. The device, though inside my arm, is still outside of my will. (If the device had assimilated into my will, then this would be another case of two different wills as in the scientist/Anne scenario.) The immediate cause of my action was a non-will force. We don’t need to go farther back, because the diagnosis is complete. My temporally immediate context stands unwavering. Now keep in mind, it might be necessary to go farther back in time to determine moral responsibility, since it belongs to you based on your action years ago. Once again I will remind phenyl that in a deterministic universe moral responsibility and freedom are not always related. While I admit that I don’t know all the rules for when they are related and when they aren’t, I don’t feel that distinction is needed for this debate (although I think it might have to do with the fact that freedom can make stops at any causal link, but moral responsibility can only stop at beings). All I need to do is show that at least sometimes they are not strongly related which makes moral responsibility an unreliable indicator of freedom. I have shown this here and in post #5. Phenyl’s Causal Immediacy Phenyl states that rather than looking for freedom in a temporal context immediate to an event, we should look for it in a causal context immediate to the will. All this does is ask “Is the will bound by a cause?” Of course the answer is yes, that is the premise of determinism! This is exactly why I have agreed that objective freedom, a thing being unbound by any cause, is by definition false under determinism. However, pragmatic freedom is only concerned with temporally immediate causes to an event. Pragmatism mobilizes us to act. We only care about causes that have recently occurred in hopes of doing something about them. Some cause that happened 20 years ago and no longer occurs is useless to a person trying to influence events occurring in the present. Free Will and Inaction Phenyl points out my mistake when considering inaction and an event that happens to a person. I will agree that it is not enough to simply desire an action for a person to have freely acted. Any action one may desire to happen but didn’t will to happen is not free as it is not a result of the will. The relationship between desire and the action is only coincidental in these rare cases. However, in my example I did mention that “the situation might have been the result of the man’s will.” I will now modify that stance and say that if it was the man’s free will to be crushed by the rock it is necessary that he both desired and caused the rock to crush him. I also think there is a further distinction to be made. It is possible that free will can be exercised through inaction as well. Phenyl’s example of “desire to punch but forced to punch” can be modified to explain this. Assume that I knew you were going to force me to punch someone, and also that I might be able to stop you or at least try to stop you. However, since I desired to punch the person, I choose inaction which I know will result in the person being punched as opposed to the conceivable option of stopping it from happening. So I chose to allow my hand to punch someone. Though it was not my free will to punch the person (since the more imminent, relevant force was the person who moved my hand), it was my free will to allow the person to be punched. There was nothing imminent forcing me into inaction (i.e. to not try to stop it). I chose it. Even if I couldn’t have actually stopped it from happening, I could have chosen to at least try. Finally, I will show how inaction can be treated equally as free as an action. Assume Dale is holding a knife in his hand because he just got done cutting carrots. It turns out that Dale wants to kill Brad. Brad comes running into the room. Dale thinks, “Quickly, move my hand in such a way as to kill Brad with the knife.” However, Dale realizes the knife is already in the best position to kill Brad, so he doesn’t move. Brad runs right into the knife. I would say that Dale’s free will caused Brad to die, even though what Dale chose was inaction. There was nothing imminent forcing Dale to stand still any more than there was something imminent forcing him to move. It was his free choice to stay still or not, to kill or not. Once again this shows how subjective freedom is, since it depends on Dale’s intentions. If he had merely been standing still for other reasons, it would not have been his will that caused Brad to die, but instead something else. Why Pragmatic Freedom? Now I will show why I believe pragmatic freedom to be more relevant to the question of compatibilism than objective freedom. Suppose someone becomes an incompatibilist based on the objective notion of freedom. There is a problem if this person then goes on to “disprove” determinism based on his sense of freedom as he understands it. Another problem is if he believes determinism is true and then proceeds to relinquish control over his life since he believes freedom to be only an illusion and does not want to delude himself. (As I’ve already stated, this implication of incompatibilism does deny what I call freedom, but by choice rather than coercion.) The problem with both of these scenarios is that they proceed to make decisions based on the ordinary subjective sense of freedom when there has only been shown to be incompatibility with philosophical, objective freedom. I think phenyl would probably agree that these are incorrect implications of incompatibilism. So, my conclusion on the matter is that incompatibilism based on the objective, causally immediate (not necessarily temporally immediate) notion of freedom is correct as long as it does not result in the categorical errors described above. The problem is that it often does, which, I argue, makes it incorrect. But, as long as the incompatibilist recognizes that his subjective sense of freedom does not disprove determinism and the incompatibilist determinist does not relinquish control over his life when he doesn’t need to then I have no argument with incompatibilism. However, I think these people might have to find a new word to replace the ordinary notion of freedom in order to do this (unless they want to remain ambiguous), since incompatibilism doesn’t normally qualify that only objective freedom is incompatible with determinism, but rather just plain old freedom (as in “any kind of freedom”, objective, subjective, etc.). Once again, I believe the counter-productivity of creating a new word or ambiguity for an ordinary notion makes incompatibilism not necessarily false but bad. Compatibilism, I believe, more accurately describes the situation as we ordinarily understand it, while more efficiently avoiding categorical errors and having to create more words or ambiguity. This point may very well be the last disagreement phenyl and I have on this matter (though I could be wrong).
My game sites: http://www.entropicorder.net, http://www.plushquest.com My giant stuffed animal store: http://www.mybigplush.com "But the wise man neither rejects life nor fears death. For living does not offend him, nor does he believe not living to be any evil." - Epicurus

phenyl_engine_rods
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1 of 2 people found this post helpful Posted 07/29/04 - 09:42 PM:	#10
Subjectivity I believe my opponent and I are using the word "subjective" differently. I understand something to be subjectively true if and only if its truth depends on the observer. For example, it is only subjectively true that my cup is to the left of my thermos, since to an observer at a different angle, the cup is to the right of the thermos. Prettiness, comfortability, and tastiness are also subjective qualities, since what is pretty to one observer may not be pretty to another. EntropicOrder seems to consider truth to be subjective if and only if it can be known (or perceived, perhaps) only by one observer. An example of something my opponent would consider subjective and I would not is whether you feel like your head hurts. Only you have direct experience of whether this is so or not; but if it is true, it is true absolutely, not merely relative to some particular observer. But even with this understanding of my opponent's notion of subjectivity, it seems wrong to say that whether or not one is free, in Entropic's "subjective" sense of freedom, is dependent on the observer. Even if we are talking about whether or not one seems to oneself to be free, surely it is still an observer-independent truth or untruth that one is constrained by a given external force. If one is unconstrained, one may indeed act as though one is constrained, but it is still objectively (in my sense) true that one is unconstrained by that external force--though one may be constrained by an internal force, viz., the choice to act as though constrained by the external force. Freedom and Moral Responsibility Revisited EntropicOrder claims to have shown that freedom and moral responsibility are sometimes not strongly related, in his last post and in post #5. I do not find this to be at all the case. His arguments in post #5 led to my asking what kind of freedom he wishes to talk about (since I had been assuming, based on the definitions posted at the beginning, that freedom is to be defined in terms of moral responsibility); and no satisfactory answer was forthcoming. It is not appropriate to treat this claim as established when it is still in dispute. As for the arguments of his last post, EntropicOrder has done nothing to show that freedom and moral responsibility are ever less than strongly connected. All he does is assert his conclusion, without providing any argument or justification. Temporal Proximity and Causal Immediacy My opponent points out, correctly, that my example of the device counting your sneezes can be explained through reference to the most temporally immediate external process. Suppose, then, the device was one which modifies your brain so that after those 1000 sneezes, you feel an irresistible urge to punch someone. Here, if we stick to the condition of temporal proximity, the external force--my modifying your brain--must be considered irrelevant to the freedom of your choice to punch someone. And indeed, consistent with the requirements of this condition, EntropicOrder says you are free in your choice to punch someone. He says that since your will has been modified by an external force, you are now, essentially, a different person. And since that person throws that punch because he/she wants to, the punch is thrown freely. How intuitive is this? Consider that the example does not exclude the possibility that you will, after throwing the punch, be shocked at your own actions, and wish you had never thrown it. This certainly does not seem like even a case of apparent freedom. This is a coerced act, despite the fact that the coercion--the external force--occurs a long time before the choice itself. Points of Agreement, and the Last Remaining Point of Debate It pleases me to read, again, that my opponent agrees there is no objective freedom under determinism; and that he agrees that determining objective freedom requires us to examine causally immediate external forces. And I agree with his points that one can exercise the will through inaction--when one chooses, it is irrelevant to the freedom of that choice whether the choice is to act or not to act. And the cases he details of unwisely applying incompatibilism to one's life seem as unwise to me as they to to him. The final point on which I would disagree with Entropic is his assertion that these errors some might make in acting on an incompatibilist conclusion constitute a flaw in incompatibilism itself, at least for pragmatic concerns. This seems wrong. Entropic argues that, to be unambiguous, the incompatibilist has to invent a new word to describe the sort of freedom which is incompatible with determinism. I have already stated why this is mistaken: I do not believe that "freedom" and "apparent freedom" are identical, even in ordinary parlance. It seems to me that it is not the incompatibilist who must invent a new word to avoid ambiguity, but rather one who subscribes to my opponent's point of view who must invent a new term to avoid being misleading.

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