Debate 12: Does God Exist?: Philosophy Forums

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Debate 12: Does God Exist?

Debate 12: Does God Exist?

Paul
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Posted 04/19/09 - 12:45 AM: Subject: Debate 11: Does God Exist?	#1
In this debate, 180 Proof will argue against the existence of a god. SnoopDoug will argue in favor of a god. The scope of the debate covers any arguments for/against God's existence. There will be no presumption of either theism or atheism. Rebuttals must identify specific arguments that are being rebutted. Number of rounds: 4 Maximum Length of rounds: 750 word opening statements, two rounds of 500 word rebuttals, and 250 word conclusions. Time allowed between statements: Three days. Starting date: April 19

180 Proof
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Posted 04/19/09 - 12:46 AM:	#2
"Does god exist?" An affirmative answer to this question is presupposed by every confession of faith and surely underwrites all doctrinal, theistic religions. I will not attempt to answer by deconstructing scriptural accounts or refuting theological proofs but rather will address this as a metaphysical question. Given that ultimacy is associated with "god", what’s at stake here is no less than a conception of reality as a whole, which means it’s not an idle question even in societies where religion today is largely an idling concern Apparently, our best knowledge & experience of reality – that it's indifferent, chaotic, catastrophic, protean – is consistent with the absence of any ‘intelligent design’, divine guidance & miraculous interventions. The countless inconsistencies, on the other hand, between "revealed truths" and all that’s rigorously known about reality (via sciences, histories, etc) cannot be accounted for without begging quite a few questions (e.g. "miracles"). Thus, "agnosticism" is not a coherent option. For the purposes of this inquiry I treat "god" as an object, and as such require only that this object be attributed at least one property -- some sine qua non -- that makes it that object alone and not another. If "god exists" then it follows that god has some property that differentiates it from "non-god" AND "nonexistent" objects. I will argue that "god" is, at minimum, transcendent – which undeniably distinguishes it from all other objects -- and for that reason does not exist. As far as I can tell the following world religions ascribe transcendence to their respective gods: Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Bahai & Christianity (with qualifications due to ‘divine incarnation’ in Christ). Mystics rhapsodize about a god that transcends language and cannot be described; at best, they say, we can only say what god is not. Theologians profess that god transcends reason and cannot be adequately explained or comprehended; all we can do, they instruct, is submit to, or trust in, the fullness of the mystery of god. And the prophets preach the god transcends being because "god created everything"; for such a god "all things are possible" – nothing is impossible. Surely transcendence distinguishes (this) god from all other "non-god" objects (especially those which we know, or don’t have good reasons to doubt, exist). I do not dispute these confessions but take them at face value and only point out their implications for what is & what is not the case. My argument is quite simple: i. A god that transcends language / predication is a god that is ineffable. Only silence is adequate. ii. A god that transcends reason / explicability is a god that is inexplicable. Only mystery is definite. iii. A god that transcends being / all conditions-relations is a god that is unconditional-nonrelational. "Existence & nonexistence" is indiscernible. Only non-being is necessary. Even if the first two transcendent-aspects of god are only functions of our cognitive limitations, the third cannot merely be a human affectation, otherwise god would only transcend us as "superhuman" instead of, in the greatest sense, as "supernatural", and thus not be (ultimately) transcendent. Is a god that is "not transcendent" in a metaphysical (i.e. ultimate) sense "a god"? None of the great world-religions worship – or their respective theological traditions profess – "non-transcendent gods". Even where Christianity tries to have it both ways by suggesting that its god is "both transcendent and immanent", it’s the transcendent aspect of the Christian god that is the independent variable -- prior to the world it allegedly "created" and within which it’s also "immanent" -- that determines god’s ultimate status. It’s not my point that the concept of "transcendence" is incoherent, or self-contradictory, only that it entails non-being when attributed as a property that nullifies whatever determines the difference between what is & what is not the case, existence & nonexistence. Therefore: I. If god is transcendent, then god is (a) non-being. It does not exist. II. If god is "transcendent and immanent", and if transcendence determines, or is prior to, immanence (as it is prior to the allegedly "created world" in which god is "immanent"), then god is (a) non-being. It does not exist. III. If god is "not transcendent", then god is not god, and therefore is (a) non-being. It does not exist. God does not exist. Consequently, insofar as "theism" presupposes a ‘transcendent god’ it is incoherent, and any arguments premised on "theism" will be unsound.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

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Posted 04/19/09 - 12:48 AM:	#3
I want to begin by thanking Philosophy Forums, its moderators and administrators, and especially 180 Proof for joining me. A Modal Cosmological Argument Peter van Inwagen has developed an intriguing objection to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). What he states is something like this: "If X is the set of all contingent states of affairs, then X cannot be explained by something necessary. For, what is necessary will necessarily entail its explicandum, which means that X is actually necessary. This is a contradiction; therefore, the PSR is false." I'd like to assume for the sake of argument that he is correct. Can a sound modal cosmological argument (MCA) still be developed? Here's my attempt: 1. It is possible that a necessary being explains the contingent universe. 2. If something is possibly necessary, then it exists in all possible worlds. 3. Whatever exists in all possible worlds exists in the real world. 4. Therefore, a necessary being exists in the real world. This argument avoids van Inwagen's objection, since we're no longer talking about states of affairs, but simply concrete "things" (re: "beings") in general. For example, then, there is a difference between what a thing is and what it does. It is possible that Jones is sitting under a tree, and it is also possible that Jones is not sitting under a tree. Regardless of which is true, Jones is still Jones. Applied specifically to the argument, therefore, a necessary being could exist without entailing some particular state of affairs. As Craig summarizes (emphasis in original): "[The PSR] merely requires any existing thing to have an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in some external cause. This premise is compatible with there being brute facts or states of affairs about the world. What it precludes is that there could exist things - substances exemplifying properties - which just exist inexplicably." [1] Hence, I don't believe there is any contradiction in the notion of a necessary being. The other possible objection for the skeptic is to deny the S5 axiom on which (2) is dependent. The S5 axiom basically states that, "if p is possibly necessary, then p is necessary," or, "◊□p --> □p." However, this axiom is fairly easy to defend. Its contrapositive is this: "~□p --> ~◊□p." In other words, if something is not necessary, then it's not possibly necessary. Davis puts it this way: "if p is not necessarily true, then it is not possible that p be necessarily true." [2] Given the equivalence of "~□p --> ~◊□p" with "◊□p --> □p," and the obvious truth of the former, it follows logically and inescapably that the latter is also true. As a result, there is seemingly no tenable objection to the S5 axiom. Now, since (3) follows from (2), and the real world is contained in the class of all possible worlds, it follows that (4) is correct and that a necessary being exists. Moving on, there are certain attributes that can be analytically inferred about this necessary being. Given that it explains the universe, it must transcend the universe. Hence, it must be timeless, changeless, and immaterial. It must also be enormously powerful; and finally, it must also be personal. The reason why is that explanations are either personal or scientific. Yet, scientific explanations are part of the explicandum, meaning this necessary being is explaining what is scientifically explicable. On this basis, science is contained within the set of things being explained, and cannot therefore exist outside of this set. Ergo, the necessary being that explains the universe must be personal. This necessary and personal being we call God. Kant's Practical Axiological Argument 1. Moral behavior is rational. 2. Moral behavior is rational if and only if justice will be done. 3. Justice will be done if and only if God exists. 4. Therefore, God exists. Briefly, if God does not exist, then justice will not be done. Many good people will die miserably, and many bad people will die in comfort; and, we will all have the same destiny. This would make moral behavior irrational. Yet, moral behavior is not irrational. Therefore, we have solid practical grounds for believing in God and an afterlife. Works Cited [1] William Lane Craig, "The Cosmological Argument," in The Rationality of Theism, edited by Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser, Routledge Press, 2003, p. 115. [2] Stephen T. Davis, "The Ontological Argument," ibid., p. 107.

180 Proof
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Posted 04/20/09 - 11:44 PM:	#4
My opponent’s weaker argument claims, in effect, that "god exists" in order to account for "justice" which in turn guarantees the rationality of "moral behavior", the implication being that without god there can be "no justice" rendering "moral behavior" irrational. First, "justice" is a legal standard and not a moral goal. Unlike law, morality is not enforceable by external constraints on "behavior" but is internal to agency as rationality (i.e. means applied to ends that satisfy shared interests). Second, even if "justice" is the goal of "moral behavior", failure to attain it (due to godlessness or incompetence) does not render "moral behavior" irrational (i.e. means applied to ends that jeopardize or deny shared interests). It simply does not follow from an unattainable goal that its undertaking is necessarily irrational. And third, without a sufficient explanation of god, or the "afterlife" – both being inexplicable – nothing (let alone "justice") can be intelligibly accounted for by them. The stronger, more philosophical, argument that a "necessary being" "explains the universe" which implies that "it must transcend the universe … must be timeless, changeless, immaterial … enormously powerful and personal" and that this "necessary and personal being" is god. "Necessary being." Let’s stipulate that the Modal Cosmological Argument is valid; it is, however, clearly not sound. By this I mean it’s proof of a concept not of a fact. Facts do not obtain, after all, by defining them into existence; they must be ostensibly determined (directly or indirectly). The MCA simply does not employ a single true, factual premise. "Explain the universe." Whatever can count as an explanation must be explainable (even if only in principle). "Necessary being" is a modal construct, its sole content or property being "necessity" which indicates only the role it plays in the formalism (e.g. modal logic). Again, this construct does not correspond to any ostensible, determinate fact or object, and its non-referent cannot explain anything. Furthermore, it’s a gross misuse of the word "explain" even to suggest that a less known quantity (e.g. origin of the universe) can be accounted for by a lesser known, or unknown, or unknowable quantity (e.g. god). "Transcend the universe." As I’ve argued above, to "transcend the universe" implies an object consisting in no conditions, with no relations to any other objects, "beyond" any determinable distinction between existing & not existing and therefore is neither "a being" nor "being qua being". The other attributes are ad hoc anthropomorphic projections ... Thoughtful presentation notwithstanding, my opponent evidently argues from a position already held based on "faith" – why else trot out Kant’s "practical piety" or casually garnish a deistic construct with garden-variety theistic conceits – in a rational debate tasked with arguing towards the most reasonable answer to the question at hand. Our question, after all, is a question of fact, and where god is conceived of as "transcendent" – as we both seem to agree – the task is it determine, so to speak, whether or not the set of "transcendent facts" is empty.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

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Posted 04/21/09 - 05:25 PM:	#5
Thanks to 180 Proof for his opening statement. In this debate, I'm defending two major contentions: 1) that there is no good reason to believe in atheism; and 2) there are good reasons to believe in theism. I've offered two arguments in favor of that second contention, which 180 Proof has addressed in his rebuttal. For now, I will simply examine why he believes that atheism is true. My counterpart has not raised what are often considered the “classical” atheistic arguments, like the problem of evil. Instead, he has limited his approach primarily to denying that the very concept of God is even coherent. At the beginning of his opening statement, 180 Proof points to the chaos of the universe as inductive evidence against God. However, this can be countered by simply noting that even chaos is intelligible; and since intelligibility presupposes order, we may justifiably conclude that there is order even behind elements of chaos. This is exactly what we would expect if God exists. So, it turns out that if our general experience of the world entails inductive evidence for anything, it is for theism, and not for atheism. After this, my opponent turns to his main argument in favor of atheism: that God's transcendence implies His non-existence. He says that God transcends language, reason, and being, and that as a result God is ineffable, inexplicable, and non-relational. Basically, then, if God is “beyond” being, then God must be non-existent, since only beings exist. What is important to notice about 180 Proof's argument, however, is that it rests on an equivocation of the term “transcendent.” The Encarta Dictionary defines “transcendent” in four different ways, two of which are relevant to this debate: beyond limits of experience: in Kant's philosophical system, exceeding the limits of experience and therefore unknowable except hypothetically independent of world: existing outside the material universe and so not limited by it [1] What my counterpart has in mind is something, but not exactly, like the first definition. Indeed, if God were beyond being in the sense that He is neither being nor non-being, then the very notion of God would be unintelligible, and thus incoherent. While I admit that some theists may understand God's transcendence in this way, that is not what classical theists, such as myself, have meant by God's transcendence. Theists prefer the second definition, where God is knowable, at least to a degree, but exists beyond the material universe. In other words, God is immaterial, indivisible, simple, bodiless, and so forth. None of these attributes have been shown to be incoherent, so I will wait until my opponent offers solid proof that they are. In sum, I believe that 180 Proof's argument boils down to a straw man objection to theism. If he is going to argue that atheism is true, then he will need to address the claims that theists actually make. Works Cited [1] http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861721408/transcendent.html

180 Proof
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Posted 04/22/09 - 01:55 AM:	#6
I do not understand my counterpart’s rebuttal. He claims that my argument denies that the "concept of god" is coherent. He then claims that I offer "inductive evidence against god" in the form of pointing "to the chaos of the universe". And lastly he makes the charge that I use the term "transcendent" in different (i.e. misleading) ways throughout my argument. A careful reading of my argument, I think, suffices to dispel the confusions my opponent prefers to raise in lieu of answering my rebuttal to what he calls "goods reasons to believe in theism." My argument does not address "god the concept" but rather transcendence as a property (specifically) in an ultimate, or metaphysical, sense. To the extent there are various uses made of this term, I take note of their different contexts, or users, but focus my argument on the metaphysical aspect since that’s the one entailed by "god as creator" (i.e. separate / prior to "creation" aka being). And nowhere do I make evidentiary claims "against god"; instead, only a prima facie aside is made suggesting that "agnosticism" is incoherent. I want any "presumption of agnosticism" eliminated in order to focus the task at hand on seeking a clear, unambiguous answer to "Does god exist?" Also, since I’ve not made a case against "theism" (i.e. belief in god), my opponent’s charge of "strawman" is conspicuously non sequitur. The case I’m making is for a negative answer to the question above. I can only hope that a rational "theist" would relieve him or herself of "belief in god" once he or she has been shown that god does not exist. Of course, there are "non-realist" approaches to god … (vide Don Cupitt et al) What we have before us is a question of fact that cannot be answered by formal proofs. If god is transcendent, even in the sense that my counterpart accepts "beyond the material universe", then such a god cannot be a fact insofar as its existence & nonexistence are indiscernible in the absence of conditions, relations, etc (that necessarily belong to the universe) which god transcends. *Whatever allegedly "transcends the universe" in no way "exists" within (or vis-à-vis) the universe in any factual* sense.**
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

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Posted 04/22/09 - 01:50 PM:	#7
You will recall from my opening statement that I presented two arguments that I believe support the claim that God exists: 1) the modal cosmological argument; and 2) a practical axiological argument. In this post, I'd like to respond to some of my worthy counterpart's objections. The Modal Cosmological Argument 180 Proof grants that the MCA is logically valid, but he believes its premises are false. He states that we cannot merely define things into existence. I agree with this, but the MCA does no such thing. His standard for what counts as “ostensibly determined” is vague; no criteria are offered for what might constitute such determination. Moreover, I gave reasons in support of each of the premises, which have yet to be dealt with. Next, my opponent claims that necessity in modality is applicable only to formal logic. However, this is an objection from incredulity. Why should we believe that what is demonstrable in modal logic has no correspondence with reality? If this were so, then we wouldn't be able to make even the most uncontroversial claims, like, “It is possible that Jones is sitting under a tree.” Moreover, if my opponent were correct, then it would undercut his own argument against God's existence. For, if modality doesn't correspond to the real world, then his claims about the necessity of his verificationism and God's non-existence can be equally dismissed. Finally, 180 Proof objects that God's transcendence makes "God" incoherent. I have already addressed this in my first rebuttal, so we can touch upon the final objection to the MCA. My opponent's claim that the attributes of God are anthropomorphic projections is left without support. If he is going to deny the necessary being's personality, then the argument I offered must be specifically addressed. Kant's Practical Axiological Argument 180 Proof offers three objections to the moral argument. First, he says that justice is a legal term, and not a moral goal. On this point, I believe he is simply mistaken. Regardless of whether justice is exacted in a court of law, our moral experience points to a desire to see people treated fairly. Next, my opponent rejects the premise that states that moral behavior is rational if and only if justice will be done. He merely says that this conclusion doesn't follow. However, consider the consequences if justice will not be done. If this were the case, then in the long run it makes no difference whether one lives morally. The person who is honest, loving, and selfless is no better off than the person who lies, hates, and cares only for himself. What inclination could one possibly have to live morally if there will be no justice? Finally, 180 Proof maintains that concepts like God and an afterlife are inexplicable. Based on my counter-arguments, I believe that any appeal to transcendence that would support my opponent's claim ultimately falls short.

180 Proof
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Posted 04/22/09 - 02:22 PM:	#8
In closing, I'd like to begin by thanking SnoopDoug for engaging me in this debate. My summation consists in these points: Considering the failure of the "Modal Cosmological Argument" for being unsound due to the lack of factually true premises (not that they’re "false") and the "Practical Axiological Argument" for being premised on the incoherent notion that behavior can only be "rational" on grounds external both to behavior & being alive, sufficient reasons "for god" are very much lacking. Furthermore, given the failure to demonstrate that "transcending the universe" -- as we both agree god must (if it is traditionally & properly god) -- does not entail "the indiscernibility of existing & not existing", the argument -- that essentially a ‘transcendent god’ is no more of a fact than is a ‘five-sided triangle’ -- remains, up to now, unrefuted. The last word, however, is yet to be given, so we shall see. Thanks, lastly, to Paul for moderating (as well as providing this forum), and to the members who've taken some interest in this debate. I look forward to reading (and being skewered on) the corresponding debate discussion thread(s) after SnoopDoug has posted his closing remarks. ===================================== Errata for my posts above: (Post-1/paragraph-2/line 6-7) Thus, "agnosticism" is not a coherent position since the "god or no god" options are not equipollent. (Post-1/paragraph-4/line 7) And the prophets preach that god transcends being... (Post-1/paragraph-5/section iii) Only non-being is possible. (Post-2/paragraph-3/line 1) The stronger, more philosophical, argument is that a "necessary being"... 　 Edited by 180 Proof on 04/23/09 - 03:58 PM. Reason: code weirdness + grammar
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

SnoopDoug

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Posted 04/24/09 - 03:01 PM:	#9
In my closing statement, I'd like to again thank Paul, our moderator par excellence, as well as 180 Proof and those continuing the conversation in the Debate Discussion forum. God's Transcendence? My opponent maintains that God's transcendence is indicative of His non-existence. My response that 180 Proof equivocates his use of “transcendence” I believe has gone unsuccessfully addressed. He contends that God is beyond what can be considered “factual,” and so it must be the case that God does not exist. I find 180 Proof's criteria for what constitutes something as factual dubious at best, and virtually non-existent! The only conclusion I can draw from his criteria is that something must be capable of being empirically verified. The problem with this is that such a starting point is itself incapable of empirical verification, which would make his criteria self-contradictory. Theism Undefeated I have offered two arguments that support the conclusion that God exists. I've pointed out that modality is a very important element of any truth-claim, and that a dismissal of it with respect to the MCA is unwarranted. The support I've offered in favor of the practical axiological argument has likewise consisted of little response from my counterpart. Given the failure of 180 Proof's a priori reason for rejecting the argument, one must deal specifically with the soundness of the premises. We've seen that each of the premises still stands, so I believe we are within our epistemic rights to conclude that God exists.

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