Debate 6 Discussion: Whether Truth Exists in a Deterministic Universe: Philosophy Forums

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Debate 6 Discussion: Whether Truth Exists in a Deterministic Universe

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Debate 6 Discussion: Whether Truth Exists in a Deterministic Universe

dreamweaver
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 12/09/04 - 07:20 AM:	#11
AKG wrote: Whether beliefs can be forced is a good question. It is something I would be willing to deny for the sake of debate, i.e. if it weren't the key issue, but I'm not sure. I can't see any reason why it can't be forced. In fact, I have a hard time believing that all beliefs are chosen. The thing with determinism here is that we have to forget that there is "I". So many things are abandoned; we say beliefs still exist in a deterministic world. Then what credibility would it have? As Mariner notes, what credibility would one belief have over the other if they're both determined by blind causation? I used an example in debate not so long ago, so might as well use it again here. The movement of the wind is, generally, a good example of blind causation. Now, let's say that we have an arrow, and it points to a different direction, depending on which way the wind is blowing. Ok, now let's set up a question, it'll be "What is my name?" If it points north, then my name is Francis; south: John; west: Jim; east: sicnarF. Trusting your beliefs, when they're determined by blind causation is like trusting the wind to land on the right direction; or rather, that the direction it lands on is the right one. But of course, in our everyday lives, the probability of it being "right" is generally much, much lower. Would be interested in hearing what you make of the argument. AKG wrote: I can see that beliefs based on brainwashing are different from other types of beliefs, but do we really say that they aren't beliefs? Perhaps. Take a brainwashed person. Well, let's say that you were brainwashed, and you were made to say a few things. Would you trust those things that you are saying to be true? This example isn't as good as the previous one, since it's an agent forcing the decision, but still. That doesn't defeat the argument for determinism. That might suggest that it is impossible to "believe" in determinism, but that doesn't mean that the evidence supporting it doesn't exist, or that the inferences made were not reasonable. Sure; there can still be evidence for it, but it will still be refuted. Logic trumps science, particularly in this case. If no-one can believe that determinism is true, then we should abandon all talk of it being true. We'd be uttering a contradiction.
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Posted 12/09/04 - 11:27 AM:	#12
dreamweaver wrote: The thing with determinism here is that we have to forget that there is "I". So many things are abandoned; we say beliefs still exist in a deterministic world. Then what credibility would it have? As Mariner notes, what credibility would one belief have over the other if they're both determined by blind causation? The same credibility it would have otherwise. What credibility does one belief have over another if one of them is chosen? I don't see how choice or causation affect credibility. I used an example in debate not so long ago, so might as well use it again here. The movement of the wind is, generally, a good example of blind causation. Now, let's say that we have an arrow, and it points to a different direction, depending on which way the wind is blowing. Ok, now let's set up a question, it'll be "What is my name?" If it points north, then my name is Francis; south: John; west: Jim; east: sicnarF. Trusting your beliefs, when they're determined by blind causation is like trusting the wind to land on the right direction; or rather, that the direction it lands on is the right one. But of course, in our everyday lives, the probability of it being "right" is generally much, much lower. Would be interested in hearing what you make of the argument. When you determine 5+3 in your head, do you choose the answer, or compute it? If given a choice of 10 numbers, would it simply be a matter of choice, or does your brain perform a deterministic computation? If I had to people, one who claimed that he would choose the answer, and another who claimed that he would compute the answer in a manner that has nothing to do with his free will (where does your will come into play when adding 5 + 3? Do you (consciously) choose what "5" means, or do you consciously choose how to add?), I will trust the person who plans on computing it with his brain. If the movement of the wind counts as a deterministic process, showing the unreliability of determinism, then let's choose a really stupid person, and use him to demonstrate the lack of reliability of choice. Just because a process is determined doesn't mean that it can't be right, and, moreover it doesn't mean that it's not trustworthy. When presented with determinism or non-determinism, how do you determine which one is better? You choose the one with the best supporting argument. Now, do you blindly choose, or is there some criteria you base your choice one? And do you choose that criteria, and if so, what criteria do you use to choose that criteria, etc... Eventually, unless you want to fall into infinite regress, you will have to see that we must start with some unchosen criteria, since every choice must have a criteria to be considered a choice (otherwise it would be no different than a random event) but not every criteria must be chosen (some can be forced). Anyhow, we don't even need to go that far. Whatever criteria you use to determine whether determinism or non-determinism is better, let's assume we can program that into a deterministic machine. You might argue that you are free to go against your criteria, but that's misleading. If you change the criteria, you do it for a reason, and whatever those reasons are will be programmed into the machine. We can continue going back and back, but let us decide to set some criteria as given. Based on that, a deterministic machine will choose the same way you will. Now, if we aren't there to program it, can a deterministic machine ever develop the same criteria as you? Of course. We can say how we know this in general, and also how it might be done in real life. In real life, this would be done through human evolution, social progress, and individual human development. We can model these things as causal phenomena without requiring free choice. We can also say why we know this in general, and I've already done so. The initial criteria is not freely chosen, so whatever reason that initial criteria led to you (whether it be part of the nature of mind, or whether it was a spontaneous random thing, or both, whatever), let that criteria be in a determinstic being. That criteria will lead to choices, including choices of more criteria, and those new criteria will lead to more chocies again, etc, etc. This things will develop into something no different from you given that his basis for choices evolve in the same deterministic ways yours must have, and that the external stimulus all occurs the same way, since we might assume the rest of the world to be deterministic. Sure; there can still be evidence for it, but it will still be refuted. Logic trumps science, particularly in this case. If no-one can believe that determinism is true, then we should abandon all talk of it being true. We'd be uttering a contradiction. I had "believe" in quotation marks for a reason. Mariner has essentially stated that beliefs must be freely chosen. I disagree. However, if that were the case, then it would make sense to say that determinism cannot be believed, but in fact it really can be believed, it might simply be believed in a different sense than the sense in which free beings believe.
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Posted 12/09/04 - 12:40 PM:	#13
AKG wrote: When you determine 5+3 in your head, do you choose the answer, or compute it? If given a choice of 10 numbers, would it simply be a matter of choice, or does your brain perform a deterministic computation? I compute it -- there's the key (I chose to compute it; they're not mutually exclusive). In a deterministic universe, I don't do anything. As has been said, free will isn't necessarily the belief that we could have chosen otherwise, it's that we chose. If we gave a computer an algorithm, we could make it bring out the truth, but then again, we're the ones imposing the truth. I can, equally, write you a program that will deliver "6" when you put in 1 + 3. If the movement of the wind counts as a deterministic process, showing the unreliability of determinism, then let's choose a really stupid person, and use him to demonstrate the lack of reliability of choice. We're doing the same thing here as last time. Determinism here is in question, and you're attacking free-will. Why don't we see where determinism leads us, then we can get to free will? When presented with determinism or non-determinism, how do you determine which one is better? You choose the one with the best supporting argument. Sure; but firstly I'd rather see if there are contradictions in either system; since determinism is in question here, we're seeing if there's any contradiction here. Furthermore, if a contradiction is found, it doesn't matter how much empirical evidence you show. For 2 + 3, we use reason/logic, and of course -- truth. But again, taking the example of the wind, putting different equations at each pole and simply hoping it to land on the right answer would be trusting any thoughts of determinism. You have yet to show why it would not be trustworthy -- as I see it, the example still stands. Hoping for truth in determinism is "chasing for the wind".
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Posted 12/09/04 - 02:35 PM:	#14
dreamweaver wrote: I compute it -- there's the key (I chose to compute it; they're not mutually exclusive). In a deterministic universe, I don't do anything. As has been said, free will isn't necessarily the belief that we could have chosen otherwise, it's that we chose. If we gave a computer an algorithm, we could make it bring out the truth, but then again, we're the ones imposing the truth. I can, equally, write you a program that will deliver "6" when you put in 1 + 3. But is your choice to compute it free? And does the fact that you choose to compute it make your more reliable than a computer that is forced to compute what I tell it to compute? The fact that you choose to compute 3 + 5 doesn't mean you're reliable. Also, I am not stating that there are no choices, but are there free choices? What would it mean for a choice to be "free"? I find it to be inherently contradictory. We're doing the same thing here as last time. Determinism here is in question, and you're attacking free-will. Why don't we see where determinism leads us, then we can get to free will? I'm showing your argument to be irrelevant by showing that when applied to free will, if your argument were relevant, it would render free will untrustworthy. No, I can't trust the wind, what's the relevance? I can't trust a stupid choice either, but what's the relevance? You're not showing deterministic processes to be untrustworthy. You're showing the wind to be untrustworthy. Sure; but firstly I'd rather see if there are contradictions in either system; since determinism is in question here, we're seeing if there's any contradiction here. Furthermore, if a contradiction is found, it doesn't matter how much empirical evidence you show. My approach, I suppose, is that if you are to accept your argument to show a contradiction in determinism, it would show a contradiction in free will. It may be harder to express how the argument fails in relation to determinism, but can be shown by analogy to how it fails when applied to free will. It fails because it's irrelevant, which may seem more obvious when discussing free will, but it is irrelevant in both situations. For 2 + 3, we use reason/logic, and of course -- truth. But again, taking the example of the wind, putting different equations at each pole and simply hoping it to land on the right answer would be trusting any thoughts of determinism. You have yet to show why it would not be trustworthy -- as I see it, the example still stands. Hoping for truth in determinism is "chasing for the wind". Do you trust something because you choose it, or do you choose it because you trust it? If you trust something simply because you choose it, then why can one not trust something because it's determined. One response is determined the other is chosen. Up to this point, one is not more trustworthy than the other. Now, say you choose something because you trust it. Okay, but why do you trust it? Not because you choose it, we already went down that route. So you trust it for some other reason. Let that other reason be the reasons why a determinate being chooses something. Again, we have no problem. If you can arbitrarily stipulate that chosen things are inherently more trustworthy than determined things (and would have to show this is the case no matter who chooses it, and what their reasons are), then of course you can conclude that we should not trust determined beliefs, so if we believe in determinism, we would be contradicting ourselves. However, you cannot stipulate such a thing. Chosen things aren't inherently more trustworthy. Something else makes something trustworthy. If we had a list of criteria to determine if proposition P is trustworthy, "P was chosen" would not be on the list. As such, we can "program" this criteria into a determinate being, since choice is out of the picture, and he can still determine what is trustworthy.
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0 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 12/09/04 - 03:42 PM:	#15
AKG wrote: I can't trust a stupid choice either, but what's the relevance? You're not showing deterministic processes to be untrustworthy. You're showing the wind to be untrustworthy. And just what is the wind? Is it not a deterministic process? It surely is. There are no "different levels" of blind causation; they're all the same. The ones that would have led you to believe that you are male, and the ones controlling the wind are the same; all blind causation and all blindly moving atoms. That's why I use the example. What would it mean for a choice to be "free"? As the common definition of free-will, for one to make a choice unconstrained by external circumstances. Okay, but why do you trust it? Multiple reasons; but the primary reason is, of course, that we feel that if we really do have the choice, then we can [potentially] reason for ourselves; with determinism we cannot reason. We simply can't help feeling that what we perceive as reality really is reality, and what appears as free-will really is. We want to think for ourselves. As such, we can "program" this criteria into a determinate being, since choice is out of the picture, and he can still determine what is trustworthy. People have mentioned this before, and I really don't think such arguments -- of computers, calculators and what not -- are valid. Since we have determined the being, it doesn't "determine what's trustworthy". If you posited that, there would always be the hidden premise that "we determined it to determine what's trustworthy"; that is, we are actually saying what's trustworthy, and the computer is simply acting as a mouthpiece for that.
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Posted 12/09/04 - 03:57 PM:	#16
dreamweaver wrote: And just what is the wind? Is it not a deterministic process? It surely is. There are no "different levels" of blind causation; they're all the same. The ones that would have led you to believe that you are male, and the ones controlling the wind are the same; all blind causation and all blindly moving atoms. That's why I use the example. That's like saying that the evolution of insects is the same blind causation as the wind. The evolution of insects is a very complicated process with a very astonishing result (a living creature). The wind could not blow a pile of atoms together and make a cockroach. Some deterministic process are better at doing things than others. Multiple reasons; but the primary reason is, of course, that we feel that if we really do have the choice, then we can [potentially] reason for ourselves; with determinism we cannot reason. Sure, we can. Reasoning is coming to a conclusion that satisfies a number of conditions, conditions we deem to be reasonable. Logical conditions are reasonable by definition, we define them. We also decide what we feel to be "enough" evidence when doing an experiment. Is 100 examples enough? DO we need 1000? Why is one number better than another? What does choice have to do with any of it? We can still feel and reason, even if we do so for predetermined reasons. People have mentioned this before, and I really don't think such arguments -- of computers, calculators and what not -- are valid. Since we have determined the being, it doesn't "determine what's trustworthy". If you posited that, there would always be the hidden premise that "we determined it to determine what's trustworthy"; that is, we are actually saying what's trustworthy, and the computer is simply acting as a mouthpiece for that. That's not the point. We could say, rather, that a being evolves such that it holds the same criteria. Same thing, it doesn't have to be we who program the criteria into it.
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Posted 12/09/04 - 04:53 PM:	#17
Having just debated essentialy the same subject with Mariner. I have to give my vote to Socrastein for managing to say with clarity in his last two posts what I was trying to say in http://forums.philosophyforums.com/showthread.php?t=12467
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Posted 12/10/04 - 07:24 AM:	#18
Stop ruining my arguments, AKG. :P Maybe I'm really bad at arguing this version of the argument, or maybe you're right. Will have to wait to see what Mariner says. Though, I still hold that it is meaningless to speak of I, without grossly changing the definition. Such as, I = sum of cause and events that force me to do things. Though, interestingly enough, what do you make of its sister argument? Mariner wrote: Lack of free will = actions are forced by extrinsic factors Argument (discussion) presupposes the possibility of logical persuasion -- i.e., as long as we try to convince people (as opposed to forcing them), we are arguing. If your actions and mine are forced by extrinsic factors, then your post (and mine), being actions, were forced by extrinsic factors. If our posts are forced by extrinsic factors, then they can't be influenced by logical arguments. Therefore, if we lack free will, arguing is pointless. Yet, arguing is required to demonstrate this, so arguing can't be pointless. Which is a contradiction.
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Posted 12/10/04 - 03:48 PM:	#19
dreamweaver wrote: Stop ruining my arguments, AKG. :P Maybe I'm really bad at arguing this version of the argument, or maybe you're right. Will have to wait to see what Mariner says. Though, I still hold that it is meaningless to speak of I, without grossly changing the definition. Such as, I = sum of cause and events that force me to do things. Though, interestingly enough, what do you make of its sister argument? I think that's akin to saying that free will and omniscience can't co-exist. Just because God knows everything, including all your choices, it doesn't mean your choices aren't free. He knows the free choices you're going to make, that doesn't mean he forced them. Similarly, a forced argument is not irrational. If some being evolves to be a rational machine, then its arguments will be forced and rational.
"The only reason we die... is because we accept it as an inevitability." -- Stewie "To enslave nuance to dogma is folly." -- Lord Hillyer

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Posted 12/10/04 - 08:14 PM:	#20
Mariner makes the good point that a being must be aware for there to be meaning. If it is not aware, then it cannot know what it is saying, and although it may appear to mean something to you, that doesn't really mean that it has meaning. Unfortunately, he seems to make the faulty assumption that free will is required for awareness. Surely, the converse holds (that awareness is required for free will), but he appears to be fallaciously equivocating the two. Although Socrastein doesn't show that monkeys are aware, Mariner doesn't show that they aren't. Secondly, Mariner makes some argument seemingly related to logic, but as far as I can tell, it doesn't really have anything to do with logic, nor does it relate to the topic. He also goes on talking about deterministic propositions being self-referencing. If deterministic propositions are meaningless, they can't be self-referencing. They can't have any reference, otherwise they'd have some sort of meaning. I doubt he means that a deterministic propostion has meaning, and part of what it means refers to itself, but I can't figure out at all what it would mean for a deterministic proposition to be "self-referencing." He equates apples to deterministic propositions. How is an apple self-referencing? It appears that he is using the term "self-referencing" in a "metaphorical" sense, or, rather, he's got some idea of a flaw with deterministic propositions, and has labelled this flaw as "self-referencing", but this is confusing. If he does have a valid point, he certainly confuses (and as far as I can see, hides it altogether) it with his choice of words. I also think Socrastein accounts for falsehood (although I don't see why it was necessary). If Socrastein can show that statements have meaning, then if the meaning does not correspond to reality, it is false. I can't understand Mariner's request for an account for falsehood especially if it is meant to be distinct for his request for Socrastein to show the existence of meaning. Mariner continues to make arguments in the form of irrelevant, and difficult-to-understand requests: "it is true that my statement is the product of deterministic causation"; taking care to note that your explanation must account for the statement "it is not true that my statement is the product of deterministic causation". Your explanation must show how these two sentences can take place in a deterministic universe. I don't think this should be very difficult. It seems trivial, and, again, has nothing to do with the issue. Mariner asks how two deterministic beings can disagree given the same factual data. Again, irrelevant and trivial. Suppose we want to find the sum of two input numbers. One computer is programmed with an incorrect method of reasoning and another with the correct method. One will give the right answer, the other the wrong answer. If we say that deterministic beings come to conclusions by processing given data using some conclusion generating algorithm, one using principles of inference that conclude false propositions based on given data, and the other using principles of inference that conclude true propositions, then we can easily have disagreement. How can two machines have different principles of inference? Easy, why the heck would all deterministic beings have to be identical? Snowflakes aren't identical, they're shape is determined. How can we tell if a machine has principles that lead to true propositions? Well, if the propositions corresponds to reality, then it's true. In a free universe and a deterministic universe, the nature of the universe is not directly observable, so it would be hard for an individual to be certain that his conclusion is right (maybe), but that doesn't undermine the fact that truth can exist. Again, the only possible argument that can remain is that the propositions can never correspond to reality because they're devoid of meaning. But if monkeys are aware of what they're communicating, then I think we can say that deterministic propositions have meaning. In truth, how is Socrastein to show that a monkey is really aware of, what it really experiences? Now, I believe Mariner put a nice dent in Socrastein's argument. In DNA communication, we can identify the stimulus, encoding, transmission, etc. but we wouldn't claim that DNA asserts or denies anything, there are no propositions, no meaning. He shows that Socrastein has not shown meaning to exist in a determinist universe. On the other hand, Mariner has given no good reason to believe it doesn't. What choice and understanding have to do with anything, I can't imagine, and Mariner hasn't shown it. Mariner states: One must make an active effort to interpret words as the speaker wanted them to mean; this is not passive, and indeed it requires free will. Interpretation is an active process. Why does it require free will. This assertion above seems trivially false, but if it is true, there would need to be reasons for it. When I listen to someone talk to me, I'm not making choices and decisions. If I do, then I do so unconsciously, which would contradict the notion of "choice" itself, so that's certainly not the case. In fact, for the most part, when someone talks to you, you understand what they're saying in "real time." Do you take a bunch of words, temporarily meaningless, analyze them in your head and then decide what you'll interpret them to mean? The time between you hearing someone's speech and the time you know what they're saying does not leave any time for a conscious decision to have taken place. To me, it seems that the transition speech makes from sounds to meaningful thoughts is seamless and instantaneous, there is no decision required for me to interpret and understand. In the end, I think both guys did a good job. Both had some good, key arguments which kept the debate interesting throughout. However, I think if Mariner stuck to clarifying, developing, and pushing his key arguments, he would have fared better. Instead, he split his time between those arguments and other arguments which were sometimes unclear, confusing, irrelevant, or trivial. Despite that, I believe that since my thinking is much more in line with Socrastein's than with Mariner's, my inability to see the relevance or meaning of some of Mariner's points might be my fault, rather than his, so, if there were a vote between either of these two, I guess I'd have to vote Nader.
"The only reason we die... is because we accept it as an inevitability." -- Stewie "To enslave nuance to dogma is folly." -- Lord Hillyer

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